People vs. Jugueta, 788 SCRA 331, G.R. No. 202124 April 5, 2016
G.R. No. 202124. April 5, 2016.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IRENEO JUGUETA, accused-appellant.
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:
Synopsis:
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, Irenneo Jugueta was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder along with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel. However, Roger San Miguel moved for reinvestigation of the case and was eventually dismissed, leaving Irenneo as the only defendant. The prosecution's witness, Norberto, testified that Irenneo and the two other men entered his family's nipa hut and fired shots, causing the death of one daughter and injury to another. Irenneo offered a defense of denial and alibi, but this was found to be weak by the trial court, which ruled that Irenneo conspired with the two other men to shoot the family of Norberto. The trial court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The main issue raised in the appeal was the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, but these were deemed to be trivial and inconsequential. The court held that Irenneo can be held liable for 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder and that the trial court and CA failed to take into account dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.
FACTS:
In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, IRENEO JUGUETA, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder. Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to appellant.
Norberto, the witness, testified that the appellant and two other men, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, stripped the wall of his family's nipa hut in the evening of June 6, 2002. When the men entered the hut, Norberto saw their faces in the light of a gas lamp. The men ordered Norberto to come down, but he refused and begged for mercy, but the men fired shots, causing Norberto to protect his family. As a result of the attack, Norberto's two young daughters were wounded and his daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine died in the hospital. Norberto explained that the attack was prompted by a previous altercation with the appellant over a molestation case that Norberto filed against the appellant's two brothers.
On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he had been living for several years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that said house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.
Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto, the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto.
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA, but the latter affirmed the trial's court decison.
ISSUE:
(1) The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s children, affect the credibility of witnesses; - NO
(2) WON Appellant can be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively; - YES
(3) WON the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an ordinary, aggravating circumstance; - YES
HELD:
(1)
NO. Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan, "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime." Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People that:
Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial court in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x.
The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or exceptional circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of Norberto Divina identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the perpetrators of the crime.
(2)
YES. Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same.
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.
Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida, the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in Article 4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held in People v. Nelmida, "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime."
(3)
YES. the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
In People v. Agcanas, the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder. However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.
Doctrines:
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not recalibrate and reexamine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.
Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto’s daughters because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto’s family. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their concerted acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of all. Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together, each with his own firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired from appellant’s firearm that killed the children.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. The presence of any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder.
Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held in People v. Fallorina, 424 SCRA 655 (2004), the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.
As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v. People, 589 SCRA 489 (2009), the Court held:
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of:
(a) motive;(b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime;(c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim;(d) the manner the crime was committed; and(e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court thus quotes with approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder, viz.: In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by suddenly stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this case, he alone is liable for the crime committed.
The supposed inconsistencies in Norberto’s testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness’s credibility. An examination of Norberto’s testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan, 666 SCRA 174 (2012), “[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime.” Both the trial court and the CA found Norberto’s candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People, 713 SCRA 311 (2014).
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals, 21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al., 751 SCRA 675 (2015), thus: The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Noncompliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.
Since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9 of Rule 117 provides that “[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.”
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense. Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven during trial.
Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held in People v. Nelmida, 680 SCRA 386 (2012), “each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime.”
In People v. Agcanas, 658 SCRA 842 (2011), the Court stressed that “[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.” Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant violated the victims’ home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
For crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence pegs the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount of P100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at P100,000.00. “[T]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes x x x.”
When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender caused several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the maximum penalty shall be imposed, then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
If the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed due to RA No. 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages will be P100,000.00 each, and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 moral damages and P100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.
In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the crime was committed and proven during the trial. x x x As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA No. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be P100,000.00 and another P100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be P75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be P50,000.00, and an award of P25,000.00 civil indemnity and P25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the crime committed, in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder, the amount of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is P100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is P25,000.00 each.
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except the robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery with homicide, other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries become part of the crime, “Homicide,” in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms part of the essential element of robbery, which is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted stage.
In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be P50,000.00 and P50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded. However, an award of P50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an aggravating circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the information.
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. In this case, the Court now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate damages to P50,000.00.
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because the same only attaches if the following requisites are present:
(1) a first jeopardy has attached before the second;(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only:
(a) after a valid indictment;(b) before a competent court;(c) after arraignment;(d) when a valid plea has been entered; and(e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In this case, the case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be served by reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.
Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, among other things, of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim. (Guevarra vs. People, 715 SCRA 384 [2014])
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. (De Guzman, Jr. vs. People, 742 SCRA 501 [2014]) People vs. Jugueta, 788 SCRA 331, G.R. No. 202124 April 5, 2016)
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 30, 2012 in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole under RA No. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina and Claudine Divina the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prisión correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor, as maximum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 to each of the four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina.
(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate damages.
(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice, be FURNISHED a copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability of Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.
Appeal dismissed, judgment affirmed with modifications.