Leonen Cases and Doctrines (updated periodically)
1. Team Energy Corporation (formerly: Mirant Pagbilao Corporation and
Southern Energy Quezon, Inc.) vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 859
SCRA 1, March 14, 2018
Case Title : TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION (formerly: MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION
and SOUTHERN ENERGY QUEZON, INC.), petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc.
Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Value-Added Tax ; Value-Added Tax Invoice
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; To qualify its electricity sale to National Power
Corporation (NPC) as zero (0)-rated, Team Energy needs only to show that it is
a Value-Added Tax (VAT)-registered entity and that it has complied with the invoicing
requirements under Section 108(B)(3) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC), in conjunction with Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.-
—Here, considering that Team Energy’s refund claim is premised
on Section 108(B)(3) of the 1997 NIRC, in relation to NPC’s charter, the
requirements under the EPIRA are inapplicable. To qualify its electricity sale
to NPC as zero-rated, Team Energy needs only to show that it is a
VAT-registered entity and that it has complied with the invoicing requirements
under Section 108(B)(3) of the 1997 NIRC, in conjunction with Section 4.108-1
of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The text of the law is clear that resort to an appeal with
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) should be made within thirty (30) days either
from receipt of the decision denying the claim or the expiration of the one
hundred twenty (120)-day period given to the Commissioner to decide the claim.-
—The text of the law is clear that resort to an appeal with the
Court of Tax Appeals should be made within 30 days either from receipt of the
decision denying the claim or the expiration of the 120-day period given to the
Commissioner to decide the claim. It was in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422 (2010), where this Court
first pronounced that observance of the 120+30-day periods in Section 112(D) is
crucial in filing an appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals. This was further
emphasized in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,
690 SCRA 336 (2013), where this Court categorically held that compliance with
the 120+30-day periods under Section 112 of the 1997 NIRC is mandatory and
jurisdictional. Exempted from this are VAT refund cases that are prematurely
filed before the Court of Tax Appeals or before the lapse of the 120-day period
between December 10, 2003, when the BIR issued Ruling No. DA-489-03, and
October 6, 2010, when this Court promulgated Aichi.
3. Statutory Construction; Retroactivity of Laws; The Supreme Court (SC), in construing the law, merely
declares what a particular provision has always meant. It does not create new
legal obligations. The Supreme Court does not have the power to legislate.
Interpretations of law made by courts necessarily always have a “retroactive”
effect.-
—When Team Energy filed its refund claim in 2004, the 1997 NIRC
was already in effect, which clearly provided for: (a) 120 days for the
Commissioner to act on a taxpayer’s claim; and (b) 30 days for the taxpayer to
appeal either from the Commissioner’s decision or from the expiration of the
120-day period, in case of the Commissioner’s inaction. “Rules and regulations
[including Revenue Regulations No. 7-95] or parts [of them] which are contrary
to or inconsistent with [the NIRC] are . . . amended or modified accordingly.”
This Court, in construing the law, merely declares what a particular provision
has always meant. It does not create new legal obligations. This Court does not
have the power to legislate. Interpretations of law made by courts necessarily
always have a “retroactive” effect.
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The Commissioner’s inaction on Team Energy’s claim during
the one hundred twenty (120)-day period is “deemed a denial,” pursuant to
Section 7(a)(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 1125, as amended by Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 9282. Team Energy had thirty (30) days from the expiration of
the 120-day period to file its judicial claim with the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA). Its failure to do so rendered the Commissioner’s “deemed a denial”
decision as final and inappealable.-
—Since then, the 120+30-day periods have been applied to pending
cases, resulting in denial of taxpayers’ claims due to late filing. This Court
finds no reason to except this case. Further, the Commissioner’s inaction on
Team Energy’s claim during the 120-day period is “deemed a denial,” pursuant to
Section 7(a)(2) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 9282. Team Energy had 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period
to file its judicial claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. Its failure to do so
rendered the Commissioner’s “deemed a denial” decision as final and
inappealable. Team Energy’s contention that denial of its duly proven refund
claim would constitute unjust enrichment on the part of the government is
misplaced.
5. Taxation; Input VAT; A claim for input Value-Added Tax (VAT) refund or credit
is construed strictly against the taxpayer.-
—“Excess input tax is not an excessively, erroneously, or
illegally collected tax.” A claim for refund of this tax is in the nature of a
tax exemption, which is based on Sections 110(B) and 112(A) of 1997 NIRC,
allowing VAT-registered persons to recover the excess input taxes they have
paid in relation to their zero-rated sales. “The term ‘excess’ input VAT simply
means that the input VAT available as [refund] credit exceeds the output VAT,
not that the input VAT is excessively collected because it is more than what is
legally due.” Accordingly, claims for tax refund/credit of excess input tax are
governed not by Section 229 but only by Section 112 of the NIRC. A claim for
input VAT refund or credit is construed strictly against the taxpayer.
Accordingly, there must be strict compliance with the prescriptive periods and
substantive requirements set by law before a claim for tax refund or credit may
prosper. The mere fact that Team Energy has proved its excess input VAT does
not entitle it as a matter of right to a tax refund or credit. The 120+30-day
periods in Section 112 is not a mere procedural technicality that can be set
aside if the claim is otherwise meritorious. It is a mandatory and
jurisdictional condition imposed by law. Team Energy’s failure to comply with
the prescriptive periods is, thus, fatal to its claim.
6. Same; Tax Refunds; Claimants of tax refunds have the burden to prove their
entitlement to the claim under substantive law and the factual basis of their
claim.-
—Claimants of tax refunds have the burden to prove their
entitlement to the claim under substantive law and the factual basis of their
claim. Moreover, in claims for VAT refund/credit, applicants must satisfy the
substantiation and invoicing requirements under the NIRC and other implementing
rules and regulations. Under Section 110(A)(1) of the 1997 NIRC, creditable
input tax must be evidenced by a VAT invoice or official receipt, which must in
turn reflect the information required in Sections 113 and 237 of the Code.
7. Same; Value-Added Tax; Words and Phrases; Value-Added Tax (VAT) is a tax imposed on each sale of
goods or services in the course of trade or business, or importation of goods
“as they pass along the production and distribution chain.” It is an indirect
tax, which “may be shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee or ee of the
goods, properties or services.”-
—This Court reiterates that to claim a refund of unutilized or
excess input VAT, purchase of goods or properties must be supported by VAT
invoices, while purchase of services must be supported by VAT official
receipts. For context, VAT is a tax imposed on each sale of goods or services
in the course of trade or business, or importation of goods “as they pass along
the production and distribution chain.” It is an indirect tax, which “may be
shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee or ee of the goods, properties or
services.” The output tax due from VAT-registered sellers becomes the input tax
paid by VAT-registered purchasers on local purchase of goods or services, which
the latter in turn may credit against their output tax liabilities. On the
other hand, for a non-VAT purchaser, the VAT shifted forms part of the cost of
goods, properties, and services purchased, which may be deductible as an expense
for income tax purposes.
8. Same; Same; A Value-Added Tax (VAT)-registered entity is liable to
VAT, or the output tax at the rate of zero percent (0%) or ten percent (10%)
(now twelve percent [12%]) on the gross selling price of goods or gross receipts
realized from the sale of services.-
—Our VAT system is invoice-based, i.e., taxation relies on sales
invoices or official receipts. A VAT-registered entity is liable to VAT, or the
output tax at the rate of 0% or 10% (now 12%) on the gross selling price of
goods or gross receipts realized from the sale of services. Sections 106(D) and
108(C) of the Tax Code expressly provide that VAT is computed at 1/11 of the
total amount indicated in the invoice for sale of goods or official receipt for
sale of services. This tax shall also be recognized as input tax credit to the
purchaser of the goods or services.
9. Same; Same; Strict compliance with substantiation and invoicing
requirements is necessary considering Value-Added Tax’s (VAT’s) nature and VAT
system’s tax credit method, where tax payments are based on output and input
taxes and where the seller’s output tax becomes the buyer’s input tax that is
available as tax credit or refund in the same transaction.-
—Strict compliance with substantiation and invoicing
requirements is necessary considering VAT’s nature and VAT system’s tax credit
method, where tax payments are based on output and input taxes and where the
seller’s output tax becomes the buyer’s input tax that is available as tax
credit or refund in the same transaction. It ensures the proper collection of
taxes at all stages of distribution, facilitates computation of tax credits,
and provides accurate audit trail or evidence for BIR monitoring purposes. The
Court of Tax Appeals further pointed out that the noninterchangeability between
VAT official receipts and VAT invoices avoids having the government refund a
tax that was not even paid. It should be noted that the seller will only become
liable to pay the output VAT upon receipt of payment from the purchaser. If we
are to use sales invoice in the sale of services, an absurd situation will
arise when the purchaser of the service can claim tax credit representing input
VAT even before there is payment of the output VAT by the seller on the sale
pertaining to the same transaction. As a matter of fact[,] if the seller is not
paid on the transaction, the seller of service would legally not have to pay
output tax while the purchaser may legally claim input tax credit thereon. The
government ends up refunding a tax which has not been paid at all. Hence, to
avoid this, VAT official receipt for the sale of services is an absolute
requirement.
10. Same; Same; Value-Added Tax Invoice; Official Receipts; Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 42-03 expressly provides
that an “invoice is the supporting document for the claim of input tax on
purchase of goods whereas official receipt is the supporting document for the
claim of input tax on purchase of services.”-
—In conjunction with this rule, Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
42-03 expressly provides that an “invoice is the supporting document for the
claim of input tax on purchase of goods whereas official receipt is the
supporting document for the claim of input tax on purchase of services.” It
further states that a taxpayer’s failure to comply with the invoicing
requirements will result to the disallowance of the claim for input tax.
Pertinent portions of this circular provide: A-13: Failure by the supplier to
comply with the invoicing requirements on the documents supporting the sale of
goods and services will result to the disallowance of the claim for input tax
by the purchaser-claimant. If the claim for refund/[tax credit certificate] is
based on the existence of zero-rated sales by the taxpayer but it fails to
comply with the invoicing requirements in the issuance of sales invoices (e.g.,
failure to indicate the TIN), its claim for tax credit/refund of VAT on its
purchases shall be denied considering that the invoice it is issuing to its
customers does not depict its being a VAT-registered taxpayer whose sales are
classified as zero-rated sales. Nonethe, this treatment is without prejudice to
the right of the taxpayer to charge the input taxes to the appropriate expense
account or asset account subject to depreciation, whichever is applicable.
Moreover, the case shall be referred by the processing office to the concerned
BIR office for verification of other tax liabilities of the taxpayer.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 197663
Counsel:
Follosco, Morallos & Herce for Team Energy Corporation.
Ponente:
LEONEN J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The April 8, 2011 Decision
and July 7, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in C.T.A. E.B.
No. 603 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Citation Ref:
2. Ebuenga vs. Southfield Agencies, Inc., 859 SCRA
50, March 14, 2018
Case Title : ARIEL A. EBUENGA, petitioner, vs. SOUTHFIELD AGENCIES, INC.,
WILHEMSEN SHIP MANAGEMENT HOLDING, LTD., and CAPT. SONNY VALENCIA, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Work-related Illness/Injury ;
Syllabi:
1. Labor Law; Work-related Illness/Injury; To be “work-related” is to say that there is a “reasonable
linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work.”-
—To be “work-related” is to say that there is a “reasonable
linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work.” Section
32-A, paragraph 1 of the POEA-SEC, thus, requires the satisfaction of all of
its listed general conditions “[f]or an occupational disease and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable”: Section 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES For
an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) The
seafarer’s work must involve the risks described herein; (2) The disease was
contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks; (3)
The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other
factors necessary to contract it; (4) There was no notorious negligence on the
part of the seafarer.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; POEA-Standard Employment Contract; The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) mandates seafarers to see a company-designated
physician for a post-employment medical examination, which must be done within
three (3) working days from their arrival. Failure to comply shall result in
the forfeiture of the right to claim disability benefits.-
—Section 20(B) of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) established the
procedures for assessing claims for disability benefits. It mandates seafarers
to see a company-designated physician for a post-employment medical
examination, which must be done within three (3) working days from their
arrival. Failure to comply shall result in the forfeiture of the right to claim
disability benefits.
3. Same; Same; Same; The conduct of post-employment medical examination is not
a unilateral burden on the part of the seafarer. Rather, it is a reciprocal
obligation where the seafarer is obliged to submit to an examination within
three (3) working days from his or her arrival, and the employer is
correspondingly obliged “to conduct a meaningful and timely examination of the
seafarer.”-
—This Court has clarified that the conduct of post-employment
medical examination is not a unilateral burden on the part of the seafarer.
Rather, it is a reciprocal obligation where the seafarer is obliged to submit
to an examination within three (3) working days from his or her arrival, and
the employer is correspondingly obliged “to conduct a meaningful and timely
examination of the seafarer”: We note on this point that the obligation imposed
by the mandatory reporting requirement under Section 20(B)(3) of the 1996
POEA-SEC is not solely on the seafarer. It requires the employer to likewise act
on the report, and in this sense partakes of the nature of a reciprocal
obligation. Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause,
and where each party is effectively a debtor and a creditor of the other, such
that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. While
the mandatory reporting requirement obliges the seafarer to be present for the
post-employment medical examination, which must be conducted within three (3)
working days upon the seafarer’s return, it also poses the employer the implied
obligation to conduct a meaningful and timely examination of the seafarer. The
petitioners failed to perform their obligation of providing timely medical
examination, thus rendering meaning Serna’s compliance with the mandatory
reporting requirement. With his July 14, 1999 visit, Serna clearly lived up to
his end of the agreement; it was the petitioners who defaulted on theirs. They
cannot now be heard to claim that Serna should forfeit the right to claim
disability benefits under the POEA-SEC and their [Collective Bargaining
Agreement].
4. Same; Same; Same; In cases where the employer refuses to have the seafarer
examined, the seafarer’s claim for disability benefits is not hindered by his
or her reliance on a physician of his or her own choosing.-
—In cases where the employer refuses to have the seafarer
examined, the seafarer’s claim for disability benefits is not hindered by his
or her reliance on a physician of his or her own choosing: The Court has in the
past, under unique circumstances, sustained the award of disability benefits
even if the seafarer’s disability had been assessed by a personal physician. In
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, we affirmed the grant by the CA
and by the NLRC of disability benefits to a claimant, based on the
recommendation of a physician not designated by the employer. The “claimant
consulted a physician of his choice when the company-designated physician
refused to examine him.” In Cabuyoc v. Inter-Orient Navigation Shipmanagement,
Inc., we reinstated the NLRC’s decision, affirmatory of that of the labor
arbiter, which awarded sickness wages to the petitioner therein even if his
disability had been assessed by the Philippine General Hospital, not by a
company-designated hospital. Similar to the case at bar, the seafarer in
Cabuyoc initially sought medical assistance from the respondent employer but it
refused to extend him help.
5. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; A party who files a Rule 45 Petition and asserts that his
or her case warrants the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) review of factual questions
bears the burden of proving two (2) things. First is the basic exceptionality
of his or her case such that the Supreme Court must go out of its way to
revisit the evidence. Second is the specific factual conclusion that he or she
wants the Supreme Court to adopt in place of that which was made by the lower
tribunals.-
—It is true that there are exceptions to the rule that Petitions
for Review on Certiorari may only be concerned with pure questions of law. But
these exceptions are not occasioned by their mere invocation. A party who files
a Rule 45 Petition and asserts that his or her case warrants this Court’s
review of factual questions bears the burden of proving two (2) things. First
is the basic exceptionality of his or her case such that this Court must go out
of its way to revisit the evidence. Second is the specific factual conclusion
that he or she wants this Court to adopt in place of that which was made by the
lower tribunals. This dual burden requires a party to not merely plead or aver.
He or she must demonstrate and prove. His or her evidentiary task persists
before this Court precisely because he or she pleads this Court to sustain
different factual conclusions.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 208396
Counsel:
Rowena A. Martin for petitioner.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
assailed April 29, 2013 Decision and July 26, 2013 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 126939 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
3. La Consolacion College of Manila vs. Pascua, 859 SCRA
111, March 14, 2018
Case Title : LA CONSOLACION COLLEGE OF MANILA, SR. IMELDA A. MORA, OSA,
ALBERT D. MANALILI, and ALICIA MANABAT, petitioners, vs. VIRGINIA PASCUA, M.D.,
respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Retrenchment ;
Illegal Dismissal ; Backwages ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; La Consolacion’s prohibitive financial condition and
demonstrated, though imperfect, attempt at devising a reasonable mechanism for
retrenching employees impel the Supreme Court (SC) to temper its liability for
backwages.-
—La Consolacion’s prohibitive financial condition and
demonstrated, though imperfect, attempt at devising a reasonable mechanism for
retrenching employees impel this Court to temper its liability for backwages.
Accordingly, this Court upholds Labor Arbiter Roque’s order for respondent to
be reinstated, but modifies the amount of backwages. Respondent is deemed to be
employed on a part-time basis from the effective date of her wrongful
termination and is entitled to backwages corresponding to such status and
period.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Retrenchment; The Labor Code recognizes retrenchment as an authorized
cause for terminating employment. It is an option validly available to an
employer to address “losses in the operation of the enterprise, lack of work,
or considerable reduction on the volume of business.”-
—The Labor Code recognizes retrenchment as an authorized cause
for terminating employment. It is an option validly available to an employer to
address “losses in the operation of the enterprise, lack of work, or
considerable reduction on the volume of business”: Retrenchment is normally
resorted to by management during periods of business reverses and economic
difficulties occasioned by such events as recession, industrial depression, or
seasonal fluctuations. It is an act of the employer of reducing the work force
because of losses in the operation of the enterprise, lack of work, or
considerable reduction on the volume of business. Retrenchment is, in many
ways, a measure of last resort when other drastic means have been tried and found to be
inadequate.
3. Same; Same; Same; As to the substantive requisites, an employer must first
show “that the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent
business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but
substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably
imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer.”-
—As to the substantive requisites, an employer must first show
“that the retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business
losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial,
serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably imminent as
perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer.” Second, an employer
must also show “that [it] exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in
good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent
the employees’ right to security of tenure.” Third, an employer must
demonstrate “that [it] used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who
would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as
status (i.e., whether they are temporary, casual, regular or managerial
employees), efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial
hardship for certain workers.”
4. Same; Same; Same; Procedurally, employers must serve a “written notice both
to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least
one (1) month prior to the intended date of retrenchment.”-
—Procedurally, employers must serve a “written notice both to
the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month
prior to the intended date of retrenchment.” Likewise, they must pay “the
retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least 1/2
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.”
5. Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence requires that the necessity of retrenchment
to stave off genuine and significant business losses or reverses be
demonstrated by an employer’s independently audited financial statements.-
—Jurisprudence requires that the necessity of retrenchment to
stave off genuine and significant business losses or reverses be demonstrated
by an employer’s independently audited financial statements. Documents that
have not been the subject of an independent audit may very well be
self-serving. Moreover, it is not enough that it presents its audited financial
statement for the year that retrenchment was undertaken for even as it may be
incurring losses for that year, its overall financial status may already be
improving. Thus, it must “also show that its losses increased through a period
of time and that the condition of the company is not likely to improve in the
near future.”
6. Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) in Asia World Publishing House,
Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 (1987), considered seniority, along with efficiency
rating and -preferred status, as a crucial facet of a fair and reasonable
criterion for effecting retrenchment.-
—La Consolacion’s failure was noncompliance with the third
substantive requisite of using fair and reasonable criteria that considered the
status and seniority of the retrenched employee. As early as 1987, this Court
in Asia World Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 (1987), considered
seniority, along with efficiency rating and -preferred status, as a crucial
facet of a fair and reasonable criterion for effecting retrenchment. Emcor,
Inc. v. Sienes, 598 SCRA 619 (2009), was categorical, a “[r]etrenchment scheme
without taking seniority into account rendered the retrenchment invalid”:
Records do not show any criterion adopted or used by petitioner in dismissing
respondent. Respondent was terminated without considering her seniority.
Retrenchment scheme without taking seniority into account rendered the
retrenchment invalid. While respondent was the third most senior employee among
the 7 employees in petitioner’s personnel department, she was retrenched while
her other co-employees junior than her were either retained in the Personnel
Department or were transferred to other positions in the company. There was no
showing that respondent was offered to be transferred to other positions.
7. Same; Same; Same; Illegal Dismissal; La Consolacion’s pressing financial condition may invite
commiseration, but its flawed standard for retrenchment constrains the Supreme
Court (SC) to maintain that respondent was illegally dismissed.-
—Indeed, it may have made mathematical sense to dismiss the
highest paid employee first. However, appraising the propriety of retrenchment
is not merely a matter of enabling an employer to augment financial prospects.
It is as much a matter of giving employees their just due. Employees who have
earned their keep by demonstrating exemplary performance and securing roles in
their respective organizations cannot be summarily disregarded by nakedly
pecuniary considerations. The Labor Code’s permissiveness towards retrenchments
aims to strike a balance between legitimate management prerogatives and the
demands of social justice. Concern for the employer cannot mean a disregard for
employees who have shown not only their capacity, but even loyalty. La
Consolacion’s pressing financial condition may invite commiseration, but its
flawed standard for retrenchment constrains this Court to maintain that
respondent was illegally dismissed. Besides, La Consolacion could have also
modified respondent’s status from full-time to part-time. When retrenchment
becomes necessary, the employer may, in the exercise of its business judgment,
implement cost-saving measures, but at the same time, should respect labor
rights.
8. Same; Same; Same; Same; Backwages; In prior cases, the Supreme Court (SC) mitigated an
employer’s liability for backwages “where good faith is evident.”-
—While the impropriety of the termination of respondent’s employment
is settled, it is equally manifest that she “was not a victim of arbitrary and
high handed action.” Her dismissal was a result, not so much of purposeful
malevolence, but of a flawed appreciation of circumstances. La Consolacion was
contending with dire financial straits and wound up resorting to a monetarily
logical, though legally faulty, course of action. In prior cases, this Court
mitigated an employer’s liability for backwages “where good faith is evident.”
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 214744
Counsel:
Padilla Law Office for petitioners. Chaves, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is PARTIALLY
GRANTED with respect to the award of backwages and proportionate thirteenth
(13th) month pay. Labor Arbiter Luvina P. Roque’s January 8, 2013 Decision is
MODIFIED by awarding to respondent Virginia Pascua backwages corresponding to a
part-time physician, reckoned from October 30, 2011.
Citation Ref:
4. Eversely Childs Sanitarium vs. Barbarona, 860 SCRA
283, April 04, 2018
Case Title : EVERSLEY CHILDS SANITARIUM, represented by DR. GERARDO M.
AQUINO, JR. (now DR. PRIMO JOEL S. ALVEZ) CHIEF OF SANITARIUM, petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES ANASTACIO and PERLA BARBARONA, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Jurisdiction ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Considering that respondents filed the improper case
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), it had no jurisdiction over the case.
Any disposition made, therefore, was void.-
—Considering that respondents filed the improper case before the
Municipal Trial Court, it had no jurisdiction over the case. Any disposition
made, therefore, was void. The subsequent judgments of the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals, which proceeded from the void Municipal Trial Court
judgment, are likewise void.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; There is forum shopping when a party files different
pleadings in different tribunals, despite having the same “identit[ies] of
parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.”-
—There is forum shopping when a party files different pleadings
in different tribunals, despite having the same “identit[ies] of parties,
rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.” Consistent with the principle
of fair play, parties are prohibited from seeking the same relief in multiple
forums in the hope of obtaining a favorable judgment. The rule against forum
shopping likewise fulfills an administrative purpose as it prevents conflicting
decisions by different tribunals on the same issue.
3. Same; Same; Same; In filing complaints and other initiatory pleadings, the
plaintiff or petitioner is required to attach a certification against forum
shopping, certifying that (a) no other action or claim involving the same
issues has been filed or is pending in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial
agency, (b) if there is a pending action or claim, the party shall make a
complete statement of its present status, and (c) if the party should learn
that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, that he or she
will report it within five (5) days to the tribunal where the complaint or
initiatory pleading is pending.-
—In filing complaints and other initiatory pleadings, the
plaintiff or petitioner is required to attach a certification against forum
shopping, certifying that (a) no other action or claim involving the same
issues has been filed or is pending in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial
agency, (b) if there is a pending action or claim, the party shall make a
complete statement of its present status, and (c) if the party should learn
that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending, that he or she
will report it within five (5) days to the tribunal where the complaint or
initiatory pleading is pending.
4. Same; Same; Motions; A motion is not presumed to have already been acted upon
by its mere filing.-
—The Office of the Solicitor General, however, mistakenly
presumed that the mere filing of a motion to withdraw has the effect of
withdrawing the motion for reconsideration without having to await the action
of the Court of Appeals. The Office of the Solicitor General’s basis is its
reading of Rule VI, Section 15 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals: Section 15. Effect of Filing an Appeal in the Supreme Court.—No motion
for reconsideration or rehearing shall be acted upon if the movant has
previously filed in the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari or a
motion for extension of time to file such petition. If such petition or motion
is subsequently filed, the motion for reconsideration pending in this Court
shall be deemed abandoned. This would have been true had the Office of the
Solicitor General merely manifested that it had already considered its Motion
for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals as abandoned, pursuant to its
Internal Rules. However, it filed a Motion to Withdraw, effectively submitting
the withdrawal of its Motion for Reconsideration to the Court of Appeals’ sound
discretion. A motion is not presumed to have already been acted upon by its
mere filing. Prudence dictated that the Office of the Solicitor General await
the Court of Appeals’ action on its Motion to Withdraw before considering its
Motion for Reconsideration as withdrawn.
5. Same; Same; Same; Ordinarily, “a motion that is not acted upon in due time
is deemed denied.”-
—Ordinarily, “a motion that is not acted upon in due time is
deemed denied.” When the Court of Appeals denied the Office of the Solicitor
General’s Motion for Reconsideration without acting on its Motion to Withdraw,
the latter was effectively denied. Petitioner, thus, committed forum shopping
when it filed its Petition before this Court despite a pending Motion for
Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. To rule in this manner, however,
is to unnecessarily deprive petitioner of its day in court despite the Court of
Appeals’ failure to apply its own Internal Rules. The Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals clearly provide that a subsequent motion for reconsideration
shall be deemed abandoned if the movant filed a petition for review or motion
for extension of time to file a petition for review before this Court. While
the Office of the Solicitor General can be faulted for filing a motion instead
of a mere manifestation, it cannot be faulted for presuming that the Court of Appeals
would follow its Internal Rules as a matter of course.
6. Same; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; By its very nature, an ejectment case only resolves the
issue of who has the better right of possession over the property. The right of
possession in this instance refers to actual possession, not legal possession.-
—By its very nature, an ejectment case only resolves the issue
of who has the better right of possession over the property. The right of
possession in this instance refers to actual possession, not legal possession.
While a party may later be proven to have the legal right of possession by
virtue of ownership, he or she must still institute an ejectment case to be
able to dispossess an actual occupant of the property who refuses to vacate.
7. Same; Same; Same; Ownership; Possession; In ejectment cases, courts will only resolve the issue of
ownership provisionally if the issue of possession cannot be resolved without
passing upon it.+
8. Same; Same; Same; Same; Ejectment cases are not automatically decided in favor of
the party who presents proof of ownership.-
—In this instance, respondents anchor their right of possession
over the disputed property on TCT No. 53698 issued in their names. It is true
that a registered owner has a right of possession over the property as this is
one of the attributes of ownership. Ejectment cases, however, are not
automatically decided in favor of the party who presents proof of ownership,
thus: Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from
whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must
resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file,
he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against
respondents. Ejectment cases — forcible entry and unlawful detainer — are
summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only
question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled
to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto
and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title
to the property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will not
necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of
the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular
ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.
9. Actions; Three (3) Remedies Available to One Who Has Been
Dispossessed of Property.-
—There are three (3) remedies available to one who has been
dispossessed of property: (1) an action for ejectment to recover possession,
whether for unlawful detainer or forcible entry; (2) accion publiciana or
accion plenaria de posesion, or a plenary action to recover the right of
possession; and (3) accion reivindicatoria, or an action to recover ownership.
10. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by the
allegations stated in the complaint.-
—Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by the
allegations stated in the complaint. Respondents’ Complaint before the
Municipal Trial Court states: That [the occupants] are presently occupying the
above mentioned property of the [Spouses Barbarona] without color [of] right or
title. Such occupancy is purely by mere tolerance. Indeed, [the occupants’] occupying
the lot owned by [the Spouses Barbarona] is illegal and not anchored upon any
contractual relations with the [Spouses Barbarona]. Indeed, no mention has been
made as to how petitioner came to possess the property and as to what acts
constituted tolerance on the part of respondents or their
predecessors-in-interest to allow petitioner’s occupation.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 195814
Counsel:
Siu, Riñen & Associates for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 17, 2011
Decision and August 31, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 02762 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order
dated May 13, 2011 is made PERMANENT.
Citation Ref:
5. Republic vs. Malijan-Javier, 860 SCRA 443, April 04,
2018
Case Title : REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LAUREANA
MALIJAN-JAVIER and IDEN MALIJAN-JAVIER, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Land Registration ; DENR Secretary ; Land
Classification ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Absent the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable, the
land remains part of the public domain.-
—In this case, although respondents were able to present a CENRO
certification, a DENR-CENRO report with the testimony of the DENR officer who
made the report, and the survey plan showing that the property is already
considered alienable and disposable, these pieces of evidence are still not
sufficient to prove that the land sought to be registered is alienable and
disposable. Absent the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable
and disposable, the land remains part of the public domain. Thus, even if
respondents have shown, through their testimonial evidence, that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the property since June 12, 1945, they still
cannot register the land for failing to establish that the land is alienable
and disposable.
2. Civil Law; Land Registration; Property Registration Decree; Land registration is governed by Section 14 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree.-
—Land registration is governed by Section 14 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree, which states: Section 14.
Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws. (3) Those who have acquired
ownership of private lands or abandoned riverbeds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws. (4) Those who have acquired ownership of
land in many other manner provided for by law. Where the land is owned in
common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly. Where the land
has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application
for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the
period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration
proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro,
the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any
land held in trust by him, un prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.
3. Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; It is well-settled that a Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) certification is not enough to establish that a land
is alienable and disposable.-
—It is well-settled that a CENRO or PENRO certification is not
enough to establish that a land is alienable and disposable. It should be
“accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance
declaring the land alienable and disposable.”
4. Same; Same; DENR Secretary; Land Classification; The certification issued by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is necessary since he or she is the
official authorized to approve land classification, including the release of
land from public domain. As thoroughly explained in Republic v. Spouses Go, 834
SCRA 166 (2017).-
—The certification issued by the DENR Secretary is necessary
since he or she is the official authorized to approve land classification,
including the release of land from public domain. As thoroughly explained in
Republic v. Spouses Go, 834 SCRA 166 (2017): [A]n applicant has the burden of
proving that the public land has been classified as alienable and disposable.
To do this, the applicant must show a positive act from the government
declassifying the land from the public domain and converting it into an
alienable and disposable land. “[T]he exclusive prerogative to classify public
lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department.”
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 214367
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’
September 15, 2014 Decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 98466, which affirmed the May
5, 2011 Decision and December 9, 2011 Order of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Laureana Malijan-Javier and Iden
Malijan-Javier’s application for registration of Lot No. 1591, Cad. 729,
Talisay Cadastre is DENIED for lack of merit.
Citation Ref:
6. People vs. Conception, 860 SCRA 476, April 04, 2018
Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERNIE
CONCEPCION, accused-appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Slight Illegal Detention ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Slight Illegal Detention; Elements of.-
—The felony of slight illegal detention has four (4) elements:
1. That the offender is a private individual. 2. That he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any other manner deprives him of his liberty. 3. That the act of
kidnapping or detention is illegal. 4. That the crime is committed without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in Art. 267. The elements of
slight illegal detention are all present here. Accused-appellant is a private
individual. The Court of Appeals found that after raping AAA, accused-appellant
continued to detain her and to deprive her of her liberty. It also appreciated
AAA’s testimony that accused-appellant placed electrical wires around the room
to electrocute anyone who might attempt to enter it. He refused to release AAA
even after his supposed demands were met. The detention was illegal and not
attended by the circumstances that would render it serious illegal detention.
Thus, this Court finds accused-appellant guilty of the crime of slight illegal
detention.
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Credibility of Witnesses; Rape; In rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the
credibility of a victim’s testimony.-
—In rape cases, primordial consideration is given to the
credibility of a victim’s testimony. Here, AAA’s testimonies on both incidents
of rape are equally credible. Considering that the judge who examined AAA found
her a believable witness and considering further that there was nothing wanting
in AAA’s testimony on the second rape incident, for the same reasons outlined
by the Court of Appeals in its decision, this Court finds that the evidence was
sufficient to establish accused-appellant’s guilt of the second rape charge.
3. Criminal Law; Rape; Although the initial abduction of AAA may have been
absorbed by the crime of rape, the continued detention of AAA after the rape
cannot be deemed absorbed in it.-
—The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals show that after raping AAA, accused-appellant continued to detain her
and refused to release her even after raping her. Thus, although the initial
abduction of AAA may have been absorbed by the crime of rape, the continued
detention of AAA after the rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it. Likewise,
since the detention continued after the rape had been completed, it cannot be
deemed a necessary means for the crime of rape.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 214886
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney’s
Office for plaintiff-appellee.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Regional Trial
Court’s November 29, 2011 Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 2899, 2900, and 2901,
and the Court of Appeals’ March 28, 2014 Decision in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
05721 are hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: Accused-appellant
Bernie Concepcion is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
the crime of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua for each count. Accused-appellant Bernie Concepcion is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight illegal detention
under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from nine (9) years and four (4) months
of prisión mayor in its medium period as minimum to sixteen (16) years and five
(5) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum. The victim is
entitled to the following amounts, for each count of rape: P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages; and P75,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
Citation Ref:
7. Remoticado vs. Typical Construction Tradiong Corp., 862 SCRA
245, April 23, 2018
Case Title : RENANTE B. REMOTICADO, petitioner, vs. TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION
TRADING CORP. and ROMMEL M. ALIGNAY, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Quitclaims ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Quitclaims; Jurisprudence frowns upon waivers and quitclaims forced
upon employees.-
—Jurisprudence frowns upon waivers and quitclaims forced upon
employees. Waivers and quitclaims are, however, not invalid in themselves. When
shown to be freely executed, they validly discharge an employer from liability
to an employee. “[A] legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a
laborer’s claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the
parties.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.-
—It is basic that factual issues are improper in Rule 45
petitions. Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions
of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. The rule, however,
admits of exceptions. In Pascual v. Burgos, 778 SCRA 189 (2016): The Rules of
Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed
under Rule 45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain
questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are “final,
binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt” when supported
by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not be
reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court. However, these rules do admit
exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to these rules have expanded. At present,
there are 10 recognized exceptions that were first listed in Medina v. Mayor
Asistio, Jr.: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding
of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record. These exceptions similarly apply
in petitions for review filed before this court involving civil, labor, tax, or
criminal cases.
3. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals; There can be no illegal termination when there was no
termination.-
—It is true that in illegal termination cases, the burden is
upon the employer to prove that termination of employment was for a just cause.
Logic dictates, however, that the complaining employee must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of termination by the employer. If there is no
proof of termination by the employer, there is no point in even considering the
cause for it. There can be no illegal termination when there was no
termination: Before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the
dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence
the fact of his dismissal from service. If there is no dismissal, then there can
be no question as to the legality or illegality thereof.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 206529
Counsel:
Jose Sonny G. Matula for petitioner. Espinosa, Aldea-Espinosa & Associates
Law Offices for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
assailed November 29, 2012 Decision and March 26, 2013 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 124993 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
8. Department of Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARMPC)
vs. Diaz, 864 SCRA 112, June 04, 2018
Case Title : DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
(DARMPC), petitioner, vs. CARMENCITA DIAZ, represented by MARY CATHERINE M.
DIAZ; EMMA CABIGTING; and NINA T. SAMANIEGO,1 respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ;
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Period to Appeal;
Failure to file a petition for review on certiorari, or a motion for extension
to file it, within the period prescribed under Rule 45, Section 2 results in a
party’s loss of right to appeal.—Rule 45, Section 2 of the Rules of Court clearly
provides for the period within which a petition for review must be filed:
Section 2. Time for filing; extension.—The petition shall be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. On motion duly
filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme
Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only
within which to file the petition. x x x Failure to file a
petition for review on certiorari, or a motion for extension to file it,
within the period prescribed under Rule 45, Section 2 results in a party’s loss
of right to appeal. It is settled that appeal, being a mere statutory right,
must “be exercised in the manner and according to procedures laid down by law.”
Failure to file one’s appeal within the reglementary period is fatal to a
party’s cause, “precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over
the case.”
Same; Same; Same; “Equity aids the vigilant, not those who
slumber on their rights.”—Contrary to petitioner’s claim, its counsel’s
negligence is binding upon it. “[E]quity aids the vigilant, not those who
slumber on their rights.” Despite petitioner’s claim that the execution of the
Court of Appeals’ ruling would put its very existence at stake, it still made
no effort to assiduously monitor the status of
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
1 Spelled “Samanego” in the Petition for Review.
113
VOL. 864, JUNE 4, 2018
113
Department of Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARMPC)
vs. Diaz
its appeal or to ensure that the judgment would not be executed
against it. When petitioner failed to timely file its appeal by certiorari, the
Court of Appeals’ May 11, 2012 Decision and September 12, 2012 Resolution
became final and executory, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court: Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders.—Execution shall
issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes
of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
Same; Same; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; No
court, not even the Supreme Court (SC), may thereafter modify, alter, or let
alone reverse a final and immutable judgment. The only exceptions are the
correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to
the parties, and void judgments.—No court, not even this Court, may thereafter
modify, alter, or let alone reverse a final and immutable judgment. The only
exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries that
cause no prejudice to the parties, and void judgments. Even when there are
facts or circumstances that would render the execution of a final judgment
unjust and inequitable, it must be shown that they arose after the finality as
to warrant a court’s modification or alteration. As respondents point out, “all
litigation must come to an end, however unjust the result of error may appear.”
Department of Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARMPC) vs. Diaz, 864 SCRA
112, G.R. No. 206331 June 4, 2018
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 206331
Counsel:
Rivera, Tamaca & Loyola Law Offices for petitioner. James Dennis C. Gumpal
for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
Citation Ref:
9. Cancio vs. Performance Foreign Exchange Corporation, 864 SCRA
247, June 06, 2018
Case Title : BELINA CANCIO and JEREMY PAMPOLINA, petitioners, vs.
PERFORMANCE FOREIGN EXCHANGE CORPORATION, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Foreign Exchange Transactions ;
Dismissal of Actions; Failure to Attach Material Portions of the
Record; The failure to attach material portions of the record will not
necessarily cause the outright dismissal of the petition.—The failure to attach
material portions of the record will not necessarily cause the outright
dismissal of the petition. While Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
requires that the petition “be accompanied by . . . such material
portions of the record as would support the petition,” this Court may still
give due course if there is substantial compliance with the Rules. Rule 45, Section
7 states: Section 7. Pleadings and documents that may be required;
sanctions.—For purposes of determining whether the petition should be dismissed
or denied pursuant to section 5 of this Rule, or where the petition is given
due course under section 8 hereof, the Supreme Court may require or allow the
filing of such pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it may deem
necessary within such periods and under such conditions as it may consider
appropriate, and impose the corresponding
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
248
248
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cancio vs. Performance Foreign Exchange Corporation
sanctions in case of non-filing or unauthorized filing of such
pleadings and documents or noncompliance with the conditions therefor.
Questions of Fact; While questions of fact are generally not
entertained by the Supreme Court (SC), there are, of course, certain
permissible exceptions.—Appeal is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion. While questions of fact are generally not entertained by this
Court, there are, of course, certain permissible exceptions, summarized in
Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., 191 SCRA 218 (1990): (1) When the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures. . .
; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible. . . ; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion. . . ; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts. . . ; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting. . .
; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee. . . ; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court. . . ; (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based. . . ; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents. . .
; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
Same; Question of Law; Mixed Question of Fact and Law;
Negligence; The Supreme Court (SC) has previously stated that “[n]egligence,
that is, a failure to comply with some duty of care owed by one to another, is
a mixed question of law and fact.”—This Court has previously stated that
“[n]egligence, that is, a failure to comply with some duty of care owed by one
to another, is a mixed question of law and fact.” There is a question of law as
to the duty of care owed by a defendant to a plaintiff. The existence of
negligence, however, is determined by facts and evidence, which makes it a
question of fact. The review of a finding of negligence involves a question of
fact. It is evidentiary in nature. It requires an examination of the evidence
presented by the parties to determine the basis of this negligence. This Court
has likewise held that determination of the existence of a breach of contract
is a question of fact.
249
VOL. 864, JUNE 6, 2018
249
Cancio vs. Performance Foreign Exchange Corporation
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on
Certiorari; A petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
that assails the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) failure to find negligence or breach
of contract based on the evidence presented is essentially raising questions of
fact.—A petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that
assails the Court of Appeals’ failure to find negligence or breach of contract
based on the evidence presented is essentially raising questions of fact. This
Court will uphold the findings of the Court of Appeals un the case falls under
certain exceptions, which must first be properly pleaded and substantiated.
Otherwise, this Court must apply the general rule and deny the petition.
Civil Law; Agency; A principal who gives broad and unbridled
authorization to his or her agent cannot later hold third persons who relied on
that authorization liable for damages that may arise from the agent’s
fraudulent acts.—Even if this Court were to liberally review the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals, the Petition would still be denied. A principal
who gives broad and unbridled authorization to his or her agent cannot later
hold third persons who relied on that authorization liable for damages that may
arise from the agent’s fraudulent acts.
Same; Damages; Before a claimant can be entitled to damages,
“the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of
damages and its causal connection to defendant’s acts.”—Before a claimant can
be entitled to damages, “the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence
of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendant’s acts.”
The acts of petitioners’ agent, Hipol, were the direct cause of their injury.
There is no reason to hold respondent liable for actual and moral damages.
Since the basis for moral damages has not been established, there would
likewise be no basis to recover exemplary damages and attorney’s fees from
respondent. If there was any fault, the fault remains with petitioners’ agent
and him alone. The State has already taken notice of the high risks involved in
foreign exchange leverage trading. In the prior case of Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Performance Foreign Exchange Corporation, 495 SCRA 579 (2006),
the Securities and Exchange Commission tried to issue a cease-and-desist order
against respondent for trading foreign currency futures contracts without the
proper license.
250
250
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cancio vs. Performance Foreign Exchange Corporation
Foreign Exchange Transactions; It has been concluded that
foreign exchange leverage trading is known to be risky and may lead to
substantial losses for investors.—It has been concluded that foreign exchange
leverage trading is known to be risky and may lead to substantial losses for
investors. Petitioners, who were experienced in this kind of trading, should
have been more careful in the conduct of their affairs. Currency trading adds
no new good or service into the market that would be of use to real persons.
Instead, it has the tendency to alter the price of real goods and services to
the detriment of those who manufacture, labor, and consume products. It may
alter the real value of goods and services on the basis of a rumor or anything
else that will cause a herd of speculative traders to move one way or the
other. Put in another way, those who participate in it must be charged with
knowledge that getting rich in this way is accompanied with great risk. Given
its real effects on the real economy and on real people, it will be unfair for
this Court to provide greater warranties to the parties in currency trading.
They should bear their own risks perhaps to learn that their capital is better
invested more responsibly and for the greater good of society. Be that as it may,
to arrive at these conclusions, this Court has to extensively review the
evidence submitted by the parties. If, as petitioners claim, the Petition only
raised pure questions of law, there would have been no need to reexamine the
evidence. As it stands, the Petition must be denied. Cancio vs. Performance
Foreign Exchange Corporation, 864 SCRA 247, G.R. No. 182307 June 6, 2018
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 182307
Counsel:
Anselmo P. Sinjian III for petitioners. Martinez, Vergara, Gonzalez &
Serrano for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2008 Decision
and March 31, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 88439
are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
10. Philippine Ports Authority vs. City of Davao, 864 SCRA
303, June 06, 2018
Case Title : PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. THE CITY OF DAVAO,
SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG DAVAO CITY, CITY MAYOR OF DAVAO CITY, CITY TREASURER
OF DAVAO CITY, CITY ASSESSOR OF DAVAO CITY, and CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS (CBAA), respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Forum Shopping ;
Taxation; Real Property Taxes; Local Taxation; In real property
tax cases such as this, the remedy of a taxpayer depends on the stage in which
the local government unit (LGU) is enforcing its authority to impose real
property taxes.—In real property tax cases such as this, the remedy of a
taxpayer depends on the stage in which the local government unit is enforcing
its authority to impose real property taxes. Moreover, as jurisdiction is
conferred by law, reference must be made to the law when determining which
court has jurisdiction over a case, in relation to its factual and procedural
antecedents.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
304
304
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Ports Authority vs. City of Davao
Same; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; Section 7, paragraph
(a)(5) of Republic Act (RA) No. 1125, as amended by RA No. 9282, provides
that the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over:
. . . . decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
(CBAA) in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial
or city board of assessment appeals[.]—Petitioner has failed to cite any law
supporting its contention that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
case. On the other hand, Section 7 paragraph (a)(5) of Republic Act No. 1125,
as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over: Section 7. Jurisdiction.—The CTA shall
exercise: (A) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided: . . . . (5) Decisions of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving
the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the
provincial or city board of assessment appeals[.] The Central Board of
Assessment Appeals’ April 7, 2005 Decision assailed by petitioner before the
Court of Appeals was rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
over the real property tax assessment of its properties. Clearly, this falls
within the above cited provision. Indeed, there is no dispute that this Central
Board of Assessment Appeals’ decision constitutes one of the cases covered by
the Court of Tax Appeals’ exclusive jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Urgency does not remove the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals’ (CBAA’s) decision from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).—Despite the clear wording of the law placing
this case within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals, petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals could have issued the
relief prayed for despite the provisions of Republic Act No. 9282, considering
its urgent need for injunctive relief. Petitioner’s contention has no legal
basis whatsoever and must be rejected. Urgency does not remove the Central
Board of Assessment Appeals’ decision from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Tax Appeals. This is particularly true since, as properly
recognized by the Court of Appeals, petitioner could have, and should have,
applied for injunctive relief with the Court of Tax Appeals, which has the
power to issue the preliminary injunction prayed for.
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305
Philippine Ports Authority vs. City of Davao
Same; Same; Same; In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, 715 SCRA
182 (2014), the Supreme Court (SC) expressly recognized the Court of Tax
Appeals’ (CTA’s) power to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion in cases falling within its exclusive appellate jurisdiction and
its power to issue writs of certiorari.—In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo, 715
SCRA 182 (2014), this Court expressly recognized the Court of Tax Appeals’
power to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion in
cases falling within its exclusive appellate jurisdiction and its power to
issue writs of certiorari.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Once a court
acquires jurisdiction over a case, it also has the power to issue all auxiliary
writs necessary to maintain and exercise its jurisdiction, to the exclusion of
all other courts.—Even if the law had vested the Court of Appeals with
jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief in real property tax cases such as
this, the Court of Appeals was still correct in dismissing the petition before
it. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over a case, it also has the power to
issue all auxiliary writs necessary to maintain and exercise its jurisdiction,
to the exclusion of all other courts. Thus, once the Court of Tax Appeals
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal, the Court of Appeals would have
been precluded from taking cognizance of the case.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; When a party institutes a case while
another case is pending, where there is an identity of parties and an identity
of rights asserted and relief prayed for such that judgment in one case amounts
to res judicata in the other, it is guilty of forum shopping.—The rule against
forum shopping is violated when a party institutes more than one action based
on the same cause to increase its chances of obtaining a favorable outcome.
Thus, when a party institutes a case while another case is pending, where there
is an identity of parties and an identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for such that judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other, it is
guilty of forum shopping. Philippine Ports Authority vs. City of Davao, 864
SCRA 303, G.R. No. 190324 June 6, 2018
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 190324
Counsel:
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner. Office of the City
Legal Officer for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals’ December 15, 2008 Decision and September 11, 2009 Resolution
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00735-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
11. Canlas vs. Bongolan, 864 SCRA 335, June 06, 2018
Case Title : JEROME R. CANLAS, petitioner, vs. GONZALO BENJAMIN A.
BONGOLAN, ELMER NONNATUS A. CADANO, MELINDA M. ADRIANO, RAFAEL P. DELOS SANTOS,
CORAZON G. CORPUZ, DANILO C. JAVIER, and JIMMY B. SARONA, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Grave Misconduct ;
Ombudsman; Jurisdiction; No matter the identity of the
complainant, the Ombudsman may act on the matter. Moreover, it may, on its own,
inquire into illegal acts of public officials, which may be discovered from any
source.—No matter the identity of the complainant, the Ombudsman may act on the
matter. Moreover, it may, on its own, inquire into illegal acts of public
officials, which may be discovered from any source. For administrative
complaints, the following are the cases which the Ombudsman is bound to act on:
Section 19. Administrative Complaints.—The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which: (1) Are contrary to law
or regulation; (2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; (3)
Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in
accordance with law; (4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary
ascertainment of facts;
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
336
336
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Canlas vs. Bongolan
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an
improper purpose; or (6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of
justification. However, if the “the complainant has no sufficient personal
interest in the subject matter of the grievance,” the Ombudsman may choose not
to investigate the administrative act complained of. Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 6770 provides: Section 20. Exceptions.—The Office of the Ombudsman may not
conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission
complained of if it believes that: (1) The complainant has an adequate remedy
in another judicial or quasi-judicial body; (2) The complaint pertains to a
matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman; (3) The
complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith; (4) The
complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the
grievance; or (5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of.
Same; Same; The power of the Ombudsman to act on an
administrative complaint by a person without any personal interest in the case
is, thus, discretionary.—Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770 uses the word
“may” which signifies that it is permissive and not imperative. The power of
the Ombudsman to act on an administrative complaint by a person without any
personal interest in the case is, thus, discretionary. In Bueno v. Office of
the Ombudsman, 735 SCRA 432 (2014): Petitioners are mistaken in asserting that
Section 20(4) is a bar to the Ombudsman’s investigation into their acts or
omissions in the case of Ranchez based on the supposed lack of personal
interest on the part of private respondents who are the complainants in
OMB-C-A-0065-B. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, the Court noted
that Section 20 of RA 6770 has been clarified by Administrative Order No. 17
(AO 17), which amended Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 07), otherwise known as
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Section 4, Rule III of
the amended Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, reads: Section
4. Evaluation.—Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall be evaluated to
determine whether the same may be: a) dismissed outright for any grounds stated
under Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770, Provided, however, That the
dismissal thereof is not mandatory and shall be discretionary on the part of
the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman concerned; b) treated as a
grievance/request for assistance which may be referred to the Public Assistance
Bureau, this Office, for appro-
337
VOL. 864, JUNE 6, 2018
337
Canlas vs. Bongolan
priate action under Section 2, Rule IV of this Rules; c)
referred to other disciplinary authorities under paragraph 2, Section 23, R.A.
6770 for the taking of appropriate administrative proceedings; d) referred to
the appropriate office/agency or official for the conduct of further
fact-finding investigation; or e) docketed as an administrative case for the
purpose of administrative adjudication by the Office of the Ombudsman.
x x x Thus, even if the ground raised is the supposed lack of
sufficient personal interest of complainants in the subject matter of the
grievance under Section 20(4), the dismissal on that ground is not mandatory and
is discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman evaluating
the administrative complaint.
Same; Same; The Ombudsman may prosecute or investigate the
complaint with or without the complainant’s personal interest in the outcome of
the case.—The Ombudsman may prosecute or investigate the complaint with or
without the complainant’s personal interest in the outcome of the case. There
is clearly no question on the legal standing of private respondents to file the
administrative complaint against petitioners before the Ombudsman. Indeed, the
Office of the Ombudsman is mandated to “investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient.” The Ombudsman can act on anonymous complaints
and motu proprio inquire into alleged improper official acts or omissions from
whatever source, e.g., a newspaper. Thus, any complainant may be entertained by
the Ombudsman for the latter to initiate an inquiry and investigation for
alleged irregularities.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Substantial Evidence; If there is a
clear finding, supported by substantial evidence, that the public officer is
not guilty of the charges, this finding must be given great weight and must be
respected.—While public office is a public trust, public officers must not be
exposed to continued and persistent lawsuits that can derail their ability to
discharge their duties once it has been found that there is no substantial
evidence of their guilt. The effective administration of the State’s policies
is of paramount importance, which should not be hampered by time consuming,
base, and repetitive suits. Thus, if there is a clear finding, supported by
substantial evidence, that the public officer is not guilty of the
338
338
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Canlas vs. Bongolan
charges, this finding must be given great weight and must be
respected. Therefore, not all may appeal to question a decision of the
Ombudsman.
Ombudsman; Appeals; The Ombudsman’s decision may not be appealed
if it dismisses the complaint or imposes the penalty of public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to
one (1)-month salary.—The Ombudsman’s decision may not be appealed if it
dismisses the complaint or imposes the penalty of public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one
(1)-month salary. Otherwise, it may be appealed to the Court of Appeals under
the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi is “a right of
appearance in a court of justice. . . on a given question.”—Locus
standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice. . . on a
given question.” In civil, criminal, and administrative cases, standing is
governed by Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, which states: Section 2.
Parties-in-interest.—A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Un otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
Standing depends on a party’s right to the relief prayed for. This party must
be entitled to the relief before he or she may file a suit. The party affected
by the judgment in the suit or entitled to the relief prayed for must pursue the
action.
Administrative Law; Grave Misconduct; Dismissal from Service;
Even if grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal under the rules, it is the
decision that determines whether it is appealable or unappealable to the higher
courts.—In determining whether the Office of the Ombudsman’s October 12, 2010
Decision is appealable, the deciding factor is the penalty imposed by the
Ombudsman in the decision itself. It is not determined by the penalty imposed
for the offense as provided under the law. Thus, even if grave misconduct is
punishable by dismissal under the rules, it is the decision that determines
whether it is appealable or unappealable to the higher courts. If the Ombudsman
finds that respondents are not guilty and imposes no penalty, the decision is
unappealable. Respondents were
339
VOL. 864, JUNE 6, 2018
339
Canlas vs. Bongolan
absolved by the Ombudsman from Canlas’ administrative charges.
Thus, this finding is unappealable.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari;
Question of Law; Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45. Questions of fact will not be entertained by the Supreme Court
(SC), as it is not its function to analyze and weigh evidence all over
again.—Canlas is raising a question of fact, which is not proper in a Rule 45
Petition. Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under
Rule 45. Questions of fact will not be entertained by this Court, as it is not
its function to analyze and weigh evidence all over again.
Remedial Law; Canlas is bringing into issue the correct fair
market value of the properties, which is a question of fact. It requires the
examination and the weighing of evidence to determine the value of the
properties. Such a question cannot be raised in a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45.—In this case, Canlas is bringing into issue the
correct fair market value of the properties, which is a question of fact. It
requires the examination and the weighing of evidence to determine the value of
the properties. Such a question cannot be raised in a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45. This Court has laid down exceptions to this rule as
follows: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
Administrative Agencies; Home Guaranty Corporation; As a
government-owned and -controlled corporation, Home Guaranty is also governed by
Republic Act (RA) No. 10149. Under Section 30 of
340
340
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Canlas vs. Bongolan
RA No. 10149, the Corporation Code applies suppletorily to
government-owned and -controlled corporations; Section 23 of the Corporation
Code necessarily applies. It provides that the Board of Directors of a
corporation exercises all the corporation’s powers, conducts all its business,
and controls all its properties.—As a government-owned and -controlled
corporation, Home Guaranty is also governed by Republic Act No. 10149. Under
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 10149, the Corporation Code applies suppletorily
to government-owned and -controlled corporations: Section 30. Suppletory
Application of The Corporation Code and Charters of the GOCCs.—The provisions
of “The Corporation Code of the Philippines” and the provisions of the charters
of the relevant GOCC, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act, shall apply suppletorily to GOCCs. Section 23 of the Corporation
Code necessarily applies. It provides that the Board of Directors of a
corporation exercises all the corporation’s powers, conducts all its business,
and controls all its properties. Thus, it is Home Guaranty’s Board of Directors
that is primarily responsible for the sale.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices; In Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019, it is clear that the party that is penalized is the public
officer who commits any of the corrupt practices enumerated under Section 3.—In
Republic Act No. 3019, it is clear that the party that is penalized is the
public officer who commits any of the corrupt practices enumerated under
Section 3. A “public officer” includes “elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exempt service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government.” In
this particular case, the offense charged is against public officers who, on
behalf of the government, allegedly entered into a contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to te government. Thus, it does not
distinguish whether the public officer is a director or a mere employee.
Administrative Law; Grave Misconduct; To be considered grave
misconduct, the transgression must have been committed in bad faith. Malice is
a necessary element in the offense of grave misconduct.—“Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” To be
considered grave misconduct, the transgression must have been committed in bad
faith. Malice is a necessary element in the offense of grave misconduct. Canlas
vs. Bongolan, 864 SCRA 335, G.R. No. 199625 June 6, 2018
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 199625
Counsel:
Ponce Enrile, Reyes & Manalastas Law Office for petitioner. Elmar Nonnatus
Adan Cadano for himself and Melinda M. Adriano, et al. Kapunan, Imperial,
Panaguiton & Bongolan for Gonzalo Benjamin Bongolan. Danilo C. Javier for
himself and Rafael P. Delos Santos.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ August
11, 2011 Decision and November 29, 2011 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 119352
are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
12. Orient Hope Agencies, Inc. vs. Jara, 864 SCRA 428, June
06, 2018
Case Title : ORIENT HOPE AGENCIES, INC. and/or ZEO MARINE CORPORATION,
petitioners, vs. MICHAEL E. JARA, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Disability Benefits ;
Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; Jurisprudence teaches
that in claims for a seafarer’s disability benefits, Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) is
deemed incorporated in the seafarer’s employment contract and must be read in
light of the relevant provisions on disability of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules.—Jurisprudence teaches that in claims for a seafarer’s
disability benefits, POEA-SEC is deemed incorporated in the seafarer’s
employment contract and
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
429
VOL. 864, JUNE 6, 2018
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Orient Hope Agencies, Inc. vs. Jara
must be read in light of the relevant provisions on disability
of the Labor Code and its implementing rules. In this case, the 2000 version of
the POEA-SEC applies since respondent was hired in December 2005 and he filed
his complaint in 2008. The 120-day period mandated in Section 20(B) of the
POEA-SEC, within which a company-designated physician should declare a
seafarer’s fitness for sea duty or degree of disability, should accordingly be
harmonized with Article 198[192](c)(1) of the Labor Code, in relation with Book
IV, Title II, Rule X of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, or the
Amended Rules on Employee Compensation. Book IV, Title II, Article
198[192](c)(1) of the Labor Code, as amended.
Same; Same; Same; Permanent Total Disability; Without sufficient
justification for the extension of the treatment period, a seafarer’s
disability shall be conclusively presumed to be permanent and total.—Talaroc v.
Arpaphil Shipping Corp., 838 SCRA 402 (2017), stressed that for a
company-designated physician to avail of the extended 240-day period, he or she
must perform some complete and definite medical assessment to show that the
illness still requires medical attendance beyond the 120 days, but not to
exceed 240 days. In such case, the temporary total disability period is
extended to a maximum of 240 days. Without sufficient justification for the
extension of the treatment period, a seafarer’s disability shall be
conclusively presumed to be permanent and total. This Court summarized the
following guidelines to be observed when a seafarer claims permanent and total
disability benefits: 1. The company-designated physician must issue a final
medical assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120
days from the time the seafarer reported to him; 2. If the company-designated
physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without
any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and
total; 3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment
within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer
required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the
period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer
has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient
justification to extend the period; and 4. If the company-designated physician
still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then
the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regard of any
justification.
430
430
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Orient Hope Agencies, Inc. vs. Jara
Same; Same; Same; Same; Total disability refers to an employee’s
inability to perform his or her usual work. It does not require total paralysis
or complete helpness. Permanent disability, on the other hand, is a worker’s
inability to perform his or her job for more than one hundred twenty (120)
days, or two hundred forty (240) days if the seafarer required further medical
attention justifying the extension of the temporary total disability period,
regard of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.—It is well
to point out that in disability compensation, “it is not the injury which is
compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of one’s earning capacity.” Total disability refers to an employee’s
inability to perform his or her usual work. It does not require total paralysis
or complete helpness. Permanent disability, on the other hand, is a worker’s
inability to perform his or her job for more than 120 days, or 240 days if the
seafarer required further medical attention justifying the extension of the
temporary total disability period, regard of whether or not he loses the use of
any part of his body.
Same; Same; Same; The third-doctor rule does not apply when
there is no valid final and definitive assessment from a company-designated
physician.—The facts of this case show respondent’s inability to perform his
customary sea duties and the company-designated physician’s failure to declare
his fitness or unfitness to work, despite the lapse of 240 days. This entitles
respondent, under the law, to permanent and total disability compensation. In
this regard, noncompliance with the third-doctor-referral provision as provided
in the POEA-SEC will not prejudice respondent’s claim. The third-doctor rule
does not apply when there is no valid final and definitive assessment from a
company-designated physician.
Same; Same; Same; The standard provisions in the 2000 Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) is a
regulatory attempt to balance the constitutional protection to labor with the
need for shipping and manning agencies to have an efficient basis for the
resolution of claims against them.—The standard provisions in the 2000 POEA-SEC
is a regulatory attempt to balance the constitutional protection to labor with
the need for shipping and manning agencies to have an efficient basis for the
resolution of claims against them. Hence, the 120 and 240-day periods within
which a company-designated physician
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Orient Hope Agencies, Inc. vs. Jara
should make a full, complete, and definitive assessment are
accommodations for them. Generally, between companies and an ordinary Filipino
seafarer, it is the former that has the better capability to comply with the
requirements for determining disabilities of a claimant. Certainly, the period
given to them is more than sufficient and it would be the height of inequity
for this Court to grant them more at the expense of the seafarer. Orient Hope
Agencies, Inc. vs. Jara, 864 SCRA 428, G.R. No. 204307 June 6, 2018
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 204307
Counsel:
Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Offices for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ August
15, 2012 Decision and November 6, 2012 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 113214
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners Orient Hope Agencies, Inc. and/or
Zeo Marine Corporation are ordered to pay respondent Michael E. Jara
US$60,000.00 as permanent and total disability benefits, P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of the total of these amounts.
Citation Ref:
13. Malcaba vs. ProHealth Pharma Philippines, Inc., 864 SCRA
518, June 06, 2018
Case Title : NICANOR F. MALCABA, CHRISTIAN C. NEPOMUCENO, and LAURA MAE
FATIMA F. PALIT-ANG, petitioners, vs. PROHEALTH PHARMA PHILIPPINES, INC.,
GENEROSO R. DEL CASTILLO, JR., and DANTE M. BUSTO, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Due Process ;
Labor Law; Appeals; Appeal Bonds; In labor cases, an appeal by
an employer is perfected only by filing a bond equivalent to the monetary
award.—Appeal is not a matter of right. Courts and tribunals have the
discretion whether to give due course to an appeal or to dismiss it outright.
The perfection of an appeal is, thus, jurisdictional. Noncompliance with the
manner in which to file an appeal renders the judgment final and executory. In
labor cases, an appeal by an employer is perfected only by filing a bond
equivalent to the monetary award.
Same; Same; Same; The purpose of requiring an appeal bond is “to
guarantee the payment of valid and legal claims against the employer.”—The
purpose of requiring an appeal bond is “to guarantee the payment of valid and
legal claims against the employer.” It is a measure of financial security
granted to an illegally dismissed employee since the resolution of the
employer’s appeal may take an indeterminable amount of time. In particular: The
requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to perfect its/his
appeal is apparently intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the
case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of
the employer’s appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from using an
appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to satisfy their employees’
just and lawful claims. Procedural rules require that the appeal bond filed be
“genuine.” An appeal bond determined by the National Labor Relations Commission
to be “irregular or not genuine” shall cause the immediate dismissal of the
appeal.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
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VOL. 864, JUNE 6, 2018
519
Malcaba vs. ProHealth Pharma Philippines, Inc.
Same; Labor Arbiters; National Labor Relations Commission;
Jurisdiction; Under the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter (LA) exercises original
and exclusive jurisdiction over termination disputes between an employer and an
employee while the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) exercises
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over these cases.—Under the Labor Code, the
Labor Arbiter exercises original and exclusive jurisdiction over termination
disputes between an employer and an employee while the National Labor Relations
Commission exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over these cases:
Article 224. [217] Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission.—(a)
Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30)
calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision
without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following
cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural:
. . . (2) Termination disputes; . . . (b) The Commission
shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor
Arbiters. The presumption under this provision is that the parties have an
employer-employee relationship. Otherwise, the case would be cognizable in
different tribunals even if the action involves a termination dispute.
Same; Corporations; Corporate Officers; Intra-Corporate
Disputes; Under Section 25 of the Corporation Code, the President of a
corporation is considered a corporate officer. The dismissal of a corporate
officer is considered an intra-corporate dispute, not a labor dispute.—Under
Section 25 of the Corporation Code, the President of a corporation is
considered a corporate officer. The dismissal of a corporate officer is
considered an intra-corporate dispute, not a labor dispute. Thus, in Tabang v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 266 SCRA 462 (1997): A corporate officer’s
dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate controversy, and the
nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom with which the Board of Directors
may have in taking such action. Also, an intra-corporate controversy is one
which arises between a stockholder and the corporation. There is no
distinction, qualification, nor any exemption whatsoever. The provision is
broad and covers all kinds of controversies between stockholders and
corporations.
520
520
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malcaba vs. ProHealth Pharma Philippines, Inc.
Corporations; Intra-Corporate Disputes; Regional Trial Courts;
Jurisdiction; Corporate Officers; Effective on August 8, 2000, upon the passage
of Republic Act (RA) No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation
Code, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) jurisdiction over all
intra-corporate disputes was transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
pursuant to Section 5.2 of RA No. 8799.—Effective on August 8, 2000, upon the
passage of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code,
the SEC’s jurisdiction over all intra-corporate disputes was transferred to the
RTC, pursuant to Section 5.2 of RA No. 8799, to wit: 5.2. The Commission’s
jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court in the
exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that
shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. The Commission shall retain
jurisdiction over pending cases involving intra-corporate disputes submitted
for final resolution which should be resolved within one (1) year from the
enactment of this Code. The Commission shall retain jurisdiction over pending
suspension of payments/rehabilitation cases filed as of 30 June 2000 until
finally disposed.
Same; Same; Corporate Officers; The clear weight of
jurisprudence clarifies that to be considered a corporate officer, first, the
office must be created by the charter of the corporation, and second, the
officer must be elected by the board of directors or by the stockholders.—The
clear weight of jurisprudence clarifies that to be considered a corporate
officer, first, the office must be created by the charter of the corporation,
and second, the officer must be elected by the board of directors or by the
stockholders. Petitioner Malcaba was an incorporator of the corporation and a
member of the Board of Directors. Respondent corporation’s By-Laws creates the
office of the President.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Loss of Trust and
Confidence; Loss of trust and confidence is a just cause to terminate either
managerial employees or rank-and-file employees who regularly handle large
amounts of money or property in the regular exercise of their
functions.—Article 294 [279] of the Labor Code provides that an employer may
terminate the services of an employee only upon just or authorized causes.
Article 297 [282] enumerates the just
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Malcaba vs. ProHealth Pharma Philippines, Inc.
causes for termination, among which is “[f]raud or willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative[.]” Loss of trust and confidence is a just cause to
terminate either managerial employees or rank-and-file employees who regularly
handle large amounts of money or property in the regular exercise of their
functions. For an act to be considered a loss of trust and confidence, it must
be first, work-related, and second, founded on clearly established facts: The
complained act must be work-related such as would show the employee concerned
to be unfit to continue working for the employer and it must be based on a
willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. The basis for
the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established but proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not necessary. The breach of trust must likewise be
willful, that is, “it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carely, thoughtly, heedly
or inadvertently.”
Same; Management Prerogatives; While an employer is free to
regulate all aspects of employment, the exercise of management prerogatives
must be in good faith and must not defeat or circumvent the rights of its
employees.—While an employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment, the
exercise of management prerogatives must be in good faith and must not defeat
or circumvent the rights of its employees. In industries that mainly rely on
sales, employers are free to discipline errant employees who deliberately fail
to report for work during a crucial sales period. It would have been reasonable
for respondents to discipline petitioner Nepomuceno had he been a problematic
employee who unceremoniously refused to do his work. However, as found by the
Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission, petitioner
Nepomuceno turned over all of his pending work to a reliever before he left for
Malaysia. He was able to reach his sales quota and surpass his sales target
even before taking his vacation leave. Respondents did not suffer any financial
damage as a result of his absence. This was also petitioner Nepomuceno’s first
infraction in his nine (9) years of service with respondents. None of these
circumstances constitutes a willful breach of trust on his part. The penalty of
dismissal, thus, was too severe for this kind of infraction.
522
522
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Malcaba vs. ProHealth Pharma Philippines, Inc.
Same; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals;
Reinstatement; Backwages; Separation Pay; Strained Relations Doctrine;
Considering that petitioner Nepomuceno’s dismissal was done without just cause,
he is entitled to reinstatement and full backwages. If reinstatement is not
possible due to strained relations between the parties, he shall be awarded
separation pay at the rate of one (1) month for every year of
service.—Petitioner Nepomuceno received a memorandum on April 23, 2008, asking
him to explain why no administrative investigation should be held against him.
He submitted an explanation on the same day and another explanation on May 2,
2008. On May 7, 2008, he was given his notice of termination, which had already
taken effect two (2) days earlier, or on May 5, 2008. It is true that “[t]he
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard.” Petitioner
Nepomuceno had two (2) opportunities within which to explain his actions. This
would have been sufficient to satisfy the requirement. The delay in handing him
his notice of termination, however, appears to have been an afterthought. While
strictly not a violation of procedural due process, respondents should have
been more circumspect in complying with the due process requirements under the
law. Considering that petitioner Nepomuceno’s dismissal was done without just
cause, he is entitled to reinstatement and full backwages. If reinstatement is
not possible due to strained relations between the parties, he shall be awarded
separation pay at the rate of one (1) month for every year of service.
Same; Same; Willful Disobedience; For disobedience to be
considered as just cause for termination, two (2) requisites must concur:
first, “the employee’s assailed conduct must have been wilful or intentional,”
and second, “the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known
to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he [or she] had been
engaged to discharge.”—For disobedience to be considered as just cause for
termination, two (2) requisites must concur: first, “the employee’s assailed
conduct must have been wilful or intentional,” and second, “the order violated
must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain
to the duties which he [or she] had been engaged to discharge.” For
disobedience to be willful, it must be “characterized by a wrongful and
perverse mental attitude rendering the employee’s act inconsistent with proper
subordination.” The conduct complained of must also constitute “harmful
behavior against the business interest or person of his [or her] employer.”
Thus, it is implied in every case
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Malcaba vs. ProHealth Pharma Philippines, Inc.
of willful disobedience that “the erring employee obtains undue
advantage detrimental to the business interest of the employer.” Petitioner
Palit-Ang, as Finance Officer, was instructed by respondent Del Castillo to
give a cash advance of P3,000.00 to District Branch Manager Gamboa on November
26, 2007. This order was reasonable, lawful, made known to petitioner
Palit-Ang, and pertains to her duties. What is left to be determined,
therefore, is whether petitioner Palit-Ang intentionally and willfully violated
it as to amount to insubordination. When Gamboa went to collect the money from
petitioner Palit-Ang, he was told to return the next day as she was still busy.
When petitioner Palit-Ang found out that the money was to be used for a car
tune-up, she suggested to Gamboa to just get the money from his mobilization
fund and that she just would reimburse it after. The Court of Appeals found
that these circumstances characterized petitioner Palit-Ang’s “arrogance and
hostility,” in failing to comply with respondent Del Castillo’s order, and thus,
warranted her dismissal.
Due Process; “The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard,” not that the employee must be accompanied by counsel
at all times.—Petitioner Palit-Ang likewise assails the failure of respondents
to inform her of her right to counsel when she was being investigated for her
infraction. As previously discussed, “[t]he essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard,” not that the employee must be accompanied by counsel
at all times. A hearing was conducted and she was furnished a notice of
termination explaining the grounds for her dismissal. She was not denied due
process. Petitioner Palit-Ang, nonethe, is considered to have been illegally
dismissed, her penalty not having been proportionate to the infraction
committed. Thus, she is entitled to reinstatement and full backwages. If
reinstatement is not possible due to strained relations between the parties,
she shall be awarded separation pay at the rate of one (1) month for every year
of service. Malcaba vs. ProHealth Pharma Philippines, Inc., 864 SCRA 518, G.R.
No. 209085 June 6, 2018
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 209085
Counsel:
Poblador, Bautista & Reyes for petitioners. Atienza, Madrid & Formento
for respondents. Pizarras & Associates Law Offices for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner
Christian C. Nepomuceno and petitioner Laura Mae Fatima F. Palit-Ang are
DECLARED to have been illegally dismissed. They are, therefore, entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, or in lieu thereof, separation
pay; and the payment of backwages from the filing of their Complaints until
finality of this Decision. The Court of Appeals’ February 19, 2013 Decision and
September 10, 2013 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 119093, finding that the
National Labor Relations Commission had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
petitioner Nicanor F. Malcaba’s claims is SUSTAINED. Petitioner Malcaba is
further ordered to RETURN the amount of P4,937,420.40 to respondents for having
been erroneously awarded. This shall be without prejudice to the filing of
petitioner Malcaba’s claims in the proper forum. This case is hereby REMANDED
to the Labor Arbiter for the proper computation of petitioners Christian C.
Nepo-muceno’s and Laura Mae Fatima F. Palit-Ang’s money claims.
Citation Ref:
14. Citigroup, Inc. vs. Citystate Savings Bank, Inc., 866 SCRA
185, June 13, 2018
Case Title : CITIGROUP, INC., petitioner, vs. CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC.,
respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Trademarks ; Dominancy Test ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Applying the dominancy test, the Supreme Court (SC) sees
that the prevalent feature of respondent’s mark, the golden lion’s head device,
is not present at all in any of petitioner’s marks.-
—Applying the dominancy test, this Court sees that the prevalent
feature of respondent’s mark, the golden lion’s head device, is not present at
all in any of petitioner’s marks. The only similar feature between respondent’s
mark and petitioner’s collection of marks is the word “CITY” in the former, and
the “CITI” prefix found in the latter. This Court agrees with the findings of
the Court of Appeals that this similarity alone is not enough to create a
likelihood of confusion. The dis[s]imilarities between the two marks are
noticeable and substantial. Respondent’s mark, “CITY CASH WITH GOLDEN LION’S
HEAD,” has an insignia of a golden lion’s head at the left side of the words
“CITY CASH,” while petitioner’s “CITI” mark usually has an arc between the two
I’s. A further scrutiny of the other “CITI” marks of petitioner would show that
their font type, font size, and color schemes of the said “CITI” marks vary for
each product or service. Most of the time, petitioner’s “CITI” mark is joined
with another term to form a single word, with each product or service having
different font types and color schemes. On the contrary, the trademark of
respondent consists of the words “CITY CASH,” with a golden lion’s head emblem
on the left side. It is, therefore, improbable that the public would
immediately and naturally conclude that respondent’s “CITY CASH WITH GOLDEN
LION’S HEAD” is but another variation under petitioner’s “CITI” marks. Verily,
the variations in the appearance of the “CITI” marks by petitioner, when
conjoined with other words, would dissolve the alleged similarity between them
and the trademark of respondent. These dissimilarities, and the insignia of a
golden lion’s head before the words “CITY CASH” in the mark of the respondent
would sufficiently acquaint and apprise the public that respondent’s trademark
“CITY CASH WITH GOLDEN LION’S HEAD” is not connected with the “CITI” marks of
petitioner.
2. Mercantile Law; Trademarks; There is an underlying economic justification for the
protection of trademarks: an effective trademark system helps bridge the
information gap between producers and consumers, and thus, lowers the costs
incurred by consumers in searching for and deciding what products to purchase.-
—There is also an underlying economic justification for the
protection of trademarks: an effective trademark system helps bridge the
information gap between producers and consumers, and thus, lowers the costs
incurred by consumers in searching for and deciding what products to purchase.
As summarized in a report of the World Intellectual Property Organization:
Economic research has shown that brands play an important role in bridging
so-called asymmetries of information between producers and consumers. In many
modern markets, product offerings differ across a wide range of quality
characteristics. Consumers, in turn, cannot always discern these
characteristics at the moment of purchase; they spend time and money
researching different offerings before deciding which product to buy. Brand
reputation helps consumers to reduce these search costs. It enables them to
draw on their past experience and other information about products — such as
advertisements and third-party consumer reviews. However, the reputation
mechanism only works if consumers are confident that they will purchase what
they intend to purchase. The trademark system provides the legal framework
underpinning this confidence. It does so by granting exclusive rights to names,
signs and other identifiers in commerce. In addition, by employing trademarks,
producers and sellers create concise identifiers for specific goods and
services, thereby improving communication about those goods and services.
3. Same; Same; Dominancy Test; Holistic Test; To aid in determining the similarity and likelihood of
confusion between marks, our jurisprudence has developed two (2) tests: the dominancy
test and the holistic test.-
—Petitioner insists that respondent’s mark cannot be registered
because it is confusingly similar to its own set of marks. Thus, granting the
petition rests solely on the question of likelihood of confusion between petitioner’s
and respondent’s respective marks. There is no objective test for determining
whether the confusion is likely. Likelihood of confusion must be determined
according to the particular circumstances of each case. To aid in determining
the similarity and likelihood of confusion between marks, our jurisprudence has
developed two (2) tests: the dominancy test and the holistic test. This Court
explained these tests in Coffee Partners, Inc. v. San Francisco Coffee &
Roastery, Inc., 614 SCRA 113 (2010): The dominancy test focuses on the
similarity of the prevalent features of the competing trademarks that might
cause confusion and deception, thus constituting infringement. If the competing
trademark contains the main, essential, and dominant features of another, and
confusion or deception is likely to result, infringement occurs. Exact
duplication or imitation is not required. The question is whether the use of
the marks involved is likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the
public or to deceive consumers. In contrast, the holistic test entails a
consideration of the entirety of the marks as applied to the products,
including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing similarity. The
discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words but
also on the other features appearing on both marks in order that the observer
may draw his conclusion whether one is confusingly similar to the other. x x x
With these guidelines in mind, this Court considered “the main, essential, and
dominant features” of the marks in this case, as well as the contexts in which
the marks are to be used. This Court finds that the use of the “CITY CASH WITH
GOLDEN LION’S HEAD” mark will not result in the likelihood of confusion in the
minds of customers.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 205409
Counsel:
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles Law Offices for
petitioner. Santiago, Arevalo, Asuncion & Associates for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ August
29, 2012 Decision and January 15, 2013 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 109679
are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
15. First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. vs. Philippine Bank of
Communications, 866 SCRA 438, June 19, 2018
Case Title : FIRST SARMIENTO PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
order of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Bulacan, Br. 11.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Jurisdiction ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; It is imperative that the competing claims as basis of
subject matter jurisdiction be textually based, finding its basis in the body
of the complaint and the relief sought without reference to extraneous facts
not alleged or evidence still to be presented.-
—It is clear that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
dependent on the supposed ultimate motive or true objective of the complaint
because this will require the judge to speculate on the defenses of the
plaintiff beyond the material allegations contained in the complaint. Likewise,
in attempting to pinpoint the true objective of the complaint at the initial
stages of trial, the judge might end up dictating the result outside of the
evidence still to be presented during the trial, opening up the judge to
charges of partiality and even impropriety. Furthermore, the judge is not aware
of the evidence to be presented by either party when the complaint is filed;
thus, there is no reliable basis that can be used to infer the true objective
of the complaint. It is imperative then that the competing claims as basis of
subject matter jurisdiction be textually based, finding its basis in the body
of the complaint and the relief sought without reference to extraneous facts
not alleged or evidence still to be presented. Nonethe, if subject matter
jurisdiction is assailed during the course of the trial and evidence is presented
to prove the defense’s allegation of lack of jurisdiction, this will lead to an
anomaly where the defense’s evidence, instead of the complaint, will
effectively determine the remedy and cause of action.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Rule 45 of the Rules of Court allows for a direct recourse
to the Supreme Court (SC) by appeal from a judgment, final order, or resolution
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).-
—Rule 45 of the Rules of Court allows for a direct recourse to
this Court by appeal from a judgment, final order, or resolution of the
Regional Trial Court. Rule 45, Section 1 provides: Section 1. Filing of
petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth. Rule 41, Section 2(c) likewise provides: Section 2. Modes
of appeal.—. . . . (c) Appeal by certiorari.—In all cases where only questions
of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. Thus, there is no
question that a petitioner may file a verified petition for review directly
with this Court if only questions of law are at issue; however, if both
questions of law and of facts are present, the correct remedy is to file a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
3. Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; Jurisdiction is “the power and authority of a court to
hear, try and decide a case” brought before it for resolution.-
—Jurisdiction is “the power and authority of a court to hear,
try and decide a case” brought before it for resolution. Courts exercise the
powers conferred on them with binding effect if they acquire jurisdiction over:
“(a) the cause of action or the subject matter of the case; (b) the thing or
the res; (c) the parties; and (d) the remedy.” Jurisdiction over the thing or
the res is a court’s authority over the object subject of litigation. The court
obtains jurisdiction or actual custody over the object through the seizure of
the object under legal process or the institution of legal proceedings which
recognize the power and authority of the court. Jurisdiction over the parties
is the court’s power to render judgment that are binding on the parties. The
courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs when they file their initiatory
pleading, while the defendants come under the court’s jurisdiction upon the
valid service of summons or their voluntary appearance in court. Jurisdiction
over the cause of action or subject matter of the case is the court’s authority
to hear and determine cases within a general class where the proceedings in
question belong. This power is conferred by law and cannot be acquired through
stipulation, agreement between the parties, or implied waiver due to the
silence of a party.
4. Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution, with
Congress given the plenary power, for cases not enumerated in Article VIII,
Section 5 of the Constitution, to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts.-
—Jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution, with Congress
given the plenary power, for cases not enumerated in Article VIII, Section 5 of
the Constitution, to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, provided for the jurisdictional division
between the first and second level courts by considering the complexity of the
cases and the experience needed of the judges assigned to hear the cases. In
criminal cases, first level courts are granted exclusive original jurisdiction
to hear complaints on violations of city or municipal ordinances and offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years. In contrast, second
level courts, with more experienced judges sitting at the helm, are granted
exclusive original jurisdiction to preside over all other criminal cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any other court, tribunal, or body. The
same holds true for civil actions and probate proceedings, where first level
courts have the power to hear cases where the value of personal property,
estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed P100,000.00 or P200,000.00 if
in Metro Manila. First level courts also possess the authority to hear civil
actions involving title to, possession of, or any interest in real property
where the value does not exceed P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 if the real property
is situated in Metro Manila. Second level courts then assume jurisdiction when
the values involved exceed the threshold amounts reserved for first level
courts or when the subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
5. Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 129, as
amended, provides Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) with exclusive, original
jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.”-
—Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides
Regional Trial Courts with exclusive, original jurisdiction over “all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.” Lapitan v. Scandia, 24 SCRA 479 (1968), instructed that to
determine whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be
established. This finds support in this Court’s repeated pronouncement that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by examining the material
allegations of the complaint and the relief sought.
6. Same; Special Civil Actions; Foreclosure of Mortgage; Extrajudicial Sale; Redemption Period; Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, provides that a
property sold through an extrajudicial sale may be redeemed “at any time within
the term of one (1) year from and after the date of the sale.”-
—Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, provides that a property
sold through an extrajudicial sale may be redeemed “at any time within the term
of one year from and after the date of the sale”: Section 6. In all cases in
which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore
referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or
judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property
subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold,
may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the
date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive,
of the Code of Civil Procedure, insofar as these are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act.
7. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The registration of the certificate of
sale issued by the sheriff after an extrajudicial sale is a mandatory
requirement; thus, if the certificate of sale is not
registered with the Registry of Deeds, the property sold at auction is not
conveyed to the new owner and the period of redemption does not begin to run.-
—The registration of the certificate of sale issued by the
sheriff after an extrajudicial sale is a mandatory requirement; thus, if the
certificate of sale is not registered with the Registry of Deeds, the property
sold at auction is not conveyed to the new owner and the period of redemption
does not begin to run. In the case at bar, the Ex Officio Sheriff of the City
of Malolos, Bulacan was restrained from registering the certificate of sale
with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan and the certificate of sale was only
issued to respondent after the Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage
was filed. Therefore, even if the properties had already been foreclosed when
the Complaint was filed, their ownership and possession remained with
petitioner since the certificate of sale was not registered with the Registry
of Deeds. This supports petitioner’s claim that it never asked for the
reconveyance of or asserted its ownership over the mortgaged properties when it
filed its Complaint since it still enjoyed ownership and possession over them.
Considering that petitioner paid the docket fees as computed by the clerk of
court, upon the direction of the Executive Judge, this Court is convinced that
the Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the Complaint for annulment
of real estate mortgage. Furthermore, even if it is assumed that the instant
case were a real action and the correct docket fees were not paid by
petitioner, the case should not have been dismissed; instead, the payment of
additional docket fees should have been made a lien on the judgment award. The
records attest that in filing its complaint, petitioner readily paid the docket
fees assessed by the clerk of court; hence, there was no evidence of bad faith
or intention to defraud the government that would have rightfully merited the
dismissal of the Complaint.
8. Same; Civil Procedure; Temporary Restraining Orders; A temporary restraining order (TRO) may
be issued by a trial court in only two (2) instances; first, when great or irreparable injury
would result to the applicant even before the application for writ of
preliminary injunction can be heard; and
second, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave
injustice and irreparable injury.-
—It is clear that a temporary restraining order may be issued by
a trial court in only two (2) instances: first, when great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant even before the application for writ of
preliminary injunction can be heard; and second, if the matter is of extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury.
The executive judge of a multi-sala court or the presiding judge of a
single-sala court may issue a 72-hour temporary restraining order. In both
instances, the temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte. However, in
the first instance, the temporary restraining order has an effectivity of only
20 days to be counted from service to the party sought to be enjoined.
Likewise, within those 20 days, the court shall order the enjoined party to
show why the injunction should not be granted and shall then determine whether
or not the injunction should be granted. In the second instance, when there is
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury, the court shall issue a temporary restraining order effective for only
72 hours upon issuance. Within those 72 hours, the court shall conduct a
summary hearing to determine if the temporary restraining order shall be
extended until the application for writ of preliminary injunction can be heard.
However, in no case shall the extension exceed 20 days. If the application for
preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved within the given periods, the
temporary restraining order is automatically vacated and the court has no
authority to extend or renew it on the same ground of its original issuance.
9. Same; Same; Same; A temporary restraining order (TRO) cannot be extended
indefinitely to take the place of a writ of preliminary injunction, since a TRO
is intended only to have a limited lifespan and is deemed automatically vacated
upon the expiration of seventy-two (72) hours or twenty (20) days, as the case
may be.-
—A temporary restraining order cannot be extended indefinitely
to take the place of a writ of preliminary injunction, since a temporary
restraining order is intended only to have a limited lifespan and is deemed
automatically vacated upon the expiration of 72 hours or 20 days, as the case
may be. As such, the temporary restraining order has long expired and, in the
absence of a preliminary injunction, there was nothing to stop the sheriff from
registering the certificate of sale with the Registry of Deeds. This Court has
repeatedly expounded on the nature of a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction. Yet lower courts consistently interchange these
ancillary remedies and disregard the sunset clause inherent in a temporary
restrainingorder by erroneously extending it indefinitely. Such ignorance or
defiance of basic remedial measures is a gross disservice to the public, who
look towards the court for legal guidance and legal remedy. More importantly,
this cavalier attitude towards these injunctive reliefs might even be construed
as a deliberate effort to look the other way to favor a party, which will then
sully the image of the entire judiciary. Henceforth, this Court will demand
stricter compliance with the rules from the members of the bench as regards
their issuances of these injunctive reliefs.
10. Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Capable of Pecuniary Estimation; If the principal relief sought is the recovery of a sum of
money or real property, then the action is capable of pecuniary estimation.
However, if the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of money or real
property and the money claim is only a consequence of the principal relief,
then the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.-
—Whatever confusion there might have been regarding the nature
of actions for nullity of contracts or legality of conveyances, which would
also involve recovery of sum of money or real property, was directly addressed
by Lu v. Lu Ym, 563 SCRA 254 (2008). Lu underscored that “where the basic issue
is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, the money claim
being only incidental to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.” This finds support in
numerous decisions where this Court proclaimed that the test to determine
whether an action is capable or incapable of pecuniary estimation is to
ascertain the nature of the principal action or relief sought. Thus, if the
principal relief sought is the recovery of a sum of money or real property,
then the action is capable of pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal
relief sought is not for the recovery of money or real property and the money
claim is only a consequence of the principal relief, then the action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 202836
Counsel:
Pedro T. Dabu, Jr. for petitioner. Roviel B. Nepomuceno for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to GRANT the Petition. The
assailed April 3, 2012 Decision and July 25, 2012 Order of Branch 11, Regional
Trial Court, City of Malolos, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 04-M-2012 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is ordered REMANDED to Branch 11, Regional Trial Court,
City of Malolos, Bulacan for continued trial on First Sarmiento Property
Holdings, Inc.’s Complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage and its
amendments.
Citation Ref:
16. Racho vs. Tanaka, 868 SCRA 25, June 25, 2018
Case Title : RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO, a.k.a. “RHODORA RACHO TANAKA,”
petitioner, vs. SEIICHI TANAKA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, and
the ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
order of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Br. 254.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Family Law ; Marriages ; Divorce ; Capacity
to Remarry ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Capacity to Remarry; Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute
dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both parties the legal capacity to
remarry.-
—Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the
matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce. The Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that
would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other
interpretation than that the divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is
absolute and completely terminates their marital tie. Even under our laws, the
effect of the absolute dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both parties
the legal capacity to remarry. Thus, Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
2. Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Divorce; Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a
foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was
validly obtained according to the foreign spouse’s national law.-
—Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a
foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was
validly obtained according to the foreign spouse’s national law, thus: Article
26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. x x x The second paragraph was included to avoid an absurd situation where
a Filipino spouse remains married to the foreign spouse even after a validly
obtained divorce abroad. The addition of the second paragraph gives the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have the marriage considered as dissolved, and
ultimately, to grant him or her the capacity to remarry. Article 26 of the
Family Code is applicable only in issues on the validity of remarriage. It
cannot be the basis for any other liability, whether civil or criminal, that
the Filipino spouse may incur due to remarriage.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus,
our laws require that the divorce decree and the national law of the foreign
spouse must be pleaded and proved like any other fact before trial courts.-
—Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is
insufficient. In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), this Court established
the principle that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this
jurisdiction, a separate action must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus, our laws
require that the divorce decree and the national law of the foreign spouse must
be pleaded and proved like any other fact before trial courts. Hence, in Corpuz
v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010): The starting point in any recognition of a
foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that,
as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in
an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
4. Supreme Court; Question of Fact; Petition for Review on Certiorari; The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of
the Report of Divorce is a question of fact that would not ordinarily be within
the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) ambit to resolve. Issues in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are limited to questions of law.-
—Upon appeal to this Court, however, petitioner submitted a
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce, certifying that the divorce
issued by Susumu Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Prefecture, has been
accepted on December 16, 2009. The seal on the document was authenticated by
Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.
The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce
is a question of fact that would not ordinarily be within this Court’s ambit to
resolve. Issues in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are limited to questions of law.
5. Remedial Law; Evidence; Admissibility of Evidence; Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the
admissibility of official records that are kept in a foreign country requires
that it must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign country.-
—Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the
admissibility of official records that are kept in a foreign country requires
that it must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of
the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign country:
Section 24. Proof of official record.—The record of public documents referred
to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is
in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by an
Authentication issued by Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of the
Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan.
The Authentication further certified that he was authorized to sign the
Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his signature in it
was genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of
the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between
petitioner and respondent. The Regional Trial Court established that according
to the national law of Japan, a divorce by agreement “becomes effective by
notification.” Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce was duly authenticated, the divorce between petitioner and respondent
was validly obtained according to respondent’s national law.
6. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; Equal protection, within the context of Article III,
Section 1 only provides that any legal burden or benefit that is given to men
must also be given to women.-
—In this particular instance, it is the Filipina spouse who
bears the burden of this narrow interpretation, which may be unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides: Section 14. The State
recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. This constitutional
provision provides a more active application than the passive orientation of Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution does, which simply states that no person
shall “be denied the equal protection of the laws.” Equal protection, within
the context of Article III, Section 1 only provides that any legal burden or
benefit that is given to men must also be given to women. It does not require
the State to actively pursue “affirmative ways and means to battle the
patriarchy — that complex of political, cultural, and economic factors that
ensure women’s disempowerment.”
7. Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Divorce; Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes
“validly obtained” and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status
should be given to the Filipino spouse.-
—In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna
Carta for Women, which provides that the State “shall take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to
marriage and family relations.” This necessarily includes the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to
mean that it is irrelevant for courts to determine if it is the foreign spouse
that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce
becomes “validly obtained” and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The
same status should be given to the Filipino spouse.
8. Same; Conflict of Laws; Divorce; It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be
prohibited by her own national laws from something that a foreign law may
allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in
divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.-
—The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse
from initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be
inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national
laws from something that a foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the
prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce proceedings will not be
protecting our own nationals. The Solicitor General’s narrow interpretation of
Article 26 disregards any agency on the part of the Filipino spouse. It
presumes that the Filipino spouse is incapable of agreeing to the dissolution
of the marital bond. It perpetuates the notion that all divorce proceedings are
protracted litigations fraught with bitterness and drama. Some marriages can
end amicably, without the parties harboring any ill will against each other.
The parties could forgo costly court proceedings and opt for, if the national
law of the foreign spouse allows it, a more convenient out-of-court divorce
process. This ensures amity between the former spouses, a friendly atmosphere
for the children and extended families, and financial burden for the family.
9. Same; Family Law; Marriages; Divorce; Patriarchy; To rule that the foreign spouse may remarry, while the
Filipino may not, only contributes to the patriarchy.-
—It is unfortunate that legislation from the past appears to be
more progressive than current enactments. Our laws should never be intended to
put Filipinos at a disadvantage. Considering that the Constitution guarantees
fundamental equality, this Court should not tolerate an unfeeling and callous
interpretation of laws. To rule that the foreign spouse may remarry, while the
Filipino may not, only contributes to the patriarchy. This interpretation
encourages unequal partnerships and perpetuates abuse m intimate relationships.
10. Same; Same; Same; Same; Recent jurisprudence holds that a foreign divorce may be
recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it is validly obtained, regard of
who among the spouses initiated the divorce proceedings.-
—Recent jurisprudence, therefore, holds that a foreign divorce
may be recognized in this jurisdiction as long as it is validly obtained,
regard of who among the spouses initiated the divorce proceedings. The question
in this case, therefore, is not who among the spouses initiated the proceedings
but rather if the divorce obtained by petitioner and respondent was valid. The
Regional Trial Court found that there were two (2) kinds of divorce in Japan:
judicial divorce and divorce by agreement. Petitioner and respondent’s divorce
was considered as a divorce by agreement, which is a valid divorce according to
Japan’s national law.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 199515
Counsel:
Lorenzo U. Padilla for petitioner.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court
June 2, 2011 Decision and October 3, 2011 Order in S.P. Proc. No. 10-0032 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. By virtue of Article 26, second paragraph of the Family
Code and the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce dated December
16, 2009, petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho is declared capacitated to remarry.
Citation Ref:
17. Chavez vs. Marcos, 868 SCRA 251, June 27, 2018
Case Title : FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. IMELDA R. MARCOS,
respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Prosecutors ;
Syllabi:
1. Prosecutors; Prosecutors for the government should always remember that
their work does not end with public announcements relating to the filing of informations
against those who have committed nefarious raids on our public coffers.-
—Prosecutors for the government should always remember that
their work does not end with public announcements relating to the filing of
informations against those who have committed nefarious raids on our public
coffers. Their work is to professionally present the evidence marshalled
through painstaking and fastidious investigation. Prosecutors should avoid the
soundbite that will land them the headlines in all forms of media. Instead,
they should do their work and attain justice and reparations for our people
wronged by selfish conniving politicians who do not deserve their public
offices. Apathetic prosecution allows impunity. It is difficult as enough as it
is to discover wrongdoing, protect key witnesses, preserve the evidence, and
guard against the machinations of powerful and moneyed individuals. Prosecutors
must not only be courageous but must also show their dedication to public
interest through their competence. Otherwise, the system will invite suspicion
that there had been unholy collusion.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall
only pertain to questions of law.-
—A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall only
pertain to questions of law. Further, the Rules of Court mandate that petitions
for review distinctly set forth the questions of law raised.
3. Same; Same; Same; Although the Supreme Court (SC) may, in exceptional cases,
delve into questions of fact, these exceptions must be alleged, substantiated,
and proved by the parties before the Court may evaluate and review facts of the
case.-
—Essentially, petitioner takes issue with how the Court of
Appeals interpreted the acts of Judge Pampilo and found no manifest partiality,
which are clearly not questions of law. He did not even attempt to frame the
issues as questions of law. By claiming that Judge Pampilo violated a writ of
injunction, petitioner attempts to cloak the second alleged error with some
semblance of being a question of law. However, petitioner does not provide any
legal basis or coherent legal argument to support the claim that a writ of
injunction was violated, and this claim is totally specious. Although this
Court may, in exceptional cases, delve into questions of fact, these exceptions
must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties before this Court may
evaluate and review facts of the case. Petitioner having failed to establish the
basis for this Court to evaluate and review the facts in this case, the
petition may be dismissed on this ground.
4. Judges; Disqualification and Inhibition of
Judges; Whether or not to voluntarily inhibit
from hearing a case is a matter within the judge’s discretion.+
5. Same; Same; Allowing a judge to inhibit without concrete proof of
personal interest or any showing that his bias stems from an extrajudicial
source will open the floodgates to abuse.-
—Since the second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1 was
introduced, this Court has periodically repeated that it shall always presume
that a judge will decide on the merits of the case without bias. Allowing a
judge to inhibit without concrete proof of personal interest or any showing
that his bias stems from an extrajudicial source will open the floodgates to
abuse. No concrete proof of Judge Pampilo’s personal interest in the case was
presented. There was no showing that his bias stems from an extrajudicial
source. Not only that, but none of his acts, as shown on the record, was
characterized by any error.
6. Mandatory Trial System; Supreme Court (SC) Administrative Circular No. 3-90
requires all trial courts to adopt the mandatory continuous trial system
pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4 and Circular No. 1-89.-
—Petitioner finds fault in the scheduling of his testimony but
fails to show how it was irregular. He characterizes the scheduling as “noose-tightening,”
for being scheduled on “unreasonably proximate” dates. Far from the scheduling
being evidence of partiality, it was aligned with this Court’s rules on
expeditious disposition of cases and the mandatory continuous trial system.
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-90 requires all trial courts to
adopt the mandatory continuous trial system pursuant to Administrative Circular
No. 4 and Circular No. 1-89.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 185484
Counsel:
Chavez, Miranda, Aseoche Law Offices for petitioner. Robert A.C. Sison for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals’ February 28, 2008 Decision and November 24, 2008 Resolution
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 98799 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
18. Federal Express Corporation vs. Antonino, 868 SCRA
450, June 27, 2018
Case Title : FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LUWALHATI R.
ANTONINO and ELIZA BETTINA RICASA ANTONINO, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ; Diligence Required of Common
Carriers ; Extraordinary Diligence ;
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Contract of Adhesion; Although not automatically void, any ambiguity in a
contract of adhesion is construed strictly against the party that prepared it.-
—The contract between petitioner and respondents is a contract
of adhesion; it was prepared solely by petitioner for respondents to conform
to. Although not automatically void, any ambiguity in a contract of adhesion is
construed strictly against the party that prepared it. Accordingly, the
prohibition against transporting money must be restrictively construed against
petitioner and liberally for respondents. Viewed through this lens, with
greater reason should respondents be exculpated from liability for shipping
documents or instruments, which are reasonably understood as not being money,
and for being unable to declare them as such.
2. Civil Law; Common Carriers; Contract of Carriage; A provision in a contract of carriage requiring the filing
of a formal claim within a specified period is a valid stipulation.-
—Petitioner disclaims liability because of respondents’ failure
to comply with a condition precedent, that is, the filing of a written notice
of a claim for nondelivery or misdelivery within 45 days from acceptance of the
shipment. The Regional Trial Court found the condition precedent to have been
substantially complied with and attributed respondents’ noncompliance to FedEx
for giving them a runaround. This Court affirms this finding. A provision in a
contract of carriage requiring the filing of a formal claim within a specified
period is a valid stipulation. Jurisprudence maintains that compliance with
this provision is a legitimate condition precedent to an action for damages
arising from loss of the shipment.
3. Same; Same; Diligence Required of Common Carriers; Extraordinary Diligence; The Civil Code mandates common carriers to observe
extraordinary diligence in caring for the goods they are transporting.-
—The Civil Code mandates common carriers to observe
extraordinary diligence in caring for the goods they are transporting: Article
1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case. “Extraordinary diligence is
that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and
circumspection use for securing and preserving their own property or rights.”
Consistent with the mandate of extraordinary diligence, the Civil Code
stipulates that in case of loss or damage to goods, common carriers are presumed
to be negligent or at fault, except in the following instances: (1) Flood,
storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of
the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of
the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in
the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act or competent public
authority. In all other cases, common carriers must prove that they exercised
extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties, if they are to be
absolved of liability.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; The responsibility of common carriers to exercise
extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally
placed in their possession until they are delivered “to the consignee, or to
the person who has a right to receive them.”-
—The responsibility of common carriers to exercise extraordinary
diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in their
possession until they are delivered “to the consignee, or to the person who has
a right to receive them.” Thus, part of the extraordinary responsibility of
common carriers is the duty to ensure that shipments are received by none but
“the person who has a right to receive them.” Common carriers must ascertain
the identity of the recipient. Failing to deliver shipment to the designated
recipient amounts to a failure to deliver. The shipment shall then be
considered lost, and liability for this loss ensues.
5. Money; Money is “what is generally acceptable in exchange for
goods.”-
—Money is “what is generally acceptable in exchange for goods.”
It can take many forms, most commonly as coins and banknotes. Despite its
myriad forms, its key element is its general acceptability. Laws usually define
what can be considered as a generally acceptable medium of exchange. In the
Philippines, Republic Act No. 7653, otherwise known as The New Central Bank
Act, defines “legal tender” as follows: All notes and coins issued by the
Bangko Sentral shall be fully guaranteed by the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines and shall be legal tender in the Philippines for all debts,
both public and private: Provided, however, That, un otherwise fixed by the
Monetary Board, coins shall be legal tender in amounts not exceeding Fifty
pesos (P50.00) for denomination of Twenty-five centavos and above, and in
amounts not exceeding Twenty pesos (P20.00) for denominations of Ten centavos
or .
6. Mercantile Law; Negotiable Instruments; Checks; It is settled in jurisprudence that
checks, being only negotiable instruments, are only substitutes for money and
are not legal tender; more
so when the check has a named payee and is not payable to bearer.-
—It is settled in jurisprudence that checks, being only
negotiable instruments, are only substitutes for money and are not legal
tender; more so when the check has a named payee and is not payable to bearer.
In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 557 (1990), this
Court ruled that the payment of a check to the sheriff did not satisfy the
judgment debt as checks are not considered legal tender. This has been
maintained in other cases decided by this Court. In Cebu International Finance
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 488 (1999), this Court held that the
debts paid in a money market transaction through the use of a check is not a
valid tender of payment as a check is not legal tender in the Philippines.
Further, in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 641
(2000), this Court held that “a check, whether a manager’s check or ordinary
check, is not legal tender.”
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 199455
Counsel:
Quisumbing, Torres Law Office for petitioner. Alentajan Law Office for
respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
assailed August 31, 2011 Decision and November 21, 2011 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91216 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
More
19. Abubakar vs. People, 868 SCRA 489, June 27, 2018
Case Title : FAROUK B. ABUBAKAR, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decisions
and resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
Syllabi Class :Arias Doctrine ;
20. Re: Memorandum dated July 10, 2017 from Associate Justice Teresita
J. Leonardo-De Castro, 870 SCRA 16, July 03, 2018
Case Title : RE: MEMORANDUM DATED JULY 10, 2017 FROM ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.
Appointment to the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) Chief of Office for the
Philippine Mediation Center.
Syllabi Class :Supreme Court ; Jurisdiction ; Appointments ; Supreme
Court Human Resources Manual ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court Human Resource Manual (SC HRM)
is the result of a series of consultative, collaborative, and comprehensive
study, [and] serves to benefit both the public and the courts.-
—The SC HR Manual is the “result of a series of consultative,
collaborative, and comprehensive study, [and] serves to benefit both the public
and the courts. On one hand, it draws up a framework within which we in the
Judiciary are to perform our duties towards an effective, efficient, and
economic administration of justice. It also provides a system of checks and
controls to make us accountable as we serve the public. On the other hand, the
Manual also lays down policies to protect the welfare of court officials and
employees, giving us the means to assert our rights as members of the Court. As
a guide, the Manual also serves to steer personnel to the right direction,
allowing us to achieve both professional and personal growth.”
2. Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Appointments; The 1987 Constitution vests the power of
appointment within the judiciary in the Supreme Court (SC); The “Supreme Court” in which this appointing power is
conferred is the Court En Banc.-
—The 1987 Constitution vests the power of appointment within the
judiciary in the Supreme Court. Article VIII, Section 5(6) states: Section 5.
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: . . . . (6) Appoint all
officials and employees of the Judiciary m accordance with the Civil Service
Law. The “Supreme Court” in which this appointing power is conferred is the
Court En Banc: This is in contrast to the President’s power to appoint which is
a self-executing power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject
to legislative limitations or conditions. The power to appoint conferred
directly by the Constitution on the Supreme Court En Banc and on the
Constitutional Commissions is also self-executing and not subject to
legislative limitations or conditions. . . . . Fifth, the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions make a clear distinction whenever granting the power to appoint
lower-ranked officers to members of a collegial body or to the head of that
collegial body. Thus, the 1935 Constitution speaks of vesting the power to
appoint “in the courts, or in the heads of departments.” Similarly, the 1973
Constitution speaks of “members of the Cabinet, courts, heads of agencies,
commissions, and boards.” Also, the 1987 Constitution speaks of vesting the power
to appoint “in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.” This is consistent with Section 5(6), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution which states that the “Supreme Court shall. . . [a]ppoint
all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law,” making the Supreme Court En Banc the appointing power. In sharp
contrast, when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the power to appoint
lower-ranked officers in the Executive branch, it vests the power “in the heads
of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.”
3. Same; Collegial Courts; Since the Supreme Court (SC) is a collegial court, each
Justice has equal power and authority, and all Justices must act on the basis
of consensus or majority rule.-
—Since this Court is a collegial court, each Justice has equal
power and authority, and all Justices must act on the basis of consensus or
majority rule. Even if this Court has a Chief Justice and does much of its work
in divisions, it still remains that this Court must exercise its powers as one
(1) body: There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts
are required to take their bearings. While most of the Court’s work is
performed by its three divisions, the Court remains one court — single,
unitary, complete and supreme. Flowing from this is the fact that, while
individual justices may dissent or only partially concur, when the Court states
what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. Any doctrine or principle of
law laid down by the Court may be modified or reversed only by the Court En
Banc. x x x x The only exception is when the Court En Banc itself delegates the
exercise of some of its powers.
4. Same; Delegation of Powers; The Supreme Court (SC), which is conferred with not only
the power of judicial review, but also the role of administrator over all
courts and their personnel, has found it necessary to delegate some matters to
dispense justice effectively and efficiently.-
—“The three powers of government — executive, legislative, and
judicial — have been generally viewed as nondelegable.” Nonethe, the delegation
of these powers has been found necessary owing to the complexity of modern
governments. This Court, which is conferred with not only the power of judicial
review, but also the role of administrator over all courts and their personnel,
has found it necessary to delegate some matters to dispense justice effectively
and efficiently. Being the source of authority, every act in relation to a
delegated power may, however, be reviewed by the delegating authority. This is
to ensure that the act of the delegate does not go beyond its intended scope.
This Court has resolved to delegate the disposition of certain matters to its
three (3) divisions, to their chairpersons, or to the Chief Justice alone.
Under Administrative Circular No. 37-2001A dated August 21, 2001, the Chief
Justice, with the concurrence of the Chairs of Divisions, may select the
appointees for Assistant Chief of Office and higher positions.
5. Same; Jurisdiction; Appointments; Supreme Court Human Resource Manual; Adopted in 2012, the Supreme Court Human Resource Manual
(SC HRM) states the procedure of appointment of positions within the Supreme
Court. The selection of appointees in career service differs according to the
level of the position.-
—Adopted in 2012, the Supreme Court Human Resource Manual states
the procedure of appointment of positions within this Court. The selection of
appointees in career service differs according to the level of the position.
First level career positions “include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial
service positions involving nonprofessional or subprofessional work in a
nonsupervisory capacity requiring than
four (4) years of collegiate studies.” Second-level positions are
“professional, technical, and scientific positions involving professional,
technical, or scientific work in a supervisory or nonsupervisory capacity up to
Division Chief level, requiring at least four (4) years of collegiate studies.”
The screening and recommendation of appointees to vacancies in the first and
second levels are made by the Supreme Court Selection and Promotion Board. The
recommendations are given to the Chief Justice who, with the concurrence of the
Chairpersons of the Divisions, selects the candidate deemed most qualified to
be appointed. Third-level positions are “positions from Court Attorney V to
Chiefs of Offices which have been classified by the Court as highly technical
and/or policy determining pursuant to AM No. 05-9-29-SC, dated September 27,
2005.” Under the Supreme Court Human Resource Manual, these positions are
filled in by the Chief Justice, with the concurrence of the Chairpersons of the
Divisions.
6. Same; Same; Same; Third-Level Positions; Supreme Court Human Resources Manual; Under A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC, third-level positions in the
Supreme Court (SC) with salary grade twenty-six (26) and above, excluding the
Chief Justice (CJ), the Associate Justices, and the Regular Members of the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) are classified as “highly technical or
policy-determining.”-
—Under A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC, third-level positions in this Court
with salary grade 26 and above, excluding the Chief Justice, the Associate
Justices, and the Regular Members of the Judicial and Bar Council are
classified as “highly technical or policy-determining.” These positions range
from the PHILJA Chancellor and Court Administrator, both with salary grade 31,
to Court Attorney V and PHILJA Attorney V, both with salary grade 26.
7. Same; Delegation of Powers; Any ambiguity or vagueness in the delegation of powers
must be resolved in favor of nondelegation.-
—Any ambiguity or vagueness in the delegation of powers must be
resolved in favor of nondelegation. To do otherwise is to permit an abdication
of the “duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his
own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.” This is
demonstrated by the requirement for a valid delegation of legislative power
that both the completeness and sufficient standard tests must be passed. Here,
the delegation of the power of appointment by this Court to the Chairpersons of
the Divisions in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised), while seemingly broad as to
encompass all appointments of personnel in the judiciary, is contradicted by
this Court’s Resolutions and practices, both prior to and following its
adoption. Several third-level positions within the Judiciary, such as the Court
Administrator, Deputy Court Administrators, and Assistant Court Administrators,
as well as third-level PHILJA officials, continue to be appointed by the Court
En Banc, and not by the Chairpersons of the Divisions. The extent of the
delegation of the appointive power to the Chairpersons of the Divisions should
be determined by the Court En Banc because of the contradictions between the
text of A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised) and this Court’s own practices. Its
resolution should not be left to the discretion of those to whom the power has
been delegated, including the Chief Justice and the Chairpersons of the
Divisions. At the very least, the Court En Banc should be given the opportunity
to correct or resolve the ambiguity in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised).
8. Same; Office of the Administrative Services; The Supreme Court (SC) Office of Administrative Services
cannot make any binding interpretation of the En Banc Resolutions of the SC,
including those concerning administrative matters. Only the SC, acting En Banc,
may do so.-
—A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC cannot be relied upon as a basis for the
extent of the delegated appointing power, there being no clear and unequivocal
adoption by this Court of the classification of positions in it for the
purposes of A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised). Moreover, the Supreme Court Office
of Administrative Services cannot make any binding interpretation of the En
Banc Resolutions of this Court, including those concerning administrative
matters. Only this Court, acting En Banc, may do so. At the very least,
considering that contrary interpretations may arise over this Court’s previous
practice of appointing the PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation
Center, any changes to the appointing process should have been referred to the
Court En Banc for consultation. The power of appointment in the judiciary being
vested by the Constitution in the Court En Banc, any delegation or diminution
thereof must be resolved by the Court En Banc.
9. Same; PHILJA Chief of Office for the
Philippine Mediation Center; Under
Administrative Order No. 33-2008, the appointment of the Philippine Judicial
Academy (PHILJA) Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC)
shall be made “by the Supreme Court (SC), upon recommendation of PHILJA.”-
—Under Administrative Order No. 33-2008, the appointment of the
PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center shall be made “by
the Court, upon recommendation of PHILJA.” Prior to the appointment of Atty.
Mendoza, it is evident that this Court’s practice is to have the Court En Banc
issue the appointment following the recommendation made by the PHILJA Board of
Trustees, as evidenced by a Board Resolution. Parenthetically, this was also
the position of the Chief Justice in 2015. In line with this Court’s prior Resolutions
and further to its interpretation that the “recommendation of PHILJA” means the
recommendation of the PHILJA Board of Trustees, there must be a Resolution
issued by the PHILJA Board of Trustees, stating its recommendation for the
position of the PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center.
This is regard of any other methods employed by PHILJA to evaluate its
personnel recommendations to this Court.
10. Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Appointments; Delegated Powers; Third-Level Positions; View that A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised)
empowers the Chairmen of the Divisions to act for and in behalf of the Supreme
Court (SC) En Banc in rendering the appropriate action or resolution of
administrative matters relating to, or in connection with the “appointment of
regular (including coterminous), temporary, casual, or contractual personnel in
the SC, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the Lower Courts (including
the Shari’a courts), the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), and the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC); officers and members of existing committees; and consultants.”-
—It is clear that the 1987 Constitution vests the power of
appointment within the judiciary in the Supreme Court. Article VIII, Section
5(6) provides: Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: x
x x x (6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law. Nonethe, such power may be delegated and the Court
resolved to delegate this power to its three divisions, or their Chairpersons,
or to the Chief Justice alone. Consequently, on April 22, 2003, this Court
issued its Resolution in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC, entitled “Referral of
Administrative Matters and Cases to the Divisions of the Court, The Chief
Justice, and to the Chairmen of the Divisions for Appropriate Action or
Resolution” (A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised). A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised)
empowers the Chairmen of the Divisions to act for and in behalf of the Court En
Banc in rendering the appropriate action or resolution of administrative
matters relating to, or in connection with the “appointment of regular
(including coterminous), temporary, casual, or contractual personnel in the
Supreme Court, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, the Lower Courts (including
the Shari’a courts), the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), and the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC); officers and members of existing committees; and
consultants.”
11. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the selection of appointees to third-level
positions which have been classified as highly technical and/or policy
determining pursuant to A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC dated September 27, 2005 shall be
made by the Chief Justice (CJ) with the concurrence of the Chairmen of the
Divisions.-
—In Chapter Two of the Supreme Court Human Resource Manual (SC
HR Manual), entitled Personnel Policies and Procedures, which was approved by
the Court En Banc as A.M. No. 00-6-1-SC dated January 31, 2012, it was stated
that in filling career positions, the Chief Justice shall assess the merits of
the Selection and Promotion Board’s recommendation for appointment and in the
exercise of his sound discretion and with the concurrence of the Chairpersons
of the Divisions, pursuant to A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC, select the candidate who is
most qualified for appointment to the position. The selection of appointees to
third-level positions which have been classified as highly technical and/or
policy determining pursuant to A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC dated September 27, 2005
shall be made by the Chief Justice with the concurrence of the Chairmen of the
Divisions.
12. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that there is no doubt that the Supreme Court (SC) En
Banc has delegated the power to appoint personnel to the Chief Justice (CJ)
with the concurrence of the Chairpersons of the Divisions.-
—There is no doubt that the Court En Banc has delegated the
power to appoint personnel to the Chief Justice with the concurrence of the
Chairpersons of the Divisions. As such, it is humbly submitted that the
appointment of Atty. Brenda Jay A. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) as PHILJA Chief of
Office for the Philippine Mediation Center was validly made in accordance with
the rules and practice. Moreover, Atty. Mendoza was qualified and recommended
by the PHILJA, through Chancellor Justice Azcuna, to be appointed for the
vacant position, to wit: After due deliberation, Atty. Brenda Jay
Angeles-Mendoza topped the screening process, with a rating of 93.96%. With her
commendable educational background, training and experience, both in law and in
alternative dispute resolution, we highly recommend Atty. Mendoza as PHILJA
Chief of Office for Philippine Mediation Center (PMC). The undersigned relied
in good faith that there was compliance with the pertinent niles for the appointment
of Atty. Mendoza because of the recommendation of Chancellor Justice Azcuna.
13. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Chief Justice (CJ) and the Chairpersons of
the Supreme Court (SC) may rely on the report and recommendation made by Chancellor
Justice Azcuna in the appointment of Atty. Mendoza because it is already
compliant with Administrative Order No. 33-2008.-
—As stated by Acting Chancellor Justice Callejo in his Comment
dated October 27, 2017, the recommendation of Chancellor Justice Azcuna was
fully compliant with Section 2(B) of Administrative Order No. 33-2008 which
states that the PHILJA may only recommend the PHILJA Chief of Office for the
Philippine Mediation Center to the Supreme Court. The said provision does not
specifically indicate that the recommendation for the position of the PHILJA
Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center must come only from the
PHILJA Board of Trustees. Thus, as Acting Chancellor Justice Callejo opined, it
is clear that Section 2(B) of Administrative Order No. 33-2008 authorizes the
following: (1) Chair and Members of the PHILJA Board of Trustees; and/or (2)
Chancellor Justice Azcuna; and/or (3) the other executive officials of the
PHILJA. Any of them can recommend to the Supreme Court their nominees for
appointment of PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center.
Hence, the Chief Justice and the Chairpersons of the Supreme Court may rely on
the report and recommendation made by Chancellor Justice Azcuna in the
appointment of Atty. Mendoza because it is already compliant with
Administrative Order No. 33-2008.
14. Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Appointments; View that Section II(a) of A.M. No.
99-12-08-SC (Revised) dated May 1, 2003 referred to the Chief Justice (CJ) and
Chairpersons of the Divisions for appropriate action or resolution, for and in
behalf of the Supreme Court (SC) En Banc, administrative matters relating to or
in connection with the appointment of “regular (including coterminous),
temporary, casual, or contractual personnel in the SC, Court of Appeals (CA),
Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), the Lower Courts (including Shari’a
courts), the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), and Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC); officers and
members of existing committees; and
consultants.”-
—Section II(a) of A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised) dated May 1,
2003 referred to the Chief Justice and Chairpersons of the Divisions for
appropriate action or resolution, for and in behalf of the Court En Banc,
administrative matters relating to or in connection with the appointment of
“regular (including coterminous), temporary, casual, or contractual personnel
in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals,
the Lower Courts (including Shari’a courts), the PHILJA, and Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC); officers and members of existing committees; and consultants.”
15. Same; Same; Same; Third-Level Positions; View that I cannot subscribe to the overbroad
interpretation of the term “personnel” in Section II(a) of A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC
(Revised) as to refer to all employees of the Judiciary, even including those
in third-level positions.-
—I cannot subscribe to the overbroad interpretation of the term
“personnel” in Section II(a) of A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised) as to refer to
all employees of the Judiciary, even including those in third-level positions.
Such interpretation will result in the absurd situation in which the
Chairpersons of the Divisions are considered vested with the delegated power of
appointment over all positions in the Supreme Court below the Chief Justice and
Associate Justices, that would include even the positions of PHILJA Chancellor,
Vice Chancellor, and Assistant Chancellor; Court Administrator, Deputy Court
Administrator, and Assistant Court Administrator; Clerk of Court, Assistant
Clerk of Court, Division Clerk of Court, and Assistant Division Clerk of Court.
16. Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Chapter Two, Section II(A) of the Supreme Court
Human Resource Manual (SC HRM), approved on January 31, 2012, providing the
Procedure in Filling Career Positions-
— which stated that “[t]he selection of appointees to
third-level positions which have been classified by the SC as highly technical
and/or policy determining pursuant to A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC dated September 27,
2005 shall be made by the Chief Justice (CJ) with the concurrence of the
Chairmen of the Divisions pursuant to A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC” — applies only to
personnel in the Judiciary whose appointments must be screened by the Supreme
Court Selection and Promotion Board as mentioned in the said SC HRM
provisions.—A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC dated September 27, 2005 merely classified all
third-level positions in the Supreme Court, including the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), PHILJA, JBC, and Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Office (MCLEO), with Salary Grade 26 and above as highly technical or policy
determining. It contains no provision at all on the delegation by the Court En
Banc of its power to appoint to said third-level positions. Hence, the said
Resolution cannot be used as a basis to remove from the Court En Banc the
constitutional authority of appointment to third-level positions classified as
highly technical or policy determining. Chapter Two, Section II(A) of the
SC-HRM, approved on January 31, 2012, providing the Procedure in Filling Career
Positions — which stated that “[t]he selection of appointees to third-level
positions which have been classified by the Court as highly technical and/or
policy determining pursuant to A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC dated September 27, 2005
shall be made by the Chief Justice with the concurrence of the Chairmen of the
Divisions pursuant to A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC” — applies only to personnel in the
Judiciary whose appointments must be screened by the Supreme Court Selection
and Promotion Board as mentioned in the said SC HRM provisions. It is not
applicable to the PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center,
whose appointment is governed particularly by Administrative Order No. 33-2008
of the Court En Banc. Under said Administrative Order, it is the PHILJA Board
of Trustees which screens and recommends to the Court En Banc the appointment
of the PHILJA Chief of Office for the Philippine Mediation Center.
17. Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court Human Resource Manual; View that the Supreme Court Human Resource Manual (SC HRM)
is a mere compilation of laws, issuances, and circulars governing personnel and
records management for the Judiciary and it is not intended to repeal, modify,
or set aside existing rules, regulations, or resolutions specifically adopted
by the Supreme Court (SC) En Banc.-
—I stress once more that the SC HRM is a mere compilation of
laws, issuances, and circulars governing personnel and records management for
the Judiciary and it is not intended to repeal, modify, or set aside existing
rules, regulations, or resolutions specifically adopted by the Court En Banc.
Despite the reference by the SC HRM to A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised) and A.M.
No. 05-9-29-SC, there is nothing in said Resolutions to support the purported
delegation by the Court En Banc to the Chief Justice and the Chairpersons of
the other Divisions of its power to appoint to third-level positions in the
Judiciary classified as highly technical and/or policy determining and those
which are covered by specific law like Presidential Decree No. 842 (1975)
creating the office of the Court Administrator and the Court En Banc issuances.
18. Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Appointments; Delegation of Powers; View that the delegation of the power to appoint personnel
by the Supreme Court (SC) En Banc to the Chief Justice (CJ) with the
concurrence of the Division Chairmen is clearly within the inherent power of
the Court En Banc.-
—Chapter Two of the Supreme Court Human Resources Manual (SC HR
Manual), entitled “Personnel Policies and Procedures,” which was approved by
the Court En Banc as A.M. No. 00-6-1-SC dated January 31, 2012 provides the
procedure in filling Career Positions, which include the Chief Justice’s
assessment of the merits of the Selection and Promotion Board’s recommendation
for appointment and the selection of appointees to third-level positions which
have been classified by the Court as highly technical and/or policy-determining
pursuant to A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC dated September 27, 2005 by the Chief Justice
with the concurrence of the Chairmen of the Divisions pursuant to A.M. No.
99-12-08-SC. There is, as well, no question that the delegation of the power to
appoint personnel by the Court En Banc to the Chief Justice with the concurrence
of the Division Chairmen is clearly within the inherent power of the Court En
Banc. There is also no dispute that this delegation was impelled by the desire
to en the administrative burden of the Court En Banc. With the adoption of the
SC HR Manual in 2012 by the Court En Banc, there is no question in my mind that
this desire subsisted then and that the pros and cons of such delegation were
surely ventilated and thoroughly discussed. Proceeding to the matter on the
appointment of Atty. Brenda Jay C. Angeles-Mendoza (Atty. Angeles-Mendoza) as
Philippine Mediation Center Office (PMCO) Chief of Office, the Comment dated
October 27, 2017 of the PHILJA Acting Chancellor, Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr.,
proposes that the validity of the appointment should be determined based on the
resolution of two sub-issues, namely: (1) whether the PHILJA through a
Resolution of the Board of Trustees (BOT) is mandated to recommend the
appointment of Atty. Angeles-Mendoza as PMCO Chief of Office under Section 2(B)
of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 33-2008 issued on February 12, 2008
(adopting A.M. No. 08-2-5-SC-PHILJA); and (2) whether the Court En Banc should
act on and approve or deny the recommendation of the PHILJA BOT for the
appointment of Atty. Angeles-Mendoza. I concur that this proposal is the
correct approach.
19. Same; Same; Same; View that in respect of Atty. Angeles-Mendoza’s
appointment, that the failure to follow the “strict view,” i.e., requiring a
Board of Trustees’ (BOT) Resolution, as espoused by Justice De Castro, is not a
fatal defect that cannot be remedied. To date, and this is not disputed, the
Philippine Judicial Academy Board of Trustees (PHILJA BOT) has not revoked
Chancellor Justice Azcuna’s recommendation of Atty. Angeles-Mendoza’s appointment.-
—While there may be a need to clarity what actions require
PHILJA BOT approval and recommendation and whether a specific BOT resolution is
required to accompany such approval and recommendation, I take the view, in
respect of Atty. Angeles-Mendoza’s appointment, that the failure to follow the
“strict view,” i.e., requiring a BOT Resolution, as espoused by Justice De
Castro, is not a fatal defect that cannot be remedied. To date, and this is not
disputed, the PHILJA BOT has not revoked Chancellor Justice Azcuna’s
recommendation of Atty. Angeles-Mendoza’s appointment. Neither has the PHILJA
BOT questioned Chancellor Justice Azcuna’s action. Moreover, as Atty.
Angeles-Mendoza had stated in her Memorandum, she had been invited to attend
meetings of the PHILJA BOT to report and answer queries about important PMC
policy matters. In other words, the fact that PHILJA BOT has not, to date, done
any act to countermand the actions of Chancellor Justice Azcuna’s
recommendation and action leads me to believe that there has, at the very
least, been an implied ratification of Chancellor Justice Azcuna’s
recommendation.
20. Same; Same; Same; Third-Level Positions; Supreme Court Human Resources Manual; View that the Supreme Court Human Resource Manual (SC HRM)
(approved on January 31, 2012) provides that the appointment and the selection
of appointees to third-level positions which have been classified by the SC as
highly technical and/or policy-determining pursuant to A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC
requires only the approval of the Chief Justice (CJ) with the concurrence of
the Chairmen of the Divisions pursuant to A.M. No. 99-12- 08-SC.-
—Proceeding to the second sub-issue, the PMCO Chief of Office
has a Salary Grade of 30 which is the same as that of an Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals. A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC (September 27, 2005) provides that
any third-level position with Salary Grade 26 or higher which may thereafter be
created in the Court, PHILJA or JBC will, un otherwise indicated, be deemed
highly technical or policy-determining. In turn, the SC HR Manual (approved on
January 31, 2012) provides that the appointment and the selection of appointees
to third-level positions which have been classified by the Court as highly
technical and/or policy-determining pursuant to A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC requires
only the approval of the Chief Justice with the concurrence of the Chairmen of
the Divisions pursuant to A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC.
21. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that since it was adopted prior to Atty.
Angeles-Mendoza’s appointment, the Supreme Court Human Resource Manual (SC HRM)
should control and be applied accordingly to determine the validity of Atty.
Angeles-Mendoza’s appointment. The appointment of Atty. Angeles-Mendoza by the
Chief Justice (CJ) and the Chairpersons of the Second and Third Divisions of
the SC is, as stated earlier, in conformity with the SC HR Manual.-
—Since the SC HR Manual expressly took into consideration both
A.M. No. 05-9-29-SC and A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised), I see no ambiguity or vagueness
in the delegated power of appointment by the Chief Justice and the Chairpersons
of the Second and Third Divisions. As of its adoption on January 31, 2012, the
SC HR Manual should govern the appointments of personnel in the Judiciary.
Since it was adopted prior to Atty. Angeles Mendoza’s appointment, the SC HR
Manual should control and be applied accordingly to determine the validity of
Atty. Angeles-Mendoza’s appointment. The appointment of Atty. Angeles-Mendoza
by the Chief Justice and the Chairpersons of the Second and Third Divisions of
the Court is, as stated earlier, in conformity with the SC-HR Manual. I take
the position that the observation in the Resolution that the rules of
appointment in the SC HR Manual “have been inconsistently applied, or
contradict this Court’s own practices” does not per se invalidate the
appointment of Atty. Angeles-Mendoza because her appointment was consistent
with the SC HR Manual. There is legal basis for her appointment, and until the
SC HR Manual is amended or superseded, it must be accorded legal respect.
22. Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court Human Resources Manual; View that in private institutions, a Human Resource Manual
(HRM) or employee handbook is required to be read and conformed to prior to
employment. It is part of the employment contract.-
—In private institutions, an HR Manual or employee handbook is
required to be read and conformed to prior to employment. It is part of the
employment contract. This is so because the current policies on personnel, including
their appointment, promotion, separation, benefits, privileges, leaves and
travel, are part thereof. To a private employee, it is a Bible so to speak of
what he expects from his employer and vice-versa. Thus, the SC HR Manual is not
inconsequential and non-binding. To be sure, I refer to the following Message
of the late Chief Justice Renato C. Corona: x x x the Human Resource Manual
[is] a specific set of guidelines for us men and women in the Judiciary in the
exercise of our duties as administrators of justice. x x x x The Judiciary’s
high regard for integrity dismisses any argument for the redundancy of the
Manual in ensuring the proper functioning of our courts. Indeed, just as it
cannot be overemphasized that the credibility of our courts depends on the
confidence of the people in the Judiciary, so can we not over stress to members
of the Court the need for a clean, competent, and cohesive judicial workforce.
This Manual, covering justices, judges, officials, and employees in courts all
over the country, gives members of the judicial branch a clearer picture of the
exacting standards required from us in the delivery of judicial services, from
the moment we enter the Judiciary, to every minute spent at work, to the time
we leave the service.
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: A.M. No. 17-07-05-SC
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the PHILJA Board of
Trustees is INSTRUCTED to commence with its selection process for its
recommendations to the position of the PHILJA Chief of Office of the Philippine
Mediation Center. The Philippine Judicial Academy shall present its
recommendations within sixty (60) days from receipt of this resolution. The
official who is the next most senior in rank shall be the officer-in-charge of
the Philippine Mediation Center Office until the appointment of the new PHILJA
Chief of Office of the Philippine Mediation Center. The rules on the
appointment of personnel to the Judiciary, as clarified in this Resolution, are
amended. The delegation to the Chief Justice and the Chairpersons of the
Divisions in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC (Revised) of the power of appointment and
revocation or renewal of appointments of personnel in this Court, Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, the Lower Courts including the
Shari’a courts, the Philippine Judicial Academy, and the Judicial and Bar
Council shall not be deemed to include personnel with salary grades 29 and
higher, and those with judicial rank.
Citation Ref:
21. Abuda vs. L. Natividad Poultry Farms, 870 SCRA 468, July
04, 2018
Case Title : MARIO A. ABUDA, RODOLFO DEL REMEDIOS, EDWARDO DEL REMEDIOS,
RODOLFO L. ZAMORA, DIONISIO ADLAWAN, ELPIDIO GARCIA, JR., ROGELIO ZAMORA, SR.,
JIMMY TORRES, POLICARPIO OBANEL, JOSE FERNANDO, JOHNNY BETACHE, JAYSON GARCIA,
EDWIN ESPE, NEMENCIO CRUZ, LARRY ABAÑES, ROLANDO SALEN, JOSEPH TORRES,
FRANCISCO LIM, ARNALDO GARCIA, WILFREDO BROÑOLA, GLENN MORAN, JOSE GONZALES,
ROGER MARTINEZ, JAIME CAPELLAN, RICHARD ORING, JEREMIAS CAPELLAN, ARNEL
CAPELLAN, MELCHOR CAPELLAN, ROLLY PUGOY, JOEY GADONES, ARIES CATIANG, LEONEL
LATUGA, VICENTE GO, TEMMIE C. NAWAL and EDUARDO A. CAPILLAN, petitioners, vs.
L. NATIVIDAD POULTRY FARMS, JULIANA NATIVIDAD, and MERLINDA NATIVIDAD,
respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ; Petition for
Review on Certiorari ; Illegal Dismissal ;
Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Illegal Dismissal; Illegal dismissal is essentially a factual issue, and
therefore, not proper in a Rule 45 petition.-
—Illegal dismissal is essentially a factual issue, and
therefore, not proper in a Rule 45 petition. This Court does not try facts.
Moreover, the labor tribunals and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that
petitioners were not illegally dismissed.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; When a decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) decided under
Rule 65 is brought to the Supreme Court (SC) through a petition for review
under Rule 45, the general rule is that the Supreme Court may only pass upon
questions of law.-
—When a decision of the Court of Appeals decided under Rule 65
is brought to this Court through a petition for review under Rule 45, the
general rule is that this Court may only pass upon questions of law. Meralco
Industrial Engineering Services Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
548 SCRA 315 (2008), emphasized as follows: This Court is not a trier of facts.
Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to
reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, un the factual findings complained
of are completely devoid of support from the evidence on record, or the
assailed judgment is based on a gross misapprehension of facts. Besides,
factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the [National Labor Relations
Commission], when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive upon the
parties and binding on this Court.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial review under Rule 45 is confined to the question
of whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA) correctly “determined the presence
or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the [National Labor Relations
Commission’s (NLRC’s)] decision before it and not on the basis of whether the
[National Labor Relations Commission’s] decision on the merits of the case was
correct.”-
—Judicial review under Rule 45 is confined to the question of
whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly “determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the [National Labor Relations
Commission’s] decision before it and not on the basis of whether the [National
Labor Relations Commission’s] decision on the merits of the case was correct.”
Respondents deny that the petitioners, who claim to be maintenance personnel
are their employees and declare that they were hired by independent
contractors, who exercised control over them and paid their wages.
4. Labor Law; Labor-Only Contracting; Labor-only contracting is prohibited as
it is seen as a circumvention of labor laws; thus, the labor-only contractor is treated as a mere agent
or intermediary of its principal.-
—Labor-only contracting is prohibited as it is seen as a
circumvention of labor laws; thus, the labor-only contractor is treated as a
mere agent or intermediary of its principal. The Court of Appeals found that
San Mateo and petitioner Del Remedios were not independent contractors but
labor-only contractors since they did not have substantial investment in the
form of tools, equipment, or work premises. As labor-only contractors, they
were considered to be agents of respondent L. Natividad.
5. Same; Pakyaw; Words and Phrases; A pakyaw or task basis arrangement defines the manner of
payment of wages and not the relationship between the parties.-
—A pakyaw or task basis arrangement defines the manner of
payment of wages and not the relationship between the parties. Payment through
pakyaw or task basis is provided for in Articles 97(f) and 101 of the Labor
Code: Article 97. Definitions.—As used in this Title: . . . . (f) “Wage” paid
to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however designated,
capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a
time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the
same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or
unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services
rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonable value, as
determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, of board, lodging, or
other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the employee. “Fair
and reasonable value” shall not include any profit to the employer, or to any
person affiliated with the employer. . . . . Article 101. Payment by
results.—(a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall regulate the payment
of wages by results, including pakyaw, piecework, and other nontime work, in
order to ensure the payment of fair and reasonable wage rates, preferably through
time and motion studies or in consultation with representatives of workers’ and
employers’ organizations.
6. Same; Employer-Employee Relationship; Four (4)-Fold Test; Four (4)-Fold Test to Determine the Existence of
Employer-Employee Relationship.-
—A resort to the four (4)-fold test of “(1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of
dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee’s conduct” also
strengthens the finding that respondent L. Natividad is petitioners’ employer.
Respondents hired petitioners directly or through petitioner Del Remedios, a
supervisor at respondents’ farm. They likewise paid petitioners’ wages, as seen
by the vouchers issued to Del Remedios and San Mateo. They also had the power
of dismissal inherent in their power to select and engage their employees. Most
importantly though, they controlled petitioners and their work output by
maintaining an attendance sheet and by giving them specific tasks and
assignments. With an employer-employee relationship between respondent L.
Natividad and petitioners duly established, the next question for resolution is
whether petitioners can be considered to be regular employees.
7. Same; Regular Employees; Words and Phrases; A regular employee is an employee who
is: 1) engaged to perform tasks usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, un the employment is one for a specific
project or undertaking or where the work is seasonal and for the duration of a
season; or 2) has rendered at least one (1) year
of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, with respect to the
activity for which he is employed and his employment continues as long as such
activity exists.-
—A regular employee is an employee who is: 1) engaged to perform
tasks usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, un the employment is one for a specific project or undertaking or
where the work is seasonal and for the duration of a season; or 2) has rendered
at least 1 year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, with
respect to the activity for which he is employed and his employment continues
as long as such activity exists. x x x x This finds basis in Article 280 of the
Labor Code which provides: Article 295. [280] Regular and casual
employment.—The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding
and regard of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed
to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season. An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one
year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
8. Same; Same; Maintenance Personnel; A careful review of petitioners’ activity as maintenance
personnel and of the entirety of respondents’ business convinces the Supreme
Court (SC) that they performed activities which were necessary and desirable to
respondents’ business of poultry and livestock production.-
—A careful review of petitioners’ activity as maintenance
personnel and of the entirety of respondents’ business convinces this Court
that they performed activities which were necessary and desirable to
respondents’ business of poultry and livestock production. As maintenance
personnel, petitioners performed “repair works and maintenance services such as
fixing livestock and poultry houses and facilities as well as doing construction
activities within the premises of [L. Natividad’s] farms and other sales
outlets for an uninterrupted period of three (3) to seventeen (17) years.”
Respondents had several farms and offices in Quezon City and Montalban,
including Patiis Farm, where petitioners were regularly deployed to perform
repair and maintenance work. At first glance it may appear that maintenance
personnel are not necessary to a poultry and livestock business. However, in
this case, respondents kept several farms, offices, and sales outlets, meaning
that they had animal houses and other related structures necessary to their
business that needed constant repair and maintenance.
9. Same; Same; Same; Being regular employees, petitioners, who were maintenance
personnel, enjoyed security of tenure and the termination of their services
without just cause entitles them to reinstatement and full backwages, inclusive
of allowances and other benefits.-
—Being regular employees, petitioners, who were maintenance
personnel, enjoyed security of tenure and the termination of their services
without just cause entitles them to reinstatement and full backwages, inclusive
of allowances and other benefits.
10. Same; Termination of Employment; Moral Damages; Exemplary Damages; The termination of employment without just cause or due
process does not immediately justify the award of moral and exemplary damages.-
—The prayer for moral and exemplary damages must be denied. The
termination of employment without just cause or due process does not
immediately justify the award of moral and exemplary damages. Philippine School
of Business Administration v. National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 189
(1996), stated: This Court however cannot sustain the award of moral and
exemplary damages in favor of private respondents. Such an award cannot be
justified solely upon the premise that the employer fired his employee without
just cause or due process. Additional facts must be pleaded and proved to
warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil Code. The act of dismissal
must be attended with bad faith, or fraud or was oppressive to labor or done in
a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy and, of course, that
social humiliation, wounded feelings, or grave anxiety resulted therefrom.
Similarly, exemplary damages are recoverable only when the dismissal was
effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. x x x x Petitioners
maintain that their employments were terminated by respondents in an
“oppressive, malicious and unjustified manner,” yet they failed to explain or
illustrate how their dismissal was oppressive, malicious, or unjustified. It is
not enough that they were dismissed without due process. Additional acts of the
employers must also be pleaded and proved to show that their dismissal was
tainted with bad faith or fraud, was oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Petitioners failed
to allege any acts by respondents which would justify the award of moral or
exemplary damages.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 200712
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition.
The assailed October 11, 2011 Decision and February 8, 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 117681 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The following petitioners are DECLARED to be regular employees of L. Natividad
Poultry Farms and are ORDERED to be REINSTATED to their former positions and to
be PAID their backwages, allowances, and other benefits from the time of their
illegal dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement: a) Rodolfo Del
Remedios b) Edwardo Del Remedios c) Dionisio Adlawan d) Elpidio Garcia, Jr. e)
Rogelio Zamora, Sr. f) Jimmy Torres g) Policarpio Obanel h) Jose Fernando i)
Johnny Betache j) Jayson Garcia k) Edwin Espe l) Nemencio Cruz m) Larry Abañes
n) Rolando Salen o) Francisco Lim p) Arnaldo Garcia q) Mario Abuda r) Rodolfo
Zamora The monetary awards shall bear the legal interest rate of six percent
(6%) per annum to be computed from the finality of this Decision until full
payment. The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of
backwages and other monetary awards due to petitioners.
Citation Ref:
22. Lee vs. Sales, 870 SCRA 516, July 04, 2018
Case Title : ELMER P. LEE, petitioner, vs. ESTELA V. SALES, DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER LEGAL AND INSPECTION GROUP; EFREN P. MARTINEZ, CHIEF PERSONNEL
INQUIRY DIVISION; NESTOR S. VALEROSO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REVENUE REGION NO. 8;
and ALL OF THE BIR AND ALL PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR ORDERS OR BEHALF,
respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the order of the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Br. 105.
Syllabi Class :Ombudsman ; Judgments ; Injunction ;
Syllabi:
1. Ombudsman; Judgments; Injunction; Since decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory
even pending appeal, it follows that they may not be stayed by the issuance of
an injunctive writ.-
—Since decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even
pending appeal, it follows that they may not be stayed by the issuance of an
injunctive writ. It bears noting that for an injunction to issue, the right of
the person seeking its issuance must be clear and unmistakable. However, no
such right of petitioner exists to stay the execution of the penalty of
dismissal. There is no vested interest in an office, or an absolute right to
hold office. Petitioner is deemed preventively suspended and should his motion
for reconsideration be granted or his eventual appeal won, he will be entitled
to the salary and emoluments he did not receive in the meantime. Further, it is
the legally mandated duty of respondents to implement the Office of the
Ombudsman’s decision. If they refused or failed to comply with the Ombudsman’s
order to dismiss petitioner from service, then they would be liable for
disciplinary action, pursuant to Rule III, Section 7 of Administrative Order
No. 07, as amended.
2. Ombudsman; Both Administrative Order No. 17 and Memorandum Circular
No. 01, Series of 2006 were issued by the Ombudsman, an independent
Constitutional office, pursuant to its rule-making power under the 1987
Constitution and Republic Act (RA) No. 6770 to effectively exercise its mandate
to investigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office, or
agency, when this act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.-
—Both Administrative Order No. 17 and Memorandum Circular No.
01, Series of 2006 were issued by the Ombudsman, an independent Constitutional
office, pursuant to its rule-making power under the 1987 Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6770 to effectively exercise its mandate to investigate any
act or omission of any public official, employee, office, or agency, when this
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. For
this Court to not give deference to the Ombudsman’s discretion would be to
interfere with its Constitutional power to promulgate its own rules for the
execution of its decisions.
3. Same; Policy of Noninterference; To uphold its independence, the Supreme Court (SC) has
adopted a general policy of noninterference with the exercise of the Ombudsman
of its prosecutorial and investigatory powers.-
—The Ombudsman is the Constitutional body tasked to preserve the
integrity of public service, and must be beholden to no one. To uphold its
independence, this Court has adopted a general policy of noninterference with
the exercise of the Ombudsman of its prosecutorial and investigatory powers.
The execution of its decisions is part of the exercise of these powers to which
this Court gives deference.
4. Same; Judgments; The immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman is
a protective measure with a purpose similar to that of preventive suspension,
which is to prevent public officers from using their powers and prerogatives to
influence witnesses or tamper with records.-
—After a ruling supported by evidence has been rendered and
during the pendency of any motion for reconsideration or appeal, the civil
service must be protected from any acts that may be committed by the
disciplined public officer that may affect the outcome of this motion or
appeal. The immediate execution of a decision of the Ombudsman is a protective
measure with a purpose similar to that of preventive suspension, which is to
prevent public officers from using their powers and prerogatives to influence
witnesses or tamper with records.
5. Public Officers; Exoneration of Public Officers on Appeal; In case the suspended or removed public official is
exonerated on appeal, Administrative Order (AO) No. 17, Rule III, Section 7
itself provides for the remedial measure of payment of salary and such other
emoluments not received during the period of suspension or removal.-
—Public office is a public trust. There is no vested right to a
public office or an absolute right to remain in office that would be violated
should the decision of the Ombudsman be immediately executed. In case the
suspended or removed public official is exonerated on appeal, Administrative
Order No. 17, Rule III, Section 7 itself provides for the remedial measure of payment
of salary and such other emoluments not received during the period of
suspension or removal. No substantial prejudice is caused to the public
official.
6. Statutory Construction; When two (2) rules apply to a particular case, that which
was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.-
—Petitioner relies on JP Latex Technology, Inc. v. Ballons
Granger Balloons, Inc., 581 SCRA 553 (2009), to support his claim that a motion
for reconsideration stays an execution pending appeal, but that case is
inapplicable here. JP Latex Technology, Inc. involved the execution of a
decision of a Regional Trial Court in a civil case, which is governed by the
Rules of Court, specifically Rule 39. Here, petitioner’s case is an
administrative action specifically governed by the special rules of procedure
issued by the Office of the Ombudsman. “[W]hen two rules apply to a particular
case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the
other.” Petitioner does not present any reason for this Court to reexamine the
doctrine established in the above cited cases.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 205294
Counsel:
Real, Brotarlo & Real Law Firm for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor
General for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
January 16, 2013 Order of Branch 105, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-12-72104 is AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
23. Magsaysay Mol Marine, Inc. vs. Atraje, 873 SCRA
368, July 23, 2018
Case Title : MAGSAYSAY MOL MARINE, INC. and/or MOL SHIP MANAGEMENT
(SINGAPORE), PTE. LTD., petitioners, vs. MICHAEL PADERES ATRAJE, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Disability Benefits ; Third
Doctor Rule ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Third Doctor Rule; The third doctor rule covers only conflicting medical
findings on the fitness to work or degree of disability.-
—Petitioners were adamant in their position that respondent’s
disabling medical conditions are not work-related. The third doctor rule covers
only conflicting medical findings on the fitness to work or degree of
disability. It does not cover the determination of whether the disability is
work-related or not. As this Court held in Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v.
Obrero, 802 SCRA 341 (2016): [U]nder Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC, referral
to a third physician in case of contrasting medical opinions (between the
company-designated physician and the seafarer-appointed physician) is a
mandatory procedure that must be expressly requested by the seafarer. As a
consequence of the provision, the company can insist on its disability rating
even against a contrary opinion by another physician, un the seafarer signifies
his intent to submit the disputed assessment to a third physician. We clarify,
however, that Section 20(B)(3) refers only to the declaration of fitness to
work or the degree of disability. It does not cover the determination of
whether the disability is work-related. There is nothing in the POEA-SEC which
mandates that the opinion of the company-designated physician regarding
work-relation should prevail or that the determination of such relation be
submitted to a third physician.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; As a rule, a Rule 45 review by the Supreme Court (SC) in
labor cases does not delve into factual questions or to an evaluation of the
evidence submitted by the parties.-
—As a rule, a Rule 45 review by this Court in labor cases does
not delve into factual questions or to an evaluation of the evidence submitted
by the parties. This Court is tasked to merely determine the legal correctness
of the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators in awarding full disability
benefits to respondent. Even so, this Court finds Capt. Pisarenko’s
Certification proffered by petitioners insufficient to prove their claim that
Atraje did not incur an accident.
3. Labor Law; Seafarers; Vessel’s Logbook; In Haverton Shipping, Ltd. v. NLRC, 135 SCRA 685 (1985),
the Supreme Court (SC) declared that entries made in the vessel’s logbook, when
“made by a person in the performance of a duty required by law[,] are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated [in it].”-
—Capt. Pisarenko’s Certification lacks probative value. First,
it was not authenticated by Philippine consular officials. Second, the vessel’s
logbook, which is the official repository of the daily transactions and
occurrences onboard the vessel, is the best evidence of its contents. In
Haverton Shipping, Ltd. v. NLRC, 135 SCRA 685 (1985), this Court declared that
entries made in the vessel’s logbook, when “made by a person in the performance
of a duty required by law[,] are prima facie evidence of the facts stated [in
it].” However, the logbook itself or authenticated copies of pertinent pages of
it must be presented and not merely “typewritten excerpts from the ‘logbook’
[that] have no probative value at all.”
4. Same; Same; Disability Benefits; To be compensable, reasonable proof of work-connection,
not direct causal relation, is sufficient.-
—To be compensable, reasonable proof of work-connection, not
direct causal relation, is sufficient. “Thus, probability, not the ultimate
degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.” This
Court agrees with the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and the Court of Appeals
that respondent’s illnesses are work-related.
5. Same; Same; Same; Under the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), it is the primary
responsibility of the company-designated doctor to determine the disability
grading or fitness to work of seafarers.-
—Under the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), it is the primary
responsibility of the company-designated doctor to determine the disability
grading or fitness to work of seafarers. To be conclusive, however, the medical
assessment or report of the company-designated physician must be complete and
definite to give the seafarer proper disability benefits. As explained by this
Court: A final and definite disability assessment is necessary in order to
truly reflect the true extent of the sickness or injuries of the seafarer and
his or her capacity to resume work as such. Otherwise, the corresponding
disability benefits awarded might not be commensurate with the prolonged
effects of the injuries suffered. x x x Furthermore, while the assessment of
the company-designated physician vis-Ã -vis the schedule of disabilities under
the POEA-SEC is the basis for compensability of a seafarer’s disability, it is
still subject to the periods prescribed in the law.
6. Same; Same; Same; Permanent Total Disability; Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that
temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred
twenty (120) days, except as otherwise provided in the Implementing Rules or
the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation of Title II, Book IV of the Labor
Code, shall be deemed total and permanent.-
—Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that temporary
total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, except as
otherwise provided in the Implementing Rules or the Amended Rules on Employee
Compensation of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, shall be deemed total and
permanent. Rule X, Section 2(a) of the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation
in turn provides that: Section 2. Period of entitlement.—(a) The income benefit
shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an
injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except
where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days
but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for
temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare the
total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary
total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment
of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.
7. Same; Same; Same; Third Doctor Rule; Under Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), “If a doctor
appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s
decision shall be final and binding on both parties.”-
—Under Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, “If a doctor
appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s
decision shall be final and binding on both parties.” The assessment refers to
the declaration of fitness to work or the degree of disability, as can be
gleaned from the first paragraph of Section 20(A)(3). It presupposes that the
company-designated physician came up with a valid, final, and definite
assessment on the seafarer’s fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration
of the 120- or 240-day period.
8. Same; Same; Same; Given the company-designated physicians’ inaction or
failure to disclose respondent’s medical progress, the extent of his illnesses,
and their effect on his fitness or disability, respondent was justified in
seeking the medical expertise of the physician of his choice.-
—Respondent was kept in the dark about his medical condition. It
is the height of unfairness, bordering on bad faith, for petitioners to demand
from respondent compliance with the third doctor rule when they and their
designated physicians, in the first place, did not fulfill their obligations
under the law and the POEA-SEC. Given the company-designated physicians’
inaction or failure to disclose respondent’s medical progress, the extent of
his illnesses, and their effect on his fitness or disability, respondent was
justified in seeking the medical expertise of the physician of his choice.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 229192
Counsel:
MD Pecson Law for petitioners. Nicodemus Tolentino for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ August
5, 2016 Decision and January 5, 2017 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 141333
are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
24. Rodriguez vs. Your Own Home Development Corporation
(YOHDC), 877 SCRA 367, August 15, 2018
Case Title : IRIS RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. YOUR OWN HOME DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (YOHDC), respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Banks and Banking ; Drawee Bank ;
Syllabi:
1. Banks and Banking; Drawee Bank; Considering that Metrobank is the drawee bank, it is
obligated to return the full amounts of the checks upon discovering that they
were not paid to the correct payees.-
—Considering that Metrobank is the drawee bank, it is obligated
to return the full amounts of the checks upon discovering that they were not
paid to the correct payees. In Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA
620 (1996): Where the instrument is payable to order at the time of the
forgery, such as the checks in this case, the signature of its rightful holder
(here, the payee hospital) is essential to transfer title to the same
instrument. When the holder’s indorsement is forged, all parties prior to the
forgery may raise the real defense of forgery against all parties subsequent
thereto. An indorser of an order instrument warrants “that the instrument is
genuine and in all respects what it purports to be; that he has a good title to
it; that all prior parties had capacity to contract; and that the instrument is
at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting.” He cannot interpose the
defense that signatures prior to him are forged. A collecting bank where a
check is deposited and which indorses the check upon presentment with the
drawee bank, is such an indorser. So even if the indorsement on the check
deposited by the banks’ client is forged, the collecting bank is bound by his
warranties as an indorser and cannot set up the defense of forgery as against
the drawee bank. The bank on which a check is drawn, known as the drawee bank,
is under strict liability to pay the check to the order of the payee. The
drawer’s instructions are reflected on the face and by the terms of the check.
Payment under a forged indorsement is not to the drawer’s order. When the
drawee bank pays a person other than the payee, it does not comply with the
terms of the check and violates its duty to charge its customer’s (the drawer)
account only for properly payable items. Since the drawee bank did not pay a
holder or other person entitled to receive payment, it has no right to
reimbursement from the drawer. The general rule then is that the drawee bank
may not debit the drawer’s account and is not entitled to indemnification from
the drawer. The risk of loss must perforce fall on the drawee bank. . . . . In
cases involving checks with forged indorsements, such as the present petition,
the chain of liability does not end with the drawee bank. The drawee bank may
not debit the account of the drawer but may generally pass liability back
through the collection chain to the party who took from the forger and, of
course, to the forger himself, if available. In other words, the drawee bank
can seek reimbursement or a return of the amount it paid from the presentor
bank or person. Theoretically, the latter can demand reimbursement from the
person who indorsed the check to it and so on. The loss falls on the party who
took the check from the forger, or on the forger himself.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; The Supreme Court (SC) does not review factual findings in
Rule 45 Petitions. It only entertains questions of law-
— those which ask to resolve which law applies on a given set of
facts.—This Court does not review factual findings in Rule 45 Petitions. It
only entertains questions of law — those which ask to resolve which law applies
on a given set of facts. It does not rule on questions which determine “the
truth or falsehood of alleged facts.” In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Co.,
809 SCRA 193 (2016): The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed
before this Court is “not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion.”
The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should be raised
in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are not the proper
subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court’s function to once
again analyze or weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower
courts. x x x The question of whether Delos Reyes has been paid the amount of
P424,000.00 is a question of fact. It does not simply ask to resolve which law
properly applies given the set of facts in this case. It requires a review of
the evidence and the determination of the truth or falsity of the parties’
allegations. Clearly, Iris is raising a question of fact which is not proper in
the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
3. Notarized Documents; A notarized document is presumed valid, regular, and
genuine. It carries evidentiary weight with respect to its due execution.-
—A notarized document is presumed valid, regular, and genuine.
It carries evidentiary weight with respect to its due execution. As such, it
need not be proven authentic before it is admitted into evidence. On its face,
it is entitled to full faith and credit, and is deemed to be in full force and
effect. A notarized Deed of Absolute Sale has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. x x x To nullify a notarized document on account of flaws and defects,
there must be a strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity. The
required quantum of proof is a clear, strong, and convincing evidence.
4. Retractions; The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently held that
retractions are looked upon with disfavor because of its unreliable nature and
the likely probability that it may again be repudiated.-
—This Court assumes that the Acknowledgment is in the nature of
a retraction. This Court has consistently held that retractions are looked upon
with disfavor because of its unreliable nature and the likely probability that
it may again be repudiated. Again, in Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, 434
SCRA 418 (2004): Lastly, while it is evident that Alusitain’s subsequent sworn
statement is in the nature of a retraction of his May 22, 1991 Affidavit of
Separation, such retraction does not necessarily negate the affidavit. For
retractions are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor
by the courts as they can easily be fabricated. Thus, before accepting a retraction,
it is necessary to examine the circumstances surrounding it and possible
motives for reversing the previous declaration, as these motives may not
necessarily be in consonance with the truth. To automatically adopt them hook,
line and sinker would allow unscrupulous individuals to throw wide open the
doors to fraud. In the case at bar, Alusitain’s retraction is highly suspect.
Other than his bare and self-serving allegations and the sworn statement of his
daughter which, as reflected above, cannot be relied upon, he has not shown any
scintilla of evidence that he was employed with petitioner Rufina Patis Factory
at the time R.A. 7641 took effect. He did not produce any documentary evidence
such as pay slips, income tax return, his identification card, or any other
independent evidence to substantiate his claim. While the NLRC and its Labor
Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence in the
adjudication of cases, this should not be construed as a license to disregard
fundamental rules on evidence in proving one’s allegations. x x x The rationale
for this ruling stems from retractions being easily obtained from witnesses
through intimidation or monetary consideration.
5. Same; Retractions must not be believed right away. It is important
to consider a witness’ surrounding circumstances and motives for changing his
or her stance.-
—Retractions must not be believed right away. It is important to
consider a witness’ surrounding circumstances and motives for changing his or
her stance. In Philippine National Bank v. Gregorio, 840 SCRA 37 (2017): We
concur with the NLRC’s appreciation of the affidavits of retraction. We have
often repeated that “[j]ust because one has executed an affidavit of retraction
does not imply that what has been previously said is false or that the latter
is true.” The reliability of an affidavit of retraction is determined in the
same manner that the reliability of any other documentary evidence is
ascertained. In particular, it is necessary to examine the circumstances
surrounding it. In the case of Villar’s affidavit of retraction, we note that
this has never been identified and authenticated. Thus, its weight as evidence
is highly suspect. As to Rebollo’s alleged affidavit of retraction, a reading
of its contents, as correctly pointed out by the NLRC, reveals that Rebollo in
fact affirmed Gregorio’s participation in the lending activities within PNB
Sucat when she said in this affidavit that Gregorio introduced her to a certain
Realina Ty who became her borrower.
6. Civil Law; Human Relations; Unjust Enrichment; It is the State’s public policy to prevent a person from
unjustly retaining a benefit, money, or property, at the expense of another, or
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.-
—Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states: Every
person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. This provision
addresses unjust enrichment. It is the State’s public policy to prevent a
person from unjustly retaining a benefit, money, or property, at the expense of
another, or against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good
conscience. Unjust enrichment has two (2) elements: a person benefited without
a real or valid basis or justification, and the benefit was at another person’s
expense or damage.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 199451
Counsel:
Ferdinand Raymund J. Navarro for petitioner. Julian R. Torcuator, Jr. for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals’ July 18, 2011 Decision and November 23, 2011 Resolution in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 90297 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
25. Enriquez vs. The Mercantile Insurance Co., Inc., 877 SCRA
447, August 15, 2018
Case Title : MILAGROS P. ENRIQUEZ, petitioner, vs. THE MERCANTILE INSURANCE
CO., INC., respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contract of Adhesion ; Insurance Contracts ;
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Contract of Adhesion; Insurance Contracts; A contract of insurance is, by default,
a contract of adhesion. It is prepared by the insurance company and might
contain terms and conditions too vague for a layperson to understand; hence, they are construed liberally in favor of the
insured.-
—Basic is the principle that “a contract is law between the
parties” for as long as it is “not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.” Under their Indemnity Agreement, petitioner
held herself liable for any payment made by respondent by virtue of the
replevin bond. Petitioner contends that the Indemnity Agreement was a contract
of adhesion since respondent made the extent of liability “so comprehensive and
all-encompassing to the point of being ambiguous.” A contract of insurance is,
by default, a contract of adhesion. It is prepared by the insurance company and
might contain terms and conditions too vague for a layperson to understand;
hence, they are construed liberally in favor of the insured.
2. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Replevin; Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal
property. It is both a principal remedy and a provisional relief.-
—Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal property. It
is both a principal remedy and a provisional relief. When utilized as a
principal remedy, the objective is to recover possession of personal property
that may have been wrongfully detained by another. When sought as a provisional
relief, it allows a plaintiff to retain the contested property during the pendency
of the action.
3. Same; Same; Same; Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the party seeking the
issuance of the writ must first file the required affidavit and a bond in an
amount that is double the value of the property.-
—As a provisional remedy, a party may apply for an order for the
delivery of the property before the commencement of the action or at any time
before an answer is filed. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure
for the application of a writ of replevin. Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the
party seeking the issuance of the writ must first file the required affidavit
and a bond in an amount that is double the value of the property.
4. Same; Same; Same; Once the affidavit is filed and the bond is approved by
the court, the court issues an order and a writ of seizure requiring the
sheriff to take the property into his or her custody. If there is no further
objection to the bond filed within five (5) days from the taking of the
property, the sheriff shall deliver it to the applicant.-
—Once the affidavit is filed and the bond is approved by the
court, the court issues an order and a writ of seizure requiring the sheriff to
take the property into his or her custody. If there is no further objection to
the bond filed within five (5) days from the taking of the property, the
sheriff shall deliver it to the applicant. The contested property remains in
the applicant’s custody until the court determines, after a trial on the
issues, which among the parties has the right of possession.
5. Same; Civil Procedure; Dismissal Without Prejudice; The Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) dismissal for failure
to prosecute was a dismissal without prejudice to refiling.-
—The Regional Trial Court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute
was a dismissal without prejudice to refiling. In this particular instance, any
writ of seizure, being merely ancillary to the main action, becomes functus
oficio. The parties returned to the status quo as if no case for replevin had
been filed. Thus, upon the dismissal of the case, it was imperative for
petitioner to return the van to Asuten.
6. Same; Surety Bond; A surety bond remains effective until the action or
proceeding is finally decided, resolved, or terminated.-
—For this reason, a surety bond remains effective until the action
or proceeding is finally decided, resolved, or terminated. This condition is
deemed incorporated in the contract between the applicant and the surety,
regard of whether they failed to expressly state it. Under the Guidelines on
Corporate Surety Bonds: VII. LIFETIME OF BONDS IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
ACTIONS/SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS Un and until the Supreme Court directs otherwise,
the lifetime or duration of the effectivity of any bond issued in criminal and
civil actions/special proceedings, or in any proceeding or incident therein
shall be from its approval by the court, until the action or proceeding is
finally decided, resolved or terminated. This condition must be incorporated in
the terms and condition of the bonding contract and shall bind the parties
notwithstanding their failure to expressly state the same in the said contract
or agreement.
7. Same; Provisional Remedies; Replevin; Replevin Bond; Of all the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of
Court, only Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the amount of the bond be double
the value of the property.-
—Of all the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of Court,
only Rule 60, Section 2 requires that the amount of the bond be double the
value of the property. The other provisional remedies provide that the amount
be fixed by court or be merely equal to the value of the property.
8. Same; Same; Same; Same; The bond functions not only to indemnify the defendant in
case the property is lost, but also to answer for any damages that may be awarded
by the court if the judgment is rendered in defendant’s favor.-
—There is a rationale to the requirement that the bond for a
writ of seizure in a replevin be double the value of the property. The bond
functions not only to indemnify the defendant in case the property is lost, but
also to answer for any damages that may be awarded by the court if the judgment
is rendered in defendant’s favor.
9. Same; Same; Same; Same; The Rules of Court likewise require that for the defendant
to be granted the full amount of the bond, he or she must first apply to the
court for damages.-
—The Rules of Court likewise require that for the defendant to
be granted the full amount of the bond, he or she must first apply to the court
for damages. These damages will be awarded only after a proper hearing.
10. Same; Same; Same; Same; Forfeiture of the replevin bond requires first, a judgment
on the merits in the defendant’s favor, and second, an application by the
defendant for damages.-
—Forfeiture of the replevin bond, therefore, requires first, a
judgment on the merits in the defendant’s favor, and second, an application by
the defendant for damages. Neither circumstance appears in this case. When
petitioner failed to produce the van, equity demanded that Asuten be awarded only
an amount equal to the value of the van. The Regional Trial Court would have
erred in ordering the forfeiture of the entire bond in Asuten’s favor,
considering that there was no trial on the merits or an application by Asuten
for damages. This judgment could have been reversed had petitioner appealed the
Regional Trial Court’s May 24, 2004 Order in Civil Case No. 10846.
Unfortunately, she did not. Respondent was, thus, constrained to follow the
Regional Trial Court’s directive to pay Asuten the full amount of the bond.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 210950
Counsel:
Senador & Associates for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 13, 2013 Decision
and January 14, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
95955 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
26. Civil Service Commission vs. Moralde, 877 SCRA
473, August 15, 2018
Case Title : CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. GABRIEL MORALDE,
respondent.
Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Resignation ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Resignation; Public officers and employees cannot forestall a finding
of liability by opting out of employment. It is doubly worse when they reap
financial benefits through severance packages upon opting out of employment.-
—This Court must end the inanity and debasement. It cannot allow
a duplicitous former civil servant to use the Judiciary as a tool to render
administrative disciplinary processes inutile. A decision rendered by this
Court cannot be the means to restore Moralde to the service that he so
willingly abandoned and against which he admitted to committing repeated falsehoods.
Jurisprudence cannot be the key to enable him to wrest undue benefits from the
government. This Court cannot be consigned as a tool to helply validate
Moralde’s duplicity. Public officers and employees cannot forestall a finding
of liability by opting out of employment. It is doubly worse when they reap
financial benefits through severance packages upon opting out of employment.
Public service is a public trust, and to hold a government position, no matter
the rank, is a privilege, not a right. As such, it must be earned, and to be
kept, one must continuously prove oneself worthy not only in terms of
competence, but also of integrity.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Finality of Judgments; A judgment becomes “final and executory” by operation of
law.-
—Social Security System v. Isip, 520 SCRA 310 (2007),
articulated the basic parameters of and the rationale for adhering to the
doctrine of immutability of a final judgment: A judgment becomes “final and
executory” by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact when the reglementary
period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. As a
consequence, no court (not even this Court) can exercise appellate jurisdiction
to review a case or modify a decision that has bec[o]me final. When a final
judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer
be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by
this Court. The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound
practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at
some definite point in time. The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of
a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge
of judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the
risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies
cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must
not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.
3. Same; Same; Same; Immutability of Final Judgments; Jurisprudence is categorical: “the principle of
conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the
judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies
upon which judicial powers had been conferred.”-
—In Peña v. Government Service Insurance System, 502 SCRA 383
(2006): [I]t is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be
attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by
the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file
an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case. . . . .
The rule on finality of decisions, orders or resolutions of a judicial,
quasi-judicial or administrative body is “not a question of technicality but of
substance and merit,” [as its] underlying consideration [is]. . . protecti[n]g.
. . the winning party[’s substantive rights]. . . Nothing is more settled in
law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
of the land. x x x As is clear from Peña, 286 SCRA 666, 681 (1998), the
doctrine of immutability of judgments applies as much to decisions of agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers as they do to judicial decisions. Jurisprudence
is categorical: “the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not
confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as
courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been
conferred.”
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence enumerates instances in
which a final judgment’s execution may be disturbed: (1) the correction of
clerical errors; (2) nunc pro
tunc entries that do not prejudice a party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever supervening events or circumstances
transpire after the decisions’ finality, making the decision’s execution unjust
and inequitable.-
—The doctrine of immutability of judgments is not itself
absolutely and inescapably immutable. “While firmly ingrained as a basic
procedural tenet in Philippine jurisprudence, [it] was never meant to be an
inflexible tool to excuse and overlook prejudicial circumstances.” This Court
has recognized that it “must yield to practicality, logic, fairness and
substantial justice.’’ Jurisprudence enumerates instances in which a final
judgment’s execution may be disturbed: (1) the correction of clerical errors;
(2) nunc pro tunc entries that do not prejudice a party; (3) void judgments;
and (4) whenever supervening events or circumstances transpire after the
decisions’ finality, making the decision’s execution unjust and inequitable.
5. Same; Same; Same; Finality of Judgments; To strangle a party’s access to legitimate exceptions to
the immutability doctrine would be to frustrate the higher ends of justice and
to condone the triumph of hollow, procedural niceties.-
—This Court acknowledges the need to temper obdurate insistence
on black letter mechanics. To strangle a party’s access to legitimate
exceptions to the immutability doctrine would be to frustrate the higher ends
of justice and to condone the triumph of hollow, procedural niceties. While
maintaining restraint, this Court, neverthe, rightly esteems itself in not
being “precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn
adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the
sacrifice of justice for technicality.”
6. Government Employees; Resignation; Reinstatement; The Civil Service Commission (CSC) was correct in
realizing that forcing the reinstatement of a voluntarily deserting employee
was impractical, illogical, unfair, and unjust.-
—Moralde willfully severed his employer-employee relationship
with the government. This is the inescapable implication of his deliberate
petitioning for benefits occasioned by what he mistakenly thought was
retirement, but which was more accurately a simulation of resignation. In any
case, regard of the technical nomenclature that flawly encapsulates every
nuance of his voluntary act of ending his employment, the naked truth and the
pivotal element of voluntary termination of employment remain. This voluntary
termination of employment was made before the administrative complaint against
Moralde could be resolved by the Province, at the first instance, and then
referred to the Commission, on appeal. It was also successfully concealed for
almost nine (9) years. Its discovery was made only long after the Commission
ruled on his appeal. The Civil Service Commission’s willingness to rule on his
appeal reveals that it was under the mistaken impression that Moralde’s
continuance in office was still an unresolved, justiciable matter. Evidently,
however, the Civil Service Commission’s ruling on Moralde’s appeal was a point
superfluity. Any pronouncement on his continuance in office was reduced to a
purely academic exercise as Moralde had already put himself out of office. Such
antecedent, voluntary termination of employment was the “realit[y] of the
situation,” the “practicality” that the Civil Service Commission had to contend
with when it was unexpectedly notified of Moralde’s successful application for
benefits under Republic Act No. 8291. Common sense dictated that the Civil
Service Commission endeavored to come to terms with Moralde’s importuning to
occupy a position, which had become vacant because Moralde himself vacated it
before the Province could even remove him. Basic sensibility impelled the Civil
Service Commission to consider the primordial question of whether it was even
still possible to compel the restoration to office of an employee who himself
terminated his employment. The Civil Service Commission’s rumination was not
confined to the basal question of practicability, but extended into the matter
of whether this restoration was logical and, even more importantly, fair and
just. The subsequent unraveling of the pointness and utter absurdity of
reinstating an employee who voluntarily left employment changed the entire
complexion of Moralde’s case. Confronted with the basic and pressing demands of
“practicality, logic, fairness and substantial justice,” the Civil Service
Commission was correct in realizing that forcing the reinstatement of a
voluntarily deserting employee was impractical, illogical, unfair, and unjust.
7. Same; Same; Retirement Benefits; For recipients of separation benefits, a basic monthly
pension can be obtained only by those who have served for at least fifteen (15)
years, as expressed in Section 11(b). Even then, they may only avail of this
pension upon reaching the age of sixty (60).-
—The availing of retirement benefits differs from the availing
of separation benefits with respect to the requisite age and length of service.
For retirement, the applicant needs to be at least 60 years old and must have
served for at least 15 years. For separation benefits, the applicant must be
below 60 years old. There are further distinctions for availing of separation
benefits under Section 11, paragraphs (a) and (b). Under paragraph (a), the
applicant needs to have served for at least three (3) years, but than 15 years. Under paragraph (b), the
applicant must have served for at least 15 years. Retirement and separation
benefits differ on the availability of monthly pensions, and the computation of
the amount that will be immediately released to an approved applicant. For
retirees, with their two (2) options specified in Section 13(a)(1) and Section
13(a)(2), an old-age or basic monthly pension is always assured. It is for the
applicant to choose between starting to receive it five (5) years after leaving
the service, as provided for by Section 13(a)(1), or immediately upon retiring,
as provided for under Section 13(a)(2). For recipients of separation benefits,
a basic monthly pension can be obtained only by those who have served for at
least 15 years, as expressed in Section 11(b). Even then, they may only avail
of this pension upon reaching the age of 60.
8. Private Sector Employees; Retirement; Retirement Benefits; Concerning the retirement of private sector employees,
jurisprudence states that retirement arises as the result of “a voluntary
[employer-employee] agreement. . . where the latter, after reaching a certain
age, agrees to sever his employment with the former.”-
—Concerning the retirement of private sector employees,
jurisprudence states that retirement arises as the result of “a voluntary
[employer-employee] agreement. . . where the latter, after reaching a certain
age, agrees to sever his employment with the former.” Retirement, in this
context, is a bilateral act of the employee and the employer. In Gerlach v.
Reuters Limited, Phils., 448 SCRA 535 (2005), this Court considered three (3)
categories of retirement in the private sector: The first type is compulsory
and contributory in character. The second type is one set up by agreement
between the employer and the employees in collective bargaining agreements or
other agreements between them. The third type is one that is voluntarily given
by the employer, expressly as in an announced company policy or impliedly as in
a failure to contest the employee’s claim for retirement benefits.
9. Government Employees; Retirement; Republic Act (RA) No. 8291’s retirement benefits are not
predicated upon the forcible termination of a civil servant’s employment
arising from the employer’s desire to cease professional relations with a
specific, unwanted individual.-
—Retirement from the civil service operates differently from
retirement from private employment. By no means, however, does it lose its
fundamental character as a mechanism for severing an employer-employee
relationship. Retirement as a public officer or employee is no “a withdrawal from office, public station, . .
. occupation, or public duty.” Republic Act No. 8291’s retirement benefits are
not predicated upon the forcible termination of a civil servant’s employment
arising from the employer’s desire to cease professional relations with a
specific, unwanted individual. While retirement upon reaching the compulsory
age is not per se an action out of one’s personal volition, there is still no
coercive removal of someone otherwise pinpointed as undesirable. Section 13-A
even contemplates voluntary retirement, as early as at age 60, five (5) years
ahead of Section 13(b)’s compulsory retirement age.
10. Same; Same; As to the receipt of Republic Act (RA) No. 8291’s
separation benefits, it is true that a public officer or employee who avails of
separation benefits is not irreversibly precluded from again rendering service
to the government at a later time.-
—As to the receipt of Republic Act No. 8291’s separation
benefits, it is true that a public officer or employee who avails of separation
benefits is not irreversibly precluded from again rendering service to the
government at a later time. Neverthe, at that moment that a public officer or
employee manifests intent to avail of separation benefits, that public officer
or employee concedes his or her intent to actually “separate from” government,
that is, to put an end to his or her employment. By Section 11’s own text,
availing of such benefits demands specific action on the part of the applicant,
i.e., that he or she “resigns or separates from the service.” On availing of
retirement benefits, neither is availing of Republic Act No. 8291’s separation
benefits predicated upon the forcible termination of a civil servant’s
employment. Section 11’s benefits are very clearly available to a civil servant
who voluntarily or willfully ends his or her employment. An employee’s own
“resign[ation] or separat[ion] from the service” is the necessary precondition
to avail of separation benefits.
11. Same; Same; An employee who voluntarily ends his employment cannot
later cry foul over the end of such employment and compel his employer to
reinstate him.-
—Moralde’s manifestation of his separation from service and the
accompanying application for Republic Act No. 8291’s benefits should not be
viewed in isolation. Instead, they must be perceived with a concomitant
appreciation of how, with his own admission of wrongdoing, a guilty verdict was
probably, if not certainly, forthcoming. Likewise, it must be viewed with a
sense of how a particularly graver penalty, such as dismissal from service, was
equally possible given his history of delinquency and Atty. Rubio’s specific
recommendation. Indeed, not longer than a day after his “retirement” took
effect, Governor Calingin issued Memorandum No. APC 1019, finding him guilty of
falsification and ruling that he must be dismissed from service. Thus, one must
appreciate that at the bottom of Moralde’s actions was a desire to forestall a
forthcoming guilty verdict and dishonorable removal from government service. He
may not have been animated by a monetary motive per se, i.e., to enrich himself
through the benefits which he petitioned from GSIS, but it is not difficult to
see how he was really looking to secure an honorable conclusion to his 16 years
of service. Having successfully carried out that intention, Moralde cannot now
claim that he should be reinstated. Quitters cannot blame others for their own
quitting. An employee who voluntarily ends his employment cannot later cry foul
over the end of such employment and compel his employer to reinstate him.
Moralde has put an end to his employment, he has vacated his own position; it
would be laughably ridiculous to force others to restore him to it. Not only
would a ruling favoring Moralde run afoul of common sense. It would also amount
to condoning the injustice of his reneging on his own word.
12. Estoppel in Pais; No party should be precluded from making out his case
according to its truth un by force of some positive principle of law, and,
consequently, estoppel in pais must be applied strictly and should not be
enforced un substantiated in every particular.-
—Moralde is estopped by his own actions. He cannot be allowed to
“go back on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of the [Civil
Service Commission and the Province, both of which have] relied upon them.”
Estoppel is not to be lightly invoked. In Kalalo v. Luz, 34 SCRA 337 (1970),
this Court clarified: Estoppel. . . [is] harsh or odious, and not favored in
law. When misapplied, [it] becomes a most effective weapon to accomplish an
injustice, inasmuch as it shuts a man’s mouth from speaking the truth and
debars the truth in a particular case. [It] cannot be sustained by mere
argument or doubtful inference; it must be clearly proved in all its essential
elements by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. No party should be
precluded from making out his case according to its truth un by force of some
positive principle of law, and, consequently, estoppel in pais must be applied
strictly and should not be enforced un substantiated in every particular.
13. Reinstatement; Reinstatement is given as a remedy to those whose
employment was illegally terminated because the law considers them as having
been unduly deprived of their positions.-
—By definition, reinstatement works to restore a person to his
or her former status. Reinstatement is given as a remedy to those whose
employment was illegally terminated because the law considers them as having
been unduly deprived of their positions. In Verdadero v. Barney Autolines Group
of Companies Transport, Inc., 679 SCRA 545 (2012): Reinstatement and backwages
are reliefs available to an illegally dismissed employee. Reinstatement
restores the employee who was unjustly dismissed to the position from which he
was removed, that is, to his status quo ante dismissal, while the grant of
backwages allows the same employee to recover from the employer that which he
had lost by way of wages as a result of his dismissal. These twin remedies —
reinstatement and payment of backwages — make the dismissed employee whole who
can then look forward to continued employment. Thus, do these two remedies give
meaning and substance to the constitutional right of labor to security of
tenure. x x x It is preposterous to consider reinstatement when there was no
prior removal. Verdadero’s pronouncements on reinstatement cannot encompass
those who, like Moralde, did not only voluntarily intend and declare their
intent to relinquish their position, but even petitioned to receive monetary
benefits available only through the consummation of such relinquishment.
14. Government Employees; Resignation; Moralde’s case is one of an admittedly dishonest civil
servant endeavoring to dodge a guilty verdict to the extent of consciously and
willfully leaving his job just so he would not otherwise get fired.-
—In Yenko and Dytiapco, rulings dismissing employees from
service were made first. Thereafter, appeals from those rulings were filed. The
dismissed employees filed for separation benefits only when their appeals had
been pending for so long, they could not bear the lack of a source of income.
They sought monetary benefits attendant to separation from service because the
length of time that had elapsed without their salaries forced them into
demonstrably difficult financial situations. On the other hand, in Moralde’s
case, his application for retirement benefits preceded any appeal. Worse, it
even preceded a ruling at the first instance. Moralde jumped the gun. He did
not bother to wait for a resolution of the administrative case against him. He
sought to arrest the possibility that his public service career would end in
dishonor, and with his separation benefits forfeited. His case is not a case of
a hap worker pushed to his economic breaking point. Rather, it is one of an
admittedly dishonest civil servant endeavoring to dodge a guilty verdict to the
extent of consciously and willfully leaving his job just so he would not
otherwise get fired.
15. Same; Retirement Benefits; Applying for retirement benefits before any ruling on his
liability, appealing his dismissal during his application’s pendency,
benefitting from his application’s approval, and now seeking to double his
windfall by insisting that he be reinstated are clear signs that Moralde valued
escaping a finding of guilt, while securing monetary benefits in the interim,
more than maintaining the employment he had already enjoyed.-
—The conclusion made by Yenko and Dytiapco that acceptance of
separation benefits does not equate to the abandonment of one’s plea for
reinstatement does not obtain here. Applying for retirement benefits before any
ruling on his liability, appealing his dismissal during his application’s
pendency, benefitting from his application’s approval, and now seeking to
double his windfall by insisting that he be reinstated are clear signs that
Moralde valued escaping a finding of guilt, while securing monetary benefits in
the interim, more than maintaining the employment he had already enjoyed. It
was never about him merely keeping his job. It was about circumventing the law:
Moralde effected a contingency plan to forestall a forthcoming guilty verdict
and the ensuing loss of his job, but he realized later on that by leaving, yet
still appealing for reinstatement, he could doubly profit.
16. Same; Reinstatement; The Supreme Court (SC) cannot condone what the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) has rightly described as “reinstatement of a deceitful person
to an institution when dishonesty is anathema in the civil service.”-
—Moralde’s almost decade-long concealment of his successful
application indicates not only his more than sufficient knowledge of how the
application process worked, but also of the gains he could reap by preventing
his successful application from impairing his chances of succeeding in his
other gambit of seeking reinstatement. His double dealings reveal that he was,
by no means, a hap victim of circumstance but the percipient architect of an
insidiously duplicitous design. This Court cannot condone what the Civil
Service Commission has rightly described as “reinstatement of a deceitful
person to an institution when dishonesty is anathema in the civil service.” Any
such reinstatement strains the bounds of logic and tramples on common sense.
Moralde was not forced out, he left of his own accord and did so in the face of
a looming finding of liability. With his prior willful departure, there was not
even a dismissal, let alone an illegal one, to speak of. Any discussion on
reinstatement can make for interesting thought experiments, but they are just
that: purely academic theorizing that is ineffectual in the face of Moralde’s
voluntary act of terminating his employment.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 211077
Counsel:
Benber B. Apepe for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari
are GRANTED. The assailed June 24, 2013 Decision and January 22, 2014
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 02720-MIN are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Civil Service Commission’s Resolution No. 080805 dated April
28, 2008 and Resolution No. 082249 dated December 8, 2008 are REINSTATED.
Citation Ref:
27. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office vs. De Leon, 877 SCRA
638, August 15, 2018
Case Title : PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, petitioner, vs. HON.
MAXIMO M. DE LEON, Presiding Judge of the Makati City Regional Trial Court,
Branch 143, and PHILIPPINE GAMING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Provisional Remedies ; Provisional
Dismissal ; Writ of Preliminary Injunction ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; In Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) v. City
Advertising Ventures Corporation, 808 SCRA 53 (2016), the Supreme Court (SC) held
that “[f]or a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the applicant must
show, by prima facie evidence, an existing right before trial, a material and
substantial invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary injunction
is necessary to prevent irreparable injury.”-
—In Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) v. City
Advertising Ventures Corporation, 808 SCRA 53 (2016), this Court held that
“[f]or a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the applicant must show,
by prima facie evidence, an existing right before trial, a material and
substantial invasion of this right, and that a writ of preliminary injunction
is necessary to prevent irreparable injury.”
2. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Provisional Dismissal; Writ of Preliminary Injunction; A Writ of Preliminary Injunction is issued “to prevent
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before
their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated.”-
—This Court finds that the Regional Trial Court committed grave
abuse of discretion in granting respondent Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation’s application for injunctive relief. A Writ of Preliminary
Injunction is issued “to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury
to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.” In Mabayo Farms, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 386 SCRA 110 (2002): A
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to
final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a particular act. As an
ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may therefore
be resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. Nos. 236577 and 236597
Counsel:
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner. Ponce Enrile, Reyes,
Manalastas for private respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office may proceed with the bidding process for
the Nationwide Online Lottery System for Luzon.
Citation Ref:
28. Amoguis vs. Ballado, 878 SCRA 1, August 20, 2018
Case Title : GREGORIO AMOGUIS and TITO AMOGUIS, petitioners, vs. CONCEPCION
BALLADO and MARY GRACE BALLADO LEDESMA, and ST. JOSEPH REALTY, LTD.,
respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Sales ; Buyers in Good Faith ; Burden of
Proof ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; It is incumbent upon a buyer to prove good faith should he
or she assert this status.-
—It is incumbent upon a buyer to prove good faith should he or
she assert this status. This burden cannot be discharged by merely invoking the
legal presumption of good faith. This Court rules that based on the evidence on
record, petitioners failed to discharge this burden. Though they were informed
by Francisco on his claim to the properties only after their purchase, it is
undisputed from the records that mango and chico trees were planted on the
properties, and that they were cordoned off by barbed wires. St. Joseph Realty
also informed them that there were previous buyers, who allegedly abandoned
their purchase. To merely claim that they were buyers in good faith, absent any
proof, does not make the case for them.
2. Civil Law; Condominiums; Presidential Decree (PD) No. 957 instituted the National
Housing Authority (NHA) as the administrative body with exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate the trade and business of subdivision and condominium developments.
It provided for mechanisms where entities can apply for licenses to develop and
sell subdivision lots or condominiums with the intent of curbing fraud
instigated on purchasers of real estate.-
—Presidential Decree No. 957 instituted the National Housing
Authority as the administrative body with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the trade and business of subdivision and condominium developments. It provided
for mechanisms where entities can apply for licenses to develop and sell
subdivision lots or condominiums with the intent of curbing fraud instigated on
purchasers of real estate. A performance bond is also required of these
entities to guarantee their undertaking under the subdivision and condominium
plans. For greater transparency, their subdivision and condominium plans must
likewise be registered. The following transactions, however, were beyond the
administrative body’s regulatory supervision, and were exempt from license and
performance bond requirements: (a) Sale of a subdivision lot resulting from the
partition of land among co-owners and coheirs. (b) Sale or transfer of a
subdivision lot by the original purchaser thereof and any subsequent sale of
the same lot. (c) Sale of a subdivision lot or a condominium unit by or for the
account of a mortgagee in the ordinary course of business when necessary to
liquidate a bona fide debt.
3. National Housing Authority; Appeals; Section 3 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1344 provided
that appeals from decisions of the National Housing Authority (NHA) shall be
made to the President of the Philippines within fifteen (15) days from receipt.-
—Presidential Decree No. 1344 was later on enacted to add to the
National Housing Authority’s jurisdiction. It was no longer just a licensing
body for subdivision and condominium developers. Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1344 gave authority to the National Housing Authority to hear and
decide cases: Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: A. Unsound real
estate business practices; B. Claims involving refund and any other claims
filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and C. Cases involving specific
performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1344 provided that
appeals from decisions of the National Housing Authority shall be made to the
President of the Philippines within 15 days from receipt.
4. Housing and Land Use and Regulatory Board; Jurisdiction; Presently, jurisprudence still dictates that when a buyer
wants to compel a developer to conform with the terms of the contract it
executed, jurisdiction lies with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).-
—In the years that followed, this Court tackled the issue of
whether the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board’s jurisdiction included the
cancellation of land titles issued to third parties due to the subdivision
developer’s or owner’s unsound business practices. Fajardo v. Hon. Bautista,
232 SCRA 291 (1994), ruled that it did. Apart from unsound business practices,
the cancellation of titles issued to third parties also involved claims for
specific performance against subdivision developers and owners. In Fajardo, the
claimants sought that the developer perform its obligations under the contract
to sell, and the cancellation of titles were but incidental. These doctrines
have been observed by this Court even in recent cases. Presently, jurisprudence
still dictates that when a buyer wants to compel a developer to conform with
the terms of the contract it executed, jurisdiction lies with the Housing and
Land Use and Regulatory Board.
5. Void Judgments; A void judgment has absolutely no legal effect, “by which
no rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which neither
binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims
flowing out of are void.”-
—Where there is no jurisdiction over a subject matter, the
judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment has absolutely no legal
effect, “by which no rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained,
which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and
all claims flowing out of are void.” Because there is in effect no judgment,
res judicata does not apply to commencing another action despite previous
adjudications already made.
6. Estoppel by Laches; Jurisdiction; Estoppel by laches bars a party from invoking lack of
jurisdiction in an unjustly belated manner especially when it actively
participated during trial.+
7. Same; Same; A delay of fifteen (15) years in raising questions on
subject matter jurisdiction was appreciated by the Supreme Court (SC) as
estoppel by laches.-
—Tijam will only apply when given the circumstances of a case,
allowing the belated objection to the jurisdiction of the court will
additionally cause irreparable damages, and therefore, injustice to the other
party that relied on the forum and the implicit waiver. In Tijam, this Court
ruled that long delay in raising lack of jurisdiction is unfair to the party pleading
laches because he or she was misled into believing that this defense would no
longer be pursued. A delay of 15 years in raising questions on subject matter
jurisdiction was appreciated by this Court as estoppel by laches.
8. Same; Same; The delay of ten (10) years in raising jurisdictional
issues in that case was appreciated as laches.-
—In Bernardo v. Heirs of Villegas, 615 SCRA 466 (2010), this
Court identified the propensity of litigants who, to exhaust the time and
resources of their opponents, will plead lack of jurisdiction only when an
unfavorable decision is obtained in order to relitigate the case. The delay of
10 years in raising jurisdictional issues in that case was appreciated as
laches. In summary, Tijam applies to a party claiming lack of subject matter
jurisdiction when: (1) there was a statutory right in favor of the claimant;
(2) the statutory right was not invoked; (3) an unreasonable length of time
lapsed before the claimant raised the issue of jurisdiction; (4) the claimant
actively participated in the case and sought affirmative relief from the court
without jurisdiction; (5) the claimant knew or had constructive knowledge of
which forum possesses subject matter jurisdiction; (6) irreparable damage will
be caused to the other party who relied on the forum and the claimant’s
implicit waiver.
9. Remedial Law; Evidence; Formal Offer of Evidence; All evidence must be formally offered. Otherwise, the
court cannot consider them.-
—A witness’ testimony must be offered at the start, when he or
she takes the stand for the first time and before questions are propounded to
him or her. Documentary or object evidence, on the other hand, must be orally
offered after the presentation of a party’s witnesses un the court orders or
allows that a written formal offer is filed. All evidence must be formally
offered. Otherwise, the court cannot consider them. This rule ensures that
judges will carry out their constitutional mandate to render decisions that
clearly state the facts of cases and the applicable laws. Judgments must be
based “only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to the suit.”
This rule also affords parties their right to due process by examining the
evidence presented by their opponent, and to object to its presentation when
warranted.
10. Same; Same; Same; Testimonial Evidence; Testimonial evidence not formally offered but not timely
objected to by an opposing party may be still be considered by the Supreme
Court (SC).+
11. Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the opposing party belatedly raises the technicality
that the witnesses’ testimonies were not formally offered to “ambush” the party
presenting them, the Supreme Court (SC) may not expunge or strike them out.-
—Catuira also discussed that litigation is not a game of surprises.
Rules of procedure and evidence are in place to ensure the smooth and speedy
dispensation of cases. Where the opposing party belatedly raises the
technicality that the witnesses’ testimonies were not formally offered to
“ambush” the party presenting them, the court may not expunge or strike them
out. Under the rules, a timely objection is a remedy available to petitioners.
They waived their right to this remedy when they waited until the case was
submitted for resolution to do so.
12. Same; Same; Witnesses; A witness, whether in a criminal or civil case, is
presented to support and prove the allegations made by the party presenting him
or her. The witness must be competent, and his or her testimony must be
relevant and material.-
—The rules on examination of witnesses and objecting to them are
not separate for civil and criminal cases. A witness, whether in a criminal or
civil case, is presented to support and prove the allegations made by the party
presenting him or her. The witness must be competent, and his or her testimony
must be relevant and material. Whether the case is civil or criminal, objection
or failure to offer the testimony of a witness must be made immediately.
13. Civil Law; Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; Words and Phrases; A buyer in good faith is one who purchases and pays fair
price for a property without notice that another has an interest over or right
to it.-
—A buyer in good faith is one who purchases and pays fair price
for a property without notice that another has an interest over or right to it.
If a land is registered and is covered by a certificate of title, any person
may rely on the correctness of the certificate of title, and he or she is not
obliged to go beyond the four (4) corners of the certificate to determine the condition
of the property. This rule does not apply, however, when the party has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man
to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the
lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably
prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in
litigation.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 189626
Counsel:
Lagare Law Offices for petitioners. Falgui Law Offices for St. Joseph Realty,
Ltd. Gacal, Gacal and Gacal for respondents Sps. Francisco and Concepcion
Ballado.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals’ September 26, 2008 Decision and August 7, 2009 Resolution in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 73758-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
29. Lehnert vs. Diño, 878 SCRA 357, August 28, 2018
Case Title : ALFRED LEHNERT, complainant, vs. ATTY. DENNIS L. DIÑO,
respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ; Code of Professional
Responsibility ; Gross Misconduct ;
Syllabi:
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Gross Misconduct; The issuance of worth checks constitutes gross misconduct
and violates Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which
mandates all members of the bar “to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law.”-
—This Court continues to state that the issuance of worth checks
constitutes gross misconduct and violates Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates all members of the bar “to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law.” Issuance of worth checks also violates Rule
1.01 of the Code, which mandates that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Thus, this Court has imposed the
penalty of one (1)-year suspension from the practice of law for a cavalier
attitude toward incurring debts. This Court has imposed a higher penalty of two
(2)-year suspension on a lawyer who issued worth checks and also disregarded
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ orders in administrative proceedings. In
light of the foregoing, this Court finds the recommended penalty of two
(2)-year suspension from the practice of law proper.
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: A.C. No. 12174
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dennis L. Diño is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years. He is likewise WARNED that a repetition of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. The respondent, upon receipt of
this Resolution, shall immediately serve his suspension. He shall formally manifest
to this Court that his suspension has started, and copy furnish all courts and
quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance, within five (5) days
from receipt of this Resolution. Respondent shall also serve copies of his
manifestation on all adverse parties in all the cases he entered his formal
appearance. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be attached to Atty. Dennis L. Diño’s personal record. Copies of
this Resolution should also be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for its proper disposition, and the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
Citation Ref:
30. Republic vs. Heirs of Ignacio Daquer, 878 SCRA
638, September 04, 2018
Case Title : REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF IGNACIO
DAQUER and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, PROVINCE OF PALAWAN, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Land Registration ; Reversion ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Reversion; The State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake, or
error of its officials or agents. It may revert the land at any time, where the
concession or disposition is void ab initio.-
—Lands of the public domain can only be classified as alienable
and disposable through a positive act of the government. The State cannot be
estopped by the omission, mistake, or error of its officials or agents. It may
revert the land at any time, where the concession or disposition is void ab
initio.
2. Civil Law; Land Registration; Homestead Patents; A homestead patent is a gratuitous grant from the
government “designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to
land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation.”-
—A homestead patent is a gratuitous grant from the government
“designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute
citizens for their home and cultivation.” Being a gratuitous grant, a homestead
patent applicant must strictly comply with the requirements laid down by the
law.
3. Same; Same; Under the Public Land Act, the
Governor-General (now the President), upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural
Resources [DENR]), shall have the power to classify lands of the public domain
into: (1) alienable or disposable; (2) timber; and
(3) mineral lands.-
—Under the Public Land Act, the Governor-General (now the
President), upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural Resources), shall have the
power to classify lands of the public domain into: (1) alienable or disposable;
(2) timber; and (3) mineral lands. Lands of public domain which have been
classified as alienable or disposable may further be classified into: (1)
agricultural; (2) commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(3) educational, charitable and other similar purposes; and (4) reservations
for town sites, and for public and quasi-public uses. Once lands of public
domain have been classified as public agricultural lands, they may be disposed
through any of the following means: (1) homestead settlement; (2) sale; (3)
lease; or (4) confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
4. Same; Same; Until and un lands of the public domain have been
classified as public agricultural lands, they are inalienable and not capable
of private appropriation.-
—Only lands of the public domain which have been classified as
public agricultural lands may be disposed of through homestead settlement. The
Public Land Act vested the exclusive prerogative to classify lands of the
public domain to the Executive Department, specifically with the
Governor-General, now the President. Thus, until and un lands of the public
domain have been classified as public agricultural lands, they are inalienable
and not capable of private appropriation. In the case at bar, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the President’s issuance of Homestead Patent No. V-67820 in
favor of Daquer under the terms stated in it was considered as an adequate
recognition that Lot No. H- 19731 was already classified as alienable and
disposable when the patent was issued.
5. Same; Same; In classifying lands of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, there must be a positive act from the government declaring them as
open for alienation and disposition.-
—At the outset, it must be emphasized that in classifying lands
of the public domain as alienable and disposable, there must be a positive act
from the government declaring them as open for alienation and disposition. In
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, 568
SCRA 164 (2008): A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has
time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,
such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. x x x A positive act is an
act which clearly and positively manifests the intention to declassify lands of
the public domain into alienable and disposable. “Any person seeking relief
under. . . the Public Land Act admits that the property being applied for is
public land.” “The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration
(or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.”
6. Same; Same; Reclaimed Lands; Public Domain; Submerged areas belong to the public domain. Mere
reclamation by Public Estates Authority (PEA) “does not convert these
inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and
open to disposition or concession.”-
—On the issue of land classification, this Court held that
foreshore and submerged areas belong to the public domain. Mere reclamation by
PEA “does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or
presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.” Thus: Under
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged
areas of Manila Bay are part of the “lands of the public domain, waters. . .
and other natural resources” and consequently “owned by the State.” As such,
foreshore and submerged areas “shall not be alienated,” un they are classified
as “agricultural lands” of the public domain. The mere reclamation of these
areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the State
into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or
presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these
reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use. Section 8 of C[ommonwealth]
A[ct] No. 141 provides that “only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified.”
The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to
Section 6 of C[ommonwealth] A[ct] No. 141.
7. Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; The Supreme Court (SC) considered the issuance of a
presidential decree and a special patent proclaiming the land as alienable and
disposable as a positive act of the Executive Department that converted the
reclaimed areas into alienable and disposable agricultural lands.-
—This Court considered the issuance of a presidential decree and
a special patent proclaiming the land as alienable and disposable as a positive
act of the Executive Department that converted the reclaimed areas into
alienable and disposable agricultural lands: P[residential] D[ecree] No. 1085,
coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a special patent covering
the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the
Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
P[residential] D[ecree] No. 1085 and President Aquino’s issuance of a land
patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer
needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified
parties. x x x In other words, Presidential Decree No. 1085 provides for the
express and direct transfer of ownership of the reclaimed lands located in the
foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay. On the other hand, Act No. 2874
merely outlines the procedure for the administration and disposition of
alienable lands of the public domain.
8. Same; Same; Inalienable Lands; Public Domain; Even if the property falls within the unclassified zone,
the Supreme Court (SC), in Heirs of the Late Spouses Palanca v. Republic, 500
SCRA 209 (2006), ruled that unclassified lands, until released and rendered
open to disposition, shall be considered as inalienable lands of the public
domain.-
—Even if the property falls within the unclassified zone, this
Court, in Heirs of the Late Spouses Palanca v. Republic, 500 SCRA 209 (2006),
ruled that unclassified lands, until released and rendered open to disposition,
shall be considered as inalienable lands of the public domain, thus: While it
is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the
islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to
the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or timber
land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition. When the property is still unclassified, whatever possession
applicants may have had, and however long, still cannot ripen into private
ownership. This is because, pursuant to Constitutional precepts, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in such lands and is charged with the conservation
of such patrimony. Thus, the Court has emphasized the need to show in
registration proceedings that the government, through a positive act, has
declassified inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.
9. Same; Same; Homestead Patents; As a rule, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a
homestead patent partakes the nature of a certificate of title issued through a
judicial proceeding and becomes incontrovertible upon the expiration of one (1)
year.-
—As a rule, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a
homestead patent partakes the nature of a certificate of title issued through a
judicial proceeding and becomes incontrovertible upon the expiration of one (1)
year. Thus, in Wee v. Mardo, 725 SCRA 242 (2014): [O]nce a patent is registered
and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be
part of public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of
Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A public land patent, when
registered in the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens
title, and becomes as indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the
date of issuance thereof. Said title, like one issued pursuant to a judicial
decree, is subject to review within one (1) year from the date of the issuance
of the patent. This rule is embodied in Section 103 of PD 1529, which provides
that: Section 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents.—Whenever public
land is by the Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the
same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree. . . . After
due registration and issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be
deemed to be registered land to all intents and purposes under this Decree. x x
x Neverthe, the rule that “a certificate of title issued pursuant to a
homestead patent becomes indefeasible after one year, is subject to the proviso
that ‘the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within
the contemplation of the Public Land Law.”’
10. Same; Same; Inalienable Lands; Public Domain; When the property covered by a homestead patent is part of
the inalienable land of the public domain, the title issued pursuant to it is
null and void, and the rule on indefeasibility of title will not apply.-
—When the property covered by a homestead patent is part of the
inalienable land of the public domain, the title issued pursuant to it is null
and void, and the rule on indefeasibility of title will not apply. In Agne v.
Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793 (1990): The rule on the incontrovertibility of
a certificate of title upon the expiration of one year, after the entry of the
decree, pursuant to the provisions of the Land Registration Act, does not apply
where an action for the cancellation of a patent and a certificate of title
issued pursuant thereto is instituted on the ground that they are null and void
because the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them at all[.]
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 193657
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. Manuel R. Riguera for private
respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The January 14, 2010
Decision and September 7, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
CV No. 90488 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ownership and possession of the
tract of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. G-3287 in the name
of Ignacio Daquer falling within the unclassified zone is hereby REVERTED to
and REACQUIRED by the Republic of the Philippines. The Register of Deeds of
Palawan is directed to CANCEL Original Certificate of Title No. G-3287 for
being null and void.
Citation Ref:
31. Garcia-Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, 880 SCRA 173, September
17, 2018
Case Title : FLORENCIA GARCIA-DIAZ, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,
respondent.
Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Sandiganbayan.
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Arias Doctrine ;
Syllabi:
1. Administrative Law; Arias Doctrine; It is true that the Supreme Court (SC) said in Arias that
“all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates
and on the good faith of those who . . . enter into negotiations.”-
—It is true that this Court said in Arias, that “all heads of
offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the
good faith of those who . . . enter into negotiations.” However, as earlier
found, it was never established that a subordinate prepared the February 12,
1998 Letter and that petitioner Solis merely signed it perfunctorily. The
Sandiganbayan even found that it did not pass the usual procedure, not being
signed by an assistant director, a director, and a deputy administrator. Furthermore,
petitioner Solis testified on direct examination that he examined it and its
attachments. It must be presumed that petitioner Solis prepared it, not a
subordinate. Arias, therefore, does not apply.
2. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA
No. 3019); Entering Into
Contracts Grossly Disadvantageous to the Government (Sec 3[g], Republic Act
[RA] No. 3019); Elements of.-
—Petitioners Garcia-Diaz and Solis were convicted of violating
Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful: . . . . (g) Entering, on behalf of the Government,
into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. The
elements of Section 3(g) are: first, the accused is a public officer; second,
that he or she entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the
government; and third, that the contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Given the above elements, petitioner
Garcia-Diaz claims that she cannot be convicted under Section 3(g) because the
first element is absent. She is not a public officer but a private person.
Petitioner Garcia-Diaz’s argument is not new. It is true that Section 3 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act speaks of corrupt practices of public
officers. “However, if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private person
may be held liable together with the public officer.” This is consistent with
the policy behind the statute, which, as provided in its first section, is “to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.” The reason
that private persons may be charged with public officers under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act is “to avoid repeated and unnecessary presentation of
witnesses and exhibits against conspirators in different venues, especially if
the issues involved are the same. It follows, therefore, that if a private person
may be tried jointly with public officers, he or she may also be convicted
jointly with them.”
3. Same; Same; Liability of Private Persons; When an information alleges that a public officer
“conspires,” “confederates,” “connives,” or “colludes” with private person, or
when the “allegation of basic facts constitution conspiracy between the public
officer and the private person is mad in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended,” then a private person may be
convicted under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.-
—When an information alleges that a public officer “conspires,”
“confederates,” “connives,” or “colludes” with a private person, or when the
“allegation of basic facts constituting conspiracy [between the public officer
and the private person is made] in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended,” then a private person may be
convicted under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
information against the private person will be sufficient in form and substance
and, contrary to Garcia-Diaz’s argument, there is no “impossible crime” against
the private person. The Information filed in Criminal Case No. 27974 provides
that Solicitor General Galvez, NAMRIA Administrator Solis, Officer-in-Charge
Bonnevie, Assistant Director Fabian, and Remote Sensing Technologists Valencia
and Viernes, all public officers, “conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, together with Florencia Garcia-Diaz, a private person,”
executed the Compromise Agreement that declared a part of Fort Magsaysay as
outside the technical description provided in Presidential Proclamation No.
237. It obviously contains an allegation of conspiracy against petitioner
Garcia-Diaz. Having been charged and tried under a valid Information,
petitioner Garcia-Diaz was validly convicted of Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. This is despite her being a private person.
4. Same; Conspiracy; Coconspirators are answerable collectively and equally,
regard of the degree of their participation in the crime, because it is the
common scheme, purpose, or objective that is punished, not the individual acts
of each of the accused.-
—For his part, petitioner Solis mainly contends that he was
erroneously convicted because of the absence of the second and third elements.
He was not a party to the Compromise Agreement. Thus, he never entered into a
contract or transaction on behalf of the government as provided in Section 3(g)
of Republic Act No. 3019. Furthermore, he points out that the registration of
the 4,689 hectares in the name of petitioner Garcia-Diaz did not push through;
hence, there was no gross and manifest disadvantage to the government. In so
arguing, petitioner Solis disregards the essence of conspiracy where the act of
one is the act of all. A finding of conspiracy means that all the accused are
deemed to have “consented to and adopted as their own, the offense [of the
other accused].” Coconspirators are answerable collectively and equally, regard
of the degree of their participation in the crime, because it is the common
scheme, purpose, or objective that is punished, not the individual acts of each
of the accused.
5. Same; Falsification by Public Officer; To be convicted under Article 171, the public officer must
have taken advantage of his or her official position to commit the
falsification either because “he [or she] has the duty to make or prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document,” or because he or she
has the official custody of the falsified document.-
—In general, the elements of Article 171 are: first, “the
offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public”; second, he or she
takes advantage of his or her official position; and third, he or she falsifies
a document by committing any of the acts enumerated in Article 171. Specific to
the fourth mode in Article 171, i.e., making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts, the elements are: first, “the offender makes in a [public]
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts”; second, the offender
“has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him [or
her]”; and, third, the facts that he or she narrated are absolutely false.
Further, to be convicted under Article 171, the public officer must have taken
advantage of his or her official position to commit the falsification either
because “he [or she] has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene
in the preparation of a document,” or because he or she has the official
custody of the falsified document.
6. National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority; Jurisdiction; National Mapping and Resource Information Authority
(NAMRIA) is the government agency responsible for conducting geophysical
surveys as well as managing resource information needed by both the public and
private sectors.-
—It is ridiculous to say that petitioner Solis had no legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts as he narrated in his February
12, 1998 Letter. On the contrary, inherent in the very nature and purpose of
the document was petitioner Solis’ obligation, as NAMRIA Administrator, to
disclose the truth of the facts as he narrated. NAMRIA is the government agency
responsible for conducting geophysical surveys as well as managing resource
information needed by both the public and private sectors. Because of the
agency’s special competence, petitioner Solis was requested by the Republic,
through the Solicitor General, to conduct a resurvey of Fort Magsaysay. He was
informed at the outset that his agency’s findings would determine whether or
not the government would enter into a compromise with petitioner Garcia-Diaz.
To allow petitioner Solis to claim that he had no legal obligation to disclose
the truth in his letter will be contrary to NAMRIA’s functions. It will erode
the public’s confidence in NAMRIA and all its issuances and research findings.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 193236
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Review on Certiorari are DENIED.
The Sandiganbayan’s March 3, 2010 Decision and July 29, 2010 Resolution in
Criminal Cases Nos. 27974-75 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
32. Imperial vs. Heirs of Neil Bayaban and Mary Lou Bayaban, 881
SCRA 383, October 03, 2018
Case Title : RAUL S. IMPERIAL, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF NEIL BAYABAN AND
MARY LOU BAYABAN, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Damages ; Temperate Damages ;
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Damages; Temperate Damages; Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal
but than actual or compensatory damages,
may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered, but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty.-
—Apart from the actual damages for the hospital and medical
expenses that respondents have incurred, this Court finds that respondents are
entitled to temperate damages for loss of earning capacity. Temperate or
moderate damages, which are more than nominal but than actual or compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered, but
its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances. While respondents
failed to put forward definite proof of income lost during confinement and
post-therapy, they still suffered pecuniary loss when they were incapacitated
to work. Under the circumstances, the P100,000.00 awarded by the Regional Trial
Court is reasonable to compensate them for the income that the Bayaban Spouses
could have earned as a second mate seaman and a pharmacist, respectively. As
opposed to the Court of Appeals’ ruling, temperate damages may still be awarded
to respondents despite previous award of actual damages because the damages
cover distinct pecuniary losses. The temperate damages awarded cover the loss
of earning capacity while the actual damages cover the medical and hospital
expenses.
2. Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Vicarious Liability; Article 2176 defines “quasi-delict” as the fault or
negligence that causes damage to another, there being no preexisting
contractual relations between the parties. On the other hand, Article 2180
enumerates persons who are vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of
persons over whom they exercise control, whether absolute or limited.-
—Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code were derived from
Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Article 2176 defines
“quasi-delict” as the fault or negligence that causes damage to another, there
being no preexisting contractual relations between the parties. On the other
hand, Article 2180 enumerates persons who are vicariously liable for the fault
or negligence of persons over whom they exercise control, whether absolute or
limited.
3. Same; Same; Same; For employers, they are deemed liable or morally
responsible for the fault or negligence of their employees but only if the
employees are acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.-
—This Court explained the legal fiction of vicarious liability
in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768 (1918). Though involving
Articles 1902 and 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Cangco’s explanation
of the law’s rationale remains relevant considering that Articles 1902 and
1903, and the present Articles 2176 and 2180 are similarly worded. In Cangco:
With respect to extra contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether
of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our
Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in which the
person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the
contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without
regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for
the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a
legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has
elected to limit extra contractual liability — with certain well-defined
exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the
persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed
to exercise due care in one’s own acts, or in having failed to exercise due
care in the selection and control of one’s agents or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.
Specifically for employers, they are deemed liable or morally responsible for
the fault or negligence of their employees but only if the employees are acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks. An act is deemed an assigned task if
it is “done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or
for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage.”
4. Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) finds that respondents have
discharged the burden of proof necessary to hold Imperial vicariously liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is no question here that Laraga was
petitioner’s driver, hence, his employee, as this fact was admitted by
petitioner.-
—This Court finds that respondents have discharged the burden of
proof necessary to hold Imperial vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. There is no question here that Laraga was petitioner’s driver,
hence, his employee, as this fact was admitted by petitioner. This Court
likewise finds that respondents have established that Laraga was acting within
the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the accident. It was 3:00 p.m.
and Laraga was driving in Antipolo City, where, as alleged by petitioner, his
greenhouse and garden were located. It is worth noting that according to
petitioner, he loaned the van to Pascua for the maintenance of his greenhouse
and the repair of the water line pipes in his garden. The logical conclusion is
that Laraga was driving the van in connection with the upkeep of petitioner’s
Antipolo greenhouse and garden. Laraga was driving the van in furtherance of
the interests of petitioner at the time of the accident. The defense that
Sunday was supposedly Laraga’s day off fails to convince. There is no proof
whatsoever of the truthfulness of this allegation, with Laraga not having
appeared in court to testify on this matter.
5. Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Public Documents; When public documents are presented in evidence, they are
prima facie evidence of the facts stated there, and thus, need not be
authenticated.-
—Under the rules of evidence, documents are either public or
private. Public documents are those exclusively enumerated in Rule 132, Section
19 of the Rules of Court. These include written official acts, or records of
the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments;
and public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by
law to be entered there. When public documents are presented in evidence, they
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated there, and thus, need not be
authenticated.
6. Same; Same; Same; Private Documents; Official receipts of hospital and medical expenses are not
among those enumerated in Rule 132, Section 19. These official receipts,
therefore, are private documents which may be authenticated either by
presenting as witness anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by
presenting an evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.-
—As for private documents, i.e., those not enumerated in Rule
132, Section 19, they must be authenticated, or their due execution and
authenticity proven, per Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Section 20. Proof of private document.—Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b)
By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed
to be. Official receipts of hospital and medical expenses are not among those
enumerated in Rule 132, Section 19. These official receipts, therefore, are
private documents which may be authenticated either by presenting as witness
anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by presenting an evidence
of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 197626
Counsel:
Kapunan, Imperial, Panaguiton & Bongolan for petitioner. Medina, Libatique
& Associates for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals’ March 18, 2011 Decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 93498 is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the award of temperate damages to respondents Mary
Lou Bayaban and the Heirs of Neil Bayaban is REINSTATED. Consequently, Raul S.
Imperial is ordered to pay Mary Lou Bayaban and the Heirs of Neil Bayaban the
following: P462,868.83 as actual damages representing medical expenses;
P100,000.00 as temperate damages for loss of earning capacity; P50,000.00 as
moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as attorney’s
fees, inclusive of appearance fees plus cost of suit. The total amount shall
earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality
of this Decision until full payment.
Citation Ref:
33. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Avon Products Manufacturing,
Inc., 881 SCRA 451, October 03, 2018
Case Title : COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. AVON
PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING, INC., respondent.
Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc.
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Right to be Informed ;
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Right to be Informed; It is imperative that the taxpayers are informed of the
Commissioner’s action for them to take proper recourse to the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) at the opportune time.-
—Taxpayers cannot be left in quandary by the Commissioner’s
inaction on the protested assessment. It is imperative that the taxpayers are
informed of the Commissioner’s action for them to take proper recourse to the
Court of Tax Appeals at the opportune time. Furthermore, this Court had time
and again expressed the dictum that “the Commissioner should always indicate to
the taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language what constitutes his [or her]
final determination of the disputed assessment. That procedure is demanded by
the pressing need for fair play, regularity and orderliness in administrative
action.” While indeed the government has an interest in the swift collection of
taxes, its assessment and collection should be exercised justly and fairly, and
always in strict adherence to the requirements of the law and of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue’s own rules.
2. Taxation; Bureau of Internal Revenue; Jurisdiction; The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) is the primary agency
tasked to assess and collect proper taxes, and to administer and enforce the
Tax Code. To perform its functions of tax assessment and collection properly,
it is given ample powers under the Tax Code, such as the power to examine tax
returns and books of accounts, to issue a subpoena, and to assess based on best
evidence obtainable, among others.-
—The Bureau of Internal Revenue is the primary agency tasked to
assess and collect proper taxes, and to administer and enforce the Tax Code. To
perform its functions of tax assessment and collection properly, it is given
ample powers under the Tax Code, such as the power to examine tax returns and
books of accounts, to issue a subpoena, and to assess based on best evidence
obtainable, among others. However, these powers must “be exercised reasonably
and [under] the prescribed procedure.” The Commissioner and revenue officers
must strictly comply with the requirements of the law, with the Bureau of
Internal Revenue’s own rules, and with due regard to taxpayers’ constitutional
rights. The Commissioner exercises administrative adjudicatory power or
quasi-judicial function in adjudicating the rights and liabilities of persons
under the Tax Code.
3. Due Process; Administrative Due Process; Administrative due process is anchored on fairness and
equity in procedure.-
—Administrative due process is anchored on fairness and equity
in procedure. It is satisfied if the party is properly notified of the charge
against it and is given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain or defend
itself. Moreover, it demands that the party’s defenses be considered by the
administrative body in making its conclusions, and that the party be
sufficiently informed of the reasons for its conclusions.
4. Taxation; Tax Assessment; Under Section 228, it is explicitly
required that the taxpayer be informed in writing of the law and of the facts
on which the assessment is made; otherwise,
the assessment shall be void.-
—The importance of providing the taxpayer with adequate written
notice of his or her tax liability is undeniable. Under Section 228, it is
explicitly required that the taxpayer be informed in writing of the law and of
the facts on which the assessment is made; otherwise, the assessment shall be
void. Section 3.1.2 of Revenue Regulations No. 12-99 requires the Preliminary
Assessment Notice to show in detail the facts and law, rules and regulations,
or jurisprudence on which the proposed assessment is based. Further, Section
3.1.4 requires that the Final Letter of Demand must state the facts and law on
which it is based; otherwise, the Final Letter of Demand and Final Assessment
Notices themselves shall be void. Finally, Section 3.1.6 specifically requires
that the decision of the Commissioner or of his or her duly authorized
representative on a disputed assessment shall state the facts and law, rules
and regulations, or jurisprudence on which the decision is based. Failure to do
so would invalidate the Final Decision on Disputed Assessment.
5. Constitutional Law; Right to be Heard; The right to be heard, which includes the right to present
evidence, is meaning if the Commissioner can simply ignore the evidence without
reason.-
—It is true that the Commissioner is not obliged to accept the
taxpayer’s explanations, as explained by the Court of Tax Appeals. However,
when he or she rejects these explanations, he or she must give some reason for
doing so. He or she must give the particular facts upon which his or her
conclusions are based, and those facts must appear in the record. Indeed, the
Commissioner’s inaction and omission to give due consideration to the arguments
and evidence submitted before her by Avon are deplorable transgressions of
Avon’s right to due process. The right to be heard, which includes the right to
present evidence, is meaning if the Commissioner can simply ignore the evidence
without reason.
6. Taxation; Tax Assessment; The Supreme Court (SC) has, in several cases, declared
void any assessment that failed to strictly comply with the due process
requirements set forth in Section 228 of the Tax Code and Revenue Regulation
(RR) No. 12-99.-
—This Court has, in several cases, declared void any assessment
that failed to strictly comply with the due process requirements set forth in
Section 228 of the Tax Code and Revenue Regulation No. 12-99. In Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Metro Star Superama, Inc., 637 SCRA 633this Court held
that failure to send a Preliminary Assessment Notice stating the facts and the
law on which the assessment was made as required by Section 228 of the Tax Code
rendered the assessment made by the Commissioner as void. This Court explained:
Indeed, Section 228 of the Tax Code clearly requires that the taxpayer must
first be informed that he is liable for deficiency taxes through the sending of
a PAN. He must be informed of the facts and the law upon which the assessment
is made. The law imposes a substantive, not merely a formal, requirement. To
proceed heedly with tax collection without first establishing a valid
assessment is evidently violative of the cardinal principle in administrative
investigations — that taxpayers should be able to present their case and adduce
supporting evidence.
7. Same; Same; As a general rule, petitioner has three
(3) years from the filing of the return to assess taxpayers; An exception to the rule of prescription is found in
Section 222, paragraphs (b) and (d) of the Tax Code.-
—As a general rule, petitioner has three (3) years from the
filing of the return to assess taxpayers. Section 203 of the Tax Code provides:
Section 203. Period of Limitation Upon Assessment and Collection.—Except as
provided in Section 222, internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within three
(3) years after the last day prescribed by law for the filing of the return,
and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such taxes
shall be begun after the expiration of such period: Provided, That in a case
where a return is filed beyond the period prescribed by law, the three (3)-year
period shall be counted from the day the return was filed. For purposes of this
Section, a return filed before the last day prescribed by law for the filing
thereof shall be considered as filed on such last day. An exception to the rule
of prescription is found in Section 222, paragraphs (b) and (d) of the same
Code, viz.: Section 222. Exceptions as to Period of Limitation of Assessment
and Collection of Taxes.— . . . . (b) If before the expiration of the time
prescribed in Section 203 for the assessment of the tax, both the Commissioner
and the taxpayer have agreed in writing to its assessment after such time, the
tax may be assessed within the period agreed upon. The period so agreed upon
may be extended by subsequent written agreement made before the expiration of
the period previously agreed upon. . . . . (d) Any internal revenue tax, which
has been assessed within the period agreed upon as provided in paragraph (b)
hereinabove, may be collected by distraint or levy or by a proceeding in court
within the period agreed upon in writing before the expiration of the five
(5)-year period. The period so agreed upon may be extended by subsequent
written agreements made before the expiration of the period previously agreed
upon. Thus, the period to assess and collect taxes may be extended upon the
Commissioner and the taxpayer’s written agreement, executed before the
expiration of the three (3)-year period.
8. Same; Estoppel; The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) could not hide behind
the doctrine of estoppel to cover its failure to comply with its own
procedures.+
9. Same; Appeals; With the amendment introduced by Republic Act (RA) No.
8424, the taxpayer may now immediately appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
in case of inaction of the Commissioner for one hundred eighty (180) days from
submission of supporting documents.-
—Section 228 of the Tax Code amended Section 229 of the Old Tax
Code by adding, among others, the 180-day rule. This new provision presumably
avoids the situation in the past when a taxpayer would be held hostage by the
Commissioner’s inaction on his or her protest. Under the Old Tax Code, in
conjunction with Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, only the decision or
ruling of the Commissioner on a disputed assessment is appealable to the Court
of Tax Appeals. Consequently, the taxpayer then had to wait for the
Commissioner’s action on his or her protest, which more often was long-delayed.
With the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 8424, the taxpayer may now
immediately appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals in case of inaction of the
Commissioner for 180 days from submission of supporting documents.
10. Same; Same; The taxpayer has the option to either elevate the case to
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) if the Commissioner does not act on his or her
protest, or to wait for the Commissioner to decide on his or her protest before
he or she elevates the case to the CTA.-
—Section 228 of the Tax Code and Section 7 of Republic Act No.
9282 should be read in conjunction with Rule 4, Section 3(a)(2) of the 2005
Court of Tax Appeals Rules. In other words, the taxpayer has the option to
either elevate the case to the Court of Tax Appeals if the Commissioner does
not act on his or her protest, or to wait for the Commissioner to decide on his
or her protest before he or she elevates the case to the Court of Tax Appeals.
This construction is reasonable considering that Section 228 states that the
decision of the Commissioner not appealed by the taxpayer becomes final,
executory, and demandable.
11. Same; Tax Assessment; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Section 228 of the Tax Code requires taxpayers to exhaust
administrative remedies by filing a request for reconsideration or
reinvestigation within thirty (30) days from receipt of the assessment.-
—The Commissioner is reminded of her duty enunciated in Section
3.1.6 of Revenue Regulations No. 12-99 to render a final decision on disputed
assessment. Section 228 of the Tax Code requires taxpayers to exhaust
administrative remedies by filing a request for reconsideration or
reinvestigation within 30 days from receipt of the assessment. Exhaustion of
administrative remedies is required prior to resort to the Court of Tax Appeals
precisely to give the Commissioner the opportunity to “reexamine its findings
and conclusions” and to decide the Issues raised within her competence.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. Nos. 201398-99
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Romulo,
Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles for Avon Products
Manufacturing, Inc.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in G.R. Nos. 201398-99 is DENIED. The Petition of Avon Products Manufacturing,
Inc. in G.R. Nos. 201418-19 is GRANTED. The remaining deficiency Income Tax
under Assessment No. LTAID-II-IT-99-00018 in the amount of P357,345.88 for
taxable year 1999, including increments, is hereby declared NULL and VOID and
is CANCELLED.
Citation Ref:
34. The Insular Assurance Co., Ltd. vs. Heirs of Jose H.
Alvarez, 881 SCRA 516, October 03, 2018
Case Title : THE INSULAR ASSURANCE CO., LTD., petitioner, vs. THE HEIRS OF
JOSE H. ALVAREZ, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Insurance Law ; Mortgage Redemption Insurance ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Mortgage Redemption Insurance; Bank clients are generally unaware of insurance policies
such as a mortgage redemption insurance un brought to their knowledge by a bank.-
—The Regional Trial Court was correct in emphasizing that
Alvarez entered into the Group Mortgage Redemption Insurance entirely upon
UnionBank’s prodding. Bank clients are generally unaware of insurance policies
such as a mortgage redemption insurance un brought to their knowledge by a
bank. The processing of a mortgage redemption insurance was within UnionBank’s
regular course of business. It knew the import of truthfully and carefully
accomplished applications. To facilitate the principal contract of the loan and
its accessory obligations such as the real estate mortgage and the mortgage
redemption insurance, UnionBank completed credit appraisals and background
checks. Thus, the Regional Trial Court was correct in noting that UnionBank had
been in possession of materials sufficient to inform itself of Alvarez’s
personal circumstances.
2. Insurance Law; Fraud; Fraud is not to be presumed, for “otherwise, courts would
be indulging in speculations and surmises.”-
—Fraud is not to be presumed, for “otherwise, courts would be
indulging in speculations and surmises.” Moreover, it is not to be established
lightly. Rather, “[i]t must be established by clear and convincing evidence. .
. [; a] mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.”
These precepts hold true when allegations of fraud are raised as grounds
justifying the invalidation of contracts, as the fraud committed by a party
tends to vitiate the other party’s consent.
3. Same; Concealment; A concealment, regard of actual intent to defraud, “is
equivalent to a false representation.”-
—Insular Life correctly notes that proof of fraudulent intent is
unnecessary for the rescission of an insurance contract on account of
concealment. This is neither because intent to defraud is intrinsically
irrelevant in concealment, nor because concealment has nothing to do with
fraud. To the contrary, it is because in insurance contracts, concealing
material facts is inherently fraudulent: “if a material fact is actually known
to the [insured], its concealment must of itself necessarily be a fraud.” When
one knows a material fact and conceals it, “it is difficult to see how the
inference of a fraudulent intent or intentional concealment can be avoided.”
Thus, a concealment, regard of actual intent to defraud, “is equivalent to a
false representation.”
4. Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Section 26 defines concealment as “[a] neglect to
communicate that which a party knows and ought to communicate.”-
—Section 26 defines concealment as “[a] neglect to communicate
that which a party knows and ought to communicate.” However, Alvarez did not
withhold information on or neglect to state his age. He made an actual
declaration and assertion about it.
5. Same; Representation; A representation is to be deemed false when the facts fail
to correspond with its assertions or stipulations.-
—What this case involves, instead, is an allegedly false
representation. Section 44 of the Insurance Code states, “A representation is
to be deemed false when the facts fail to correspond with its assertions or
stipulations.” If indeed Alvarez misdeclared his age such that his assertion
fails to correspond with his factual age, he made a false representation, not a
concealment.
6. Same; Concealment; Concealment applies only with respect to material facts.-
—Concealment applies only with respect to material facts. That
is, those facts which by their nature would clearly, unequivocally, and
logically be known by the insured as necessary for the insurer to calculate the
proper risks. The absence of the requirement of intention definitely increases
the onus on the insured. Between the insured and the insurer, it is true that
the latter may have more resources to evaluate risks. Insurance companies are
imbued with public trust in the sense that they have the obligation to ensure
that they will be able to provide succor to those that enter into contracts
with them by being both frugal and, at the same time, diligent in their
assessment of the risk which they take with every insurance contract. However,
even with their tremendous resources, a material fact concealed by the insured
cannot simply be considered by the insurance company. The insurance company may
have huge resources, but the law does not require it to be omniscient.
7. Same; Representation; When the insured makes a representation,
it is incumbent on them to assure themselves that a representation on a
material fact is not false; and
if it is false, that it is not a fraudulent misrepresentation of a material
fact.-
—When the insured makes a representation, it is incumbent on
them to assure themselves that a representation on a material fact is not
false; and if it is false, that it is not a fraudulent misrepresentation of a
material fact. This returns the burden to insurance companies, which, in
general, have more resources than the insured to check the veracity of the
insured’s beliefs as to a statement of fact. Consciousness in defraudation is
imperative and it is for the insurer to show this. There may be a mistaken
impression, on the part of the insured, on the extent to which precision on
one’s age may alter the calculation of risks with definitiveness. Deliberation
attendant to an apparently inaccurate declaration is vital to ascertaining
fraud.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 207526
Counsel:
Cayetano, Sebastian, Ata, Dado & Cruz for Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Office of the General Counsel for UnionBank of the Philippines. Manuel S.
Fonacier, Jr. for respondent Heirs of J.H. Alvarez.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The assailed Court of
Appeals’ May 21, 2013 Decision and November 6, 2013 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 91820 are AFFIRMED. Petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines and The
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. are ordered to comply with the insurance
undertaking under Mortgage Redemption Insurance Policy No. G-098496 by applying
its proceeds as payment of the outstanding loan obligation of deceased Jose H.
Alvarez with respondent Union Bank of the Philippines; The extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage over Jose H. Alvarez’s TCT No. C-315023
is declared null and without legal force and effect; Petitioner Union Bank of
the Philippines is ordered to reconvey the title and ownership over the lot
covered by TCT No. C-315023 to the Estate of the deceased Jose H. Alvarez for
the benefit of his heirs and successors-in-interest; and Petitioners Union Bank
of the Philippines and The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. are ordered to
jointly and severally pay respondents the Heirs of Jose H. Alvarez attorney’s
fees and the costs of suit.
Citation Ref:
35. Concha vs. People, 881 SCRA 556, October 03, 2018
Case Title : MELKY CONCHA and ROMEO MANAGUELOD, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; Conviction in criminal cases demands proof beyond
reasonable doubt.-
—This Court reminds the members of the bar and bench that:
Conviction in criminal cases demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. While this
does not require absolute certainty, it calls for moral certainty. It is the
degree of proof that appeals to a magistrate’s conscience: An accused has in
his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Un
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This
reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and un it
discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf,
and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not, of course, mean such degree of proof as excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must
be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It is a settled doctrine that the
Supreme Court (SC) will only entertain questions of law in a Petition for
Review on Certiorari; Exceptions.-
—It is a settled doctrine that this Court will only entertain
questions of law in a Petition for Review on Certiorari. Under Rule 45, Section
1 of the Rules of Court: Section 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court.—A
party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court
or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. x x x Nonethe, this Court
admits certain exceptions to this rule, upon a showing of the existence of any
of the following circumstances: (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(2) when the findings are grounded on speculations; (3) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting;
(6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its
findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of
Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) when the facts set forth by the
petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted
by the evidence on record.
3. Criminal Law; Burden of Proof; Appeals; Before the prosecution concerns itself with the existence
of the elements of a crime, it must first discharge the burden of proving that
an accused is correctly identified.-
—Before the prosecution concerns itself with the existence of
the elements of a crime, it must first discharge the burden of proving that an
accused is correctly identified. In People v. Arapok, 347 SCRA 479 (2000), this
Court held: Once again we stress that the correct identification of the author
of a crime should be the primal concern of criminal prosecution in any
civilized legal system. Corollary to this is the actuality of the commission of
the offense with the participation of the accused. All these must be proved by
the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without
solace from the weakness of the defense. Thus, even if the defense of the
accused may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the
prosecution failed to discharge the onus on his identity and culpability. The
presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the people to demonstrate
guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence. x x x The out-of-court
identification of petitioners could have been disregarded altogether since it
was not shown that they were assisted by counsel. However, this Court
recognizes that the “probative weight of an in-court identification is largely
dependent upon an out-of-court identification.” Thus, it is necessary to determine
if the conduct of the latter is above suspicion.
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Out-of-Court Identification; People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995), enumerated
the ways on how the police may conduct out-of-court identification and provided
guidance on its admissibility.-
—People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1995), enumerated the
ways on how the police may conduct out-of-court identification and provided
guidance on its admissibility, thus: Out-of-court identification is conducted
by the police in various ways. It is done thru showups where the suspect alone
is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru
mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect.
It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a
group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the
trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and
its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the
criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that
time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the
length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
5. Same; Same; Same; Admissibility of Evidence; Given the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Supreme
Court (SC) holds that the gross corruption of Macutay’s out-of-court
identification through the improper suggestion of police officers affected the
admissibility of his in-court identification.-
—Given the peculiar circumstances of this case, this Court holds
that the gross corruption of Macutay’s out-of-court identification through the
improper suggestion of police officers affected the admissibility of his
in-court identification. In Arapok, this Court rendered a similar ruling: We
find that the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant, which is a
showup, falls short of “totality of circumstances” test. Specifically, there
was no prior description given by the witness to the police at any time after
the incident; and we cannot discount the possibility that the police may have
influenced the identification under the circumstances by which
accused-appellant was presented to him. This Court has held in People v.
Salguero that this kind of identification, where the attention of the witness
is directed to a lone suspect, is suggestive. Also, in People v. Niño, this
Court described this type of out-of-court identification as being “pointedly
suggestive, generated confidence where there was none, activated visual
imagination, and, all told, subverted their reliability as eyewitnesses.”
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 208114
Counsel:
Public Attorney’s Office for petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals’ January
31, 2013 Decision and July 5, 2013 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 33806 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Melky Concha and Romeo Managuelod are ACQUITTED
for reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, un
confined for any other lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report
to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he
has taken. A copy shall also be furnished to the Director General of Philippine
National Police for his information. Let entry of judgment be issued
immediately.
Citation Ref:
36. Padillo vs. Villanueva, 882 SCRA 1, October 03, 2018
Case Title : AURELIO PADILLO, petitioner, vs. ROLLY VILLANUEVA and JOSEPH
DIOPENES, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Secretary of Department of Agrarian
Reform ; Jurisdiction ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Secretary of Department of Agrarian
Reform; Jurisdiction; Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9700, which amends
Section 24 of RA No. 6657, states that “the cancellation of registered
emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership award, and other titles
issued under any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the [Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)].”-
—Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9700, which amends Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 6657, states that “the cancellation of registered emancipation
patents, certificates of land ownership award, and other titles issued under
any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction
of the Secretary of the [Department of Agrarian Reform].” This covers only
certificates under the Department of Agrarian Reform’s jurisdiction. The
cancellation of a registered certificate of land ownership award or a
certificate of title does not fall under it.
2. Agrarian Reform; Certificate of Land Ownership Award; A certificate of land ownership award (CLOA) is evidence
of the award of a public land by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to the
beneficiary under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657.-
—A certificate of land ownership award is evidence of the award
of a public land by the Department of Agrarian Reform to the beneficiary under
Republic Act No. 6657. Upon its registration, the subject land is placed under
the operation of the Torrens system. Well-settled is the rule that certificates
of title emanating from the grant of public land in an administrative proceeding
enjoy the same protection as those issued in registration proceedings. This
Court affirms the Court of Appeals in ruling that “a certificate of land
ownership award becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration
of one year from the date of registration with the Office of the Registry of
Deeds.”
3. Same; Same; Collateral Attack; Once under the Torrens system, a certificate of land
ownership award (CLOA) or certificate of title issued may only be attacked
through a direct proceeding before the court.-
—Similar to a certificate of title issued in registration
proceedings, the registration of a certificate of land ownership award places
the subject land under the operation of the Torrens system. Once under the
Torrens system, a certificate of land ownership award or certificate of title
issued may only be attacked through a direct proceeding before the court. Under
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, or the Property Registration
Decree: SECTION 48. Certificate Not Subject to Collateral Attack.—A certificate
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
4. Same; Same; Annulment of Certificate of Land
Ownership Award; Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529, a registered certificate of land ownership award (CLOA) may be
altered, modified, or canceled only through an action for annulment of the
certificate itself.-
—An attack is collateral when “it incidentally questions the
validity of the transfer certificate of title in an action seeking a different
relief.” A direct attack is an action that annuls the title itself. In De Pedro
v. Romasan Development Corporation, 743 SCRA 52 (2014), this Court explained:
An action for annulment of certificate of title is a direct attack on the title
because it challenges the judgment decree of title. In Goco v. Court of
Appeals, this court said that “[a]n action for annulment of certificates of
title to property [goes] into the issue of ownership of the land covered by a
Torrens title and the relief generally prayed for by the plaintiff is to be
declared as the land’s true owner.” x x x Thus, under Section 48 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, a registered certificate of land ownership award
may be altered, modified, or canceled only through an action for annulment of
the certificate itself. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, an action for annulment of a registered certificate
of land ownership award, like the annulment of a certificate of title, involves
title to or possession of real property or any interest therein. This falls
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of either the Regional Trial Court or
the Municipal Trial Court, depending on the assessed value.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 209661
Counsel:
Manuel M. Casumpang for petitioner. Jagna-an, Belloga, Agot & Associates
for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals’ September 30, 2013 Decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 05797, the
June 23, 2010 Decision and February 10, 2011 Resolution of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 15114, the March 15, 2007
Decision of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, and the September 30,
2003, February 24, 2004, and May 31, 2005 Orders of Regional Director Alexis M.
Arsenal in Adm. Case No. A-0604-0811-02 are all SET ASIDE. The Petition for
Cancellation of Certificate of Land Ownership Award in DARAB Case No.
VI-3603-IL-06 is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing by Aurelio P.
Padillo of an action before the proper court.
Citation Ref:
37. International Container Terminal Services, Inc. vs. City of
Manila, 883 SCRA 359, October 17, 2018
Case Title : INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs. THE CITY OF MANILA; LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as TREASURER OF
MANILA; GABRIEL ESPINO, in his capacity as RESIDENT AUDITOR OF MANILA; and THE
CITY COUNCIL OF MANILA, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; If the party can prove that the resort to the
administrative remedy would be an idle ceremony such that it will be absurd and
unjust for it to continue seeking relief that evidently will not be granted to
it, then the doctrine would not apply.-
—When there is an adequate remedy available with the
administrative remedy, then courts will decline to interfere when the party
refuses, or fails, to avail of it. Nonethe, the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is not always fatal to a party’s cause. This Court has
admitted of several exceptions to the doctrine: As correctly suggested by the
respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine
may be dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately.
Among these exceptional cases are: 1) when the question raised is purely legal;
2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of
is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5)
when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;
7) when there is [no] other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong
public interest is involved; 9) when the subject of the controversy is private
land; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings. x x x If the party can prove that
the resort to the administrative remedy would be an idle ceremony such that it
will be absurd and unjust for it to continue seeking relief that evidently will
not be granted to it, then the doctrine would not apply.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Docket Fees; It is an established rule that the payment of the
prescribed docket fees is essential for a court to acquire jurisdiction over a
case.-
—It is an established rule that the payment of the prescribed
docket fees is essential for a court to acquire jurisdiction over a case.
Nonethe, in Sun Insurance Office, 170 SCRA 274 (1989), this Court laid down the
principles concerning the payment of docket fees for initiatory pleadings:
Neverthe, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still
insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which
the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk
or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, i[f] any amount is found
due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same. Thus, the Court
rules as follows: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed
until and un the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also
allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond
its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 3. Where the trial court
acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards
a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left
for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk
of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; If a party pays the correct amount of docket fees for its
original initiatory pleading, but later amends the pleading and increases the
amount prayed for, the failure to pay the corresponding docket fees for the
increased amount should not be deemed to have curtailed the court’s
jurisdiction.-
—Should the docket fees paid be found insufficient considering
the value of the claim, the filing party shall be required to pay the
deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost. The clerk of court
involved, or his or her duly authorized deputy, is responsible for making the
deficiency assessment. If a party pays the correct amount of docket fees for
its original initiatory pleading, but later amends the pleading and increases the
amount prayed for, the failure to pay the corresponding docket fees for the
increased amount should not be deemed to have curtailed the court’s
jurisdiction. In PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 297
SCRA 402 (1998): With respect to petitioner’s contention that the lower court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the amended complaint increasing the amount
of damages claimed to P600,000.00, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the
lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when private respondent paid
the docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its
failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages
under the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the
lower court’s jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien
on the judgment even though private respondent specified the amount of
P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its amended complaint.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled that any additional docket fees shall
constitute a lien on the judgment that may be awarded.-
—There is no showing that petitioner intended to deliberately
defraud the court when it did not pay the correct docket fees for its Amended
and Supplemental Petition. Respondents have not provided any proof to
substantiate their allegation that petitioner purposely avoided the payment of
the docket fees for its additional claims. On the contrary, petitioner has been
consistent in its assertion that it will undertake to pay any additional docket
fees that may be found due by this Court. Further, it is well-settled that any
additional docket fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment that may be
awarded.
5. Taxation; Tax Assessment; Tax Remedies; If the taxpayer receives an assessment
and does not pay the tax, its remedy is strictly confined to Section 195 of the
Local Government Code (LGC); If
the taxpayer opts to pay the assessed tax, fee, or charge, it must still file
the written protest within the sixty (60)-day period, and then bring the case
to court within thirty (30) days from either the decision or inaction of the
local treasurer.-
—If the taxpayer receives an assessment and does not pay the
tax, its remedy is strictly confined to Section 195 of the Local Government
Code. Thus, it must file a written protest with the local treasurer within 60
days from the receipt of the assessment. If the protest is denied, or if the
local treasurer fails to act on it, then the taxpayer must appeal the
assessment before a court of competent jurisdiction within 30 days from receipt
of the denial, or the lapse of the 60-day period within which the local
treasurer must act on the protest. In this case, as no tax was paid, there is
no claim for refund in the appeal. If the taxpayer opts to pay the assessed
tax, fee, or charge, it must still file the written protest within the 60-day
period, and then bring the case to court within 30 days from either the decision
or inaction of the local treasurer. In its court action, the taxpayer may, at
the same time, question the validity and correctness of the assessment and seek
a refund of the taxes it paid. “Once the assessment is set aside by the court,
it follows as a matter of course that all taxes paid under the erroneous or
invalid assessment are refunded to the taxpayer.”
6. Same; Same; Same; If no assessment notice is issued by the local treasurer,
and the taxpayer claims that it erroneously paid a tax, fee, or charge, or that
the tax, fee, or charge has been illegally collected from him, then Section 196
applies.-
—If no assessment notice is issued by the local treasurer, and
the taxpayer claims that it erroneously paid a tax, fee, or charge, or that the
tax, fee, or charge has been illegally collected from him, then Section 196
applies. Here, there is no dispute on the refund of P6,224,250.00, representing
the additional taxes paid for the first three (3) quarters of 1999, as ordered
by the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division in its May 17, 2006 Decision on to
petitioner’s entitlement to a refund of the taxes paid subsequent to the third
quarter of 1999, which was denied by the Court of Tax Appeals Second Division
on the ground that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of Section
195.
7. Same; Same; Same; The notice of assessment must state “the nature of the
tax, fee, or charge, the amount of deficiency, the surcharges, interests and
penalties.”-
—What determines the appropriate remedy is the local government’s
basis for the collection of the tax. It is explicitly stated in Section 195
that it is a remedy against a notice of assessment issued by the local
treasurer, upon a finding that the correct taxes, fees, or charges have not
been paid. The notice of assessment must state “the nature of the tax, fee, or
charge, the amount of deficiency, the surcharges, interests and penalties.” In
Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium Corp., 474 SCRA 258 (2005): Ostensibly, the
notice of assessment, which stands as the first instance the taxpayer is
officially made aware of the pending tax liability, should be sufficiently
informative to apprise the taxpayer the legal basis of the tax. Section 195 of
the Local Government Code does not go as far as to expressly require that the
notice of assessment specifically cite the provision of the ordinance involved
but it does require that it state the nature of the tax, fee or charge, the
amount of deficiency, surcharges, interests and penalties. In this case, the
notice of assessment sent to the Corporation did state that the assessment was
for business taxes, as well as the amount of the assessment. There may have
been prima facie compliance with the requirement under Section 195. However in
this case, the Revenue Code provides multiple provisions on business taxes, and
at varying rates. Hence, we could appreciate the Corporation’s confusion, as
expressed in its protest, as to the exact legal basis for the tax. Reference to
the local tax ordinance is vital, for the power of local government units to
impose local taxes is exercised through the appropriate ordinance enacted by
the sanggunian, and not by the Local Government Code alone. What determines tax
liability is the tax ordinance, the Local Government Code being the enabling law
for the local legislative body.
8. Same; Same; Tax Credit; Tax Refund; Tax Remedies; To be entitled to a refund under Section
196 of the Local Government Code (LGC), the taxpayer must comply with the
following procedural requirements: first, file a written claim for refund or
credit with the local treasurer; and
second, file a judicial case for refund within two (2) years from the payment
of the tax, fee, or charge, or from the date when the taxpayer is entitled to a
refund or credit.-
—A tax refund or credit is in the nature of a tax exemption,
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the
taxing authority. Claimants of a tax refund must prove the factual basis of
their claims with sufficient evidence. To be entitled to a refund under Section
196 of the Local Government Code, the taxpayer must comply with the following
procedural requirements: first, file a written claim for refund or credit with
the local treasurer; and second, file a judicial case for refund within two (2)
years from the payment of the tax, fee, or charge, or from the date when the
taxpayer is entitled to a refund or credit.
9. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires
recourse to the pertinent administrative agency before resorting to court
action. This is under the theory that the administrative agency, by reason of
its particular expertise, is in a better position to resolve particular issues.-
—The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires
recourse to the pertinent administrative agency before resorting to court
action. This is under the theory that the administrative agency, by reason of
its particular expertise, is in a better position to resolve particular issues:
One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers,
which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of noninterference with
matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the
other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a
better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise
and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified
by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no important consideration is that administrative
decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that
strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable
number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily loaded
dockets.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 185622
Counsel:
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles for petitioner. Neil
L. Salcedo for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
September 5, 2008 Decision and December 12, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Tax
Appeals En Banc in C.T.A.-E.B. No. 277 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Court of Tax Appeals En Banc is DIRECTED to proceed with the resolution on the
merits of C.T.A.-E.B. No. 277 with due and deliberate dispatch.
Citation Ref:
38. Pacios vs. Tahanang Walang Hagdanan, 885 SCRA
581, November 14, 2018
Case Title : BERNARDO B. PACIOS, MARILOU T. ABEDES, ALEXIS L. ELINON,
ARMANDO V. ABEDES, GINA P. ARIATE, VI-VENCIA N. BUELA, HERMENIGILDO E. CANSINO,
ER-NESTO DAVIS, ALFREDO G. DELMONTE, JR., ROBERTO F. ESBER, ADELAIDA S.
GABRIEL, INES S. GENETIANO, ISMAEL M. IBO, JR., RONIE C. LEAL, JAIME S. MEJIA,
MARCELINO P. PENOLIAR, CARLOS D. OLEDAN, RO-DELIO A. OSINTA, VIRGILIO M.
TORRES, ANTONIO A. VIÑAS, JENNETTE C. VIÑAS, ERIC P. ANDRES, and ARMANDO M. DE
GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. TAHANANG WALANG HAGDANAN and SISTER VALERIANA BAERTS,
ICM, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Execution of Judgments ; Execution Pending
Appeal ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Execution Pending Appeal; The principles allowing execution pending appeal invoked
in Aris are equally applicable here as petitioners are poor employees, deprived
of their only source of livelihood for years and reduced to begging on the
streets.-
—This Court finds that the principles allowing execution pending
appeal invoked in Aris are equally applicable here as petitioners are poor
employees, deprived of their only source of livelihood for years and reduced to
begging on the streets. In view of their dire straits and since the National
Labor Relations Commission has already ruled twice on the case in a way that supports
the release of the supersedeas bond, it is proper to continue with execution
proceedings in this case despite a pending motion for reconsideration.
2. Labor Law; Execution of Judgments; When used as basis for suspending execution, the rule
requires an extra step, namely, the determination of what part of the execution
is affected by the reversal.-
—The Court of Appeals pointed out that Rule XI, Section 17 of
the National Labor Relations Commission Rules “explicitly mandates the
suspension of the execution proceedings in case of total or partial reversal of
judgment by the Court of Appeals.” It held that because its April 27, 2015
Decision reversed the National Labor Relations Commission’s February 25, 2014
Resolution, suspension of the execution was mandated under the rules. However,
the Court of Appeals failed to note that under the Rules, the execution
proceedings should be suspended only “insofar as the reversal is concerned.”
This omission leads to an incorrect reading of the rule and suggests that any
reversal on appeal leads to the automatic suspension of execution of the
appealed decision. When used as basis for suspending execution, the rule
requires an extra step, namely, the determination of what part of the execution
is affected by the reversal.
3. Same; Same; Appeal in Labor Cases; The perfection of an appeal stays the execution of a Labor
Arbiter’s (LA’s) decision.-
—The more relevant rule in this case is Rule XI, Section 3 of
the National Labor Relations Commission Rules, which provides: Section 3.
Effect of Perfection of Appeal on Execution.—The perfection of an appeal shall
stay the execution of the decision of the Labor Arbiter except execution for
reinstatement pending appeal. Under this provision, the perfection of an appeal
stays the execution of a Labor Arbiter’s decision. Thus, for clarity, the Court
of Appeals should have explained that because its April 27, 2015 Decision
deemed respondents’ appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission as
reinstated, the execution of the Labor Arbiter’s October 24, 2013 Decision was
stayed under Rule XI, Section 3 of the National Labor Relations Commission
Rules of Procedure. However, despite the applicability of Rule XI, Section 3 of
the National Labor Relations Commission Rules to the factual circumstances
before the Court of Appeals as of its assailed July 22, 2016 Decision and
January 23, 2017 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 142199, the Petition must be
granted.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 229579
Counsel:
Zenaida T. Aton for petitioners. Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc &
Delos Angeles for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ July 22, 2016 Decision and January
23, 2017 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 142199 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The National Labor Relations Commission’s cashier is DIRECTED to RELEASE to
petitioners the amount deposited by respondents as supersedeas bond. The Labor
Arbiter is DIRECTED to immediately CONTINUE the execution proceedings in the
case before him, and to ensure the speedy implementation of this Decision.
Citation Ref:
39. Cezar Yatco Real Estate Services, Inc. vs. Bel-Air Village Association,
Inc., 886 SCRA 351, November 21, 2018
Case Title : CEZAR YATCO REAL ESTATE SERVICES, INC., GRD PROPERTY
RESOURCES, INC., GAMALIEL PASCUAL, JR., MA. LOURDES LIMJAP PASCUAL, and AURORA
PIJUAN, petitioners, vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its
President ANTONIO GUERRERO, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Freedom of Association ;
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Freedom of Association; Bel Air Village Association, Inc. v. Dionisio, 174 SCRA
589 (1989), also underscored that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
association can only be invoked against the State, and does not apply to
private transactions, like a sale, where a condition was validly imposed by the
vendor.-
—Bel Air Village Association, Inc. v. Dionisio, 174 SCRA 589
(1989), also underscored that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
association can only be invoked against the State, and does not apply to
private transactions, like a sale, where a condition was validly imposed by the
vendor. Finally, Padcom Condominium Corporation v. Ortigas Center Association,
Inc., 382 SCRA 222 (2002), reiterated that automatic membership in a
homeowners’ association does not violate lot owners’ right to freedom of
association because they were not forced to buy their lots from the developer.
2. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Proxy; Words and Phrases; A proxy is a form of agency created in
instances when a person is unable to personally cast his or her vote; hence, the act of voting is delegated to another person.-
—A proxy is a form of agency created in instances when a person
is unable to personally cast his or her vote; hence, the act of voting is
delegated to another person. Section 89 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the
Corporation Code of the Philippines, recognizes a member’s right to vote by
proxy. Section 58 then provides that a proxy shall be in writing, signed by the
member, and filed with the corporate secretary before the scheduled meeting:
Section 58. Proxies.—Stockholders and members may vote in person or by proxy in
all meetings of stockholders or members. Proxies shall be in writing, signed by
the stockholder or member and filed before the scheduled meeting with the
corporate secretary. Un otherwise provided in the proxy, it shall be valid only
for the meeting for which it is intended. No proxy shall be valid and effective
for a period longer than five (5) years at any one time. However, the
Corporation Code also empowers the members to provide for their own proxy
requirements in their bylaws, as seen in Section 47(4), which provides: Section
47. Contents of bylaws.—Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, this
Code, other special laws, and the articles of incorporation, a private
corporation may provide in its bylaws for: . . . . 4. The form for proxies of
stockholders and members and the manner of voting them[.]
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 211780
Counsel:
Valenton, Loseriaga Law Offices for petitioners. Angara, Abello, Concepcion,
Regala & Cruz for private respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The
assailed Court of Appeals’ September 5, 2013 Decision and March 17, 2014
Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 122954 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
40. Fernandez vs. People, 886 SCRA 427, November 21, 2018
Case Title : CHRISTINE FERNANDEZ y MEDINA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Minor Inconsistencies ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Minor Inconsistencies; Courts expect minor inconsistencies when a child victim
narrates the details of a harrowing experience, especially when the details are
too painful to recall.-
—Courts expect minor inconsistencies when a child victim
narrates the details of a harrowing experience, especially when the details are
too painful to recall. Such inconsistencies only prove that the child victim
was unrehearsed, especially when the discrepancies are minor details irrelevant
to the elements of the crime, and thus, cannot be considered as grounds for
acquittal. Here, AAA’s and BBB’s testimonies sufficiently established that
petitioner committed physical violence against the minors. They validated their
testimonies with properly identified photos depicting the injuries they had
suffered from petitioner, further corroborated by their medical certificates.
Thus, there is sufficient basis to conclude that they were telling the truth.
2. Criminal Law; Child Abuse Law; Elements of.-
—Under Article I, Section 3 of the law, child abuse may be
committed through the following: Section 3. Definition of Terms.—. . . . (b)
“Child abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child
which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse,
neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds
or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
a child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for
survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to immediately give medical
treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Credibility of Witnesses; Trial courts at first instance determine the credibility
of witnesses. Generally, their findings and conclusions on this matter are
given great weight.-
—Trial courts at first instance determine the credibility of
witnesses. Generally, their findings and conclusions on this matter are given
great weight. These findings should not be disturbed on appeal, un facts that
were overlooked or misinterpreted would materially affect the disposition of
the case. Thus, in People v. De Los Santos, 731 SCRA 52 (2014): Basic is the
rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand
is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility
by the various indicia available but not reflected on the record. Hence, the
corollary principle that absent any showing that the trial court overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances that would affect the final disposition of
the case, appellate courts are bound to give due deference and respect to its
evaluation of the credibility of an eyewitness and his testimony as well as its
probative value amidst the rest of the other evidence on record.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; The Regional Trial Court (RTC) judge’s assessment of the
witnesses’ credibility is given great weight and respect, especially on appeal,
since he or she had the advantage of actually examining both object and
testimonial evidence, including the demeanors of the witnesses.-
—A perusal of the records shows that there is no clear reason to
disturb the factual findings of the Regional Trial Court. AAA’s and BBB’s
testimonies were clear, positive, and direct. The Regional Trial Court judge’s
assessment of the witnesses’ credibility is given great weight and respect,
especially on appeal, since he or she had the advantage of actually examining
both object and testimonial evidence, including the demeanors of the witnesses.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 217542
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ September 29, 2014 Decision and
March 11, 2015 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 35695 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner
Christine Fernandez y Medina is GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of two (2)
counts of child abuse in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610,
and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from a minimum of four (4) years, nine
(9) months, and eleven (11) days of prisión correccional to a maximum of six
(6) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prisión mayor for each count of
violation. Furthermore, she is ordered to pay AAA and 443 BBB the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) each as civil indemnity. In line with
current jurisprudence, an annual six percent (6%) interest rate should be
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the finality of this Decision until
fully paid.56
Citation Ref:
41. Naredico, Inc. vs. Krominco, Inc., 888 SCRA
264, December 05, 2018
Case Title : NAREDICO, INC., petitioner, vs. KROMINCO, INC., respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Mines and Mining ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Instead of a first-in-time, first-in-right approach toward
applicants for mining claims and mining rights, the State decides what the most
beneficial method is when it comes to exploring, developing, and utilizing
minerals.-
—Instead of a first-in-time, first-in-right approach toward
applicants for mining claims and mining rights, the State decides what the most
beneficial method is when it comes to exploring, developing, and utilizing
minerals. It may choose to either directly undertake mining activities by
itself or enter into co-production, joint venture, or production sharing
agreements with qualified applicants.
2. Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies.-
—The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies. An actual case or controversy exists “when the case presents
conflicting or opposite legal rights that may be resolved by the court in a
judicial proceeding.” A case is deemed moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy due to a supervening event. The lack of an
actual or justiciable issue means that there is nothing for the court to
resolve and will be in effect only rendering an advisory opinion.
3. Mines and Mining; Panel of Arbitrators; Jurisdiction; Section 77 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7942
granted the Panel of Arbitrators exclusive and original jurisdiction on: (1) disputes
involving rights to mining areas; (2) disputes on mineral agreements or permit; (3) disputes among surface owners,
occupants, and claimholders/con-cessionaires; and (4) disputes pending before the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB) and Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) when
the law was passed.-
—Chapter XIII of Republic Act No. 7942 enumerates the powers
available to the Panel of Arbitrators and Mines Adjudication Board. Section 77,
in turn, granted the Panel of Arbitrators exclusive and original jurisdiction
on: (1) disputes involving rights to mining areas; (2) disputes on mineral
agreements or permit; (3) disputes among surface owners, occupants, and
claimholders/concessionaires; and (4) disputes pending before the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau and Department of Environment and Natural Resources when the law was
passed.
4. Same; Mines Adjudication Board; Jurisdiction; The Mines Adjudication Board (MAB) has appellate
jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Panel of Arbitrators, while also
possessing specific powers and functions related to its quasi-judicial
functions.-
—The Mines Adjudication Board has appellate jurisdiction over
decisions and orders of the Panel of Arbitrators, while also possessing
specific powers and functions related to its quasi-judicial functions: SECTION
79. Mines Adjudication Board.—The Mines Adjudication Board shall be composed of
three (3) members. The Secretary shall be the Chairman with the Director of the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau and the Undersecretary for Operations of the
Department as members thereof. The Board shall have the following powers and
functions: (a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and
disposition of cases before it, as well as those pertaining to its internal
functions, and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out its
functions; (b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue
subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production
of such books, papers, contracts, records, statement of accounts, agreements,
and other documents as may be material to a just determination of the matter
under investigation, and to testify in any investigation or hearing conducted
in pursuance of this Act; (c) To conduct hearings on all matters within its
jurisdiction, proceed to hear and determine the disputes in the absence of any
party thereto who has been summoned or served with notice to appear, conduct
its proceedings or any part thereof in public or in private, adjourn its
hearing at any time and place, refer technical matters or accounts to an expert
and to accept his report as evidence after hearing of the parties upon due
notice, direct parties to be joined in or excluded from the proceedings, correct,
amend, or waive any error, defect or irregularity, whether in substance or in
form, give all such directions as it may deem necessary or expedient in the
determination of the dispute before it, and dismiss the mining dispute as part
thereof, where it is trivial or where further proceedings by the Board are not
necessary or desirable; (1) To hold any person in contempt, directly or
indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties therefor; and (2) To enjoin any or
all acts involving or arising from any case pending before it which, if not
restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of the
parties to the case or seriously affect social and economic stability.
5. Same; Same; As the administrative body with jurisdiction over disputes
relative to mining rights, the Mines Adjudication Board’s (MAB’s) findings
should be treated with deference in recognition of its expertise and technical
knowledge over such matters.-
—As the administrative body with jurisdiction over disputes
relative to mining rights, the Mines Adjudication Board’s findings should be
treated with deference in recognition of its expertise and technical knowledge
over such matters. Additionally, Rule 43, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, acknowledging the primacy and deference accorded to decisions of
quasi-judicial agencies, states that the factual findings of a quasi-judicial
agency, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court
of Appeals. Hence, this Court upholds the findings of the Mines Adjudication
Board and reinstates its Decision.
6. Same; The Philippine Bill of 1902 declared all valuable mineral
deposits in public lands to be open to “exploration, occupation, and purchase”
by Americans and Filipinos.-
—There is no vested right to mining rights, save for patented
mining claims that were granted under the Philippine Bill of 1902. When the
Philippines was still under Spanish rule, the Royal Decree of May 14, 1867, or
the Spanish Mining Law, was the prevailing law for the exploration and use of
our mineral lands. When the Americans took control of the Philippines, they
governed our country through a series of organic acts which effectively acted
as our Constitution from 1900 to 1935. Among these was the Philippine Bill of
1902, through which the United States Congress assumed control over the
Philippines. The Philippine Bill of 1902 declared all valuable mineral deposits
in public lands to be open to “exploration, occupation[,] and purchase” by
Americans and Filipinos. It required the locator of a mineral claim to record
it in the mining recorder of the district it was found in within 30 days, with
no than US$100.00 worth of labor or
improvements of the same value each year.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 196892
Counsel:
Musico Law Office for petitioner. Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals’ November 26, 2010
Decision and May 10, 2011 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 99372 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Mines Adjudication Board’s May 25, 2007 Decision is
REINSTATED.
Citation Ref:
42. People vs. Magallano, Jr., 889 SCRA 74, December 10,
2018
Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NADY
MAGALLANO, JR. y FLORES and ROMEO TAPAR y CASTRO, accused-appellants.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Conspiracy ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Conspiracy; Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that
“[a] conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.”-
—The conspiracy between accused-appellants was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “[a]
conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” Conspiracy may be proven
by direct or circumstantial evidence that show a “common design or purpose” to
commit the crime.
2. Findings of fact; Due to their unique position, the trial courts’ factual
findings and appreciation of the witnesses’ testimonies are given much respect,
more so when their conclusions are affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).-
—Trial courts have the advantage of personally scrutinizing the
conduct and attitude of witnesses when giving their testimonies. Thus,
“assignment of values to the testimony of a witness is virtually left, almost
entirely, to the trial court which has the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witness on the stand.” Due to their unique position, the trial courts’
factual findings and appreciation of the witnesses’ testimonies are given much
respect, more so when their conclusions are affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Factual findings of trial courts will only be disturbed on appeal if it is
convincingly shown that they “overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any
fact or circumstance of weight and substance.”
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; There is no standard form of behavior when confronted by a
shocking incident.-
—This Court has consistently held that there is no standard form
of behavior when confronted by a shocking incident. It must be recalled that it
was very early in the morning when Pineda was roused from sleep by a screaming
woman outside his house. He peered out of his window and saw two (2) men
ganging up on a third man who was by then lying helply on the ground. Pineda
testified that he wanted to help the victim, but his wife, understandably,
refused to let him out of their house in fear of a similar harm befalling him.
In People v. Del Prado, 603 SCRA 662 (2009): There is no standard form of human
behavioral response when confronted with a frightful experience. Not every
witness to a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably with the
expectations of mankind, because witnessing a crime is an unusual experience
that elicit[s] different reactions from witnesses, and for which no clear-cut,
standard form of behavior can be drawn. In the case at bar, it was not even
unusual for Hudo’s unarmed companions to refrain from risking their lives to
defend him when the assailants were brandishing a foot-long knife, a baseball
bat[,] and a 6x8-inch stone.
4. Same; Same; Same; There is no rule that the suspect in a crime should be
hurriedly named by a witness.-
—Pineda’s delay in reporting the incident or making a statement
before the police, when adequately explained, neither impairs his credibility
as a witness nor destroys the probative value of his testimony. Further, “there
is no rule that the suspect in a crime should be hurriedly named by a witness.”
Here, Pineda testified that the day after the victim was killed, a police
investigator told him that a woman had already executed a sworn statement, and
was willing to testify against accused-appellants. Hence, there was no need for
him to execute a similar statement. The lower courts found this as a
satisfactory explanation for Pineda’s failure to immediately file his sworn
statement with the police. This Court sees no reason to reverse their findings.
5. Same; Same; Testimonial Evidence; An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the
elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction.-
—As for the supposed inconsistencies in Pineda’s testimony,
People v. Nelmida, et al., 680 SCRA 386 (2012), explained, “An inconsistency,
which has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to
reverse a conviction.” The Court of Appeals thus held: As to the imputed
inconsistencies in Pineda’s testimony, they refer only to minor if not
inconsequential or trivial matters which do not impair the credibility of
Pineda. In fact, it even signifies that he was neither coached nor was lying on
the witness stand. What commands greater importance is that there is no
inconsistency in Pineda’s complete and vivid narration as far as the principal
occurrence and positive identification of accused-appellants as the victim’s
assailants.
6. Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.-
—Murder is committed when a person is killed under any of the
circumstances enumerated under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended: Art. 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense
or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. 2. In consideration of a
price, reward or promise. 3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion,
shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall
of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
means involving great waste and ruin. 4. On occasion of any of the calamities
enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity. 5. With
evident premeditation. 6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly
augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person
or corpse. To sustain a conviction under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
the prosecution must prove the following beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused-appellants killed the victim; (3) that
the killing was not parricide or infanticide; and (4) that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248.
7. Same; Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Two (2) conditions must be established
by the prosecution for a killing to be properly qualified by treachery to
murder: “(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method[,] or form of attack employed by him.”-
—In People v. Abadies, 387 SCRA 317 (2002), this Court held that
“[t]he essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed
victim without the slightest provocation on his part.” It further provided that
two (2) conditions must be established by the prosecution for a killing to be
properly qualified by treachery to murder: “(1) that at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in a position to defend himself[;] and (2) that the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, method[,] or form of attack employed
by him.” The prosecution failed to show the presence of treachery as a
qualifying circumstance. Pineda’s testimony began when accused-appellants were
in the middle of mauling the victim, and there was no testimony to prove that
the victim did not provoke them or expect their attack. The prosecution did not
present evidence that would show that accused-appellants reflected on and
decided on the form of their attack to secure an unfair advantage over the
victim. Even when accused-appellants returned after chasing the screaming woman
and hit the crawling victim with rocks, treachery is still absent. This is
because the second attack was not a surprise, as shown by the victim’s attempt
to go back to the safety of his own house.
8. Same; Same; Same; Same; People v. Tigle, 420 SCRA 424 (2004), stated that for
treachery to qualify a killing to murder, it must be present at the inception
of the attack.-
—People v. Tigle, 420 SCRA 424 (2004), stated that for treachery
to qualify a killing to murder, it must be present at the inception of the
attack: For treachery to be appreciated, it must exist at the inception of the
attack, and if absent and the attack continues, even if present at the
subsequent stage, treachery is not a qualifying or generic aggravating
circumstance. The prosecution must adduce conclusive proof as to the manner in
which the altercation started and resulted in the death of the victim. If the
prosecution fails to discharge its burden, the crime committed is homicide and
not murder. x x x The prosecution thus only proved that accused-appellants
committed homicide, not murder.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 220721
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney’s
Office for accused-appellants.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the December 12, 2014 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is MODIFIED. Accused-appellants Nady F. Magallano, Jr. and Romeo C.
Tapar are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. As the crime was not attended by either
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, accused-appellants are SENTENCED to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years of
prisión mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. The period of their preventive imprisonment
shall be credited in their favor if they have given their written conformity to
abide by the disciplinary rules on convicted prisoners under Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. Accused-appellants are, likewise, ORDERED to
solidarily indemnify the heirs of Ronnie Batongbakal: (1) Sixty Thousand Pesos
(P60,000.00) as actual damages; (2) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity ex delicto; (3) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages;
and (4) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages. All damages
awarded shall be subject to the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction.
Citation Ref:
43. Dela Cruz vs. National Police Commission, 890 SCRA
42, January 07, 2019
Case Title : QUIRINO T. DELA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL POLICE
COMMISSION, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Procedural Rules and Technicalities ;
Syllabi:
1. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The relaxation of procedural rules is warranted only if
compelling and justifiable reasons exist.-
—The relaxation of procedural rules is warranted only if
compelling and justifiable reasons exist. In Asia United Bank v. Goodland
Company, 635 SCRA 637 (2010): The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules
or the exemption of a case from their operation is warranted only by compelling
reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it. As early as 1998, in Hon.
Fortich v. Hon. Corona, we expounded on these guiding principles: Procedural
rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard
since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the [B]ill of
[R]ights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that “all persons shall
have a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.” The adjudicatory bodies and the
parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is
true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. There have been some
instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in the application of the
rules, but this flexibility was “never intended to forge a bastion for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity.” A liberal interpretation and
application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review
on certiorari shall only pertain to questions of law.-
—Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on
certiorari shall only pertain to questions of law. The factual findings of the
Court of Appeals bind this Court. While several exceptions to these rules were
provided by jurisprudence, they must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by
the parties so this Court may evaluate and review the facts of the case. Both
of petitioner’s arguments are questions of fact not proper for review in this
case. The date he received the assailed National Police Commission’s Resolution
is a question of fact that was resolved by the Civil Service Commission. As the
Court of Appeals pointed out, the Civil Service Commission might have resolved
his motion for reconsideration differently, had petitioner substantiated his
claim with evidence that he received the National Police Commission’s
Resolution on January 4, 2011. Yet, petitioner failed to do so. It is not this
Court’s role to review the evidence to resolve this question. Further,
petitioner has not addressed the December 15, 2010 Resolution of the National
Police Commission, which found that his motion for reconsideration was filed
out of time. Thus, the January 12, 2010 Decision would have already attained
finality when he failed to timely seek its reconsideration, regard of whether
the December 15, 2010 Resolution was received on January 4, 2011.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 215545
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The June 27, 2014 Decision
and November 18, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
131189 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
44. Angeles vs. Lina-ac, 890 SCRA 171, January 08, 2019
Case Title : EVERDINA C. ANGELES, complainant, vs. ATTY. WILFREDO B.
LINA-AC, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Negligence.
Syllabi Class :Attorney-Client Relationship ; Attorneys ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Attorneys; The Supreme Court (SC) expects an officer of the court to
strictly adhere to the “rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality, and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal
profession.”-
—This Court expects an officer of the court to strictly adhere
to the “rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality[,] and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession[.]
“Undoubtedly, respondent lacks the essential requirements of “probity and moral
fiber,” which are needed for his continued membership in the legal profession.
Nonethe, this Court takes judicial notice that respondent will be about 78
years old by the time this Resolution is promulgated. In light of his advanced
age, this Court deems it proper to temper justice with mercy and mete out a
penalty of two (2) years of suspension instead of the ultimate penalty of
disbarment. Ours is a court of law, but it is our humane compassion that
strengthens us as an institution and cloaks us “with a mantle of respect and
legitimacy.”
2. Attorney-Client Relationship; The high degree of service required of a lawyer is brought
about by the lawyer’s fiduciary duty toward the client, with their relationship
marked “with utmost trust and confidence.”-
—Upon pursuing his client’s cause, respondent Atty. Lina-ac
became duty bound to protect complainant Angeles’ interests. The degree of
service expected of him as an advocate was his “entire devotion to the interest
of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability[.] “The high degree of service
required of a lawyer is brought about by the lawyer’s fiduciary duty toward the
client, with their relationship marked “with utmost trust and confidence.”
3. Same; Despite complainant’s considerable efforts at coming up
with the cash for respondent’s professional fees, respondent did not
reciprocate with similar diligence toward her case.-
—Complainant engaged respondent’s services to secure a
declaration nullifying her marriage with her husband. However, despite
complainant’s considerable efforts at coming up with the cash for respondent’s
professional fees, respondent did not reciprocate with similar diligence toward
her case. Further, instead of filing an actual petition for the nullity of
complainant’s marriage, he attempted to hoodwink complainant by furnishing her
a copy of a Complaint with a fraudulent received stamp from the Regional Trial
Court. As the Investigating Commissioner found: A painstaking review of the
case shows that respondent was negligent enough in his obligation as counsel
despite having received the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) from
the complainant. He was remised (sic) in his obligation when he failed to file
the petition for annulment of marriage despite the lapse of reasonable period
of time. Worse, he deceived complainant by showing a copy of the petition with
a stamp of the court in order to make her believe that it was already filed
when in truth, there was no such case filed by him. His belated filing of the
petition in (sic) June 27, 2011 will not exculpate him from any administrative
liability under Rule 18.03 of the CPR which states: “a lawyer shall not neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.” x x x Respondent’s deceitful conduct violates Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides, “A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral[,] or deceitful conduct.”
Worse, even after their attorney-client relationship was severed, respondent
filed a second Complaint in a blatant attempt to cover up his earlier
negligence and thwart complainant’s efforts to recover the money she paid him.
Respondent’s repeated duplicity toward complainant reflects his lack of
integrity, and is a clear violation of the oath he took before becoming a
lawyer, as correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner: Very clearly, respondent
violated his oath as he was not forthright and honest in his dealings with the
complainant. He engaged in deceitful conduct by presenting a bogus complaint
allegedly bearing the stamp of the court. Consequently, he must bear the
consequence of his own wrongdoing.
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: A.C. No. 12063
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfreda B. Lina-ac is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years. He is ORDERED to return to
complainant Everdina C. Angeles the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
promulgation of this Resolution until fully paid.53 He is likewise DIRECTED to
submit to this Court proof of payment of the amount within ten (10) days from
payment. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to: (1) the Office of the
Court Administrator, to disseminate it to all courts throughout the country for
their information and guidance; (2) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
(3) the Office of the Bar Confidant, to append it to respondent’s personal
record as a member of the Bar.
Citation Ref:
45. Steag State Power, Inc. (formerly State Power Development
Corporation) vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 890 SCRA
257, January 14, 2019
Case Title : STEAG STATE POWER, INC. (formerly STATE POWER DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION), petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
Case Nature : MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the
Supreme Court.
Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Tax Remedies ;
Syllabi:
1. Taxation; Tax Remedies; Noncompliance with the 120+30-day periods is fatal to the
taxpayer’s judicial claim.-
—Since then, the 120+30-day periods have been applied to pending
cases resulting in the denial of taxpayers’ claims due to late filing. This
Court finds no reason to make an exception here. A claim for unutilized input
value-added tax is in the nature of a tax exemption. Thus, strict adherence to
the conditions prescribed by the law is required of the taxpayer. Refunds need
to be proven and their application raised in the right manner as required by
law. Here, noncompliance with the 120+30-day periods is fatal to the taxpayer’s
judicial claim.
2. Taxation; Tax Remedies; A taxpayer may appeal the Commissioner’s denial or
inaction only within thirty (30) days when the decision that denies the claim
is received, or when the one hundred twenty (120)-day period given to the
Commissioner to decide on the claim expires.-
—A taxpayer may appeal the Commissioner’s denial or inaction
only within 30 days when the decision that denies the claim is received, or
when the 120-day period given to the Commissioner to decide on the claim
expires. In Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422 (2010), this
Court applied the plain text of the law and declared that the observance of the
120+30-day periods is crucial in filing an appeal before the Court of Tax
Appeals. This Court also declared that, following Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, 565 SCRA 154 (2008), claims for refund
or tax credit of excess input tax are governed not by Section 229, but by
Section 112 of the Tax Code. These doctrines were reiterated in San Roque Power
Corporation, 690 SCRA 336 (2013), where this Court stressed that Section 112,
in providing the 120+30 day periods to appeal before the Court of Tax Appeals,
“must be applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain, and unequivocal.”
Petitioner’s claim that it filed its judicial claims under Revenue Regulation
No. 7-95, which supposedly allowed claims for refund filed after the 120-day
period but before the lapse of the two (2)-year period, is untenable.
3. Same; Same; Petitioner’s judicial claims were filed
on April 20, 2006 and December 27, 2006; hence, they were governed by the Tax
Code, which clearly provided: (1) one hundred twenty (120) days for the
Commissioner to act on a taxpayer’s claim; and (2) thirty (30) days for the taxpayer to appeal either
from the Commissioner’s decision or from the expiration of the 120-day period
in case of the Commissioner’s inaction.-
—Petitioner’s judicial claims were filed on April 20, 2006 and
December 27, 2006; hence, they were governed by the Tax Code, which clearly
provided: (1) 120 days for the Commissioner to act on a taxpayer’s claim; and
(2) 30 days for the taxpayer to appeal either from the Commissioner’s decision
or from the expiration of the 120-day period in case of the Commissioner’s
inaction. Moreover, Revenue Regulation No. 16-2005, not Revenue Regulation No.
7-95, was the prevailing rule when petitioner filed its judicial claims. Its
Section 4.112-1 faithfully reflected Section 112 of the Tax Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 9337: SEC. 4.112-1. Claims for Refund/Tax Credit Certificate
of Input Tax.—. . . . (d) Period within which refund or tax credit
certificate/refund of input taxes shall be made. In proper cases, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall grant a tax credit certificate/refund
for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date
of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in
accordance with subparagraph (a) above. In case of full or partial denial of
the claim for tax credit certificate/refund as decided by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, the taxpayer may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)
within thirty (30) days from the receipt of said denial, otherwise the decision
shall become final. However, if no action on the claim for tax credit certificate/refund
has been taken by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue after the one hundred
twenty (120)-day period from the date of submission of the application with
complete documents, the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from the
lapse of the 120-day period. x x x It is misleading for petitioner to raise its
supposed reliance in good faith on Revenue Regulation No. 7-95, when the rule
had already been superseded and revoked by the time it filed its judicial
claims.
4. Same; Same; Tax Refund; Under Section 112 of the Tax Code, only the administrative
claim for refund of input value-added tax (VAT) must be filed within the two
(2)-year prescriptive period, the judicial claim need not be.-
—Under Section 112 of the Tax Code, only the administrative
claim for refund of input value-added tax must be filed within the two (2)-year
prescriptive period, the judicial claim need not be. Section 112(A) states
that: (A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales.—Any VAT-registered
person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two
(2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made,
apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable
input tax due or paid attributable to such sales[.]
5. Same; Same; Same; Tax Credit; In Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. and San Roque Power
Corporation, the phrase “within two (2) years. . . apply for the issuance of a
tax credit certificate or refund” refers to administrative claims for refund or
credit filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), not to appeals
made before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).-
—In Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. and San Roque Power
Corporation, the phrase “within two (2) years. . . apply for the issuance of a tax
credit certificate or refund” refers to administrative claims for refund or
credit filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, not to appeals made
before the Court of Tax Appeals. This is apparent in Section 112(D), paragraph
1 of the Tax Code, which gives the Commissioner “[120] days from the date of
submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in
accordance with Subsections (A) and (B)” within which he or she can decide on
the claim. On the other hand, Section 112(D), paragraph 2 provides a thirty
(30)-day period within which one may appeal a judicial claim before the Court
of Tax Appeals. Reading together Subsections (A) and (D), San Roque Power
Corporation declared that the 30-day period does not have to fall within the two
(2)-year prescriptive period, as long as the administrative claim is filed
within the two (2)-year prescriptive period.
6. Same; Same; Same; Under the Court of Tax Appeals’ (CTA’s) Charter, the
Commissioner’s inaction on a claim for refund is considered a “denial” of the
claim, which may be appealed before the CTA within thirty (30) days from the
expiration of the period fixed by law for action.-
—Under the Court of Tax Appeals’ Charter, the Commissioner’s
inaction on a claim for refund is considered a “denial” of the claim, which may
be appealed before the Court of Tax Appeals within 30 days from the expiration
of the period fixed by law for action. Here, since petitioner filed its
judicial claims way beyond the 30-day period to appeal, the Court of Tax Appeals
lost its jurisdiction over the Petitions. This Court has held that
“[j]urisdiction over the subject matter is fundamental for a court to act on a
given controversy.” Moreover, it “cannot be waived. . . and is not dependent on
the consent or objection or the acts or omissions” of any or both parties.
Contrary to petitioner’s stance, the Court of Tax Appeals is not precluded to
pass on this issue motu proprio, regard of any purported stipulation made by
the parties.
7. Retroactivity of Laws; Interpretations of law made by courts “necessarily always
have a retroactive effect.”-
—There is nothing in the same BIR’s Ruling that states,
expressly or impliedly, that late filings of judicial claims are acceptable.
Similarly, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mindanao II Geothermal
Partnership, 713 SCRA 645 (2014), Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership filed its
claim 138 days after the lapse of the 30-day period. This Court held that while
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in effect when it filed its claim, the rule
nonethe cannot be properly invoked because it contemplates premature filing,
not late filing. This Court further emphasized that late filing, or beyond the
30-day period, is absolutely prohibited, even when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was
in force. Likewise, this Court rejects petitioner’s claim that Aichi Forging
Company of Asia, Inc. and San Roque Power Corporation should be applied
prospectively because it would be unjust to the other claimants who relied on
the old rule, under which both administrative and judicial claims should be
filed before the lapse of the two (2)-year period. Interpretations of law made
by courts “necessarily always have a retroactive effect.” This Court, in
construing the law, merely declares what a particular provision has always
meant. It does not create new legal obligations. In Aichi Forging Company of
Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422 (2010), this Court first squarely addressed the issue
on prematurity of a judicial claim based on its interpretation of the language
of the Tax Code. In that case, this Court did not defer application of the
doctrine laid down. Rather, it ordered the Court of Tax Appeals to dismiss
Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.’s appeal as it prematurely filed its claim
for refund/credit of input value-added tax. Aichi Forging Company of Asia,
Inc.’s claim was filed prior to this case.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 205282
Counsel:
Salvador & Associates for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
The Motion for Reconsideration is, thus, DENIED.
46. Re: Complaint-Affidavit of Elvira N. Enalbes, Rebecca H. Angeles
and Estelita B. Ocampo against former Chief Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro [Ret.], relative to G.R. Nos. 203063 and 204743, 891 SCRA
76, January 22, 2019
Case Title : RE: COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT OF ELVIRA N. ENALBES, REBECCA H.
ANGELES AND ESTELITA B. OCAMPO AGAINST FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO [RET.], RELATIVE TO G.R. NOS. 203063 AND 204743.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Gross Inefficiency, Gross Misconduct, Gross Dishonesty,
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings ; Judges ; Gross Ignorance of
the Law ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Magistrates must be given discretion to defer the
disposition of certain cases to make way for other equally important matters in
the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) agenda.-
—Magistrates must be given discretion to defer the disposition
of certain cases to make way for other equally important matters in this
Court’s agenda. In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, et al., this Court noted that
“the right to speedy disposition of cases should be understood to be a relative
or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved would not be sufficient.” As a final note, the prescribed time limit
should not be ignored as to render nugatory the spirit which breathes life to
the letter of the 1987 Constitution. Ultimately, courts must strike an
objective and reasonable balance in disposing cases promptly, while maintaining
judicious tenacity in interpreting and applying the law. Accordingly,
respondent’s failure to promptly resolve the Mallari Spouses’ Petitions does
not constitute gross ignorance of the law warranting administrative liability.
2. Administrative Proceedings; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Gross ignorance of the law is the failure of a magistrate
to apply “basic rules and settled jurisprudence.”-
—Gross ignorance of the law is the failure of a magistrate to
apply “basic rules and settled jurisprudence.” It connotes a blatant disregard
of clear and unambiguous provisions of law “because of bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty[,] or corruption.”
3. Same; Same; Same; To hold a magistrate administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that his or her action
was erroneous; it must also be proven that it was
driven by bad faith, dishonesty, or ill motive.-
—To hold a magistrate administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law, it is not enough that his or her action was erroneous; it
must also be proven that it was driven by bad faith, dishonesty, or ill motive.
Complainants’ Complaint-Affidavit is predicated on respondent’s failure to
resolve the Mallari Spouses’ Petitions for more than five (5) years. They
insist that respondent’s neglect to promptly decide on the Petitions resulted
in a violation of the spouses’ constitutional right to speedy disposition of
their cases. Complainants rely on the constitutional provision requiring this
Court to decide on cases within 24 months from their submission.
4. Same; Same; Same; Both the 1987 Constitution and the Internal Rules state that
the twenty-four (24)-month period for deciding on or resolving a case is
reckoned from the date of its submission for resolution.-
—Both the 1987 Constitution and the Internal Rules state that
the 24-month period for deciding on or resolving a case is reckoned from the
date of its submission for resolution. The 24-month period does not run
immediately upon the filing of a petition before this Court, but only when the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum has been submitted.
5. Same; Same; Same; Being the court of last resort, the Supreme Court (SC)
should be given an ample amount of time to deliberate on cases pending before
it.-
—Being the court of last resort, this Court should be given an
ample amount of time to deliberate on cases pending before it. Ineluctably,
leeway must be given to magistrates for them to thoroughly review and reflect
on the cases assigned to them. This Court notes that all matters brought before
it involves rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. It would be at
the height of injustice if cases were hastily decided on at the risk of
erroneously dispensing justice. While the 24-month period provided under the
1987 Constitution is persuasive, it does not summarily bind this Court to the
disposition of cases brought before it. It is a mere directive to ensure this
Court’s prompt resolution of cases, and should not be interpreted as an
inflexible rule.
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: A.M. No. 18-11-09-SC
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Administrative Complaint
against respondent, former Chief Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, for
gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, gross misconduct, gross
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is
DISMISSED as there is no showing of a prima facie case against her.
Citation Ref:
47. Lazaro vs. Commission on Audit, 891 SCRA 96, January 22,
2019
Case Title : TERESITA S. LAZARO, DENNIS S. LAZARO, MARIETA V. JARA, ANTONIO
P. RELOVA, GILBERTO R. MONDEZ, PABLO V. DEL MUNDO, JR., and ALSANEO F. LAGOS,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGIONAL DIRECTOR OF COA REGIONAL OFFICE
NO. IV-A, and COA AUDIT TEAM LEADER, PROVINCE OF LAGUNA, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
Syllabi Class :Liability of Public Officers ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Since petitioner Villanueva’s liability for the disallowed
transactions is anchored on her position as Provincial Accountant, she should
only be liable for the transactions that occurred after she was designated
Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the Office of the Provincial Accountant. Finding her
liable for reimbursements of transactions prior to this constitutes grave abuse
of discretion.-
—Since petitioner Villanueva’s liability for the disallowed
transactions is anchored on her position as Provincial Accountant, she should
only be liable for the transactions that occurred after she was designated
Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Accountant. Finding her
liable for reimbursements of transactions prior to this constitutes grave abuse
of discretion. However, which of the disallowed transactions occurred before
her designation is a question of fact that this Court has no evidentiary basis to
determine. This Court is constrained to remand the case to the Commission on
Audit to properly determine this matter.
2. Government Procurement; The law is patently clear, with no exceptions:
“[r]eference to brand names shall not be allowed.”-
—What petitioners Governor Lazaro, et al. fail to mention is
that National Center for Mental Health Management was decided in 1996, before
Republic Act No. 9184 was enacted in 2003. Exceptions to the prohibition
against reference to brand names in Republic Act No. 9184 could not have been
laid out years before the statute’s enactment. The law is patently clear, with
no exceptions: “[r]eference to brand names shall not be allowed.” Without basis
to claim that it was proper to refer to brand names in their procurement, the
claim that this case is an exception to the requirement of competitive bidding
has no leg to stand on. Consequently, the transactions were properly
disallowed.
3. Principle of Quantum Meruit; The principle of quantum meruit-
— that a party is allowed to recover as much as he or she
reasonably deserves — is usually invoked with regard to paying a contractor for
works rendered.—Indeed, the principle of quantum meruit — that a party is
allowed to recover as much as he or she reasonably deserves — is usually
invoked with regard to paying a contractor for works rendered. Here, however,
the contractors have already been paid, and the question to be resolved is
whether the public officers responsible for the irregularity must reimburse the
government for it.
4. Same; Liability of Public Officers; To determine a public officer’s liability based on quantum
meruit, the amount of reasonable value of the procured items or services must
first be established, so that the public officer is liable for only the excess
paid beyond the reasonable value.-
—Here, no part of the disallowed transaction could be deemed
valid. Petitioners plainly violated the law requiring procurement to undergo
competitive bidding. In doing so, they also violated the law prohibiting
reference to brand names. Moreover, even if the principle of quantum meruit
could be applied here, petitioners fail to establish the factual basis for its
application. In Melchor, to determine a public officer’s liability based on
quantum meruit, the amount of reasonable value of the procured items or
services must first be established, so that the public officer is liable for
only the excess paid beyond the reasonable value.
5. Same; Same; In asserting limited or complete lack of liability based
on the principle of quantum meruit and good faith, petitioners, in good
diligence, bear the burden to clearly allege and support the factual basis for
their claims.-
—This Court notes the Commission on Audit’s observations that:
(1) the Therapeutics Committees did not refer to any clinical study to support
the claims in the Certifications/Justifications; and (2) these
Certifications/Justifications were merely recommendatory, whereas the language
of Republic Act No. 9184 is mandatory. In asserting limited or complete lack of
liability based on the principle of quantum meruit and good faith, petitioners,
in good diligence, bear the burden to clearly allege and support the factual
basis for their claims. It is not this Court’s duty to construe their
incomplete submissions and vague narrations to determine merit in their
assertions.
6. Liability of Public Officers; Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 006-09 provides how
the COA should determine the liability of a public officer in relation to audit
disallowances.-
—Public officers should not be held liable for disallowed
transactions in which they did not participate. Holding them liable without any
proof of their participation in the transaction is grave abuse of discretion.
Commission on Audit Circular No. 006-09 provides how the Commission on Audit
should determine the liability of a public officer in relation to audit
disallowances.
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 213323
Counsel:
Ma. Carmen D. Babista-Lazaro, et al. for petitioners in G.R. No. 213323. Mariel
A. Mailom-Llarena for petitioner in G.R. No. 213324.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals’ January
13, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 119511
are AFFIRMED insofar as they reversed and set aside the May 24, 2010 Order and
March 14, 2011 Joint Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branches 46 and 24, in
Civil Case No. 09-121849. However, the rulings of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the Complaint and the Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 09-121849
without prejudice to referral of the disputes to arbitration are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Complaint and the Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 09-121849 are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the refling of the same claims before the proper
court.
Citation Ref:
48. Hygienic Packaging Corporation vs. Nutri-Asia, Inc., doing
business under the name and style of UFC Philippines (formerly Nutri-Asia,
Inc.), 891 SCRA 176, January 23, 2019
Case Title : HYGIENIC PACKAGING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NUTRI-ASIA,
INC., doing business under the name and style of UFC PHILIPPINES (formerly
NUTRI-ASIA, INC.), respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Venue ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) reminds litigants that while the
rules on venue are for the convenience of plaintiffs, these rules do not give
them unbounded freedom to file their cases wherever they may please.-
—This Court reminds litigants that while the rules on venue are
for the convenience of plaintiffs, these rules do not give them unbounded
freedom to file their cases wherever they may please: [T]he rules on venue,
like the other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and orderly
administration of justice or the impartial and even-handed determination of
every action and proceeding. Obviously, this objective will not be attained if
the plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to choose the court where he may
file his complaint or petition. The choice of venue should not be left to the
plaintiff’s whim or caprice. He [or she] may be impelled by some ulterior
motivation in choosing to file a case in a particular court even if not allowed
by the rules on venue.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue; Since there is no contractual stipulation that can be
enforced on the venue of dispute resolution, the venue of petitioner’s personal
action will be governed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.-
—Petitioner and respondent may have entered into a contract of
sale with respect to petitioner’s merchandise. However, the case records do not
show that they have a contract in relation to the venue of any civil action
arising from their business transaction. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna
West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., 728 SCRA 482 (2014), provides, “[f]or
there to be a contract, there must be a meeting of the minds between the
parties.” Here, no evidence shows that petitioner and respondent had a meeting
of minds and agreed to submit any future issue either to the trial court or to
arbitration. Since there is no contractual stipulation that can be enforced on
the venue of dispute resolution, the venue of petitioner’s personal action will
be governed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Actions; Personal Action; Collection of Sum of Money; It has been consistently held that an action for
collection of sum of money is a personal action.-
—It has been consistently held that an action for collection of
sum of money is a personal action. Taking into account that no exception can be
applied in this case, the venue, then, is “where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, . . . at the election of the plaintiff.” For a corporation,
its residence is considered “the place where its principal office is located as
stated in its Articles of Incorporation.”
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Venue; Dismissal of Actions; One of the grounds for dismissal of an action under Rule
16, Section 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is when the venue is
improperly laid.-
—One of the grounds for dismissal of an action under Rule 16, Section
1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is when the venue is improperly
laid. Although respondent did not file a Motion to Dismiss on this ground, it
cited the improper venue as one of the affirmative defenses in its Answer.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 201302
Counsel:
Malinao, Carandang, Adan Law Offices for petitioner. Poblador, Bautista, Reyes
for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals’ January
13, 2012 Decision and March 28, 2012 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 119511
are AFFIRMED insofar as they reversed and set aside the May 24, 2010 Order and
March 14, 2011 Joint Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branches 46 and 24, in
Civil Case No. 09-121849. However, the rulings of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the Complaint and the Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 09-121849
without prejudice to referral of the disputes to arbitration are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Complaint and the Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 09-121849 are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the refling of the same claims before the proper
court.
Citation Ref:
49. GSIS Family Bank Employees Union vs. Villanueva, 891 SCRA
206, January 23, 2019
Case Title : GSIS FAMILY BANK EMPLOYEES UNION, represented by its President
MS. JUDITH JOCELYN MARTINEZ, petitioner, vs. SEC. CESAR L. VILLANUEVA (in his
capacity as the Chairman of the Governance Commission for government-owned or
-controlled corporations under the Office of the President), MR. EMMANUEL L.
BENITEZ (in his capacity as President of the GSIS Family Bank), and ATTY.
GERALDINE MARIE BERBERABE-MARTINEZ (in her capacity as Chairperson of the Board
of Directors of the GSIS Family Bank), respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
Syllabi Class :Government-Owned and -Controlled Corporations ;
Collective Bargaining Agreements ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Collective Bargaining Agreements; When it comes to collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)
and collective negotiation agreements in government-owned or -controlled
corporations (GOCCs), Executive Order (EO) No. 203 unequivocally stated that
while it recognized the right of workers to organize, bargain, and negotiate with
their employers, “the Governing Boards of all covered [government-owned or
-controlled corporations], whether Chartered or Non-chartered, may not
negotiate with their officers and employees the economic terms of their
[collective bargaining agreements].”-
—When it comes to collective bargaining agreements and
collective negotiation agreements in government-owned or -controlled
corporations, Executive Order No. 203 unequivocally stated that while it
recognized the right of workers to organize, bargain, and negotiate with their
employers, “the Governing Boards of all covered [government-owned or
-controlled corporations], whether Chartered or Non-chartered, may not
negotiate with their officers and employees the economic terms of their
[collective bargaining agreements].” Thus, considering the existing law at the
time, GSIS Family Bank could not be faulted for refusing to enter into a new
collective bargaining agreement with petitioner as it lacked the authority to
negotiate economic terms with its employees. Un directly challenged in the
appropriate case and with a proper actual controversy, the constitutionality
and validity of Republic Act No. 10149, as it applies to fully government-owned
and -controlled non-chartered corporations, prevail.
2. Judicial Power; Judicial power is the court’s authority to “settle
justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations
of such rights.”-
—Judicial power is the court’s authority to “settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable
before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights.” This Court’s judicial power is anchored on Article VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides: SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
3. Same; Judicial power includes the power to enforce rights
conferred by law and determine grave abuse of discretion by any government
branch or instrumentality.-
—Judicial power includes the power to enforce rights conferred
by law and determine grave abuse of discretion by any government branch or
instrumentality. Jurisprudence has consistently referred to these two (2) as
the court’s traditional and expanded powers of judicial review. Traditional
judicial power is the court’s authority to review and settle actual
controversies or conflicting rights between dueling parties and enforce legally
demandable rights. An actual case or controversy exists “when the case presents
conflicting or opposite legal rights that may be resolved by the court in a
judicial proceeding.”
4. Same; Expanded Power of Judicial Review; The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) expanded power of judicial
review requires a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion by any
government branch or instrumentality. This broad grant of power contrasts with
the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, which is limited to the review of
judicial and quasi-judicial acts.-
—The framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately expanded this
Court’s power of judicial review to prevent courts from seeking refuge behind
the political question doctrine and turning a blind eye to abuses committed by
the other branches of government. This Court’s expanded power of judicial
review requires a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion by any government
branch or instrumentality. This broad grant of power contrasts with the remedy
of certiorari under Rule 65, which is limited to the review of judicial and
quasi-judicial acts. Nonethe, this Court, by its own power to relax its rules,
allowed Rule 65 to be used for petitions invoking the courts’ expanded
jurisdiction.
5. Administrative Agencies; Governance Commission; Jurisdiction; The Governance Commission possesses
neither judicial nor quasi-judicial powers; thus, it cannot review or settle actual controversies or
conflicting rights between dueling parties and enforce legally demandable
rights.+
6. Same; Same; As a collegial body, all members of the Governance
Commission should have been impleaded as indispensable parties in the Petition,
since no final determination of the action can be reached without them.-
—It has not escaped this Court’s attention that petitioner only
impleaded respondent Villanueva in his capacity as chairperson of the
Governance Commission, and not the four (4) other members of the Governance
Commission. The Governance Commission is composed of five (5) members. The
chairperson, with a rank of Cabinet Secretary, and two (2) other members, with
the rank of Undersecretary, are appointed by the President. The Department of
Budget and Management and the Department of Finance Secretaries sit as ex
officio members. As a collegial body, all members of the Governance Commission
should have been impleaded as indispensable parties in the Petition, since no
final determination of the action can be reached without them. As it is,
petitioner’s failure to implead all members of the Governance Commission should
lead to the outright dismissal of this Petition as their noninclusion is
debilitating since this Court cannot exercise its juridical power when an
indispensable party is not impleaded.
7. Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Moot and Academic; Courts generally dismiss cases on the
ground of mootness un any of the following instances are present: (1) grave
constitutional violations; (2) exceptional character of the case; (3) paramount public interest; (4) the case presents an opportunity to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public; or (5) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review.-
—A case is deemed moot when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy due to a supervening event. The lack of an actual or justiciable
controversy means that the court has nothing to resolve, and will, in effect,
only render an advisory opinion. Courts generally dismiss cases on the ground
of mootness un any of the following instances are present: (1) grave
constitutional violations; (2) exceptional character of the case; (3) paramount
public interest; (4) the case presents an opportunity to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; or (5) the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. Despite GSIS Family Bank’s closure, which has effectively rendered the
case moot, this Court believes that there is a need to discuss the substantive
issues of the case, as it presents an opportunity to guide the bench and bar on
how to resolve similar issues arising from similarly situated parties.
8. Government-Owned and -Controlled Corporations; A government-owned or -controlled
corporation (GOCC) is: (1) established by original charter or through the general
corporation law; (2) vested with
functions relating to public need whether governmental or proprietary in nature; and (3) directly owned by the government or by its
instrumentality, or where the government owns a majority of the outstanding
capital stock. Possessing all three (3) attributes is necessary to be
classified as a government-owned or -controlled corporation.-
—A government-owned or -controlled corporation is: (1)
established by original charter or through the general corporation law; (2) vested
with functions relating to public need whether governmental or proprietary in
nature; and (3) directly owned by the government or by its instrumentality, or
where the government owns a majority of the outstanding capital stock.
Possessing all three (3) attributes is necessary to be classified as a
government-owned or -controlled corporation. There is no doubt that GSIS Family
Bank is a government-owned or -controlled corporation since 99.55% of its
outstanding capital stock is owned and controlled by the Government Service
Insurance System.
9. Constitutional Law; Right to Self-Organization; The right to self-organization is not limited to private
employees and encompasses all workers in both the public and private sectors,
as shown by the clear declaration in Article IX(B), Section 2(5) that “the
right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.”-
—The right to self-organization is not limited to private
employees and encompasses all workers in both the public and private sectors, as
shown by the clear declaration in Article IX(B), Section 2(5) that “the right
to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.” Article III,
Section 8 of the Bill of Rights likewise states, “[t]he right of the people,
including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.”
10. Same; Same; While the right to self-organization is absolute, the
right of government employees to collective bargaining and negotiation is
subject to limitations.-
—While the right to self-organization is absolute, the right of
government employees to collective bargaining and negotiation is subject to
limitations. Collective bargaining is a series of negotiations between an
employer and a representative of the employees to regulate the various aspects
of the employer-employee relationship such as working hours, working
conditions, benefits, economic provisions, and others. Relations between
private employers and their employees are subject to the minimum requirements
of wage laws, labor, and welfare legislation. Beyond these requirements,
private employers and their employees are at liberty to establish the terms and
conditions of their employment relationship. In contrast with the private
sector, the terms and conditions of employment of government workers are fixed
by the legislature; thus, the negotiable matters in the public sector are
limited to terms and conditions of employment that are not fixed by law.
11. Government-Owned and -Controlled Corporations; Non-chartered Government-owned and
-Controlled Corporations; Republic
Act (RA) No. 10149 defines a non-chartered government-owned or-controlled
corporation (GOCC) as a government-owned or -controlled corporation that was
organized and is operating under the Corporation Code.-
—Republic Act No. 10149 defines a non-chartered government-owned
or -controlled corporation as a government-owned or
12. Same; Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 10149 also
categorically states, “Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, no
[government-owned or -controlled corporation (GOCC)] shall be exempt from the
coverage of the Compensation and Position Classification System developed by
the [Governance Commission] under this Act.”-
—Section 9 of Republic Act No. 10149 also categorically states,
“Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, no [government-owned or -controlled
corporation] shall be exempt from the coverage of the Compensation and Position
Classification System developed by the [Governance Commission] under this Act.”
Furthermore, Republic Act No. 10149 directed the Governance Commission to
develop a Compensation and Position Classification System, to be submitted for
the President’s approval, which shall apply to all officers and employees of
government-owned or -controlled corporations, whether chartered or
non-chartered.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 210773
Counsel:
Dela Cruz, Entero & Associates for petitioner. Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel for respondents E.L. Benitez and G.M. Berberabe-Martinez.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
Citation Ref:
50. Polo Plantation Agrarian Reform Multipurpose Cooperative
(POPARMUCO) vs. Inson, 891 SCRA 446, January 30, 2019
Case Title : POLO PLANTATION AGRARIAN REFORM MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE
(POPARMUCO), represented by SILANDO GOMEZ and ELIAS RAMOS, petitioner, vs.
RODOLFO T. INSON, CESO III, as Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, Region VII-Cebu City, respondent.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Contempt.
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Certificate of Land Ownership Award ;
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; Section 24 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 9700, now explicitly provides that
certificates-
—Section 24 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, as amended
by Republic Act No. 9700, now explicitly provides that certificates of land
ownership award, “being titles brought under the operation of the [T]orrens
[S]ystem,” enjoy the same indefeasibility and security afforded to all titles
under the Torrens System.
2. Agrarian Reform; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the primary responsibility of implementing
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).-
—The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law vested in the Department
of Agrarian Reform the primary responsibility of implementing the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program. Section 50 defines the Department’s powers over
agrarian reform matters: SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.—The DAR
is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). . . . . Notwithstanding an appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the DAR shall be immediately executory.
3. Same; Same; There are two (2) modes of acquiring land under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL): (1) compulsory acquisition and (2)
voluntary offer for sale/land transfer.-
—Section 7 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law authorizes
the Department of Agrarian Reform, in coordination with the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council, to plan and program the acquisition and distribution
of all agricultural lands in accordance with the order of priority under the
law. Inherent in this function is the Department of Agrarian Reform’s power to
identify the landholdings within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, and to identify, screen, and select agrarian reform
beneficiaries. The Department of Agrarian Reform is further tasked to make
support and coordinative services available to farmer-beneficiaries and
affected landowners. There are two (2) modes of acquiring land under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law: (1) compulsory acquisition and (2) voluntary
offer for sale/land transfer.
4. Same; Same; Section 16(a) of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) requires that after identification of the land, landowners, and farmer
beneficiaries, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) will send a notice of
acquisition to the landowner, through personal delivery or registered mail, and
post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of
the place where the property is located.-
—Section 16(a) requires that after identification of the land,
landowners, and farmer beneficiaries, the Department of Agrarian Reform will
send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, through personal delivery or
registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building
and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. While the law
does not provide how the identification process must be made, the details or
guidelines can be found in pertinent administrative issuances of the Department
of Agrarian Reform or the Provincial Agrarian Reform Council, per their
rule-making power under Section 49.
5. Same; Notice of Coverage; Under the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-03, or the 2003 Rules Governing Issuance of
Notice of Coverage and Acquisition of Agricultural Lands Under Republic Act
(RA) No. 6657, compulsory acquisition is commenced through two (2) ways.-
—Under the Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order
No. 01-03, or the 2003 Rules Governing Issuance of Notice of Coverage and
Acquisition of Agricultural Lands Under Republic Act No. 6657, compulsory
acquisition is commenced through two (2) ways. The first is through a Notice of
Coverage. After determining that the land is covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program and writing a preocular inspection report, the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer sends a Notice to the landowner. The Notice
would be posted for at least seven (7) days in the bulletin boards of the
barangay hall and municipal/city hall where the property is located. The other
way is through a Petition for Coverage, filed by any party before the
Department of Agrarian Reform’s Regional Office or Provincial Office of the
region or province where the property is located. Either of these offices
transmits the case folder to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer where the
property is located.
6. Same; Same; Under Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative
Order (AO) No. 01-03, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer serves copies of
the Notice of Coverage or Petition for Coverage on the landowner.-
—Under Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No.
01-03, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer serves copies of the Notice of
Coverage or Petition for Coverage on the landowner. Through the Notice, the
landowner is informed that his or her landholding is subjected to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. He or she is invited to a public hearing
or field investigation on the date specified in the Notice. Moreover, the
landowner is informed of his or her rights and privileges (with corresponding
restrictions and conditions), as follows: 1. apply for an exemption clearance
or for exclusion from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program’s coverage; 2.
retain an area not exceeding five (5) hectares pursuant to Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6657; 3. nominate his/her child/ren who may qualify as
beneficiary/ies to the subject landholding; and/or 4. submit evidence for
determining just compensation of the subject landholding.
7. Same; Same; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program; The landowner or any real party-in-interest may file
before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Municipal Office a protest or
petition to lift the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) within sixty (60) calendar days from receipt of the Notice.-
—The landowner or any real party-in-interest may file before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Municipal Office a protest or petition to lift
the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program within 60 calendar
days from receipt of the Notice. The protest will be resolved in accordance
with the procedure set forth in Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative
Order No. 03-03, or the 2003 Rules for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases.
Meanwhile, the process of identifying and screening potential agrarian reform
beneficiaries is suspended until after the lapse of the 60-day period from the
landowner’s receipt of the Notice, or upon the authorized agency’s final
determination of the petition for retention, exclusion, and exemption, if any
were filed. Upon receipt of the Memorandum of Valuation from the Land Bank of
the Philippines and Claim Folder Profile and Valuation Summary, the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer sends a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition to the
landowner in accordance with the same service procedures in Department of
Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 01-03.
8. Same; Section 16(e) mandates the Department to take immediate
possession of the land only after full payment or deposit of the compensation
with the bank (in case of rejection/nonresponse of landowner), and to request
the Register of Deeds to transfer title in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, and later on to the intended beneficiaries.-
—Section 16(e) mandates the Department to take immediate
possession of the land only after full payment or deposit of the compensation
with the bank (in case of rejection/nonresponse of landowner), and to request
the Register of Deeds to transfer title in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, and later on to the intended beneficiaries.
9. Same; Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries; Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order
(AO) No. 07-03 provides the qualifications, disqualifications, and rights and
obligations of agrarian reform beneficiaries.-
—Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 07-03
provides the qualifications, disqualifications, and rights and obligations of
agrarian reform beneficiaries. It also provides the operating procedures for
their: (1) identification, screening, and selection; (2) resolution of protests
in the selection; and (3) certificate of land ownership award generation and
registration.
10. Same; Same; The Municipal or Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer,
together with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, screens and selects the
possible agrarian beneficiaries, under the criteria in Sections 4 and 5 of
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 07-03.-
—The Municipal or Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, together
with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee, screens and selects the possible
agrarian beneficiaries, under the criteria in Sections 4 and 5 of Department of
Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No. 07-03.
11. Same; Written protests for the inclusion/exclusion from the
master list must be filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform’s (DAR’s)
Regional or Provincial Office, as the case may be, not later than fifteen (15)
days from the last day of posting of the list.-
—All qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries are then ranked in
accordance with the order of priority under Sections 22 and 22-A. Then, the
master list of agrarian reform beneficiaries is posted for 15 days in at least
three (3) conspicuous places in the barangay hall, municipal hall, and in the
community where the property is located. Written protests for the
inclusion/exclusion from the master list must be filed before the Department of
Agrarian Reform’s Regional or Provincial Office, as the case may be, not later
than 15 days from the last day of posting of the list. The Regional Director
will resolve the protest through summary proceedings within 30 days from
receiving the Beneficiary Screening Committee’s case records or the Provincial
Office’s investigation report and recommendation. The master list becomes final
and executory after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of the Regional
Director’s decision on the protest, but such finality is only for the specific
purpose of generating the certificate of land ownership award.
12. Same; Regional Directors; Jurisdiction; Under Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative
Order (AO) No. 03-03, the Regional Director has primary jurisdiction over all
agrarian law implementation cases, while the DAR Secretary has appellate
jurisdiction over them.-
—Under Department of Agrarian Reform Administrative Order No.
03-03, the Regional Director has primary jurisdiction over all agrarian law
implementation cases, while the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary has
appellate jurisdiction over them.
13. Same; Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board; Jurisdiction; Under
Rule II, Section 2, the Adjudication Board shall have exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter, or affirm resolutions, orders,
and decisions of its Adjudicators.-
—In the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, the Department
of Agrarian Reform, through its adjudication arm — the Adjudication Board and
its regional and provincial adjudication boards — adopted the 2003 DARAB Rules
of Procedure. Under Rule II, Section 2, the Adjudication Board shall have
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter, or affirm
resolutions, orders, and decisions of its Adjudicators.
14. Same; Certificate of Land Ownership Award; Cancellation of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award; Under the new law, Republic Act (RA) No.
9700, all cases involving the cancellation of certificates of land ownership
award and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Secretary.-
—Under the new law, Republic Act No. 9700, all cases involving
the cancellation of certificates of land ownership award and other titles
issued under any agrarian reform program are within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary. Section 9
provides: SECTION 9. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows: SEC. 24. . . . . . . . All cases involving
the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of land
ownership award, and other titles issued
15. Same; Same; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; Section 24 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
states that the rights and obligations of beneficiaries commence from the time
the land is awarded to them.-
—Under the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Carding and
Identification System, agrarian reform beneficiaries with titles under the
agrarian reform laws will be issued identification cards as proof of their
being bona fide beneficiaries. These identification cards are validated yearly
based on the Department of Agrarian Reform Municipal Office’s inspection of the
beneficiaries’ performance and compliance with their duties under the laws. The
Municipal Office checks if they still own and cultivate the landholding awarded
to them, or if they have committed any offense. Beneficiaries found to have
violated the laws will be removed from the master list. Consequently, their
identification cards and emancipation patents or certificates of land ownership
award will be canceled. Section 24 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
states that the rights and obligations of beneficiaries commence from the time
the land is awarded to them. The certificate of land ownership award contains
the restrictions and conditions provided in the law and other applicable
statutes.
16. Same; Same; Cancellation of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award; Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Administrative Order (AO) No. 03-09 provides the rules and procedures for
canceling certificates of land ownership award and other titles under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).-
—Failure of beneficiaries to comply with the prescribed
conditions may result in the forfeiture of the land awarded to them. A
certificate of land ownership award may be corrected and canceled for
violations of agrarian laws, rules, and regulations. Department of Agrarian
Reform Administrative Order No. 03-09 provides the rules and procedures for
canceling certificates of land ownership award and other titles under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 189162
Counsel:
Yap-Siton Law Office for petitioner. Esther Doron-Nadela for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Contempt is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
Citation Ref:
51. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Regalado, 855 SCRA 54, February
07, 2018
Case Title : OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, represented by OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES, petitioner, vs. MARIA ROWENA REGALADO, respondent
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the amended
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Dismissal from Service ; Rule IV,
Section 52(A) (3) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service
(URACCS) ;
Syllabi:
1. Public Officers; No one has a vested right to public office. One can
continue to hold public office only for as long as he or she proves worthy of
public trust.-
—The fundamental notion that one’s tenure in government springs
exclusively from the trust reposed by the public means that continuance in
office is contingent upon the extent to which one is able to maintain that
trust. As Chief Justice Enrique Fernando eloquently wrote in his concurrence in
Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 34 (1969): [W]e must keep in mind that the Article
on the Civil Service, like other provisions of the Constitution, was inserted
primarily to assure a government, both efficient and adequate to fulfill the
ends for which it has been established. That is a truism. It is not subject to
dispute. It is in that sense that a public office is considered a public trust.
Everyone in the public service cannot and must not lose sight of that fact.
While his right as an individual although employed by the government is not to
be arbitrarily disregarded, he cannot and should not remain unaware that the
only justification for his continuance in such service is his ability to
contribute to the public welfare. (Citation omitted) No one has a vested right
to public office. One can continue to hold public office only for as long as he
or she proves worthy of public trust.
2. Administrative Law; Dismissal from Service; Grave Misconduct; 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service; The 2017 Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service (2017 RACCS) consider grave misconduct as a grave offense
warranting the ultimate penalty of dismissal from service with the accessory
penalties of cancellation of eligibility, perpetual disqualification from
public office, bar from taking civil service examinations, and forfeiture of
retirement benefits.-
—Consistent with the dignity of public office, our civil service
system maintains that misconduct tainted with “any of the additional elements
of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or disregard of established
rules” is grave. This gravity means that misconduct was committed with such
depravity that it justifies not only putting an end to an individual’s current
engagement as a public servant, but also the foreclosure of any further
opportunity at occupying public office. Accordingly, the 2017 Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (2017 RACCS) consider grave
misconduct as a grave offense warranting the ultimate penalty of dismissal from
service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, perpetual
disqualification from public office, bar from taking civil service
examinations, and forfeiture of retirement benefits.
3. Same; Illegal Solicitation; Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officers and Employees; Republic
Act (RA) No. 6713 specifically identifies as unlawful the solicitation or acceptance
of gifts “in the course of their official duties or in connection with any
operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of their office.”-
—Apart from the general treatment of misconduct with “any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or
disregard of established rules,” Republic Act No. 6713 specifically identifies
as unlawful the solicitation or acceptance of gifts “in the course of their
official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any
transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.”
4. Administrative Proceedings; Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officers and Employees; Section
11(b) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713 explicitly states that dismissal from the
service may be warranted through an administrative proceeding, even if the
erring officer is not subjected to criminal prosecution.-
—Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 explicitly states that
dismissal from the service may be warranted through an administrative
proceeding, even if the erring officer is not subjected to criminal
prosecution. This is in keeping with the three (3)-fold liability rule in the
law on public officers, “which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a
public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability.
An action for each can proceed independently of the others.”
5. Administrative Law; Illegal Solicitation; The act of requesting pecuniary or material benefits is
specifically listed by Section 3(c) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 as a “corrupt
practice.”-
—The matter is not a question of whether or not, as respondent
mentions in her Comment to the present Petition, she actually received or
profited from the solicitation of any amount from the complainants, or that she
solicited even after she had completed the inspection of St. Martha’s. Section
7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713 penalizes both solicitation and acceptance. This
is similar to how Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019 penalizes both the
requesting and receiving of pecuniary or material benefits. In Section 7(d),
the prior or subsequent performance of official acts is also immaterial. It is
equally without question that respondent engaged in misconduct that was tainted
with corruption and with willful intent to violate the law and to disregard
established rules. The act of requesting pecuniary or material benefits is
specifically listed by Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019 as a “corrupt practice.”
Further, there is certainly nothing in the records to suggest that respondent’s
actions were not products of her own volition. It is clear, then, that
respondent’s actions deserve the supreme penalty of dismissal from service. The
Court of Appeals, however, held that certain circumstances warrant the
reduction of respondent’s penalty to a year-long suspension.
6. Same; Dismissal from Service; Rule IV, Section 52(A)(3) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) unqualifiedly states that
dismissal shall be meted even if it is only the first offense.-
—The Court of Appeals noted, as a mitigating circumstance, “that
petitioner has not been previously charged of any offense and this is the very
first time that she was found to be administratively liable.” In taking this as
a mitigating circumstance, the Court of Appeals ran afoul of the clear text of
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Rule IV,
Section 52(A)(3) of these Rules unqualifiedly states that dismissal shall be
meted even if it is only the first offense.
7. Same; Grave Misconduct; Grave misconduct is not a question of frequency, but, as
its own name suggests, of gravity or weight.-
—The fact that an offender was caught for the first time does
not, in any way, abate the gravity of what he or she actually committed. Grave
misconduct is not a question of frequency, but, as its own name suggests, of
gravity or weight. One who commits grave misconduct is one who, by the mere
fact of that misconduct, has proven himself or herself unworthy of the
continuing confidence of the public. By his or her very commission of that
grave offense, the offender forfeits any right to hold public office.
Underscoring the severity of grave misconduct and other offenses meriting
dismissal, the 2017 RACCS now specifically state that no mitigating
circumstances, of any sort, may be appreciated in cases involving an offense
punishable by dismissal from service.
8. Same; Illegal Solicitation; A more appropriate summation of respondent’s actions
should recognize how she was so brazen in extorting-
— not merely soliciting, but downright badgering — money from
the complainants.—The Court of Appeals also cited respondent’s supposed “good
work performance” and referenced “affidavits executed by the representatives of
other schools previously assisted by [respondent] . . . stating their
satisfaction with the service rendered by [her].” This Court is, quite frankly,
baffled by how solicited statements of support from supposedly satisfied
clients could operate to erode the liability of one such as respondent. The
plain and evident truth is that, while the language of the charge against
respondent seemed austere and unadorned, she did so much more than merely
solicit pecuniary benefits from the complainants. A more appropriate summation
of respondent’s actions should recognize how she was so brazen in extorting —
not merely soliciting, but downright badgering — money from the complainants.
Throughout a prolonged period extending seven (7) months from October 2006 to
May 2007, she pestered the complainants for bribes that she variably referred
to as “processing fee,” “accreditation fee,” and “honorarium.” Respondent could
not even bear to be consistent about the language she would use in her attempts
to conceal extortion. In the course of pressing the complainants for money,
respondent even knowingly used a falsified copy of an official issuance of the
Bureau of Immigration.
9. Same; Same; Most telling of respondent’s audacity and depravity is how
she did not mince words in not only professing her own corruption, but even
besmirching the entire government.-
—Most telling of respondent’s audacity and depravity is how she
did not mince words in not only professing her own corruption, but even
besmirching the entire government. Asked by Diaz if she was making demands
“under the table,” respondent answered, “Yes, my dear, that’s the system ng
government.” She even added, “Ganito ang system, ano ako magmamalinis?” Far
from demonstrating considerations that should mitigate respondent’s liability,
her litany of transgressions could conceivably be appreciated as even
aggravating. Her case makes it seem like someone breathed life to a caricature
of a corrupt bureaucrat. The civil service cannot have itself overrun by
officers such as respondent. They make a mockery of every ideal that public
service exemplifies. For once, some individuals had the courage to not condone
her corruption. This is enough to show that respondent is nowhere near deserving
of public trust. As a measure of recompense to the public, and as a portent to
others who may be similarly disposed, this Court does not hesitate to impose
upon respondent the supreme administrative penalty of dismissal from government
service.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. Nos. 208481-82
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. Europa, Dacanay, Cubelo, Europa
& Flores Law Offices for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals’ January 7, 2013
original Decision in the same C.A.-G.R. S.P. Nos. 120843 and 121748 is
REINSTATED. Respondent MARIA ROWENA REGALADO is found GUILTY of Grave
Misconduct and of violating Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713. She is to suffer
the penalty of dismissal from service, along with its accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification from employment in government.
Citation Ref:
52. Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction Development
Company, 857 SCRA 549, March 07, 2018
Case Title : INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs. OFFSHORE
CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 173.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Ejectment ;
Possession by Tolerance ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Possession by Tolerance; Petitioner’s tolerance of respondent’s occupation and use
of the leased premises after the end of the lease contracts does not give the
latter a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in its favor.-
—But petitioner’s tolerance of respondent’s occupation and use
of the leased premises after the end of the lease contracts does not give the
latter a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in its favor. When a
demand to vacate has been made, as what petitioner had done, respondent’s
possession became illegal and it should have left the leased premises.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the remedy
from an adverse decision rendered by a Regional Trial Court (RTC) exercising
its appellate jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals (CA).-
—Under Rule 42, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the remedy from
an adverse decision rendered by a Regional Trial Court exercising its appellate
jurisdiction is to file a verified petition for review with the Court of
Appeals: Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.—A party desiring to
appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00
for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a
copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket
and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of
fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case
to exceed fifteen (15) days.
3. Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Question of Law; The Supreme Court (SC) has ruled that the jurisdiction of
a court over the subject matter of a complaint and the existence of forum
shopping are questions of law.-
—“A question of law exists when the law applicable to a
particular set of facts is not settled, whereas a question of fact arises when
the truth or falsehood of alleged facts is in doubt.” This Court has ruled that
the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a complaint and the
existence of forum shopping are questions of law. A petition for review under
Rule 42 may include questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law. This Court has recognized that the power to hear cases on appeal in which
only questions of law are raised is not vested exclusively in this Court. As
provided in Rule 42, Section 2, errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed
by the Regional Trial Court in its decision must be specified in the petition
for review.
4. Same; Same; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and
the Supreme Court (SC) has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. One of
these exceptions is the exigency of the situation being litigated. Here, the
controversy between the parties has been dragging on since 2010, which should
not be the case when the initial dispute-
— an ejectment case — is, by nature and design, a summary
procedure and should have been resolved with expediency.—Petitioner’s direct
resort to this Court, instead of to the Court of Appeals for intermediate
review as sanctioned by the rules, violates the principle of hierarchy of courts.
In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 (2015): The
doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this
court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles
in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the
facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are
likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of
an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially
organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach
within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important
task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented
before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial
jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes ripe a
determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of
course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort
to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions
could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
Nonethe, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not inviolable, and this Court
has provided several exceptions to the doctrine. One of these exceptions is the
exigency of the situation being litigated. Here, the controversy between the
parties has been dragging on since 2010, which should not be the case when the
initial dispute — an ejectment case — is, by nature and design, a summary
procedure and should have been resolved with expediency.
5. Same; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Possession; It is settled that the only issue that must be settled in
an ejectment proceeding is physical possession of the property involved.-
—It is settled that the only issue that must be settled in an
ejectment proceeding is physical possession of the property involved.
Specifically, action for unlawful detainer is brought against a possessor who
unlawfully withholds possession after the termination and expiration of the
right to hold possession. To determine the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in the complaint must be examined.
The jurisdictional facts must be evident on the face of the complaint. There is
a case for unlawful detainer if the complaint states the following: (1)
initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within
one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
6. Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Metropolitan Trial Courts; Regard of the claims or defenses raised by a defendant, a
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) has jurisdiction over an ejectment complaint
once it has been shown that the requisite jurisdictional facts have been alleged.-
—Not even the claim that there is an implied new lease or tacita
reconduccion will remove the Metropolitan Trial Court’s jurisdiction over the
complaint. To emphasize, physical possession, or de facto possession, is the
sole issue to be resolved in ejectment proceedings. Regard of the claims or
defenses raised by a defendant, a Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction
over an ejectment complaint once it has been shown that the requisite
jurisdictional facts have been alleged, such as in this case. Courts are
reminded not to abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of physical
possession, as there is a public need to prevent a breach of the peace by
requiring parties to resort to legal means to recover possession of real
property.
7. Same; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping is the practice of resorting to multiple
fora for the same relief, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable
judgment.-
—Forum shopping is the practice of resorting to multiple fora
for the same relief, to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable judgment.
In Spouses Reyes v. Spouses Chung, 839 SCRA 615 (2017): It has been
jurisprudentially established that forum shopping exists when a party avails
himself of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or
successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other courts.
The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping
is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Simply put, when
litis pendentia or res judicata does not exist, neither can forum shopping
exist. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or
at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regard of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other. On the other hand, the elements of res judicata, also known as bar by
prior judgment, are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which
rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and
second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
8. Same; Same; Counterclaims; Compulsory Counterclaims; A compulsory counterclaim is a defendant’s claim for money
or other relief which arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the subject
matter of the complaint.-
—A compulsory counterclaim is a defendant’s claim for money or
other relief which arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the subject
matter of the complaint. In Spouses Ponciano v. Hon. Parentela, Jr., 331 SCRA 605
(2000): A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief which
a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit
arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff’s complaint. It is
compulsory in the sense that if it is within the jurisdiction of the court, and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be set up therein, and will be
barred in the future if not set up.
9. Same; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Judgments; A judgment of eviction against respondent will affect its
subees since the latter’s right of possession depends entirely on that of the
former.-
—A subee cannot invoke a superior right over that of the subor.
A judgment of eviction against respondent will affect its subees since the
latter’s right of possession depends entirely on that of the former. A
complaint for interpleader by subees cannot bar the recovery by the rightful
possessor of physical possession of the leased premises. Since neither the
specific performance case nor the interpleader case constituted forum shopping
by petitioner, the Metropolitan Trial Court erred in dismissing its Complaint
for Ejectment.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 196795
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. Obligar Law Firm for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
April 14, 2011 Decision of Branch 173, Regional Trial Court, Manila in Civil
Case No. 10-124740 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new decision is hereby
rendered ordering respondent Offshore Construction and Development Company and
any and all its subees and successors-in-interest to vacate the leased premises
immediately. Branch 37, Regional Trial Court, Manila is DIRECTED to resolve
Civil Case No. 08-119138 with dispatch.
Citation Ref:
53. People vs. Sanchez, 859 SCRA 175, March 14, 2018
Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN
SANCHEZ y SALVO a.k.a. “DADA,” accused-appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Accused-appellant Sanchez failed to prove any ill motive
on the part of the apprehending officers so as to incriminate him for such
heinous crimes of sale and possession of dangerous drugs.-
—The defenses of denial and “frame-up” do not convince.
Accused-appellant Sanchez failed to prove any ill motive on the part of the
apprehending officers so as to incriminate him for such heinous crimes of sale
and possession of dangerous drugs. To prove that he was not doing anything
illegal when he was arrested, accused-appellant Sanchez could have presented in
court the persons he was allegedly drinking with when agents of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency supposedly came, yet he did not. In addition, although
the testimonies differed on where the seized items were marked, the prosecution
has sufficiently demonstrated that this discrepancy did not affect the
integrity or evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. IO1 Diocampo testified
that she marked the items with “1KCD” and “2KCD” in the presence of
accused-appellant Sanchez. This testimony was corroborated by IO1 Riñopa. The
inventory of the items was done in the presence of Punong Barangay Mendoza and
Department of Justice representative Magnaye. IO1 Diocampo then personally
brought the seized items to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
where the items tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The
apprehending officers more than substantially complied with the chain of custody
rule under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—The sale of dangerous drugs is punished under Section 5 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, thus: Section 5. Sale, Trading,
Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.—The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, un authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium
poppy regard of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in
any of such transactions. The elements of the crime of selling dangerous drugs
are: first, “the identity[ies] of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and [second,] the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor.”
3. Same; Same; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—Possession of dangerous drugs is punished under Section 11 of
the same Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, which partly provides: Section 11.
Possession of Dangerous Drugs.—. . . . Otherwise, if the quantity involved is than the foregoing quantities, the penalties
shall be graduated as follows: . . . . (3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if
the quantities of dangerous drugs are than five (5) grams of . . . methamphetamine
hydrochloride or “shabu,” or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
MDMA or “ecstasy,” PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly
introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or
if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
The elements of possession of dangerous drugs are: first, “the actual
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug”;
second, “such possession is not authorized by law”; and third, “the accused
freely or consciously possessed the said drug.”
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 216014
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney’s
Office for accused-appellant.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals’ July
14, 2014 Decision in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05387 is AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
54. Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation vs. Multi-Ready Development
Corporation, 861 SCRA 448, April 18, 2018
Case Title : MAKATI TUSCANY CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
MULTI-REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the amended
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Res Judicata
;
Syllabi:
1. emedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Requisites of Res Judicata.-
—There is res judicata when the following concur: a) the former
judgment must be final; b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter; c) it must be a judgment on the
merits; d) and there must be between the first and second actions identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; Reformation of Instruments; Reformation of an instrument is a remedy in equity where a
valid existing contract is allowed by law to be revised to express the true
intentions of the contracting parties.-
—Reformation of an instrument is a remedy in equity where a
valid existing contract is allowed by law to be revised to express the true intentions
of the contracting parties. The rationale is that it would be unjust to enforce
a written instrument which does not truly reflect the real agreement of the
parties. In reforming an instrument, no new contract is created for the
parties, rather, the reformed instrument establishes the real agreement between
the parties as intended, but for some reason, was not embodied in the original
instrument.
3. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Separate Legal Personality; To grant the argument that a corporation, like a natural
person, was confused or not in bad faith is to extend to it too much analogy
and to endow it more of the human characteristics beyond its legal fiction.-
—It is difficult to impute confusion and bad faith, which are
states of mind appropriate for a natural individual person, to an entire
corporation. The fiction where corporations are granted both legal personality
separate from its owners and a capacity to act should not be read as endowing
corporations with a single mind. In truth, a corporation is a hierarchical
community of groups of persons both in the governing board and in management.
Corporations have different minds working together including its lawyers,
auditors, and, in some cases, their compliance officers. To grant the argument that
a corporation, like a natural person, was confused or not in bad faith is to
extend to it too much analogy and to endow it more of the human characteristics
beyond its legal fiction. This Court is not endowed with such god-like
qualities of a creator or should allow illicit extensions of legal fiction to
cause injustice. Respondent, through a preponderance of evidence, was able to
prove its claim that the Master Deed and Deed of Transfer failed to capture the
true intentions of the parties; hence, it is but right that the instruments be
reformed to accurately reflect the agreement of the parties.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 185530
Counsel:
Petition denied, amended decision and resolution affirmed.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ April 28, 2008 Amended Decision and
December 4, 2008 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 44696 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
55. Perez vs. People, 861 SCRA 626, April 18, 2018
Case Title : PEDRO PEREZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Child Abuse Law ; Sexual Abuse ; Penalties
;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 5(b), “the penalty for lascivious conduct
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal
in its medium period.”-
—Under Section 5(b), “the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period.” Reclusion temporal in its medium period is fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months, and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
2. Criminal Law; Rape; There is no standard behavior for a victim of a crime
against chastity. Moreover, behavioral psychology teaches that people react to
similar situations dissimilarly.-
—Petitioner advances the seeming impossibility of AAA’s
allegation of child abuse considering AAA’s outfit that day, her inaction
during and after the commission of the alleged act, and the presence of other
persons in the house where it happened. Petitioner’s contention has no merit.
This Court cannot accept this reasoning of petitioner. As correctly found by
the Court of Appeals: This type of reasoning borders on the preposterous in
that the accused literally made it sound like the victim’s cycling shorts were
made of impenetrable steel like a chastity belt. That, or he is trying to
portray himself as a hap human being with wispy cotton for arms such that the
act of lifting a child’s blouse or adjusting her undergarment’s waistband (to
accommodate his hand) pose a serious physical challenge that a man of his age
and built cannot hope to accomplish. This, at all, does not run afoul with
human experience as the accused so conveniently puts it. On the contrary, this
particular act of indecency is easily attainable given the disparity in his
strength and that of the child’s, the unique access by which the accused
succeeded in his dastardly act and, for good measure, the customary ascendancy
that adults have over children. As so clearly described by the victim, the
manner by which the accused committed lasciviousness against her is not far
removed from the [other victims of acts of lasciviousness] before her. She
stated that the accused sneaked in after her when she walked toward the kitchen
to fetch herself a glass of water. There, hidden from everyone else (the living
room and the kitchen [were] separated by a room), the accused took advantage of
the situation by inserting his fingers from behind her and fumbled her breast
that visibly resulted in a bruise. Young as she is, she struggled as best as
she could to remove herself from his grip but the accused warned her not to
scream or shout for help. For a child of tenders (sic) age, such a stern
warning from a fully grown man was enough to kill off whatever courage she
might have had to scream for the others for assistance. In Awas v. People, 828
SCRA 299 (2017), the 10-year-old victim likewise failed to shout for help when
the accused touched her vagina. This Court held that “[t]here is no standard
behavior for a victim of a crime against chastity.” Moreover, “[b]ehavioral
psychology teaches that people react to similar situations dissimilarly.”
3. Same; Same; Rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises and even inside
a house where there are other occupants or where other members of the family
are also sleeping.-
—This Court cannot emphasize enough that “lust is no respecter
of time and place.” Thus, “rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises and even
inside a house where there are other occupants or where other members of the
family are also sleeping.” Furthermore, the victim in this case was able to
positively identify her assailant. She made a clear and categorical statement
that petitioner was the person who committed the crime against her. Aside from
petitioner’s denial, he failed to present his aunt as a witness or other
documentary evidence to corroborate his alibi that he went to a school on the
day of the incident. In light of AAA’s positive declaration, petitioner’s
unsubstantiated defense must fail following the doctrine that “positive
identification prevails over denial and alibi.”
4. Same; Same; Courts must continue to acknowledge that the dastardly
illicit and lustful acts of men are often veiled in either the power of
coercive threat or the inconvenience inherent in patriarchy as a culture.-
—This Court in Amarela, however, did not go as far as denying
the existence of patriarchal dominance in many social relationships. Courts
must continue to be sensitive to the power relations that come clothed in
gender roles. In many instances, it does take courage for girls or women to
come forward and testify against the boys or men in their lives who, perhaps
due to cultural roles, dominate them. Courts must continue to acknowledge that
the dastardly illicit and lustful acts of men are often veiled in either the
power of coercive threat or the inconvenience inherent in patriarchy as a culture.
Even if it were true that AAA was infatuated with the accused, it did not
justify the indignity done to her. At the tender age of 12, adolescents will
normally be misled by their hormones and mistake regard or adoration for love.
The aggressive expression of infatuation from a 12-year-old girl is never an
invitation for sexual indignities. Certainly, it does not deserve the accused’s
mashing of her breasts or the insertion of his finger into her vagina.
Consistent with our pronouncement in Amarela, AAA was no Maria Clara. Not being
the fictitious and generalized demure girl, it does not make her testimony credible especially when supported by the
other pieces of evidence presented in this case.
5. Same; Child Abuse Law; Sexual Abuse; Elements of.-
—Under Section 5(b), the elements of sexual abuse are: (1) The
accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct[;] (2) The
said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse[; and] (3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18
years of age. The presence of the first and third elements is already
established. Petitioner admits in the pretrial that AAA was only 12 years old
at the commission of the crime. He also concedes that if ever he is liable, he
is liable only for acts of lasciviousness. However, petitioner claims that the
second element is wanting. For petitioner, the prosecution must show that AAA
was “exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.” A thorough
review of the records reveals that the second element is present in this case.
6. Same; Same; Same; Other Sexual Abuse; In Quimvel v. People, the Supreme Court (SC) held that the
fact that a child is under the coercion and influence of an adult is sufficient
to satisfy this second element and will classify the child victim as one
subjected to other sexual abuse.-
—This Court in People v. Villacampa, 850 SCRA 75 (2018),
explained: [T]he second element is that the act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. To meet this
element, the child victim must either be exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse. In Quimvel v. People, the Court held that the fact that
a child is under the coercion and influence of an adult is sufficient to
satisfy this second element and will classify the child victim as one subjected
to other sexual abuse. The Court held: To the mind of the Court, the
allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one “exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse.” This is anchored on the very
definition of the phrase in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which encompasses children who
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or
any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group. Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 punishes acts
pertaining to or connected with child prostitution wherein the child is abused
primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit
but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence,
engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Hence, the law punishes
not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse against
children.
7. Same; Same; Same; Penalties; When petitioner inserted his finger into the vagina of
AAA, a minor, with the use of threat and coercion, he is already liable for
sexual abuse.-
—In Ricalde v. People, 747 SCRA 542 (2015), this Court
clarified: The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No.
7610 clearly provides that “children. . . who. . . due to the coercion. . . of
any adult. . . indulge in sexual intercourse . . . are deemed to be children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.” The label “children
exploited in. . . other sexual abuse” inheres in a child who has been the
subject of coercion and sexual intercourse. Thus, paragraph (b) refers to a
specification only as to who is liable and the penalty to be imposed. The
person who engages in sexual intercourse with a child already coerced is
liable. x x x x By analogy with the ruling in Ricalde, children who are
likewise coerced in lascivious conduct are “deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.” When petitioner inserted his finger into
the vagina of AAA, a minor, with the use of threat and coercion, he is already
liable for sexual abuse.
Division:
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, Martires and Gesmundo, JJ.
Docket Number: G.R. No. 201414
Counsel:
Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, this Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the Court of Appeals’ September 30, 2011 Decision in
C.A.-G.R. CR No. 33290, with MODIFICATION as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is
hereby rendered finding accused Pedro Perez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of R.A. 7610, otherwise known as the “Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act in relation to Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY
OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MINIMUM TO SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM. Accused Pedro Perez is likewise ordered to pay
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, and THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as
exemplary damages plus costs of suit. All awards for damages shall earn
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid. SO ORDERED.
Citation Ref:
56. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines (PBOAP)
vs. Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), 872 SCRA 50, July 17,
2018
Case Title : THE PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(PBOAP), THE SOUTHERN LUZON BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC. (SO-LUBOA), THE
INTER CITY BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION (INTERBOA), and THE CITY OF SAN JOSE DEL
MONTE BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION (CSJDMBOA), petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) and LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY
BOARD (LTFRB), respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; In constitutional litigation, the Supreme Court (SC)
presumes that official acts of the other branches of government are
constitutional.-
—In constitutional litigation, this Court presumes that official
acts of the other branches of government are constitutional. This Court
proceeds on the theory that “before the act was done or the law was enacted,
earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that
the Constitution would not be breached.” Absent a clear showing of breach of
constitutional text, the validity of the law or action shall be sustained.
2. Judicial Power; The Constitution vests in the Supreme Court (SC) and such
lower courts as may be established by law the power to “declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.”-
—The Constitution vests in this Court and such lower courts as
may be established by law the power to “declare executive and legislative acts
void if violative of the Constitution.” This Court’s power of judicial review
is anchored on Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution: Section 1. The
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
3. Political Law; Delegation of Powers; “The growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication
of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws” require the delegation of powers traditionally
belonging to the legislative to administrative agencies.-
—Our governmental structure rests on the principle of separation
of powers. Under our constitutional order, the legislative branch enacts law,
the executive branch implements the law, and the judiciary construes the law.
In reality, however, the powers are not as strictly confined or delineated to
each branch. “[T]he growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of
the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws” require the delegation of powers traditionally
belonging to the legislative to administrative agencies. The legislature may
likewise apportion competencies or jurisdictions to administrative agencies
over certain conflicts involving special technical expertise.
4. Quasi-Legislative Power; Words and Phrases; As the name implies, quasi-legislative or rule-making
power is the power of an administrative agency to make rules and regulations
that have the force and effect of law so long as they are issued “within the
confines of the granting statute.”-
—Administrative actions reviewable by this Court, therefore, may
either be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial. As the name implies,
quasi-legislative or rulemaking power is the power of an administrative agency
to make rules and regulations that have the force and effect of law so long as
they are issued “within the confines of the granting statute.” The enabling law
must be complete, with sufficient standards to guide the administrative agency
in exercising its rulemaking power. As an exception to the rule on
nondelegation of legislative power, administrative rules and regulations must
be “germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction
to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.”
5. Quasi-Judicial Power; Words and Phrases; Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is
“the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.”-
—Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is “the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy
is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law
itself in enforcing and administering the same law.” The constitutional
permissibility of the grant of quasi-judicial powers to administrative agencies
has been likewise recognized by this Court. In the 1931 case of The Municipal
Council of Lemery, Batangas v. The Provincial Board of Batangas, 56 Phil. 260,
this Court declared that the power of the Municipal Board of Lemery to approve
or disapprove a municipal resolution or ordinance is quasi-judicial in nature
and, consequently, may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding.
6. Same; Quasi-Legislative Power; Jurisdiction; Rules issued in the exercise of an
administrative agency’s quasi-legislative power may be taken cognizance of by
courts on the first instance as part of their judicial power; However, in cases involving quasi-judicial acts, Congress
may require certain quasi-judicial agencies to first take cognizance of the
case before resort to judicial remedies may be allowed.-
—Determining whether the act under review is quasi-legislative
or quasi-judicial is necessary in determining when judicial remedies may
properly be availed of Rules issued in the exercise of an administrative
agency’s quasi-legislative power may be taken cognizance of by courts on the
first instance as part of their judicial power, thus: [W]here what is assailed
is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of
whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or
the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the
courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of
judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. x x x However, in cases involving quasi-judicial acts,
Congress may require certain quasi-judicial agencies to first take cognizance
of the case before resort to judicial remedies may be allowed. This is to take
advantage of the special technical expertise possessed by administrative
agencies.
7. Quasi-Judicial Power; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; “Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction” and “Doctrine of
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies,” Distinguished.-
—Usually contrasted with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Though both concepts aim
to maximize the special technical knowledge of administrative agencies, the
doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction requires courts to not resolve
or “determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal.” The issue is jurisdictional and
the court, when confronted with a case under the jurisdiction of an
administrative agency, has no option but to dismiss it. In contrast, exhaustion
of administrative remedies requires parties to exhaust all the remedies in the
administrative machinery before resorting to judicial remedies. The doctrine of
exhaustion presupposes that the court and the administrative agency have
concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of a matter. However, in deference
to the special and technical expertise of the administrative agency, courts
must yield to the administrative agency by suspending the proceedings. As such,
parties must exhaust all the remedies within the administrative machinery
before resort to courts is allowed.
8. Same; Same; The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies may only be invoked in matters involving the exercise
of quasi-judicial power.-
—Discussion of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies aside, the present case does not require
the application of either doctrine. Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum
Circular No. 2012-001 were issued in the exercise of the DOLE’s and the LTFRB’s
quasi-legislative powers and, as discussed, the doctrines of primary
jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies may only be invoked in
matters involving the exercise of quasi-judicial power. Specifically,
Department Order No. 118-12 enforces the application of labor standards
provisions, i.e., payment of minimum wage and grant of social welfare benefits
in the public bus transportation industry. For its part, Memorandum Circular
No. 2012-001 was issued by the LTFRB in the exercise of its power to prescribe
the terms and conditions for the issuance of a certificate of public
convenience and its power to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations on
land transportation public utilities.
9. Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine of hierarchy of courts requires that recourse
must first be obtained from lower courts sharing concurrent jurisdiction with a
higher court.-
—While resort to courts may directly be availed of in
questioning the constitutionality of an administrative rule, parties may not
proceed directly before this Court, regard of its original jurisdiction over
certain matters. This Court’s original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari and Prohibition may only be invoked for special reasons under the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts requires
that recourse must first be obtained from lower courts sharing concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court. This is to ensure that this Court remains a
court of last resort so as to “satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to
it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.”
10. Same; Same; Generally, the rule on hierarchy of courts may be relaxed
when “dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.”-
—For this Court to take cognizance of original actions, parties
must clearly and specifically allege in their petitions the special and
important reasons for such direct invocation. One such special reason is that
the case requires “the proper legal interpretation of constitutional and
statutory provisions.” Cases of national interest and of serious implications,
and those of transcendental importance and of first impression have likewise
been resolved by this Court on the first instance. In exceptional cases, this
Court has also overlooked the rule to decide cases that have been pending for a
sufficient period of time. This Court has resolved original actions which could
have been resolved by the lower courts in the interest of speedy justice and
avoidance of delay. Generally, the rule on hierarchy of courts may be relaxed
when “dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.” For all other cases, the parties must have exhausted the
remedies available before the lower courts. A petition filed in violation of
the doctrine shall be dismissed.
11. Judicial Power; Justiciable Controversy; A controversy is said to be justiciable
if: first, there is an actual case or controversy involving legal rights that
are capable of judicial determination; second, the parties raising the issue
must have standing or locus standi to raise the constitutional issue; third, the constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and
fourth, resolving the constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of
the case.-
—As a rule, “the constitutionality of a statute will be passed
on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in
a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of
the parties concerned.” A controversy is said to be justiciable if: first,
there is an actual case or controversy involving legal rights that are capable
of judicial determination; second, the parties raising the issue must have
standing or locus standi to raise the constitutional issue; third, the
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth,
resolving the constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the
case. An actual case or controversy is “one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution.” A case is justiciable if the issues presented are “definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests.” The conflict must be ripe for judicial determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory; otherwise, this Court’s decision will amount to an
advisory opinion concerning legislative or executive action.
12. Same; Same; Locus Standi; To possess legal standing, parties must show “a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged.”-
—Legal standing or locus standi is the “right of appearance in a
court of justice on a given question.” To possess legal standing, parties must
show “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have]
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act
that is being challenged.” The requirement of direct injury guarantees that the
party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
and, in effect, assures “that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.”
13. Same; Same; Same; Whether a suit is public or private, the parties must have
“a present substantial interest,” not a “mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.”-
—Standing in private suits requires that actions be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, interest being “material
interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of
the case[,] [not just] mere curiosity about the question involved.” Whether a
suit is public or private, the parties must have “a present substantial
interest,’’ not a “mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.” Those who bring the suit must possess their own right
to the relief sought. Like any rule, the rule on legal standing has exceptions.
This Court has taken cognizance of petitions filed by those who have no
personal or substantial interest in the challenged governmental act but whose
petitions neverthe raise “constitutional issue[s] of critical significance.”
This Court summarized the requirements for granting legal standing to
“nontraditional suitors” in Funa v. Villar, 670 SCRA 579 (2012), thus: 1.) For
taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or
that the tax measure is unconstitutional; 2.) For voters, there must be a
showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and 4.) For
legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes their prerogatives as legislators. x x x Another exception is the
concept of third-party standing. Under this concept, actions may be brought on
behalf of third parties provided the following criteria are met: first, “the
[party bringing suit] must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him
or her a ‘sufficiently concrete interest’ in the outcome of the issue in
dispute”; second, “the party must have a close relation to the third party”; and
third, “there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect
his or her own interests.”
14. Class Suits; In a class suit, a number of the members of the class are
permitted to sue and to defend for the benefit of all the members so long as
they are sufficiently numerous and representative of the class to which they
belong.-
—The liberality of this Court to grant standing for associations
or corporations whose members are those who suffer direct and substantial
injury depends on a few factors. In all these cases, there must be an actual
controversy. Furthermore, there should also be a clear and convincing
demonstration of special reasons why the truly injured parties may not be able
to sue. Alternatively, there must be a similarly clear and convincing
demonstration that the representation of the association is more efficient for
the petitioners to bring. They must further show that it is more efficient for
this Court to hear only one voice from the association. In other words, the
association should show special reasons for bringing the action themselves
rather than as a class suit, allowed when the subject matter of the controversy
is one of common or general interest to many persons. In a class suit, a number
of the members of the class are permitted to sue and to defend for the benefit
of all the members so long as they are sufficiently numerous and representative
of the class to which they belong.
15. Judicial Power; Justiciable Controversy; Locus Standi; With their certificates of incorporation revoked,
petitioners Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines (PBOAP),
Southern Luzon Bus Operators Association, Inc. (SO-LUBOA), and Inter City Bus
Operators Association, Inc. (INTERBOA) have no corporate existence. They have no
capacity to exercise any corporate power, specifically, the power to sue in
their respective corporate names.-
—As declared at the outset, petitioners in this case do not have
standing to bring this suit. As associations, they failed to establish who their
members are and if these members allowed them to sue on their behalf. While
alleging that they are composed of public utility bus operators who will be
directly injured by the implementation of Department Order No. 118-12 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001, petitioners did not present any proof, such
as board resolutions of their alleged members or their own articles of
incorporation authorizing them to act as their members’ representatives in
suits involving their members’ individual rights. Some of the petitioners here
are not even persons or entities authorized by law or by the Rules allowed to
file a suit in court. As intervenor MMDA sufficiently demonstrated, petitioners
Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines, Southern Luzon Bus Operators
Association, Inc., and Inter City Bus Operators Association, Inc. had their
certificates of incorporation revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission
for failure to submit the required general information sheets and financial
statements for the years 1996 to 2003. With their certificates of incorporation
revoked, petitioners Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines,
Southern Luzon Bus Operators Association, Inc., and Inter City Bus Operators
Association, Inc. have no corporate existence. They have no capacity to
exercise any corporate power, specifically, the power to sue in their
respective corporate names.
16. Due Process; The “law” in the due process clause includes not only
statute but also rules issued in the valid exercise of an administrative
agency’s quasi-legislative power.-
—It is said that due process means “a law which hears before it
condemns.” The “law” in the due process clause includes not only statute but
also rules issued in the valid exercise of an administrative agency’s
quasi-legislative power.
17. Quasi-Legislative Power; Notice and Hearing; Notice and hearing are not required when an administrative
agency exercises its quasi-legislative power.-
—Notice and hearing are not required when an administrative agency
exercises its quasi-legislative power. The reason is that in the exercise of
quasi-legislative power, the administrative agency makes no “determination of
past events or facts.”
18. Political Law; Police Power; Called “the most essential, insistent and illimitable” of
the powers of the State, police power is the “authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare.”-
—The other aspect of due process — substantive due process —
requires that laws be grounded on reason and be free from arbitrariness. The
government must have “sufficient justification for depriving a person of life,
liberty, or property.” In the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, due process
is “the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.” Essentially, substantive
due process is satisfied if the deprivation is done in the exercise of the
police power of the State. Called “the most essential, insistent and
illimitable” of the powers of the State, police power is the “authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare.” In the negative, it is the “inherent and
plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to
the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.” “The reservation of essential
attributes of sovereign power is. . . read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order.”
19. Same; Same; Laws requiring the payment of minimum wage, security of
tenure, and traffic safety have been declared not violative of due process for
being valid police power legislations.-
—Laws requiring the payment of minimum wage, security of tenure,
and traffic safety have been declared not violative of due process for being
valid police power legislations. In these cases, the test or standard is
whether the law is reasonable. The interests of the State to promote the
general welfare, on the one hand, and the right to property, on the other, must
be balanced.
20. Quasi-Legislative Power; Notice and Hearing; Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No.
2012-001 were issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Land Transportation and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB), respectively. As such, notice and hearing are not
required for their validity.-
—Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No.
2012-001 were issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers of the DOLE
and the LTFRB, respectively. As such, notice and hearing are not required for
their validity. In any case, it is undisputed that the DOLE created a Technical
Working Group that conducted several meetings and consultations with interested
sectors before promulgating Department Order No. 118-12. Among those invited
were bus drivers, conductors, and operators with whom officials of the DOLE
conducted focused group discussions. The conduct of these discussions more than
complied with the requirements of procedural due process.
21. Transportation Law; Due Process; Certificates of Public Convenience; Certificates of public convenience are franchises always
subject to amendment, repeal, or cancellation. Additional requirements may be
added for their issuance, and there can be no violation of due process when a
franchise is cancelled for noncompliance with the new requirement.-
—There can be no meaningful implementation of Department Order
No. 118-12 if violating it has no consequence. As such, the LTFRB was not
unreasonable when it required bus operators to comply with the
part-fixed-part-performance-based payment scheme under pain of revocation of
their certificates of public convenience. The LTFRB has required applicants or
current holders of franchises to comply with labor standards as regards their
employees, and bus operators must be reminded that certificates of public
convenience are not property. Certificates of public convenience are franchises
always subject to amendment, repeal, or cancellation. Additional requirements
may be added for their issuance, and there can be no violation of due process
when a franchise is cancelled for noncompliance with the new requirement.
22. Bus Drivers; Conductors; Department Order No. 118-12 and Memorandum Circular No.
2012-001 are in the nature of social legislations to enhance the economic
status of bus drivers and conductors, and to promote the general welfare of the
riding public.-
—Behavioral economics explains this phenomenon. The boundary
system puts drivers in a “scarcity mindset” that creates a tunnel vision where
bus drivers are nothing but focused on meeting the boundary required and will
do so by any means possible and regard of risks. They stop for passengers even
outside of the designated bus stops, impeding traffic flow. They compete with
other bus drivers for more income without regard to speed limits and bus lanes.
Some drivers even take in performance-enhancing drugs and, reportedly, even
illegal drugs such as shabu, just to get additional trips. This scarcity
mindset is eliminated by providing drivers with a fixed income plus variable
income based on performance. The fixed income equalizes the playing field, so
to speak, so that competition and racing among bus drivers are prevented. The
variable pay provided in Department Order No. 118-12 is based on safety parameters,
incentivizing prudent driving. In sum, Department Order No. 118-12 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001 are in the nature of social legislations to
enhance the economic status of bus drivers and conductors, and to promote the
general welfare of the riding public. They are reasonable and are not violative
of due process.
23. Constitutional Law; Non-Impairment of Contract Clause; The non-impairment clause serves as a check on the
legislature “to act only through generally applicable laws prescribing rules of
conduct that operate prospectively.”-
—Since the non-impairment clause was adopted here, this Court
has said that its purpose is to protect purely private agreements from State
interference. This is to “encourage trade and credit by promoting confidence in
the stability of contractual relations.” There are views, however, that the
non-impairment clause is obsolete and redundant because contracts are
considered property, and thus, are protected by the due process clause. On the
other hand, studies show why the non-impairment clause should be maintained.
Aside from its traditional purpose of prohibiting State interference in purely
private transactions, the non-impairment clause serves as a guarantee of the
separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches of the
government. The non-impairment clause serves as a check on the legislature “to
act only through generally applicable laws prescribing rules of conduct that
operate prospectively.”
24. Same; Same; There is an impairment when, either by statute or any
administrative rule issued in the exercise of the agency’s quasi-legislative
power, the terms of the contracts are changed either in the time or mode of the
performance of the obligation. There is likewise impairment when new conditions
are imposed or existing conditions are dispensed with.-
—At any rate, so long as the non-impairment clause appears in
the Constitution, it may be invoked to question the constitutionality of State
actions. There is an impairment when, either by statute or any administrative
rule issued in the exercise of the agency’s quasi-legislative power, the terms
of the contracts are changed either in the time or mode of the performance of
the obligation. There is likewise impairment when new conditions are imposed or
existing conditions are dispensed with. Not all contracts, however, are
protected under the non-impairment clause. Contracts whose subject matters are
so related to the public welfare are subject to the police power of the State
and, therefore, some of its terms may be changed or the whole contract even set
aside without offending the Constitution; otherwise, “important and valuable
reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for
the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited.”
25. Same; Same; Franchises; Contracts which relate to rights not considered property,
such as a franchise or permit, are also not protected by the non-impairment
clause.-
—Contracts which relate to rights not considered property, such
as a franchise or permit, are also not protected by the non-impairment clause.
The reason is that the public right or franchise is always subject to amendment
or repeal by the State, the grant being a mere privilege. In other words, there
can be no vested right in the continued grant of a franchise. Additional
conditions for the grant of the franchise may be made and the grantee cannot
claim impairment. Similar to the right to due process, the right to
non-impairment yields to the police power of the State.
26. Police Power; Labor Contracts; Labor contracts are subject to special laws on wages,
working conditions, hours of labor, and similar subjects. In other words, labor
contracts are subject to the police power of the State.-
—The relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractual as provided in Article 1700 of the Civil Code. By statutory
declaration, labor contracts are impressed with public interest and, therefore,
must yield to the common good. Labor contracts are subject to special laws on
wages, working conditions, hours of labor, and similar subjects. In other
words, labor contracts are subject to the police power of the State. As
previously discussed on the part on due process, Department Order No. 118-12
was issued to grant bus drivers and conductors minimum wages and social welfare
benefits. Further, petitioners repeatedly admitted that in paying their bus
drivers and conductors, they employ the boundary system or commission basis,
payment schemes which cause drivers to drive reckly. Not only does Department
Order No. 118-12 aim to uplift the economic status of bus drivers and
conductors; it also promotes road and traffic safety.
27. Transportation Law; Certificate of Public Convenience; Certificates of public convenience granted to bus
operators are subject to amendment.-
—Certificates of public convenience granted to bus operators are
subject to amendment. When certificates of public convenience were granted in
2012, Memorandum Circular No. 2011-004 on the “Revised Terms and Conditions of
[Certificates of Public Convenience] and Providing Penalties for Violations
Thereof” was already in place. This Memorandum Circular, issued before
Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001, already required public utility vehicle
operators to comply with labor and social legislations. Franchise holders
cannot object to the reiteration made in Memorandum Circular No. 2012-001.
28. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.-
—“Equal protection of the laws” requires that “all persons. . .
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.” “The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a
statute or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.” However, the clause does not prevent the legislature from
enacting laws making valid classifications. Classification is “the grouping of
persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different
from all others in these same particulars.” To be valid, the classification
must be: first, based on “substantial distinctions which make real
differences”; second, it must be “germane to the purposes of the law”; third,
it must “not be limited to existing conditions only”; and fourth, it must apply
to each member of the class.
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 202275
Counsel:
Leonides S. Respicio, et al. for petitioners. The Solicitor General for
respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.
Citation Ref:
57. Lihaylihay vs. Tan, 872 SCRA 277, July 23, 2018
Case Title : DANILO A. LIHAYLIHAY, petitioner, vs. THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES ROBERTO C. TAN, SECRETARY OF FINANCE MARGARITO B. TEVES, SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, and THE GOVERNOR OF
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Dismissal of Actions ;
Forum Shopping ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Forum Shopping; Petitioner admits that the present
Petition was filed while the claims he lodged before former Secretary Teves and
former Treasurer Tan were still pending resolution; Clearly then, petitioner has engaged in willful and
deliberate forum shopping. Consistent with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, this is another reason for dismissing the present Petition.-
—It is incorrect to say that the present Petition is merely the
latest development in the linear and logical progression of the claims that
petitioner initially asserted in his March 11, 1987 letters to Atty. Pitargue.
For one, petitioner admits that the present Petition was filed while the claims
he lodged before former Secretary Teves and former Treasurer Tan were still
pending resolution. Ahead of his claims before them, as well as those before
President Macapagal-Arroyo and Commissioner Buñag, petitioner interjected
himself in at least two (2) cases being tried in the Sandiganbayan. A review of
this Court’s own resolutions also reveals that he had filed before this Court
another petition for mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 202556, which this Court
dismissed in its September 12, 2012 Resolution. Similarly, a cursory search for
past news reports reveals that the Commission on Audit has denied petitioner’s
claim for an informer’s reward. Clearly then, petitioner has engaged in willful
and deliberate forum shopping. Consistent with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, this is another reason for dismissing the present Petition.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; A writ of mandamus may issue in either
of two (2) situations: first, “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station”; second, “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person. . . unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled.”-
—A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations:
first, “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station”; second, “when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person. . . unlawfully excludes another from the
use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.”
3. Same; Same; Same; The duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather
than discretionary.-
—The duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather than
discretionary. A court cannot subvert legally vested authority for a body or
officer to exercise discretion. In Sy Ha v. Galang, 7 SCRA 797 (1963):
[M]andamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public
officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in
reference to any matter in which he is required to act, because it is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.
4. Same; Same; Same; “Discretionary Functions” and “Ministerial Duties,”
Distinguished.-
—This Court distinguished discretionary functions from
ministerial duties, and related the exercise of discretion to judicial and
quasi-judicial powers. In Sanson v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198 (1936): Discretion,
when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon
them by law of acting officially, under certain circumstances, according to the
dictates of their own judgments and consciences, uncontrolled by the judgments
or consciences of others. A purely ministerial act or duty, in
contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes
a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The
duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor judgment. . . . Mandamus will not lie to
control the exercise of discretion of an inferior tribunal. . . , when the act
complained of is either judicial or quasi-judicial. . . . It is the proper
remedy when the case presented is outside of the exercise of judicial
discretion.
5. Taxation; Informer’s Reward; The most basic obstacle to petitioner’s claim for an
informer’s reward under Section 1 of Republic Act (RA) No. 2338 is that RA No.
2338 is no longer in effect.-
—The most basic obstacle to petitioner’s claim for an informer’s
reward under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338 is that Republic Act No. 2338
is no longer in effect. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338 provides: Section 1.
Any person, except an internal revenue or customs official or employee, or
other public officials, or his relative within the sixth degree of
consanguinity, who voluntarily gives definite and sworn information, stating
the facts constituting as grounds for such information not yet in the possession
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Bureau of Customs, leading to the
discovery of frauds upon the internal revenue or customs laws, or violations of
any of the provisions thereof, thereby resulting in the recovery of revenues,
surcharges and fees and/or the conviction of the guilty party and/or the
imposition of any fine or penalty shall be rewarded in a sum equivalent to
twenty-five per centum of the revenues, surcharges or fees recovered and/or
fine or penalty imposed and collected. The same amount of reward shall also be
given to informer or informers where the violator has offered to compromise the
violation of law committed by him and his offer has been accepted by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of Customs, as the case
may be, and in such a case the twenty-five per centum reward fixed herein shall
be based on the amount agreed in the compromise and collected from the
violator: Provided, That should no revenue surcharges or fees be actually
recovered or collected, such persons should not be entitled to a reward:
Provided, further, That the information required herein shall not refer to a
case already pending or previously investigated or examined by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of Customs, or any of their deputies,
agents or examiners, as the case may be, or the Secretary of Finance or any of
his deputies or agents: Provided, finally, That the reward provided herein
shall be paid under regulations issued jointly by the Commissioners of Internal
Revenue and Customs with the approval of the Secretary of Finance, and that the
determination of the degree of relationship between the Internal Revenue or
Customs official or employee and the informer shall be left not only to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of Customs, as the case
may be, but should be jointly made by such official and the Solicitor General.
The reward herein authorized shall be paid out of revenues, surcharges,
compromises, and penalties established by law, collected and accounted for as a
result of the information furnished by the informer.
6. Same; Same; The grant of an informer’s reward for the discovery of tax
offenses is currently governed by Section 282 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC) of 1997, which was amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 8424 or the Tax
Reform Act of 1997.-
—Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338 was amended by Presidential
Decree No. 707 in 1975. It was then superseded by Section 331 of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which was itself amended in 1981 by Section 35
of Presidential Decree No. 1773. The grant of an informer’s reward for the
discovery of tax offenses is currently governed by Section 282 of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, which was amended by Republic Act No. 8424 or
the Tax Reform Act of 1997.
7. Same; Same; Under Section 282 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) of 1997, as amended, an information given by an informer shall merit a
reward only when it satisfies certain formal and qualitative parameters. As a
matter of form and procedure, that information must be voluntarily given,
definite, and sworn to. Qualitatively, that information must be novel and,
subsequently, prove itself effective.-
—Under Section 282 of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997, as amended, an information given by an informer shall merit a reward only
when it satisfies certain formal and qualitative parameters. As a matter of
form and procedure, that information must be voluntarily given, definite, and
sworn to. Qualitatively, that information must be novel and, subsequently,
prove itself effective. Information is novel when it is “not yet in the
possession of the Bureau of Internal Revenue” and “not refer[ring] to a case
already pending or previously investigated or examined.” Information has shown
itself to be effective not only when it leads “to the discovery of frauds upon
the internal revenue laws or violations of any of [its] provisions,” but also
when that discovery in turn enables “the recovery of revenues, surcharges and
fees and/or the conviction of the guilty party and/or the imposition of any of
the fine or penalty.” In lieu of enabling the conviction of the guilty party
and the imposition of fines or penalties, information is also effective when the
discovery of tax offenses leads the offender to offer “to compromise the
violation.” A mere offer, however, is not enough; it must have actually been
accepted and collected. Regard of whether a compromise or conviction ensues,
actual recovery is indispensable: “should no revenue, surcharges or fees be
actually recovered or collected, such person shall not be entitled to a
reward.”
8. Same; Same; Petitioner’s entitlement to an
informer’s reward is not a ministerial matter; Its determination is a discretionary, quasi-judicial
function, demanding an exercise of independent judgment on the part of certain
public officers.-
—Petitioner’s entitlement to an informer’s reward is not a
ministerial matter. Quite the contrary, its determination requires a review of
evidentiary matters and an application of statutory principles and
administrative guidelines. Its determination is a discretionary, quasi-judicial
function, demanding an exercise of independent judgment on the part of certain
public officers. Whether from Section 1 of Republic Act No. 2338, Presidential
Decree No. 707, Section 331 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977,
Section 35 of Presidential Decree No. 1773, or Section 282 of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, it is clear that the grant of an
informer’s reward is not a readily demandable entitlement. It is not a legally
mandated duty in which every incident is prescribed with a preordained outcome.
The mere consideration of a claim is contingent on several factual findings.
Making these findings demands proof the appraisal of which is to be done by
certain public officers. Hence, it demands the exercise of discretion.
9. Same; Same; The information supplied must be new or not yet known to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). It must not pertain to a pending or
previously investigated case, and must have actually led to or was the actual
cause for discovering frauds upon tax laws.-
—The information supplied must be new or not yet known to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. It must not pertain to a pending or previously
investigated case, and must have actually led to or was the actual cause for
discovering frauds upon tax laws. Acting on the information, the government’s
response must have actually led to the recovery of sums relating to the fraud,
as well as the conviction and/or punishment of the liable persons. Therefore,
the grant of an informer’s reward depends on the consideration of evidence. In
addition, it must be in keeping with rules and regulations issued by appropriate
officers: Department Order No. 46-66, in the case of Republic Act No. 2338;
and, at present, Revenue Regulations No. 016-10, in the case of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended.
10. Same; Same; The grant of an informer’s reward for the discovery of tax
offenses is effectively a quasi-judicial function, which “determine[s]
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and. . . [is]
decide[d] in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law.”-
—The grant of an informer’s reward for the discovery of tax
offenses is effectively a quasi-judicial function, which “determine[s]
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and. . . [is]
decide[d] in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law.” None of the respondents deviated
from legally mandated norms and neglected to consummate a ministerial, legally
mandated duty, thereby enabling the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
11. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Mandamus will not issue to establish a right, but only to
enforce one that is already established.-
—It is not proper for petitioner to plead before this Court the
actual merits of his claims. The very nature of his action forbids it.
“Mandamus will not issue to establish a right, but only to enforce one that is
already established.” It is not for this Court to go ahead of the Secretary of
Finance and decide for itself the issues that a statute has ordained the latter
to settle. “Mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of discretion of an
inferior [body or officer].” In any case, petitioner’s own recollection of
antecedents and recital of factual and legal bases demonstrate the utter
inadequacy of his position vis-Ã -vis the basic requisites for his claim to
prosper. Even if this Court were to overlook the procedural restrictions
against its own consideration of the merits of petitioner’s claims, petitioner
still has not shown a clear legal right worthy of a writ of mandamus.
12. Taxation; Informer’s Reward; It is obvious from the evolved statutory provisions-
— from Republic Act (RA) No. 2338 to Section 282 of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended — that an informer’s reward
under their auspices is proper only in cases of “frauds upon the internal
revenue or customs laws, or violations of any of the provisions thereof.”—The
objects of petitioner’s attempts at obtaining an informer’s reward are not even
tax cases. It is obvious from the evolved statutory provisions — from Section 1
of Republic Act No. 2338 to Section 282 of the National Internal Revenue Code
of 1997, as amended — that an informer’s reward under their auspices is proper
only in cases of “frauds upon the internal revenue or customs laws, or
violations of any of the provisions thereof.” Contrary to this basic
requirement, petitioner’s March 11, 1987 letters to Atty. Pitargue of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue-Presidential Commission on Good Government Task
Force make broad claims about the Marcos family’s ill-gotten wealth, and
impress the need for the government to recover them. However, he makes no
specific averments about specific acts of tax fraud, violations of internal
revenue and customs laws, and/or smuggling.
13. Same; Same; Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his supplied
information was the principal, if not exclusive, impetus for the State’s
efforts at prosecuting the Marcoses and their cronies for possible tax offenses
and recovering from them their ill-gotten wealth.-
—Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his supplied information
was the principal, if not exclusive, impetus for the State’s efforts at
prosecuting the Marcoses and their cronies for possible tax offenses and
recovering from them their ill-gotten wealth. He thereby failed to show that
his information did “not refer to a case already pending or previously
investigated or examined.” On the contrary, his March 11, 1987 letters
acknowledge ongoing efforts by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the
Presidential Commission on Good Government to prosecute the Marcoses and
recover their ill-gotten wealth. Likewise, his Manifestation in Civil Case No.
0002 and Notice in Civil Case No. 0013 demonstrate his attempts to merely
interlope in proceedings that were already well under way.
14. Same; Same; Petitioner failed to prove that he was the sole and
exclusive source of information leading to the discovery of fraud and
violations of tax laws, which specifically resulted in the recovery of sums
from the Marcos family and/or their conviction and punishment for violations of
tax laws.-
—Petitioner failed to prove that he was the sole and exclusive
source of information leading to the discovery of fraud and violations of tax
laws, which specifically resulted in the recovery of sums from the Marcos
family and/or their conviction and punishment for violations of tax laws. His
claims about President Marcos’ Swiss accounts were hardly novel. For instance,
Primitivo Mijares’ book The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos, which was first published in 1976 well ahead of petitioner’s letters to
Atty. Pitargue, already made intimations about these accounts. There have also
been other more comprehensive and officially recorded, albeit conflicting,
testimonies and recollections of President Marcos’ alleged gold bars.
15. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The availability of a more basic recourse ahead of a
Petition for Mandamus before the Supreme Court (SC) similarly demonstrates that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.-
—The availability of a more basic recourse ahead of a Petition
for Mandamus before this Court similarly demonstrates that petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. Apart from his noncompliance with the specific
requirements of Rule 65, Section 3, petitioner’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies represents a distinct ground for dismissing the present
Petition as it effectively lacks a cause of action: Under the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action cannot
prosper until after all such administrative remedies have first been exhausted.
If remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be
resorted to before resort can be made to courts. It is settled that
nonobservance of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results
in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court
justifying the dismissal of the complaint. x x x The need for petitioner to
have previously exhausted administrative remedies is congruous with the Bureau
of Internal Revenue’s and the Finance Secretary’s preeminent competence to
consider the merits of his claims. Indeed, between this Court on the one hand,
and the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Department of Finance on the other,
the latter are in a better position to ascertain whether or not the information
supplied by an informer has actually been pivotal to the discovery of tax
offenses, and the conviction and punishment of offenders. Having direct access
to their own records, they are in the best position to know if the information
supplied to them is novel, not having been previously within their knowledge or
not otherwise having been the subject of previous proceedings.
16. Same; Civil Procedure; In cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has
been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence in
observance of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.-
—Petitioner’s direct recourse to this Court is an invitation for
it to run afoul with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction: In cases involving
specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an
administrative agency of special competence in observance of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The Court has ratiocinated that it cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency
has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the
proceeding before the court. It applies where claim is originally cognizable in
the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within
the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body
for its view.
17. Same; Same; Hierarchy of Courts; It is basic that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court (SC), the
Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.”-
—This Court’s competence to issue writs of mandamus does not
also mean that petitioner was free to come to this Court and ignore the
concurrent jurisdiction of inferior courts equally competent to entertain
petitions for mandamus. It is basic that “[a]lthough th[is] Court, [the] Court
of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom
of choice of court forum”: The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it
by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its
original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be
exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised
relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some
reason or another, are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the
specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is and
should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and
lawyers must strictly observe.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 192223
Counsel:
Tiu Law Office; Lozano & Lozano-Endriano Law Office for petitioner.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Citation Ref:
58. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Fetalvero, Jr., 872 SCRA
463, July 23, 2018
Case Title : OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. LOVING F. FETALVERO,
JR., respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings ; Misconduct ; Words and
Phrases ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Misconduct; Words and Phrases; Misconduct is defined as “a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by the public officer.”-
—Misconduct is more than just mere error of judgment as it
involves a wrongful intention from the public officer involved. It is also
defined as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public
officer.”
2. Administrative Proceedings; Burden of Proof; In administrative proceedings, complainants carry the
burden of proving their allegations with substantial evidence or “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”-
—In administrative proceedings, complainants carry the burden of
proving their allegations with substantial evidence or “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Petitioner accuses respondent of conniving with Cecilia, Miole, and Grospe to
give Lockheed an unfair preference by readjusting its rating so that it could
participate in the bidding for a security services contract with the Philippine
Ports Authority.
3. Administrative Law; “Power of Supervision” and “Power of Control,”
Distinguished.-
—The power of supervision involves oversight of a subordinate to
ensure that the rules are followed. On the other hand, the power of control is
broader as it involves laying down the actual rules to be followed. If the
rules are not followed, the power of control allows the controlling officer to
order that the act be done or undone, or even to supplant the subordinate’s act
with his or her own act.
4. Administrative Proceedings; Dishonesty; Words and Phrases; Dishonesty is defined as the
“disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity.”-
—Dishonesty is defined as the “disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity.” It involves
intentionally making a false statement to deceive or commit a fraud.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 211450
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. Cesar G. Viola for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM
the Court of Appeals’ April 15, 2013 Decision and February 20, 2014 Resolution
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 119495.
Citation Ref:
59. Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, 875 SCRA
374, July 31, 2018
Case Title : CESAR MATAS CAGANG, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, Fifth
Division, Quezon City; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Waiver of Constitutional Right ;
Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; View that a valid waiver of one’s right to speedy
disposition cannot thus be predicated on acquiescence alone, but rather, simultaneously
anchored on acts indicative of an intent to relinquish. Verily, “[m]ere silence
of the holder of the right should not be easily construed as surrender
thereof.”-
—To constitute a valid waiver of a constitutional right, it must
appear that: (i) the right exists; (ii) the persons involved had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (iii) the
person possessing the right had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Intent, being a product of one’s state of mind, may be inferred only from
external acts. Hence, the intention to relinquish a constitutional right cannot
be deduced solely from silence or inaction. A valid waiver of one’s right to
speedy disposition cannot thus be predicated on acquiescence alone, but rather,
simultaneously anchored on acts indicative of an intent to relinquish. Verily,
“[m]ere silence of the holder of the right should not be easily construed as
surrender thereof.”
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; The pendency of a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court (SC) will not prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding to trial
absent the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of
preliminary injunction.-
—Contrary to petitioner’s arguments, the pendency of a petition
for certiorari before this Court will not prevent the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding to trial absent the issuance of a temporary restraining order or
writ of preliminary injunction. Under Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of Court:
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief.—The court in which the
petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also
grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings. The
petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case, un a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued,
enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding with the case. The
public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10) days
from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or tribunal,
absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, or upon its expiration.
Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the principal case may be a
ground for an administrative charge. Since this Court did not issue injunctive
relief when the Petition in G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 was filed, the
Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted from proceeding with trial. It was only upon
the filing of the Petition in G.R. Nos. 210141-42 that this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
3. Same; Criminal Procedure; Motion to Quash; As a general rule, the denial of a motion to quash is not
appealable as it is merely interlocutory.-
—As a general rule, the denial of a motion to quash is not
appealable as it is merely interlocutory. Likewise, it cannot be the subject of
a petition for certiorari. The denial of the motion to quash can still be
raised in the appeal of a judgment of conviction. The adequate, plain, and
speedy remedy is to proceed to trial and to determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused. Thus, in Galzote v. Briones, 657 SCRA 535 (2011): . . . In the
usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused
results in the continuation of the trial and the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower
court’s decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the
denial of his motion to quash not only as an error committed by the trial court
but as an added ground to overturn the latter’s ruling. In this case, the
petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the
denial of his motion to quash via a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an
interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory
order is not allowed under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither
can it be a proper subject of a petition for certiorari which can be used only
in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The
plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to
trial as discussed above. Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to quash simply
signals the commencement of the process leading to trial. The denial of a motion
to quash, therefore, is not necessarily prejudicial to the accused. During
trial, and after arraignment, prosecution proceeds with the presentation of its
evidence for the examination of the accused and the reception by the court.
Thus, in a way, the accused is then immediately given the opportunity to meet
the charges on the merits. Therefore, if the case is intrinsically without any
grounds, the acquittal of the accused and all his suffering due to the charges
can be most speedily acquired.
4. Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; The right to speedy disposition of cases should not be
confused with the right to a speedy trial, a right guaranteed under Article
III, Section 14(2) of the Constitution.-
—The right to speedy disposition of cases should not be confused
with the right to a speedy trial, a right guaranteed under Article III, Section
14(2) of the Constitution: Section 14. . . . . (2) In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
5. Same; Same; Right to Speedy Trial; The right to a speedy trial is invoked against the courts
in a criminal prosecution. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however,
is invoked even against quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil,
criminal, or administrative cases before them.-
—The right to a speedy trial is invoked against the courts in a
criminal prosecution. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is
invoked even against quasi-judicial or administrative bodies in civil, criminal,
or administrative cases before them. As Abadia v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA
676 (1994), noted: The Bill of Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were
precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to protect
citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights.
Moreover, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a
speedy disposition of cases to cases “before all judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.” This protection extends to all citizens, including
those in the military and covers the periods before, during and after the
trial, affording broader protection than Section 14(2) which guarantees merely
the right to a speedy trial.
6. Same; Same; The right to speedy disposition of cases is most commonly
invoked in fact-finding investigations and preliminary investigations by the
Office of the Ombudsman since neither of these proceedings form part of the
actual criminal prosecution.-
—While the right to speedy trial is invoked against courts of
law, the right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked before
quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals in proceedings that are adversarial
and may result in possible criminal liability. The right to speedy disposition
of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-finding investigations and
preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman since neither of
these proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution. The
Constitution itself mandates the Office of the Ombudsman to “act promptly” on
complaints filed before it: Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
-controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
7. Same; Same; In Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, 268 SCRA 301 (1997), the
Supreme Court (SC) dismissed the criminal complaints even if the petition filed
before the Supreme Court was a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of
the Ombudsman to resolve the complaints against him after more than six (6)
years of inaction.+
8. Same; Same; Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a
query on when a case is deemed to have commenced.-
— Determining the length of delay necessarily involves a query
on when a case is deemed to have commenced. In Dansal v. Fernandez, 327 SCRA
145 (2000), this Court recognized that the right to speedy disposition of cases
does not only include the period from which a case is submitted for resolution.
Rather, it covers the entire period of investigation even before trial. Thus,
the right may be invoked as early as the preliminary investigation or inquest.
9. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; In criminal prosecutions, the investigating prosecutor is
given a specific period within which to resolve the preliminary investigation
under Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court.-
—In criminal prosecutions, the investigating prosecutor is given
a specific period within which to resolve the preliminary investigation under
Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Courts are likewise mandated to
resolve cases within a specific time frame. Article VIII, Section 15 of the
Constitution provides: Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the
effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, un reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months
for all other lower courts. (2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pending, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. (3) Upon the
expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed
by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a
copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the
parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not
been rendered or issued within said period. (4) Despite the expiration of the
applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such
responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide
or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination, without
further delay.
10. Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Trials; Trials; Under Republic Act (RA) No. 8493, or The Speedy Trial Act
of 1998, the entire trial period must not exceed one hundred eighty (180) days,
except as otherwise provided for by the Supreme Court (SC).-
—Under Republic Act No. 8493, or The Speedy Trial Act of 1998,
the entire trial period must not exceed 180 days, except as otherwise provided
for by this Court. The law likewise provides for a time limit of 30 days from
the filing of the information to conduct the arraignment, and 30 days after
arraignment for trial to commence. In order to implement the law, this Court
issued Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98 reiterating the periods for the conduct
of trial. It also provided for an extended time limit from arraignment to the
conduct of trial: Section 7. Extended Time Limit.—Notwithstanding the
provisions of the preceding Sections 2 and 6 for the first
twelve-calendar-month period following its effectivity, the time limit with
respect to the period from arraignment to trial imposed by said provision shall
be one hundred eighty (180) days. For the second twelve-month period, the time
limit shall be one hundred twenty (120) days, and for the third twelve-month
period the time limit shall be eighty (80) days.
11. Same; Same; Same; The Office of the Ombudsman, for example, has no set
periods within which to conduct its fact-finding investigations. They are only
mandated to act promptly.+
12. Same; Same; Anonymous Complaints; Ombudsman; When an anonymous complaint is filed or the Office of the
Ombudsman conducts a motu proprio fact-finding investigation, the proceedings
are not yet adversarial. Even if the accused is invited to attend these
investigations, this period cannot be counted since these are merely preparatory
to the filing of a formal complaint. At this point, the Office of the Ombudsman
will not yet determine if there is probable cause to charge the accused.+
13. Same; Same; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; The Supreme Court (SC) now holds that for the purpose of
determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have commenced
from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the
preliminary investigation.-
—Considering that fact-finding investigations are not yet
adversarial proceedings against the accused, the period of investigation will
not be counted in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition
of cases was violated. Thus, this Court now holds that for the purpose of
determining whether inordinate delay exists, a case is deemed to have commenced
from the filing of the formal complaint and the subsequent conduct of the
preliminary investigation. In People v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, 712 SCRA
359 (2013), the ruling that fact-finding investigations are included in the
period for determination of inordinate delay is abandoned.
14. Same; Same; Same; What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a
proceeding is not determined by “mere mathematical reckoning.”-
—What may constitute a reasonable time to resolve a proceeding
is not determined by “mere mathematical reckoning.” It requires consideration
of a number of factors, including the time required to investigate the
complaint, to file the information, to conduct an arraignment, the application
for bail, pretrial, trial proper, and the submission of the case for decision.
Unforeseen circumstances, such as unavoidable postponements or force majeure,
must also be taken into account.
15. Same; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 220 SCRA 55 (1993), the
failure of the accused to timely invoke the right to speedy disposition of
cases may work to his or her disadvantage, since this could indicate his or her
acquiescence to the delay.-
—The defense must also prove that it exerted meaningful efforts
to protect accused’s constitutional rights. In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, 220
SCRA 55 (1993), the failure of the accused to timely invoke the right to speedy
disposition of cases may work to his or her disadvantage, since this could
indicate his or her acquiescence to the delay: Petitioner was definitely not
unaware of the projected criminal prosecution posed against him by the
indication of this Court as a complementary sanction in its resolution of his
administrative case. He appears, however, to have been insensitive to the
implications and contingencies thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to
accelerate the disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception
that the supervening delay seems to have been without his objection hence
impliedly with his acquiescence.
16. Same; Same; The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is
invoked by a respondent to any type of proceeding once delay has already become
prejudicial to the respondent. The invocation of the constitutional right does
not require a threat to the right to liberty. Loss of employment or
compensation may already be considered as sufficient to invoke the right.-
—The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, is invoked
by a respondent to any type of proceeding once delay has already become
prejudicial to the respondent. The invocation of the constitutional right does
not require a threat to the right to liberty. Loss of employment or
compensation may already be considered as sufficient to invoke the right. Thus,
waiver of the right does not necessarily require that the respondent has
already been subjected to the rigors of criminal prosecution. The failure of
the respondent to invoke the right even when or she has already suffered or
will suffer the consequences of delay constitutes a valid waiver of that right.
While the Barker balancing test has American roots, a catena of cases has
already been decided by this Court, starting from Tatad, which have taken into
account the Philippine experience.
17. Same; Same; More often than not, the accused only invoke the right to
speedy disposition of cases when the Ombudsman has already rendered an
unfavorable decision.-
—Institutional delay, in the proper context, should not be taken
against the State. Most cases handled by the Office of the Ombudsman involve
individuals who have the resources and who engage private counsel with the
means and resources to fully dedicate themselves to their client’s case. More
often than not, the accused only invoke the right to speedy disposition of
cases when the Ombudsman has already rendered an unfavorable decision. The
prosecution should not be prejudiced by private counsels’ failure to protect
the interests of their clients or the accused’s lack of interest in the
prosecution of their case.
18. Same; Same; For the court to appreciate a violation of the right to
speedy disposition of cases, delay must not be attributable to the defense.-
—For the court to appreciate a violation of the right to speedy
disposition of cases, delay must not be attributable to the defense. Certain
unreasonable actions by the accused will be taken against them. This includes
delaying tactics like failing to appear despite summons, filing need motions
against interlocutory actions, or requesting unnecessary postponements that
will prevent courts or tribunals to properly adjudicate the case. When proven,
this may constitute a waiver of the right to speedy trial or the right to speedy
disposition of cases. If it has been alleged that there was delay beyond the
given time periods, the burden of proof shifts. The prosecution will now have
the burden to prove that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial or
the right to speedy disposition of cases. Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA
298 (1991), states that “vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays,”
“unjustified postponements of the trial,” or “when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
[or her] case tried” are instances that may be considered as violations of the
right to speedy disposition of cases. The prosecution must be able to prove
that it followed established procedure in prosecuting the case. It must also
prove that any delay incurred was justified, such as the complexity of the
cases involved or the vast amount of evidence that must be presented.
19. Same; Right to Speedy Trial; Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court requires that
the case against the accused be dismissed if there has been a violation of the
right to speedy trial.-
—The consequences of the prosecution’s failure to discharge this
burden are severe. Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court requires that the
case against the accused be dismissed if there has been a violation of the
right to speedy trial: Section 9. Remedy where accused is not brought to trial
within the time limit.—If the accused is not brought to trial within the time
limit required by Section 1(g), Rule 116 and Section 1, as extended by Section
6 of this rule, the information may be dismissed on motion of the accused on
the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial. The accused shall have the
burden of proving the motion but the prosecution shall have the burden of going
forward with the evidence to establish the exclusion of time under Section 3 of
this Rule. The dismissal shall be subject to the rules on double jeopardy.
Failure of the accused to move for dismissal prior to trial shall constitute a
waiver of the right to dismiss under this section.
20. Same; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; The State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its
right to prosecute the criminal cases simply because of the ineptitude or
nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman.-
—The dismissal of the complaints, while favorable to petitioner,
would undoubtedly be prejudicial to the State. “[T]he State should not be
prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal cases simply
because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Office of the Ombudsman.” The
State is as much entitled to due process as the accused. In People v. Leviste,
255 SCRA 238 (1996): [I]t must be emphasized that the state, like any other
litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to
present its case. A hasty dismissal such as the one in question, instead of
unclogging dockets, has actually increased the workload of the justice system
as a whole and caused uncalled — for delays in the final resolution of this and
other cases. Unwittingly, the precipitate action of the respondent court,
instead of easing the burden of the accused, merely prolonged the litigation
and ironically enough, unnecessarily delayed the case — in the process, causing
the very evil it apparently sought to avoid. Such action does not inspire
public confidence in the administration of justice. This Court finds that there
is no violation of the accused’s right to speedy disposition of cases
considering that there was a waiver of the delay of a complex case. Definitely,
granting the present Petitions and finding grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Sandiganbayan will only prejudice the due process rights of the
State.
21. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; View that the Supreme Court (SC) has never set a threshold
period for concluding preliminary investigation proceedings before the Office
of the Ombudsman premised on the idea that “speedy disposition” is a relative
and flexible concept.-
—The Court has never set a threshold period for concluding
preliminary investigation proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman
premised on the idea that “speedy disposition” is a relative and flexible
concept. It has often been held that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time
involved is not sufficient in determining whether or not there was inordinate
delay on the part of the investigating officer, and that particular regard must
be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. This is
diametrically opposed with Sec. 58 of the 2008 Manual for Prosecutors observed
by the National Prosecutorial Service, which states that the investigating
prosecutor must terminate the preliminary investigation proceeding within sixty
(60) days from the date of assignment, extendible to ninety (90) days for
complaints charging a capital offense. And to further contradistinguish, the
Judiciary is mandated by the Constitution to resolve matters and controversies
within a definite timeline. The trial courts are required to decide cases
within sixty (60) days from date of submission, twelve (12) months for
appellate courts, and two (2) years for the Supreme Court. The prescribed
period for the Judicial branch at least gives the party-litigants an idea on
when they could reasonably expect a ruling from the courts, and at the same
time ensures that judges are held to account for the cases not so timely
disposed.
22. Same; Same; Same; View that the fact-finding investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman after the complaint is filed should then necessarily be included in
computing the aggregate period of the preliminary investigation.-
—We must distinguish between fact-finding investigations
conducted before and after the filing of a formal complaint. When a formal
criminal complaint had been initiated by a private complainant, the burden is
upon such complainant to substantiate his allegations by appending all the
necessary evidence for establishing probable cause. The fact-finding
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman after the complaint is filed should
then necessarily be included in computing the aggregate period of the
preliminary investigation. On the other hand, if the fact-finding investigation
precedes the filing of a complaint as in incidents investigated motu proprio by
the Ombudsman, such investigation should be excluded from the computation. The
period utilized for case build up will not be counted in determining the
attendance of inordinate delay.
23. Anonymous Complaints; View that with respect to investigations relating to anonymous
complaints or motu proprio investigations by the Ombudsman, the date when the
Ombudsman receives the anonymous complaint or when it started its motu proprio
investigations and the periods of time devoted to said investigations cannot be
considered in determining the period of delay.-
—With respect to investigations relating to anonymous complaints
or motu proprio investigations by the Ombudsman, the date when the Ombudsman
receives the anonymous complaint or when it started its motu proprio investigations
and the periods of time devoted to said investigations cannot be considered in
determining the period of delay. For the respondents, the case build up phase
of an anonymous complaint or a motu proprio investigation is not yet exposed to
an adversarial proceeding. The Ombudsman should of course be aware that a long
delay may result in the extinction of criminal liability by reason of the
prescription of the offense. Even if the person accused of the offense subject
of said anonymous complaint or motu proprio investigations by the Ombudsman is
asked to attend invitations by the Ombudsman for the fact-finding
investigations, this directive cannot be considered in determining inordinate
delay. These conferences or meetings with the persons subject of the anonymous
complaints or motu proprio investigations are simply conducted as preludes to
the filing of a formal complaint if it finds it proper. This should be
distinguished from the exercise by the Ombudsman of its prosecutory powers
which involve determination of probable cause to file information with the
court resulting from official preliminary investigation. Thus, the period spent
for fact-finding investigations of the ombudsman prior to the filing of the
formal complaint by the Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman is
irrelevant in determining inordinate delay.
24. Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; View that valid reasons for the delay
identified and accepted by the Supreme Court (SC) include, but are not limited
to: (1) extraordinary complications such as the degree of difficulty of the
questions involved, the number of persons charged, the various pleadings filed,
and the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence on record; and (2) acts attributable to the respondent.-
—Valid reasons for the delay identified and accepted by the
Court include, but are not limited to: (1) extraordinary complications such as
the degree of difficulty of the questions involved, the number of persons
charged, the various pleadings filed, and the voluminous documentary and
testimonial evidence on record; and (2) acts attributable to the respondent.
The period for reinvestigation cannot automatically be taken against the State.
Reinvestigations cannot generally be considered as “vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive” practices proscribed by the constitutional guarantee since these
are performed for the benefit of the accused. As Braza v. Sandiganbayan
(Braza), 691 SCRA 471 (2013), instructs: Indeed, the delay can hardly be
considered as “vexatious, capricious and oppressive.” x x x Rather, it appears
that Braza and the other accused were merely afforded sufficient opportunities
to ventilate their respective defenses in the interest of justice, due process
and fair investigation. The reinvestigation may have inadvertently contributed
to the further delay of the proceedings but this process cannot be dispensed
with because it was done for the protection of the rights of the accused.
Albeit the conduct of investigation may hold back the progress of the case, the
same was essential so that the rights of the accused will not be compromised or
sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
25. Same; Same; Waiver of Constitutional Right; View that the Supreme Court (SC) had ruled in several
cases that failure to move for the early resolution of the preliminary
investigation or similar reliefs before the Ombudsman amounted to a virtual
waiver of the constitutional right.-
—The Court had ruled in several cases that failure to move for
the early resolution of the preliminary investigation or similar reliefs before
the Ombudsman amounted to a virtual waiver of the constitutional right. Dela
Peña v. Sandiganbayan (Dela Peña), for example, ruled that the petitioners
therein slept on their rights, amounting to laches, when they did not file nor
send any letter-queries to the Ombudsman during the four-year (4-year) period
the preliminary investigation was conducted. The Court, citing Alvizo, further
held therein that: x x x The matter could have taken a different dimension if
during all those four years, they showed signs of asserting their right to a
speedy disposition of their cases or at least made some over acts, like filing
a motion for early resolution, to show that they are not waiving that right.
Their silence may, therefore be interpreted as a waiver of such right. As aptly
stated in Alvizo, the petitioner therein was insensitive to the implications
and contingencies of the projected criminal prosecution posed against him by
not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter,
which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems to
have been without his objection, [and] hence impliedly with his acquiescence.
26. Same; Same; View that following Dela Peña, it is the
duty of the respondent to bring to the attention of the investigating officer
the perceived inordinate delay in the proceedings of the formal preliminary
investigation. Failure to do so may be considered a waiver of his/her right to
speedy disposition of cases; Need
to say, investigating officers responsible for this kind of delay should be
subjected to administrative sanction.-
—Following Dela Peña, it is the duty of the respondent to bring
to the attention of the investigating officer the perceived inordinate delay in
the proceedings of the formal preliminary investigation. Failure to do so may
be considered a waiver of his/her right to speedy disposition of cases. If
respondent fails to assert said right, then it may be presumed that he/she is
allowing the delay only to later claim it as a ruse for dismissal. This could
also address the rumored “parking fee” allegedly being paid by some respondents
so that delay can be set up as a ground for the dismissal of their respective
cases. Need to say, investigating officers responsible for this kind of delay
should be subjected to administrative sanction.
27. Same; Same; View that reasonable deferment of the proceedings may be
allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full and
free presentation of evidence by all the parties, especially where the
deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any party.-
—The length of the delay and the justification proffered by the
investigating officer therefor would necessarily be counterbalanced against any
prejudice suffered by the respondent. Indeed, reasonable deferment of the
proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged
only after full and free presentation of evidence by all the parties, especially
where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any party.
28. Same; Same; View that all these controversies surrounding inordinate
delay can easily be avoided had the Ombudsman prescribed a rule on the
disposition period for the investigating graft officer to resolve the
preliminary investigation of the formal complaints.-
—The Ombudsman has the power to formulate its own rules on
pleading and procedure. It has in fact laid down its rules on preliminary
investigation. All these controversies surrounding inordinate delay can easily
be avoided had it prescribed a rule on the disposition period for the
investigating graft officer to resolve the preliminary investigation of the
formal complaints. Like the Department of Justice with respect to preliminary
investigations by its prosecutors, it should provide a disposition period from
the date of the filing of the formal complaint up to a specific date within
which the graft prosecutor should determine the existence of probable cause. This
will potentially solve all the motions and petitions that raise the defense of
inordinate delay, putting the perennial issue to rest. In the meantime, the
above enunciated criteria shall be considered in determining the presence of
inordinate delay.
29. Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; View that the right to speedy disposition covers the
periods “before, during, and after trial.”-
—The right to speedy disposition covers the periods “before,
during, and after trial.” Hence, the protection afforded by the right to speedy
disposition, as detailed in the foregoing provision, covers not only
preliminary investigation, but extends further, to cover the fact-finding
process. As explained by the Court in People v. Sandiganbayan, 712 SCRA 359
(2013): The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of
the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial
or administrative bodies. The guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile
if the hair-splitting distinction by the State is accepted. Whether or not the
fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of
determining if the respondents’ right to the speedy disposition of their cases
had been violated.
30. Same; Same; Right to Speedy Trial; View that unreasonable delay incurred during fact-finding
and preliminary investigation, like that incurred during the course of trial,
is equally prejudicial to the respondent, as it results in the impairment of
the very same interests which the right to speedy trial protects-
— against oppressive pretrial incarceration, unnecessary anxiety
and concern, and the impairment of one’s defense.—Unreasonable delay incurred
during fact-finding and preliminary investigation, like that incurred during
the course of trial, is equally prejudicial to the respondent, as it results in
the impairment of the very same interests which the right to speedy trial
protects — against oppressive pretrial incarceration, unnecessary anxiety and
concern, and the impairment of one’s defense. To hold that such right attaches
only upon the launch of a formal preliminary investigation would be to sanction
the impairment of such interests at the first instance, and render respondent’s
right to speedy disposition and trial nugatory. Further to this, it is
oppressive to require that for purposes of determining inordinate delay, the
period is counted only from the filing of a formal complaint or when the person
being investigated is required to comment (in instances of fact-finding
investigations).
31. Same; Same; View that inordinate delay is clearly prejudicial when it
impairs one’s ability to mount a complete and effective defense.-
—Prejudice is not limited to when the person being investigated
is notified of the proceedings against him. Prejudice is more real in the form
of denial of access to documents or witnesses that have been buried or
forgotten by time, and in one’s failure to recall the events due to the
inordinately long period that had elapsed since the acts that give rise to the
criminal prosecution. Inordinate delay is clearly prejudicial when it impairs
one’s ability to mount a complete and effective defense. Hence, contrary to the
majority, I maintain that People v. Sandiganbayan and Torres remain good law in
this jurisdiction. The scope of right to speedy disposition corresponds not to
any specific phase in the criminal process, but rather, attaches the very
moment the respondent (or accused) is exposed to prejudice, which, in turn, may
occur as early as the fact-finding stage.
32. Same; Same; View that considering that the State possesses vast powers
and has immense resources at its disposal, it is incumbent upon it alone to
ensure the speedy disposition of the cases it either initiates or decides.-
—Verily, the Court has held that the State’s duty to resolve
criminal complaints with utmost dispatch is one that is mandated by the
Constitution. Bearing in mind that the Bill of Rights exists precisely to
strike a balance between governmental power and individual personal freedoms,
it is, to my mind, unacceptable to place on the individual the burden to assert
his or her right to speedy disposition of cases when the State has the burden
to respect, protect, and fulfill the said right. It is thus not the
respondent’s duty to follow up on the prosecution of his case, for it is the
prosecution’s responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of
reasonable timeliness. Considering that the State possesses vast powers and has
immense resources at its disposal, it is incumbent upon it alone to ensure the
speedy disposition of the cases it either initiates or decides. Indeed, as the
Court held in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160 (2000), “[t]he
individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis-Ã -vis the vast
and overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression
and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield
him in times of need.” Further, as earlier observed, no such similar duty is
imposed by the U.S. Constitution.
33. Same; Same; View that the duty to expedite proceedings under the
Constitution does not pertain to the respondent, but to the State.-
—Considering that the Constitution, unlike its U.S. counterpart,
imposes upon the State the positive duty to ensure the speedy disposition of
all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings, waiver of the right
to speedy disposition should not be implied solely from the respondent’s
silence. To be sure, the duty to expedite proceedings under the Constitution
does not pertain to the respondent, but to the State. To fault the respondent
for the State’s inability to comply with such positive duty on the basis of
mere silence is, in my view, the height of injustice.
34. Same; Waiver of Constitutional Right; View that the Supreme Court (SC) has held that every
reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
must be afforded.-
—Time and again, this Court has recognized the State’s inherent
right to prosecute and punish violators of the law. This right to prosecute,
however, must be balanced against the State’s duty to respect the fundamental
constitutional rights extended to each of its citizens. This Court has held
that every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights must be afforded. Such waiver “not only must be
voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458
Counsel:
Philip S. Pantojan, et al. for petitioner. The Solicitor General for
respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining
Order dated February 5, 2014 is LIFTED. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to
resolve Case No. SB-11-CRM-0456 and Case No. SB-11-CRM-0457 with due and
deliberate dispatch. The period for the determination of whether inordinate
delay was committed shall commence from the filing of a formal complaint and
the conduct of the preliminary investigation. The periods for the resolution of
the preliminary investigation shall be that provided in the Rules of Court,
Supreme Court Circulars, and the periods to be established by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Failure of the defendant to file the appropriate motion after the
lapse of the statutory or procedural periods shall be considered a waiver of
his or her right to speedy disposition of cases. The ruling in People v.
Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division172 that fact-finding investigations are included
in the period for determination of inordinate delay is ABANDONED.
Citation Ref:
60. Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System vs. Local Government of
Quezon City, 884 SCRA 493, November 07, 2018
Case Title : METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS SEWERAGE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, CITY ASSESSOR
OF QUEZON CITY, SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NG QUEZON CITY, and CITY MAYOR OF QUEZON
CITY, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Local Taxation ; Real Property Taxes ;
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner is not liable to respondent Local Government of
Quezon City for real property taxes, except if the beneficial use of its
properties has been extended to a taxable person.-
—The Executive and Legislative Branches, therefore, have already
categorized petitioner not as a government-owned and -controlled corporation
but as a Government Instrumentality with Corporate Powers/Government Corporate
Entity like the Manila International Airport Authority and the Philippine
Fisheries Development Authority. Privileges enjoyed by these Government
Instrumentalities with Corporate Powers/Government Corporate Entities should
necessarily also extend to petitioner. Hence, petitioner’s real property tax
exemption under Republic Act No. 6234 is still valid as the proviso of Section
234 of the Local Government Code is only applicable to government-owned and
-controlled corporations. Thus, petitioner is not liable to respondent Local
Government of Quezon City for real property taxes, except if the beneficial use
of its properties has been extended to a taxable person.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Hierarchy of Courts; The principle of the hierarchy of courts is a judicial
policy designed to restrain direct resort to the Supreme Court (SC) if relief
can be granted or obtained from the lower courts.-
—The principle of the hierarchy of courts is a judicial policy
designed to restrain direct resort to this Court if relief can be granted or
obtained from the lower courts. As this Court explained in Aala v. Uy, 814 SCRA
41 (2017): The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy
designed to restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief
may be obtained before the lower courts. The logic behind this policy is
grounded on the need to prevent “inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction,” as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court’s dockets.
Hence, for this Court to be able to “satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter[,]” it must remain as a “court of
last resort.” This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the “task of
dealing with causes in the first instance.” This Court shares concurrent
jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals. As it stated in Aala, the principle of the hierarchy of courts
prevents parties from randomly selecting which among these forums their actions
will be directed.
3. Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of the hierarchy of courts is often invoked
in direct resorts to the Supreme Court (SC). Hence, the exceptions to the rule
are more tailored to the specific functions and discretion of the Court.-
—The doctrine of the hierarchy of courts, however, is often
invoked in direct resorts to this Court. Hence, the exceptions to the rule are
more tailored to the specific functions and discretion of this Court: Immediate
resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are
present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be
addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental importance;
(3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are
better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the
subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no
other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when
the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy,
or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained
of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an
inappropriate remedy. It is doubtful whether the Court of Appeals could apply
the same rationale when the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts is invoked. In
any case, it has full discretion on whether to give due course to any petition
for certiorari directly filed before it. In this case, it allowed petitioner’s
direct resort to it on the ground that the issue presented was a pure question
of law. No error can be ascribed to it for passing upon the issue.
4. Taxation; Local Taxation; Real Property Taxes; Local Government Units; Under the Local Government Code (LGC), local government
units (LGUs) are granted the power to levy taxes on real property not otherwise
exempted under the law.-
—Under the Local Government Code, local government units are
granted the power to levy taxes on real property not otherwise exempted under
the law: Section 232. Power to Levy Real Property Tax.—A province or city or a
municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem
tax on real property such as land, building, machinery, and other improvement
not hereinafter specifically exempted.
5. Same; Same; Same; Same; The first limitation provides a general rule, that is,
that local government units (LGUs) cannot levy any taxes, fees, or charges of
any kind on the national government or its agencies and instrumentalities.-
—The first limitation provides a general rule, that is, that
local government units cannot levy any taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on
the national government or its agencies and instrumentalities. The provision,
however, also provides for an exception: “[u]n otherwise provided herein.” The
implication, therefore, is that while a government agency or instrumentality is
generally tax-exempt, the Local Government Code may provide for instances when
it could be taxable.
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 234 of the Local Government Code (LGC) enumerates
the properties that are specifically exempted from the payment of real property
taxes.-
—The second limitation is provided for under Section 234 of the
Local Government Code, which enumerates the properties that are specifically
exempted from the payment of real property taxes: Section 234. Exemptions from
Real Property Tax.—The following are exempted from payment of the real property
tax: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted,
for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person; (b) Charitable
institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,
nonprofit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes; (c) All machineries and equipment that are actually,
directly and exclusively used by local water districts and government-owned or
-controlled corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water and/or
generation and transmission of electric power; (d) All real property owned by
duly registered cooperatives as provided for under R.A. No. 6938; and (e) Machinery
and equipment used for pollution control and environmental protection. Except
as provided herein, any exemption from payment of real property tax previously
granted to, or presently enjoyed by, all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including all government-owned or -controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn
upon the effectivity of this Code.
7. Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 234(a), the general rule is that any real
property owned by the Republic or its political subdivisions is exempt from the
payment of real property tax “except when the beneficial use thereof has been
granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.”-
—The second limitation likewise provides for its own exceptions.
Under Section 234(a), the general rule is that any real property owned by the
Republic or its political subdivisions is exempt from the payment of real
property tax “except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.” The implication is that real
property, even if owned by the Republic or any of its political subdivisions,
may still be subject to real property tax if the beneficial use of the real
property was granted to a taxable person.
8. Administrative Law; Government Instrumentality; Words and Phrases; Citing Section 2(10) of the Administrative Code, the
Supreme Court (SC) defined a government “instrumentality” as an “agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the department framework vested with
special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter.”-
—Citing Section 2(10) of the Administrative Code, this Court
defined a government “instrumentality” as an “agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter.” Government instrumentalities are exempt from any kind of
taxation from local government for the following reasons: There is . . . no
point in national and local governments taxing each other, un a sound and
compelling policy requires such transfer of public funds from one government
pocket to another. There is also no reason for local governments to tax
national government instrumentalities for rendering essential public services
to inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is when the legislature
clearly intended to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of
essential public services for sound and compelling policy considerations. There
must be express language in the law empowering local governments to tax
national government instrumentalities. Any doubt whether such power exists is
resolved against local governments.
9. Taxation; Local Taxation; Real Property Taxes; Government Instrumentality; Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA); Although the Manila International
Airport Authority was granted corporate powers, it also exercised governmental
powers of eminent domain, police authority, and levying of charges and fees.
The proper nomenclature for it, therefore, was that of a government instrumentality
exercising corporate powers, sometimes loosely referred to as “government
corporate entity.” As a government instrumentality, it is exempt from local
taxes under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code (LGC).-
—This Court determined that the Manila International Airport
Authority was not a government-owned and -controlled corporation since it was
not organized as a stock or nonstock corporation. It was likewise unnecessary
to subject it to the test of economic viability since it was not created to
compete in the marketplace. Although the Manila International Airport Authority
was granted corporate powers, it also exercised governmental powers of eminent
domain, police authority, and levying of charges and fees. The proper
nomenclature for it, therefore, was that of a government instrumentality
exercising corporate powers, sometimes loosely referred to as “government
corporate entity.” As a government instrumentality, it is exempt from local
taxes under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code.
10. Same; Same; Same; Same; The government instrumentality must not have been
organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, even though it exercises
corporate powers, administers special funds, and enjoys operational autonomy,
usually through its charter. Its properties are exempt from real property tax
because they are properties of the public dominion: held in trust for the
Republic, intended for public use, and cannot be the subject of levy,
encumbrance, or disposition.-
—According to the parameters set by Manila International Airport
Authority, a government instrumentality is exempt from the local government
unit’s levy of real property tax. The government instrumentality must not have
been organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, even though it exercises
corporate powers, administers special funds, and enjoys operational autonomy,
usually through its charter. Its properties are exempt from real property tax
because they are properties of the public dominion: held in trust for the
Republic, intended for public use, and cannot be the subject of levy,
encumbrance, or disposition.
11. Same; Same; Same; Government-Owned and -Controlled
Corporations; A government-owned and -controlled
corporation is not exempt from real property taxes due to the passage of the
Local Government Code (LGC).-
—A government-owned and -controlled corporation, on the other
hand, is not exempt from real property taxes due to the passage of the Local
Government Code, which now provides: Except as provided herein, any exemption
from payment of real property tax previously granted to, or presently enjoyed
by, all persons, whether natural or juridical, including all government-owned
or -controlled corporations are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this
Code.
12. Government-Owned and -Controlled Corporations; To be categorized as a government-owned and -controlled
corporation, a government agency must meet the two (2) requirements prescribed
in Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution: common good and economic
viability.-
—To be categorized as a government-owned and -controlled
corporation, a government agency must meet the two (2) requirements prescribed
in Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution: common good and economic
viability.
13. Civil Law; Property; Public Dominion; Properties of the public dominion are properties “devoted
to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are
outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased” by the
government agency to private parties.-
—Properties of the public dominion are properties “devoted to
public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside
the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased” by the government
agency to private parties. Manila International Airport Authority added:
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance,
levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void
for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if
properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and
auction sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and
compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for nonpayment of
real estate tax. Under its Charter, petitioner is given the power to “acquire,
purchase, hold, transfer, sell, lease, rent, mortgage, encumber, and otherwise
dispose” of its real property. Properties held by petitioner under the exercise
of this power, therefore, cannot be considered properties of the public
dominion.
14. Taxation; Local Taxation; Real Property Taxes; Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS); Petitioner is a government-owned and
controlled corporation. Under the Local Government Code (LGC), only its
machinery and equipment actually, directly, and exclusively used in the supply
and distribution of water can be exempt from the levy of real property taxes.-
—Held against the parameters of Manila International Airport
Authority, this Court cannot but conclude that petitioner is a government-owned
and -controlled corporation. Under the Local Government Code, only its
machinery and equipment actually, directly, and exclusively used in the supply
and distribution of water can be exempt from the levy of real property taxes.
Its powers, functions, and attributes are more akin to that of the National
Power Corporation, which was previously held by this Court as a taxable entity.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 194388
Counsel:
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner. Office of the City
Attorneys for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals October
19, 2010 Decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 100733 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Temporary Restraining Orders issued by this Court on January 26, 2011 and
September 7, 2011 are made PERMANENT. The real properties of the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System located in Quezon City are DECLARED EXEMPT from
the real estate tax imposed by the Local Government of Quezon City. All the
real estate tax assessments, including the final notices of real estate tax
delinquencies, issued by the Local Government of Quezon City on the real
properties of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System located in Quezon
City are declared VOID, except for the portions that are alleged and proven to
have been leased to private parties.
Citation Ref:
61. Noell Whessoe, Inc. vs. Independent Testing Consultants,
Inc., 884 SCRA 524, November 07, 2018
Case Title : NOELL WHESSOE, INC1 petitioner, vs. INDEPENDENT TESTING
CONSULTANTS, INC., PETROTECH SYSTEMS, INC., and LIQUIGAZ PHILIPPINES CORP.,
respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Damages ; Moral Damages ; Corporations ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; The existing rule is that moral damages are not awarded to
a corporation since it is incapable of feelings or mental anguish. Exceptions,
if any, only apply pro hac vice.-
—There is no standing doctrine that corporations are, as a matter
of right, entitled to moral damages. The existing rule is that moral damages
are not awarded to a corporation since it is incapable of feelings or mental
anguish. Exceptions, if any, only apply pro hac vice.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; As a general rule, only questions of law can be raised in
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.-
—As a general rule, only questions of law can be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
distinction between a question of fact and a question of law is settled. There
is a question of law if the issue can be determined without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence on record. Otherwise, the issue raised is a question of
fact.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) may, in its discretion, entertain
questions of fact if they fall under certain exceptions.-
—Appeal is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion. This Court may, in its discretion, entertain questions of fact if
they fall under certain exceptions, summarized in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.,
191 SCRA 218 (1990): (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding
of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; The presence of any of the exceptions to the general rule
does not automatically place the case under the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) review.
The Supreme Court explained in Pascual v. Burgos, 778 SCRA 189 [2016] that the
party claiming an exception “must demonstrate and prove” that a review of the
factual findings is necessary.-
—The presence of any of the exceptions to the general rule,
however, does not automatically place the case under this Court’s review. This
Court explained in Pascual v. Burgos, 778 SCRA 189 (2016), that the party
claiming an exception “must demonstrate and prove” that a review of the factual
findings is necessary. Petitioner has not alleged that it raised a question of
fact, much allege that this case falls
under any of the exceptions. This would have merited the denial of the Petition
since this Court is not a trier of facts.
5. Civil Law; Contracts; Privity of Contracts; Subject to certain exceptions, those not privy to the
contract would not be bound by any of its provisions.-
—“[A] contract is law between the parties[.]” Generally,
contracts only take effect between the parties, and their assigns and heirs.
Thus, subject to certain exceptions, those not privy to the contract would not
be bound by any of its provisions.
6. Same; Same; Same; Article 1729, while serving as an exception to the general
rule on the privity of contracts, likewise provides for an exception to this
exception.-
—Article 1729 creates a solidary liability between the owner,
the contractor, and the subcontractor. A solidary obligation is “one in which
each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled
to demand the whole obligation.” Respondent Independent Testing Consultants may
demand payment for all of its unpaid fees from Liquigaz, petitioner, or
Petrotech, even if its contract was only with the latter. However, Article
1729, while serving as an exception to the general rule on the privity of
contracts, likewise provides for an exception to this exception. The contractor
is solidarily liable with the owner and subcontractor for any liabilities
against a supplier despite the absence of contract between the contractor and
the supplier, except when the subcontractor has already been fully paid for its
services.
7. Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Moral damages are awarded when the claimant suffers
“physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.”-
—Moral damages are awarded when the claimant suffers “physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.” “These
damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or
corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury
suffered.” Its award is “aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of
the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted.”
8. Same; Same; Same; Corporations; A corporation, not having a nervous system or a human
body, does not experience physical suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, or
wounded feelings. Thus, a corporation cannot be awarded moral damages.-
—A corporation is not a natural person. It is a creation of
legal fiction and “has no feelings[,] no emotions, no senses[.]” A corporation
is incapable of fright, anxiety, shock, humiliation, and physical or mental
suffering. “Mental suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous
system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life[.]” A
corporation, not having a nervous system or a human body, does not experience
physical suffering, mental anguish, embarrassment, or wounded feelings. Thus, a
corporation cannot be awarded moral damages.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 199851
Counsel:
Picazo, Buyco, Tan, Fider & Santos for petitioner. Campanilla & Ponce
Law Office for Independent Testing Consultants, Inc. Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez
& Gatmaitan for Liquigaz Phils. Corp. Ronaldo A. Geron for Petrotech
Systems, Inc.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals April 28, 2011 Decision and December 7, 2011 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 89300 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Noell Whessoe, Inc. is
ABSOLVED from solidary liability with respondents Petrotech Systems, Inc. and
Liquigaz Philippines Corporation to respondent Independent Testing Consultants,
Inc. in view of its full payment to Petrotech Systems, Inc. Petitioner Noell
Whessoe, Inc.’s claim for moral damages is DENIED for lack of factual basis. All
other previous dispositions by the Court of Appeals STAND.
Citation Ref:
62. Sindophil, Inc. vs. Republic, 884 SCRA 555, November 07,
2018
Case Title : SINDOPHIL, INC., petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions
of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Buyer in Good Faith ;
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Buyer in Good Faith; With Sindophil failing to prove that it was a buyer in
good faith, it cannot recover damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund
under Section 95 of the Property Registration Decree (PRD).-
—With Sindophil failing to prove that it was a buyer in good
faith, it cannot recover damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund under
Section 95 of the Property Registration Decree. In La Urbana v. Bernardo, this
Court held that “it is a condition sine qua non that the person who brings an
action for damages against the assurance fund be the registered owner, and, as
to holders of transfer certificates of title, that they be innocent purchasers
in good faith and for value.”
2. Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Failure to File Appellant’s Brief; Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Rules of Court is the basis
for dismissing an appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief within the
required period.-
—Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the Rules of Court is the basis for
dismissing an appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief within the
required period: RULE 50 Dismissal of Appeal Section 1. Grounds for Dismissal
of Appeal.—An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own
motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds: . . . . (e)
Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his
brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules[.] With the use of
the permissive “may,” it has been held that the dismissal is directory, not
mandatory, with the discretion to be exercised soundly and “in accordance with
the tenets of justice and fair play” and “having in mind the circumstances
obtaining in each case.”
3. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; It is already settled that the negligence of the clerks
and employees of a lawyer binds the latter.-
—Atty. Obligar’s excuse is unacceptable. While he is not prohibited
from hiring clerks and other staff to help him in his law practice, it is
still, first and foremost, his duty to monitor the receipt of notices such as
the Court of Appeals’ resolution directing the filing of the appellant’s brief.
He cannot blame his staff or house helpers as it is already settled that the
negligence of the clerks and employees of a lawyer binds the latter. That he is
not even sure what happened to the Resolution shows his careness, and this
negligence is one that ordinary diligence could have guarded against. He should
have devised a system in his law office whereby his clerks are to immediately
route the notices they receive to the handling lawyer because the reglementary
period for filing an appeal brief runs from their receipt. Under the
circumstances, the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion soundly by deeming
Sindophil’s appeal as abandoned and, consequently, dismissing the appeal.
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Reopening of Cases; The introduction of new evidence even after a party has
rested its case may, therefore, be done but only if the Supreme Court (SC)
finds that it is for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice.-
—The introduction of new evidence even after a party has rested
its case may, therefore, be done but only if the court finds that it is for
good reasons and in the furtherance of justice. The admission is discretionary
on the part of the court and, as explained in Republic, may only be set aside
if the admission was done with grave abuse of discretion or: [T]he capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the
exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at
all in contemplation of the law.
5. Same; Same; Same; Litigation is primarily an adversarial proceeding.
Counsels are to take every opportunity, so long as it is within the bounds of
the law, to advocate their clients’ causes.-
—Neither can Sindophil claim that it was not given equal
opportunity to present its case. Atty. Obligar, counsel for Sindophil, admitted
that he never objected to the motions for extension to file formal offer of
evidence filed by the Republic. Even if this Court believes that he did not
object to the extensions “as a gesture of consideration bearing in mind the
work load and bulk of cases being attended to by the [Office of the Solicitor
General],” he was still not entitled to expect that the Office of the Solicitor
General would grant him the same leniency by not objecting to the Motion to
Reset the initial presentation of defense evidence. Litigation is primarily an
adversarial proceeding. Counsels are to take every opportunity, so long as it
is within the bounds of the law, to advocate their clients’ causes.
Furthermore, contrary to Sindophil’s claim, the Regional Trial Court
entertained the Motion to Re-Open Case that it even set the Motion for clarificatory
hearing and oral argument. However, Atty. Obligar again absented himself during
the scheduled hearing. Given the foregoing, the Regional Trial Court did not
gravely abuse its discretion in deciding the case despite the filing of the
Motion to Re-Open Case.
6. Same; Evidence; Burden of Evidence; With the Republic having put forward evidence that the
Tramo property claimed by Sindophil belongs to the Republic, the burden of
evidence shifted to Sindophil to prove that its title to it was valid.-
—With the Republic having put forward evidence that the Tramo
property claimed by Sindophil belongs to the Republic, the burden of evidence
shifted to Sindophil to prove that its title to it was valid. Concomitantly, it
had the burden of proving that it was indeed a buyer in good faith and for
value. As this Court said in Baltazar v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 354 (1988),
“the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith and for value
lies upon him who asserts that status” and “[i]n discharging that burden, it is
not enough to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith, i.e., that
everyone is presumed to act in good faith. The good faith that is [essential
here] is integral with the very status which must be proved.” Unfortunately for
Sindophil, it utterly failed to discharge the burden of evidence because its
counsel failed to attend the scheduled initial presentation of evidence.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 204594
Counsel:
Obligar Law Firm for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
June 19, 2012 Resolution and November 23, 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 96660 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
63. Aquino vs. People, 884 SCRA 611, November 07, 2018
Case Title : MARIA FE CRUZ AQUINO y VELASQUEZ a.k.a. MA. PRECIOSA CRUZ
AQUINO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Penalties ; Indeterminate Sentence Law ;
Syllabi:
1. Criminal Law; Penalties; Indeterminate Sentence Law; The Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that courts
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum provided by law and the minimum term of
which shall not be than the minimum
prescribed by law.-
—The lower courts incorrectly imposed a straight penalty of six
(6)-year imprisonment. This Court modifies the penalty of imprisonment to a
minimum of six (6) years to a maximum of eight (8) years pursuant to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that courts shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum provided by law and the minimum term of which shall not be than the minimum prescribed by law.
2. Criminal Law; Violation of the 1996 Philippine
Passport Law (Republic Act No. 8239); The Regional Trial Court (RTC) correctly found petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of violation of Section 19,
paragraph (c)1 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8239 and not paragraph (c)2 as found by
the Court of Appeals (CA).-
—The Regional Trial Court correctly found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of violation of Section 19,
paragraph (c)1 of Republic Act No. 8239 and not paragraph (c)2 as found by the
Court of Appeals. The elements of Section 19, paragraph (c)1 are: 1. The
accused forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered any passport or travel
document or any passport validly issued, which has become void by the
occurrence of any condition prescribed by law; and 2. The accused used, uses,
or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use such false, forged,
counterfeited, mutilated or altered passport or travel document or any passport
validly issued which has become void by the occurrence of any condition prescribed
by law. All the elements are present. As correctly found by the lower courts,
the evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner submitted false
supporting documents in her passport application and in the passport
applications of Kim Mariel Cruz Aquino and Leonore Coleen Cruz Aquino. She then
used the fraudulently obtained passports and false supporting documents to
apply for their United States visas.
3. Notarial Law; 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; The Supreme Court (SC) notes that the counsel for this
case is the same lawyer who notarized the pleadings filed in violation of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.-
—This Court also notes that the counsel for this case is the
same lawyer who notarized the pleadings filed in violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice. In the interest of justice, this Court is suspending the
application of these rules to prevent a miscarriage of justice for purposes of
resolving the issues raised in those pleadings. This is without prejudice,
however, to the administrative liability of the lawyer involved.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 217349
Counsel:
Eric P. Fuentes Law Office for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, this PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals’ September 4, 2013 Decision and March 19, 2015 Resolution in
C.A.-G.R. CR No. 33654 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Maria Fe Cruz
Aquino y Velasquez is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
minimum of six (6) years to a maximum of eight (8) years and to pay a fine of
P60,000.00 for each of the four (4) counts of Violation of Section 19,
paragraph (c)1 of Republic Act No. 8239 in Criminal Case Nos. 97-161314 to
97-161317. The penalties shall be served successively.
Citation Ref:
64. Tortal vs. Taniguchi, 885 SCRA 244, November 12, 2018
Case Title : JERSON E. TORTAL, petitioner, vs. CHIZURU TANIGUCHI,
respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Annulment of Judgments ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Rule 47, Section 3 then provides that an action for
annulment of judgment, if based on extrinsic fraud, should be filed within four
(4) years from discovery of the fraud, or if based on lack of jurisdiction,
then before the action is barred by laches or estoppel.-
—Rule 47, Section 3 then provides that an action for annulment
of judgment, if based on extrinsic fraud, should be filed within four (4) years
from discovery of the fraud, or if based on lack of jurisdiction, then before
the action is barred by laches or estoppel.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; Summons; If indeed summons was not properly served on petitioner,
then his remedy was to file a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An action for the annulment of judgment is an
equitable recourse that is independent of the case and is allowed only in
exceptional cases, such as when there is no more available or other adequate
remedy.-
—Petitioner claims that he failed to participate in the
proceedings for the nullity of his marriage with respondent before Branch 260,
Regional Trial Court, Parañaque City because summons was never served on him,
either personally or by substitution. If indeed summons was not properly served
on petitioner, then his remedy was to file a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. An action for the annulment of
judgment is an equitable recourse that is independent of the case and is
allowed only in exceptional cases, such as when there is no more available or
other adequate remedy. A petition for the annulment of judgment of Regional
Trial Courts may be given due course if it is sufficiently proven that the
“ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.” Furthermore, Rule 47, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
provides only two (2) grounds for an action for annulment or judgment:
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nonethe, extrinsic fraud cannot be
considered a valid ground in an action under Rule 47 “if it was availed of, or
could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.”
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 212683
Counsel:
Conrado Zumaraga for petitioner. Solis, Medina, Limpingco & Fajardo for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is DENIED.
The assailed Court of Appeals’ December 13, 2013 Decision and May 14, 2014
Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 98955 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
65. People’s General Insurance Corporation vs. Guansing, 885 SCRA
444, November 14, 2018
Case Title : PEOPLE’S GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
EDGARDO GUANSING and EDUARDO LIZASO, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Jurisdiction ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Jurisdiction; A decision remanding the case for further proceedings
serves no purpose if the Supreme Court (SC) never acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant in the first place.-
—A decision remanding the case for further proceedings serves no
purpose if the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant in the first place. Jurisdiction is the power of the courts to issue
decisions that are binding on the parties. Since the Court of Appeals ruled
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Guansing,
the trial court would have had no power to issue binding decisions over the
parties. Hence, all the proceedings would have been considered void. However,
it is clear that the Regional Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over respondent
Guansing through voluntary appearance. Necessarily, the proceedings before it
in Civil Case No. 06115736 should be reinstated. Thus, the Court of Appeals
erred when it nullified the January 28, 2010 Decision and February 23, 2011
Order of the Regional Trial Court.
2. Due Process; Due process consists of notice and hearing.-
—The rule requiring jurisdiction over the parties is based on
due process. Due process consists of notice and hearing. Notice means that
persons with interests in the subject of litigation are to be informed of the
facts and the law on which the complaint or petition is based for them to
adequately defend their interests. This is done by giving the parties
notification of the proceedings. On the other hand, hearing means that the
parties must be given an opportunity to be heard or a chance to defend their
interests. Courts are guardians of constitutional rights, and therefore, cannot
deny due process rights while at the same time be considered to be acting
within their jurisdiction.
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction over complainants or petitioners is acquired
as soon as they file their complaints or petitions, while jurisdiction over
defendants or respondents is acquired through valid service of summons or their
voluntary submission to the courts’ jurisdiction.-
—Jurisdiction over the parties is the power of the courts to
make decisions that are binding on them. Jurisdiction over complainants or
petitioners is acquired as soon as they file their complaints or petitions,
while jurisdiction over defendants or respondents is acquired through valid
service of summons or their voluntary submission to the courts’ jurisdiction.
Violation of due process is a jurisdictional defect. Hence, proper service of
summons is imperative. A decision rendered without proper service of summons
suffers a jurisdictional infirmity. In the service of summons, personal service
is the preferred mode. As a rule, summons must be served personally on a
defendant.
4. Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently held that
jurisdiction over a defendant is acquired upon a valid service of summons or
through the defendant’s voluntary appearance in court.-
—This Court has consistently held that jurisdiction over a
defendant is acquired upon a valid service of summons or through the
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court. In Interlink Movie Houses, Inc., et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 851 SCRA 505 (2018), this Court reiterated: It
is settled that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired
either through service of summons or through voluntary appearance in court and
submission to its authority. In the absence of service or when the service of
summons upon the person of the defendant is defective, the court acquires no
jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is null and
void. In actions in personam, such as collection for a sum of money and
damages, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
through personal or substituted service of summons. Personal service is
effected by handling a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if
he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him. x x x In the
same case, this Court explained: It is settled that resort to substituted
service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time. In such cases,
substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular
place of business with a competent person in charge. Because substituted
service is in derogation of the usual method of service, and personal service
of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled
right to resort to substituted service of summons.
5. Court Personnel; Sheriffs; To enjoy the presumption of regularity,
a sheriff’s return must contain: (1) detailed circumstances surrounding the
sheriff’s attempt to serve the summons on the defendant; and (2) the specifics showing impossibility of service
within a reasonable time.-
—To enjoy the presumption of regularity, a sheriff’s return must
contain: (1) detailed circumstances surrounding the sheriff’s attempt to serve
the summons on the defendant; and (2) the specifics showing impossibility of
service within a reasonable time. Based on these requirements, a sheriff’s
return is merely pro forma. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 499 SCRA 21 (2006),
this Court explained that the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the
sheriff’s return does not apply to patently defective returns. In the case at
bar, the Sheriff’s Return contained no statement on the efforts or attempts
made to personally serve the summons. It was devoid of details regarding the
service of summons. Thus, it was defective. In this case, the sheriff should
have established the impossibility of prompt personal service before he
resorted to substituted service. Impossibility of prompt personal service is
established by a sheriff’s failure to personally serve the summons within a
period of one (1) month. Within this period, he or she must have had at least
three (3) attempts, on two (2) different dates, to personally serve the
summons. Moreover, he or she must cite in the sheriff’s return why these
attempts are unsuccessful. Sheriffs are tasked to discharge their duties on the
service of summons with care, diligence, and promptness so as not to affect the
speedy disposition of justice. They are compelled to give their best efforts to
accomplish personal service of summons on a defendant. Based on the Sheriff’s
Return in this case, the sheriff clearly failed to meet this requirement.
6. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Generally, defendants voluntarily submit to the court’s
jurisdiction when they participate in the proceedings despite improper service
of summons.-
—By filing his answer and other pleadings, respondent Guansing
is deemed to have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court. Generally, defendants voluntarily submit to the court’s jurisdiction
when they participate in the proceedings despite improper service of summons.
Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court states: Section 20. Voluntary
appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
not be deemed a voluntary appearance. In Navale, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., 253 SCRA 705 (1996): Defects of summons are cured by voluntary appearance
and by the filing of an answer to the complaint. A defendant [cannot] be
permitted to speculate upon the judgment of the court by objecting to the
court’s jurisdiction over its person if the judgment is adverse to it, and
acceding to jurisdiction over its person if and when the judgment sustains its
defense. Any form of appearance in court by the defendant, his authorized agent
or attorney, is equivalent to service except where such appearance is precisely
to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
7. Same; Same; Same; Voluntary Appearance in Court; It is basic that a claim for damages constitutes a prayer
for affirmative relief, which the Supreme Court (SC) has consistently
considered as voluntary appearance.-
—It is basic that a claim for damages constitutes a prayer for
affirmative relief, which this Court has consistently considered as voluntary
appearance. It is incongruous to ask the court for damages while asserting lack
of jurisdiction at the same time.
8. Same; Same; Same; Same; An appearance without expressly objecting to the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC) over the person was voluntary
appearance.-
—Associate Justice Antonio Carpio’s dissent in Garcia is
insightful. He disagreed with the conclusion that there was no voluntary
appearance on Clarita’s part. He opined that an appearance without expressly
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person was voluntary
appearance. Clarita failed to raise lack of jurisdiction over her person in her
answer even if she filed it ex abundante ad cautelam. Likewise, she also failed
to assert lack of jurisdiction when she filed her motion to transfer or
consolidate the cases. In any case, by filing a motion to transfer or
consolidate, she sought an affirmative relief, which in turn was a recognition
of the court’s authority. Having invoked the court’s jurisdiction to secure
affirmative relief, she could not now assert otherwise.
9. Same; Same; Same; Same; A long line of cases has established that the filing of an
answer, among other pleadings, is considered voluntary appearance and vests the
court with jurisdiction over the person.-
—Respondent Guansing revealed that he was properly informed of
the contents of petitioner’s action against him when he filed his Motion for
Reconsideration and Notice of Appeal. Respondent Guansing, who actively
participated in the proceedings, cannot impugn the court’s jurisdiction. To
reiterate, a long line of cases has established that the filing of an answer,
among other pleadings, is considered voluntary appearance and vests the court
with jurisdiction over the person. The rules are clear: the filing of an answer
and other pleadings is considered voluntary appearance. Respondent Guansing’s
actions lead to no other conclusion other than he voluntarily appeared and submitted
himself to the court’s jurisdiction.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 204759
Counsel:
Ramiro S. Osorio for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals’ December 10, 2012 Decision in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 96720 is REVERSED and
the Regional Trial Court’s January 28, 2010 Decision is AFFIRMED. Respondent
Edgardo Guansing is ordered to pay: 1. The sum of P437,800.00 for the
reimbursement of the remaining cost of the Isuzu Crosswind plus interest69 of
twelve percent (12%) per annum from August 28, 2006, the date of filing of this
case, until June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013
until fully paid; 2. The sum of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and 3. Costs of
the suit.
Citation Ref:
66. Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, 887 SCRA 187, November 28, 2018
Case Title : PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, petitioner, vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, JOSE G. CUAYCONG, SIMPLICIO CIOCON, LUIS HOFILEÑA,
JR., EVA YAPTINCHAY-LICHAUCO, LERRY PADLAN, THELMO SOLIVAN, ALFONSO CASAS,
HORACIO YAPTINCHAY, COL. CESAR PIO DE RODA, G.S. LICAROS, ALICIA LL. REYES,
JULIO V. MACUJA, LEONIDES S. VIRATA, RAFAEL A. SISON, PLACIDO MAPA, JR., JOSE
TENGCO, JR., LEON O. TY, AND RUBEN ANCHETA,1 respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act ;
Causing Undue Injury to Any Party Including the Government ; Entering Into
Contract/Transaction in Behalf of the Government Grossly Disadvantageous to the
Same ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 3(e) requires “manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence” and the element of arbitrariness and
malice in taking risks must be palpable. Likewise, there must be a showing of
“undue injury” to the government. Section 3(g), on the other hand, requires a
showing of a “contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the [government].”-
—Section 3(e) requires “manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence” and the element of arbitrariness and malice in
taking risks must be palpable. Likewise, there must be a showing of “undue
injury” to the government. Section 3(g), on the other hand, requires a showing
of a “contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
[government].
2. Ombudsman; Policy of Noninterference; The Supreme Court (SC) generally does not interfere with
public respondent Office of the Ombudsman’s finding or lack of finding of
probable cause out of respect for its constitutionally granted investigatory
and prosecutory powers.-
—This Court generally does not interfere with public respondent
Office of the Ombudsman’s finding or lack of finding of probable cause out of
respect for its constitutionally granted investigatory and prosecutory powers.
Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman, 813 SCRA 273 (2016), pointed out that the
Office of the Ombudsman’s power to determine probable cause is executive in
nature and with its power to investigate, it is in a better position than this
Court to assess the evidence on hand to substantiate its finding of probable
cause or lack of it.
3. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; Probable cause is: [T]he existence of such facts and
circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of
the crime subject of the investigation.-
—Probable cause is: [T]he existence of such facts and
circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of
the crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion and
reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need
not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating
officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of
guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but than evidence which would justify a
conviction. x x x Nonethe, despite this well-established principle, petitioner
asks this Court to interfere with public respondent’s assessment purportedly on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion. However, disagreeing with public
respondent’s findings does not rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion.
4. Grave Abuse of Discretion; A court or tribunal is said to have committed grave abuse
of discretion if it performs an act in “a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.”-
—A court or tribunal is said to have committed grave abuse of
discretion if it performs an act in “a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.” Ultimately, for the petition to
prosper, it would have to prove that public respondent “conducted the
preliminary investigation in such a way that amounted to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty under the law.”
5. Criminal Law; Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Causing Undue Injury to any Party
Including the Government; Entering Into Contract/Transaction in Behalf of the
Government Grossly Disadvantageous to the Same; Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) stated
that for a charge to be valid under Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,
it must be shown that the accused “acted with manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or inexcusable negligence.” On the other hand, for liability to attach
under Section 3(g), it must be shown that the accused “entered into a grossly
disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government.”-
—Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, 538
SCRA 207 (2007), stated that for a charge to be valid under Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, it must be shown that the accused “acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.” On the other hand,
for liability to attach under Section 3(g), it must be shown that the accused
“entered into a grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government.”
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 187794
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. Trio & Regalado Law Offices
for Alicia L. Reyes and Placido L. Mapa. Bienvenido Santiago for Rafael A.
Sison. Cruz, Durian, Alday and Cruz Matters for Jose R. Tengco, Jr. Santiago
& Santiago for respondents Rafael A. Sison and Vicente T. Paterno.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED. The Office of the Ombudsman’s August 15, 2006 Resolution and May 16,
2008 Order in OMB-C-C-03-0508-I are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
67. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A.-Philippine Customer Care Center, 887 SCRA 292, November 28, 2018
Case Title : COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. J.P. MORGAN
CHASE BANK, N.A. – PHILIPPINE CUSTOMER CARE CENTER, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc.
Syllabi Class :Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 ; Fiscal Incentives ;
Tax Incentives ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Tax incentives partake of the nature of tax exemptions.
They are a privilege to which the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly
construed against the taxpayer apply.-
—Tax incentives partake of the nature of tax exemptions. They
are a privilege to which the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly
construed against the taxpayer apply. One who seeks an exemption must justify
it by words “too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be
misinterpreted.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Rule 45 applies to issues raised before the Supreme Court
(SC) that involve purely questions of law.-
—The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) invoked the correct
remedy. Rule 45 applies to issues raised before this Court that involve purely
questions of law. In Villamor, Jr. v. Umale, 736 SCRA 325 (2014), this Court
held: There is a question of law “when there is doubt or controversy as to what
the law is on a certain [set] of facts.” The test is “whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence.” Meanwhile, there is a question of fact when there is “doubt. . . as
to the truth or falsehood of facts.” The question must involve the examination
of probative value of the evidence presented.
3. Special Economic Zone Act of 1995; Fiscal Incentives; Under Section 23 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7916, or the
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, as amended, business enterprises operating
within economic zones are entitled to fiscal incentives.-
—Under Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7916, or the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995, as amended, business enterprises operating within
economic zones are entitled to fiscal incentives. It states: Section 23. Fiscal
Incentives.—Business establishments operating within the ECOZONES shall be
entitled to the fiscal incentives as provided for under Presidential Decree No.
66, the law creating the Export Processing Zone Authority, or those provided
under Book VI of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Investment Code of 1987. Furthermore, tax credits for exporters using local
materials as inputs shall enjoy the same benefits provided for in the Export
Development Act of 1994. Article 39(a)(1), Book VI of Executive Order No. 226,
as amended, enumerates the fiscal incentives granted to a registered
enterprise, which include income tax holiday from four (4) to six (6) years,
depending on whether the enterprise is registered as a pioneer or non-pioneer
firm.
4. Same; Same; Tax Incentives; Tax incentives to which an Ecozone Enterprise is entitled
do not necessarily include all kinds of income received during the period of
entitlement. Only income actually gained or received by the Ecozone Enterprise
related to the conduct of its registered business activity are covered by
fiscal incentives.-
—Rule XIII, Section 5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of Republic Act No. 7916 specifies that PEZA-granted incentives shall apply
only to registered operations of the Ecozone Enterprise and only during its
registration with PEZA. In other words, tax incentives to which an Ecozone
Enterprise is entitled do not necessarily include all kinds of income received
during the period of entitlement. Only income actually gained or received by
the Ecozone Enterprise related to the conduct of its registered business
activity are covered by fiscal incentives. Executive Order No. 226 also
provides that the incentives shall only be “to the extent engaged in a
preferred area of investment.” The purpose of the income tax holiday was
explained, thus: An income tax holiday is bestowed on a new project to
encourage investors to set up businesses and to contribute to the country’s economic
growth. The fiscal incentive is also meant to help registered enterprises
recoup their substantial initial investments by giving them a reprieve from
paying income tax for a few years. However, like any privilege, the income tax
holiday comes with conditions and requirements which must be fulfilled for its
continued enjoyment.
5. Same; Same; Same; Income Tax Holiday; To qualify for the income tax holiday incentive,
respondent must satisfactorily show that its transaction with PeopleSupport is
a registered activity or embraced within the latter’s registered activities
with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).-
—Following the rulings and the PEZA Memorandum Circular, it is
clear that the registration of an activity with PEZA is an essential requirement
to enjoy tax incentives under the law, and only income arising from or directly
related to the conduct of the Ecozone Enterprises’ registered activities are
covered by tax incentives under the Philippine Economic Zone Act of 1995.
Hence, to qualify for the income tax holiday incentive, respondent must
satisfactorily show that its transaction with PeopleSupport is a registered
activity or embraced within the latter’s registered activities with the PEZA.
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; All income that it earned from rendering outsourced
customer care and business process outsourcing services during its registration
with Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) are entitled to income tax
holiday, and thus, are exempt from the payment of regular corporate income tax
under Section 27(A).-
—All income that PeopleSupport derived from its registered
activities are “subject to such tax treatment as may be specified in its terms
of registration.” Apropos, all income that it earned from rendering outsourced
customer care and business process outsourcing services during its registration
with PEZA are entitled to income tax holiday, and thus, are exempt from the
payment of regular corporate income tax under Section 27(A). Consequently, they
are not subject to the creditable withholding tax under Section 57(B) of the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended, and Section 2.57.2 of
Revenue Regulations No. 2-98, as amended.
7. Same; Same; Same; Tax incentives under the Philippine Economic Zone Act of
1995 are granted to information technology service activities, which refer to
activities that involve the use of any information technology software and/or
system for value addition, as defined in Board Resolution No. 00-411.-
—Tax incentives under the Philippine Economic Zone Act of 1995
are granted to information technology service activities, which refer to
activities that involve the use of any information technology software and/or
system for value addition, as defined in Board Resolution No. 00-411. These
include “business processes outsourced using e-commerce.” The Department of
Trade and Industry defines “business process outsourcing” as the “delegation of
service-type business processes to a third-party service provider.” In the
Philippines, this industry is generally divided into the following sectors: (1)
contact centers; (2) back office services; (3) data transcription; (4)
animation; (5) software development; (6) engineering development; and (7) game
development.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 210528
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez &
Gatmaitan for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
July 15, 2013 Decision and December 18, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Tax
Appeals En Banc in C.T.A.-E.B. No. 876 are SET ASIDE. Respondent’s claim for
refund is DENIED.
Citation Ref:
68. Degamo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 888 SCRA
345, December 05, 2018
Case Title : ROEL R. DEGAMO, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and
MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
Syllabi Class :Political Law ; Qualified Political Agency ;
Syllabi:
1. Political Law; Qualified Political Agency; Under the doctrine of qualified political agency,
department secretaries may act for and on behalf of the President on matters
where the President is required to exercise authority in their respective
departments.-
—Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department
secretaries may act for and on behalf of the President on matters where the
President is required to exercise authority in their respective departments.
Thus, this Court rules that private respondent, under Abad’s authority, may
exercise the power to withdraw the Special Allotment Release Order through the
letter-advice sent to petitioner. Finally, this Court finds that private
respondent acted in good faith. In Ruzol: It bears stressing at this point that
in People v. Hilvano, this Court enunciated that good faith is a defense in
criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions. The term “good
faith” is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting “honesty of
intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, even though technicalities of law,
together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of
facts[,] which render transaction unconscientious.” Good faith is actually a
question of intention and although something internal, it can be ascertained by
relying not on one’s self-serving protestations of good faith but on evidence
of his conduct and outward acts.
2. Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Power to Review the Investigative and
Prosecutorial Power of the Ombudsman; The Supreme Court (SC) may review public respondent’s
exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, but only upon a clear
showing that it abused its discretion in an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical,
or despotic manner.”-
—This Court has adopted a policy of noninterference with public
respondent’s determination of probable cause. In Dichaves v. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al., 813 SCRA 273 (2016): As a general rule, this Court does not
interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutional
mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against
public officials and government employees. The rule on noninterference is based
on the respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman. An independent constitutional
body, the Office of the Ombudsman is beholden to no one, acts as the champion
of the people, and is the preserver of the integrity of the public service.
Thus, it has the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to
warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused. This function is
executive in nature. . . . . The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the
power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess the
strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of
probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound
judgment of the Ombudsman. x x x Moreover, in a special civil action for
certiorari, this Court cannot correct errors of fact or law not amounting to
grave abuse of discretion. This Court may review public respondent’s exercise
of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, but only upon a clear showing
that it abused its discretion in an “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic
manner.”
3. Criminal Law; Usurpation of Authority and Usurpation
of Official Functions; Article
177 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) penalizes the crimes of usurpation of
authority and usurpation of official functions.-
—Invoking the exception, petitioner alleges that public
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause to
indict private respondent. In his Complaint, petitioner charged private
respondent with violation of Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
which states: ARTICLE 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions.—Any
person who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be an officer,
agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine
Government or of any foreign government, or who, under pretense of official
position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public
officer of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or any
agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the
penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods. This law
provision penalizes the crimes of usurpation of authority and usurpation of
official functions. As worded, any person who commits the punishable acts enumerated
can be held liable. This was upheld in People v. Hilvano, 99 Phil. 655 (1956),
where the Court denied the appellant public official’s attempt to restrict
Article 177’s application to private individuals only. The same case held that
good faith is a defense against a charge under it.
4. Same; Same; The crime of usurpation of authority punishes the act of
knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be an officer, agent, or
representative of any department or agency of the government.-
—The crime of usurpation of authority punishes the act of
knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be an officer, agent, or
representative of any department or agency of the government. In Gigantoni y
Javier v. People, 162 SCRA 158 (1988), this Court acquitted the petitioner
accused, a former Philippine Constabulary-CIS agent convicted in the trial
court, for usurpation of authority. This Court found that there was no proof
that he was duly notified of his dismissal from the service. It held that he
cannot be said to have knowingly and falsely represented himself as a
Philippine Constabulary-CIS agent without competent and credible proof that he
knew of his dismissal when he committed the alleged offense. Thus, presumption
of innocence prevailed.
5. Same; Same; Elements of.-
—The crime of usurpation of official functions punishes any
person who, under pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to
any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any
foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to
do so. Under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the elements of
the crime of usurpation of official functions are when a person: (1) performs
any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof; (2)
acts under pretense of official position; and (3) acts without being lawfully
entitled to do so. The assailed act is the private respondent’s withdrawal of
the Special Allotment Release Order through the June 19, 2012 letter-advice.
This constitutes the first element, that a person performs an act pertaining to
a person in authority or public officer.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 212416
Counsel:
The Law Offices of Bejar, Nuque, Moncada & Besario for petitioner.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The April 19, 2013 Resolution and January 8, 2014 Order of the Office of
the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-13-0010 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
69. People vs. Ramirez, 891 SCRA 528, January 30, 2019
Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NANCY
LASACA RAMIREZ a.k.a. “ZOY” or “SOY,” accused-appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Trafficking in Persons ; Qualified
Trafficking in Persons ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Qualified Trafficking in Persons; The Supreme Court (SC) affirms the trial court and the
Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) conviction of accused-appellant in violation of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9208, Section 4(e), as qualified by Section 6(a) and
punished under Section 10(c).-
—This Court affirms the trial court and the Court of Appeals’
conviction of accused-appellant in violation of Republic Act No. 9208, Section
4(e), as qualified by Section 6(a) and punished under Section 10(c). In People
v. Casio, 744 SCRA 113 (2014), however, this Court held that moral damages and exemplary
damages must also be imposed. In People v. Aguirre, 845 SCRA 227 (2017): The
criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to
the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact[,]
it is worse, thus, justifying the award of moral damages. Exemplary damages are
imposed when the crime is aggravated, as in this case.
2. Criminal Law; Trafficking in Persons; The crime is still considered trafficking if it involves
the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of a child
for the purpose of exploitation” even if it does not involve any of the means
stated under the law.-
—Republic Act No. 9208 defines trafficking in persons as:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act: (a) Trafficking in Persons
– refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt
of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of
the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person
for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation
or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs. The
crime is still considered trafficking if it involves the “recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harboring[,] or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation” even if it does not involve any of the means stated under the
law. Trafficking is considered qualified when “the trafficked person is a
child[.]”
3. Same; Same; Republic Act (RA) No. 9208 has since been amended by RA
No. 10364 on February 6, 2013.-
—Republic Act No. 9208 has since been amended by Republic Act
No. 10364 on February 6, 2013. In recognition of the amendments to the law,
Casio clarifies that crimes prosecuted under Republic Act No. 10364 must have
the following elements: Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of
trafficking in persons have been expanded to include the following acts: (1)
The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders[”;] (2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving
or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person”[;] (3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs[.]”
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 217978
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney’s
Office for accused-appellant.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals’
October 23, 2014 Decision in C.A.-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 01655 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Nancy Lasaca Ramirez a.k.a “ZOY” or “SOY” is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Republic Act No. 9208,
Section 4(e), as qualified by Section 6(a). She is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
She is further ordered to pay Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as
moral damages and One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as exemplary damages
to each of the minor victims, AAA and BBB. All damages awarded shall be subject
to the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision
until its full satisfaction.
Citation Ref:
70. Republic vs. Fetalvero, 891 SCRA 543, February 04, 2019
Case Title : REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE REGIONAL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, REGION X, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
petitioner, vs. BENJOHN FETALVERO, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Government Funds ; Garnishment ;
Syllabi:
1. Government Funds; Garnishment; The general rule is that government funds cannot be seized
by virtue of writs of execution or garnishment.-
—The general rule is that government funds cannot be seized by
virtue of writs of execution or garnishment. This doctrine has been explained
in Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, 31 SCRA 616 (1970): The
universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action “only
up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution” and
that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since
government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law. Simply put, “no money can be taken out of the treasury
without an appropriation[.]”Here, the trial court already found that: [T]here
is an appropriation intended by law for payment of road-rights-of-way.
Defendant [respondent here] even called the attention of the court of the
existence of SAA-SR 2009-05-001538 of the DPWH Main and/or Regional Office
appertaining to the fund intended for payment of the road-rights-of-way.
2. Office of the Solicitor General; The Office of the Solicitor General’s (OSG’s) deputized
counsel is “no more than the ‘surrogate’ of the Solicitor General in any
particular proceeding” and the latter remains the principal counsel entitled to
be furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and decisions. . . . The
appearance of the deputized counsel did not divest the OSG of control over the
case and did not make the deputized special attorney the counsel of record.-
—This Court takes this opportunity to reiterate our ruling in
Republic of the Philippines v. Viaje, et al., 782 SCRA 259 (2016), which
clarified the role of a deputized counsel in relation to the Office of the
Solicitor General: The power of the OSG to deputize legal officers of
government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist it in
representing the government is well-settled. The Administrative Code of 1987
explicitly states that the OSG shall have the power to “deputize legal officers
of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the
Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving
their respective offices, brought before the courts and exercise supervision
and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases.” But it is
likewise settled that the OSG’s deputized counsel is “no more than the
‘surrogate’ of the Solicitor General in any particular proceeding” and the
latter remains the principal counsel entitled to be furnished copies of all
court orders, notices, and decisions. . . . The appearance of the deputized
counsel did not divest the OSG of control over the case and did not make the
deputized special attorney the counsel of record. x x x Here, the Office of the
Solicitor General, as the principal counsel, is shown in both the deputation
letter addressed to Atty. Lorea and the Notice of Appearance filed before the
trial court.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 198008
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. Moises G. Dalisay, Jr. for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
The Court of Appeals July 29, 2011 Decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 03710-MIN is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, insofar as it affirmed the September 22, 2009 and April
23, 2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court in granting respondent Benjohn
Fetalvero’s Motion for the Issuance of an Order for a Writ of Garnishment. This
is without prejudice to his filing of adjusted money claim before the
Commission on Audit. The remaining just compensation due to Benjohn Fetalvero
under the Compromise Agreement is subject to interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from the time of taking until June 30, 2013, and six
percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until the allowance of the money claim
by the Commission on Audit.
Citation Ref:
71. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Ledesma, 892 SCRA
37, February 06, 2019
Case Title : BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES JUANITO and VICTORIA LEDESMA, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Sugar Industry ; Sugar Restitution Fund ;
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 211176
Counsel:
Office of the General Counsel & Legal Services for BSP. April C. Pintor for
Philippine National Bank. Crispin S. Sumagaysay, Jr. for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Review on Certiorari are GRANTED.
The Court of Appeals’ May 29, 2013 Decision and January 29, 2014 Resolution in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 02904 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November 17, 2008
Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 46, Bacolod City in Civil Case No.
01-11591 for Sum of Money/Refund of Excess Payments is AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
72. Paringit vs. Global Gateway Crewing Services, Inc., 892 SCRA
54, February 06, 2019
Case Title : OSCAR M. PARINGIT, petitioner, vs. GLOBAL GATEWAY CREWING
SERVICES, INC., MID-SOUTH SHIP AND CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., and/or CAPTAIN SIMEON
FLORES, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Disability Benefits ;
Work-Related Illness/Injury ;
Grave Abuse of Discretion; A court or tribunal is said to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously acts or whimsically
exercises judgment. The abuse of discretion must be so flagrant that it amounts
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty as provided by law. “Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough.”—A court or tribunal is said to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it capriciously acts or whimsically exercises
judgment. The abuse of discretion must be so flagrant that it amounts to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty as provided by law. “Mere abuse of discretion
is not enough.” A review of the records convinces this Court that the findings
of the National Labor Relations Commission were amply supported by substantial
evidence.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; Requisites of.—To
grant a seafarer’s claim for disability benefits, the following requi-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
** Respondent name corrected from Global Shipping
Management to Global Gateway Crewing Services, Inc.
55
VOL. 892, FEBRUARY 6, 2019
55
Paringit vs. Global Gateway Crewing Services, Inc.
sites must be present: (1) [H]e suffered an illness; (2) he
suffered this illness during the term of his employment contract; (3) he
complied with the procedures prescribed under Section 20-B; (4) his illness is
one of the enumerated occupational disease[s] or that his illness or injury is
otherwise work-related; and (5) he complied with the four conditions enumerated
under Section 32-A for an occupational disease or a disputably-presumed
work-related disease to be compensable. It is not disputed that petitioner was
initially diagnosed with heart disease, anemia, renal dysfunction, and that he
fell ill while he was aboard the Tsavrilis Hellas. This resulted in his medical
repatriation and arrival m Manila on February 9, 2012.
Same; Same; Same; Work-Related Illness/Injury; The Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC)
defines a work-related illness as “any sickness as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set
therein satisfied.”—The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-Standard Employment Contract) defines a work-related
illness as “any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under
Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.” The
conditions under Section 32-A are: SECTION 32-A. Occupational Diseases.—For an
occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
all of the following conditions must be satisfied: 1. The seafarer’s work must
involve the risks described herein; 2. The disease was contracted as a result
of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks; 3. The disease was
contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary
to contract it; and 4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the
seafarer. Paringit vs. Global Gateway Crewing Services, Inc., 892 SCRA 54, G.R.
No. 217123 February 6, 2019
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 217123
Counsel:
Bermejo, Laurino-Bermejo and Luna Law Offices for petitioner. Jeronimo B.
Cumigad for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals’ September 11, 2014
Decision and February 24, 2015 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 129579 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Citation Ref:
73. Buntag vs. Toledo, 892 SCRA 222, February 11, 2019
Case Title : CELIANA B. BUNTAG, FLORA ARBILERA, VETALIANO BONGO, SEBASTIAN
BONGO, PETRONILO BONGO, LEO BONGO, and RAUL IMAN, complainants, vs. ATTY.
WILFREDO S. TOLEDO, respondent.
Case Nature : ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.
Attorneys; Disbarment; The allegations in a disbarment complaint
must be proven with substantial evidence.—It is well-established that the
allegations in a disbarment complaint must be proven with substantial
evidence. Spouses Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr., 401 SCRA 622 (2003), defines
the standard of substantial evidence for an administrative complaint: The
standard of substantial evidence required in administrative proceedings is more
than a mere
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
223
VOL. 892, FEBRUARY 11, 2019
223
Buntag vs. Toledo
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. While rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, the obvious
purpose being to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical
rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order, this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so
far as to justify orders without basis in evidence having rational probative
force.
Same; It is indeed laudable that respondent does not limit his
legal assistance only to those who can afford his services and that he
generously provides legal services to everyone who asks for help.—It has not
escaped this Court’s attention that respondent’s lackadaisical attitude toward
his professional dealings with complainants led in part to the controversy
pending before this Court. It is indeed laudable that respondent does not limit
his legal assistance only to those who can afford his services and that he
generously provides legal services to everyone who asks for help. Yet, his
failure to put in writing his contractual agreements with his clients, paying
or not, added to the confusion on the obligations and expectations of each
party in their attorney-client relationship.
Same; Attorneys Fees; Retainer Agreement; A retainer or written
agreement between a lawyer and the client lists the scope of the services to be
offered by the lawyer and governs the relationship between the parties.—A
retainer or written agreement between a lawyer and the client lists the scope
of the services to be offered by the lawyer and governs the relationship
between the parties. Without a written agreement, it would be difficult to
ascertain what the parties committed to; hence, a party may be emboldened to
make base demands from the other party, presenting his or her own
interpretation of the verbal agreement into which they entered. Buntag vs.
Toledo, 892 SCRA 222, A.C. No. 12125 February 11, 2019
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Attorneys Fees ; Retainer Agreement ;
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: A.C. No. 12125
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Administrative Complaint against respondent Atty.
Wilfredo S. Toledo is DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, he is DIRECTED to
henceforth reduce into writing all of his agreements for legal services with
his clients, and is given a STERN WARNING that a similar infraction in the
future will merit a more severe response from this Court.
Citation Ref:
74. Lapi vs. People, 892 SCRA 680, February 13, 2019
Case Title : SIMEON LAPI y MAHIPUS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Warrant Arrests
;
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on
Certiorari; A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court must, as a general rule, only raise questions of law.—This Court is not a
trier of facts. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court must, as a general rule, only raise questions of law.
Parties may only raise issues that can be determined without having to review
or reevaluate the evidence on record. This Court generally gives weight to the
factual findings of the lower courts “because of the opportunity enjoyed by the
[lower courts] to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and assess
their testimony.”
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of
Innocence; In criminal cases, the accused has the constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.—In criminal cases, however, the
accused has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proven. To prove guilt, courts must evaluate the evidence presented in
relation to the elements of the crime charged. Thus, the finding of guilt is
essentially a question of fact. For this reason, the entire records of a
criminal case are thrown open for this Court’s review. In Ferrer v.
People, 483 SCRA 31 (2006): It is a well-settled rule that an appeal in a
criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and that it becomes
the duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment
appealed from, whether they are assigned as errors or not.
Same; Same; Search Warrants; No than the Constitution guarantees that the
State cannot intrude into the citizen’s persons, house, papers, and effects
without a warrant issued by a judge finding probable cause.—A citizen’s right
to be secure against any unreasonable searches and seizures is sacrosanct. No than the Constitution guarantees that the
State cannot intrude into the citizen’s
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
681
VOL. 892, FEBRUARY 13, 2019
681
Lapi vs. People
persons, house, papers and effects without a warrant issued by a
judge finding probable cause: Article III Bill of Rights. . . . SECTION 2. The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Same; Same; Warrant Arrests; As with certain constitutional
rights, the right to question the validity of a warrant arrest can be waived.
This waiver, however, does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of
the evidence seized during the illegal arrest.—In Bolasa, the accused were
charged with possession of illegal drugs. This Court not only contended with
the validity of the warrant arrest, but also examined the validity of the
subsequent search of the accused and the seizure of items in their possession.
As with certain constitutional rights, the right to question the validity of a
warrant arrest can be waived. This waiver, however, does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during the illegal arrest.
Lapi vs. People, 892 SCRA 680, G.R. No. 210731 February 13, 2019
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 210731
Counsel:
Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The April 29, 2013 Decision
and December 10, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB-C.R.
No. 01564 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
75. People vs. Royol, 893 SCRA 54, February 13, 2019
Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGARDO
ROYOL y ASICO, accused-appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ; Presumption of
Regularity ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Presumption of Regularity; People v. Que, 853 SCRA 487 (2018), explained that, in
drugs cases, the prosecution cannot benefit from a presumption of regularity.-
—Que, 853 SCRA 487 (2018), explained that, in drugs cases, the
prosecution cannot benefit from a presumption of regularity. Section 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act articulates a specific statutory mandate that
cannot be trumped by the prosecution’s self-assurance. As against the objective
requirements imposed by statute, guarantees coming from the prosecution
concerning the identity and integrity of seized items are naturally designed to
advance the prosecution’s own cause. These guarantees conveniently aim to knock
two (2) targets with one (1) blow. First, they insist on a showing of corpus
delicti divorced from statutory impositions and based on standards entirely the
prosecution’s own. Second, they justify noncompliance by summarily pleading
their own assurance. These self-serving assertions cannot justify a conviction.
Even the customary presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties cannot suffice. People v. Kamad, explained that the presumption of
regularity applies only when officers have shown compliance with “the standard
conduct of official duty required by law.”
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—The elements required to sustain convictions for violation of
Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act are settled. In People v.
Morales, 616 SCRA 223 (2010): In actions involving the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the following elements must first be established: (1) proof
that the transaction of sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
3. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Concerning corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9165, as amended by RA No. 10640 in 2014, makes specific stipulations on
the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs
and/or drug paraphernalia.-
—Concerning corpus delicti, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165,
as amended by Republic Act No. 10640 in 2014, makes specific stipulations on
the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs
and/or drug paraphernalia. Particularly, concerning custody before filing a
criminal case, Section 21, as amended, provides: SECTION 21. Custody and
Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.—The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having
initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory
of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative
of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrant seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment,
the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative
and quantitative examination; (3) A certification of the forensic laboratory
examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory
examiner, shall be issued immediately upon the receipt of the subject item/s:
Provided, That when the volume of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the
completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination
report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of
dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided,
however, That a final certification shall be issued immediately upon completion
of the said examination and certification[.]
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; While not requiring absolute certainty, proof beyond
reasonable doubt demands moral certainty.-
—While not requiring absolute certainty, proof beyond reasonable
doubt demands moral certainty. Compliance with this standard is a matter of
compliance with a constitutional imperative: This rule places upon the
prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the
strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense of
an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the
due process clause of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an
accused to be “presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.” “Undoubtedly,
it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon
the prosecution.” Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it
follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted.
5. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody Rule; Since compliance with the chain of custody requirements
under Section 21 ensures the integrity of the seized items, it follows that
noncompliance with these requirements tarnishes the credibility of the corpus
delicti, which is at the core of prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act.-
—Since compliance with the chain of custody requirements under
Section 21 ensures the integrity of the seized items, it follows that
noncompliance with these requirements tarnishes the credibility of the corpus
delicti, which is at the core of prosecutions under the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act. Such noncompliance casts doubt on the very claim that an offense
against the law was committed: Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the prohibited drug that constituted the corpus delicti itself. The
omission naturally raises grave doubt about any search being actually conducted
and warrants the suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted evidence. In
every criminal prosecution for possession of illegal drugs, the Prosecution
must account for the custody of the incriminating evidence from the moment of
seizure and confiscation until the moment it is offered in evidence. That
account goes to the weight of evidence. It is not enough that the evidence
offered has probative value on the issues, for the evidence must also be
sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts in issue. The evidence is not
relevant merely because it is available but that it has an actual connection
with the transaction involved and with the parties thereto. This is the reason
why authentication and laying a foundation for the introduction of evidence are
important.
6. Same; Same; Same; Marking; People v. Garcia, 580 SCRA 259 (2009), is clear: the mere
marking of seized items, instead of a proper physical inventory and
photographing done in the presence of the persons specified under Section 21,
will not justify a conviction.-
—People v. Garcia, 580 SCRA 259 (2009), is clear: the mere
marking of seized items, instead of a proper physical inventory and
photographing done in the presence of the persons specified under Section 21,
will not justify a conviction: Thus, other than the markings made by PO1 Garcia
and the police investigator (whose identity was not disclosed), no physical
inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under
the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules. We
observe that while there was testimony with respect to the marking of the
seized items at the police station, no mention whatsoever was made on whether
the marking had been done in the presence of Ruiz or his representatives. There
was likewise no mention that any representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, or any elected official had been present during this
inventory, or that any of these people had been required to sign the copies of
the inventory.
7. Same; Same; Same; Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
allows for deviations from its requirements under “justifiable grounds.”-
—Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act allows
for deviations from its requirements under “justifiable grounds.” The
prosecution, however, never bothered to account for any such justifiable
ground.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 224297
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney’s
Office for accused-appellant.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals May 8, 2015 Decision in
C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04910 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Edgardo Royol y Asico is ACQUITTED for the prosecution’s failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from
detention, un he is confined for any other lawful cause. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed
to report the action he has taken to this Court within five (5) days from
receipt of this Decision. For their information, copies shall also be furnished
to the Director General of the Philippine National Police and the Director
General of the Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency. The Regional Trial Court is
directed to turn over the marijuana subject of this case to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for destruction in accordance with law.
Citation Ref:
76. Reynes vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), 894 SCRA
137, February 20, 2019
Case Title : CARLOS L. REYNES, petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
(VISAYAS), LUCRESIA M. AMORES, and MARIBEL HONTIVEROS, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Illegal Exaction ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; By petitioner’s own allegations, private respondent
Hontiveros’ involvement arose only after the June 1, 2014 incident when the
resort was supposed to have allowed her entry only after presenting an
identification card. The charge that she induced private respondent Amores to
order ceasing the collection of the resort’s garbage, if true, is by no means
righteous conduct that the Supreme Court (SC) condones.-
—By petitioner’s own allegations, private respondent Hontiveros’
involvement arose only after the June 1, 2014 incident when the resort was
supposed to have allowed her entry only after presenting an identification
card. The charge that she induced private respondent Amores to order ceasing
the collection of the resort’s garbage, if true, is by no means righteous
conduct that this Court condones. However, insofar as the charge of illegal
exactions is concerned, it does not appear that private respondent Hontiveros
herself acted in concert with private respondent Amore in demanding and
facilitating inordinate collections. It also does not appear that she, by
herself or through someone acting on her instruction, collected or received the
amounts delivered by petitioner. That said, this Court underscores that the
Affidavit-Complaint, which petitioner filed before public respondent, was not
exclusively a criminal complaint. It was at the same time an administrative
complaint for gross misconduct. The charge of gross misconduct embraces the
imputations against private respondent Hontiveros that she abused her position
and influence to induce the cessation of the garbage collection services to the
resort. This Petition specifically prayed for this Court to hold that private respondents
must be indicted for the offense of illegal exactions under Article 213(2) of
the Revised Penal Code. However, the records available lack any averment on how
public respondent disposed of the administrative aspect of petitioner’s
Complaint. This Court is not aware of any matter to affirm or reverse in this
respect. The records also do not indicate a claim or an explanation of how
public respondent may have erred in its handling of such administrative aspect.
Thus, this Court is in no position to make conclusions on the administrative
aspect of petitioner’s claims.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Information; Jurisprudence has settled that probable cause for the
filing of an information is “a matter which rests on likelihood rather than on
certainty. It relies on common sense rather than on ‘clear and convincing
evidence.’”-
—Jurisprudence has settled that probable cause for the filing of
an information is “a matter which rests on likelihood rather than on certainty.
It relies on common sense rather than on ‘clear and convincing evidence[.]’” In
Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., 560 SCRA 518 (2008): Probable cause, for
the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as
are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not
mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require
an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed by the
suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not
on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge.
He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It
does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure
a conviction.
3. Same; Same; Policy of Noninterference; In accordance with judicial noninterference, “not even the
Supreme Court (SC) can order the prosecution of a person against whom the
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie
case.”-
—Acting on the basis of the evidence presented to them, public
prosecutors are vested “with a wide range of discretion, the discretion of
whether, what and whom to charge[.]” Thus, “[t]he prosecuting attorney cannot
be compelled to file a particular criminal information.” In accordance with
judicial noninterference, “not even the Supreme Court can order the prosecution
of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case.” In People v. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748 (1967),
this Court sustained the public prosecutor and issued a writ of certiorari
against Court of First Instance Judge Hernando Pineda’s orders for the
prosecutor to abandon four (4) out of the five (5) cases that the prosecutor
previously filed because, according to Judge Pineda, “the acts complained of
‘stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by
different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore
be treated as one crime [to] the series of shots killed more than one
victim[.]”’
4. Same; Same; Certiorari; Review of Resolutions of Prosecutors; In cases of “unmistakable showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the prosecutor” in refusing to prosecute specific
persons for specific offenses, writs of certiorari have been issued to set
aside the prosecutor’s initial determination.-
—In cases of “unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the prosecutor” in refusing to prosecute specific persons for
specific offenses, writs of certiorari have been issued to set aside the
prosecutor’s initial determination. Chua v. Padillo, 522 SCRA 60 (2007),
illustrates one (1) such instance. There, this Court sustained the Court of
Appeals in granting the respondents’ Petition for Certiorari and in ordering
the inclusion of the petitioners-siblings Wilson and Renita Chua as accused,
along with Wilson’s wife, Marissa Padilla-Chua, in a case of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents.
5. Criminal Law; Illegal Exaction; Any inquiry into whether probable cause exists to
prosecute for illegal exactions as penalized under Article 213(2) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) must begin with the text of Article 213(2).-
—Any inquiry into whether probable cause exists to prosecute for
illegal exactions as penalized under Article 213(2) of the Revised Penal Code
must begin with the text of Article 213(2). It provides: Article 213. Frauds
against the public treasury and similar offenses.—The penalty of prisión
correccional in its medium period to prisión mayor in its minimum period, or a
fine ranging from 200 to 10,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any
public officer who: . . . . 2. Being entrusted with the collection of taxes,
licenses, fees and other imposts, shall be guilty of any of the following acts
or omissions: (a) Demanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums
different from or larger than those authorized by law. (b) Failing voluntarily
to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him
officially. (c) Collecting or ing, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or
otherwise, things or objects of a nature different from that provided by law.
6. Same; Same; Elements of.-
—Liability under Article 213(2) ensues when the following
elements are demonstrated: First, that the offender is a public officer who is
“entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees and other imposts.”
Second, that he or she engages in any of the three (3) specified acts or omissions
under Article 213(2): “[d]emanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums
different from or larger than those authorized by law[; f]ailing voluntarily to
issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him
officially[; or c]ollecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of
payment or otherwise, things or objects of a nature different from that
provided by law.”
7. Same; Same; When the law enables no form whatsoever of payment or
collection, a public officer’s demand for payment of any sum, or insistence on
collecting any object, is a legal breach. It is a punishable violation of
Article 213(2).-
—Atty. Mernado failed to realize that Article 213(2)’s
injunction against the “payment of sums different from or larger than those
authorized by law” and against “receiving. . . objects of a nature different
from that provided by law” admits of situations when no payment is ever
permitted, or no collection of any object is ever allowed. These situations may
arise through an explicitly stated legal prohibition, or through a law’s mere
silence. In the latter case, the law plainly declines to name any authorized
manner of payment or collection. By its reticence, it signals that there is no
permissible payment or collection. When the law enables no form whatsoever of
payment or collection, a public officer’s demand for payment of any sum, or
insistence on collecting any object, is a legal breach. It is a punishable
violation of Article 213(2). Such was petitioner’s exact contention: that
private respondent Amores violated Article 213(2) by her mere act of demanding
payment — regard of the amount — because she was, to begin with, not allowed to
demand anything. Petitioner’s entire cause was anchored on the assertion that
because no ordinance, law, or regulation has ever permitted private respondent
Amores to receive anything, yet she collected something, she violated Article
213(2).
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 223405
Counsel:
Siu, Riñen & Associates for petitioner.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed February
20, 2015 Resolution and September 29, 2015 Order issued in OMB-V-C-14-0510 by
public respondent Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), through Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer I Michael M. Mernado, Jr., are SET ASIDE
insofar as they dismissed the charge against private respondent Lucresia M.
Amores for violating Article 213(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Public
respondent Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) is directed to file before the
proper court the necessary information for violation of Article 213(2) of the
Revised Penal Code against private respondent Lucresia M. Amores. This is
without prejudice to the proper disposition of the administrative aspect of the
Complaint against both private respondents Lucresia M. Amores and Maribel
Hontiveros.
Citation Ref:
77. Zapanta vs. Commission on Elections, 894 SCRA 599, March
05, 2019
Case Title : REYNALDO S. ZAPANTA, petitioner, EDILBERTO U. LAGASCA,
petitioner-intervenor, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ALFRED J. ZAPANTA;
EDILBERTO U. LAGASCA, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class :Election Law ; Nuisance Candidates ; Disqualification of
a Nuisance Candidate ; Legal Standing ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Disqualification of a Nuisance Candidate; Legal Standing; The legal standing of unaffected candidates in a nuisance
petition has already been settled in Santos: The Supreme Court (SC) finds that
in a petition for disqualification of a nuisance candidate, the only real
parties-in-interest are the alleged nuisance candidate, the affected legitimate
candidate, whose names are similarly confusing.-
—Petitioner-intervenor contends that he was denied his right to
due process since he was not impleaded in the Nuisance Petition, nor was he
furnished with public respondent’s processes or private respondent’s pleadings.
The legal standing of unaffected candidates in a nuisance petition has already
been settled in Santos: The Court finds that in a petition for disqualification
of a nuisance candidate, the only real parties-in-interest are the alleged
nuisance candidate, the affected legitimate candidate, whose names are
similarly confusing. A real [party-in-interest] is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. In Timbol v. COMELEC (Timbol), it was stated that to
minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their COC may
be denied due course or cancelled by the petition of a legitimate candidate or
by the COMELEC. This denial or cancellation may be motu proprio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party, subject to an opportunity to be
heard. It was emphasized therein that the COMELEC should balance its duty to
ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful with
the right of an alleged nuisance candidate to explain his or her bona fide
intention to run for public office before he or she is declared a nuisance
candidate. Thus, when a verified petition for disqualification of a nuisance
candidate is filed, the real parties-in-interest are the alleged nuisance
candidate and the interested party, particularly, the legitimate candidate.
Evidently, the alleged nuisance candidate and the legitimate candidate stand to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit. The outcome of the
nuisance case shall directly affect the number of votes of the legitimate
candidate, specifically, whether the votes of the nuisance candidate should be
credited in the former’s favor. Glaringly, there was nothing discussed in
Timbol that other candidates, who do not have any similarity with the name of
the alleged nuisance candidate, are real parties-in-interest or have the
opportunity to be heard in a nuisance petition. Obviously, these other
candidates are not affected by the nuisance case because their names are not
related with the alleged nuisance candidate. Regard of whether the nuisance
petition is granted or not, the votes of the unaffected candidates shall be
completely the same. Thus, they are mere silent observers in the nuisance case.
x x x As a mere observer, petitioner-intervenor is not required to be impleaded
in the Nuisance Petition. Hence, his right to due process could not have been
violated. Records also show that petitioner-intervenor did not deny private
respondent’s allegation that it received a copy of public respondent’s August
8, 2017 Resolution. Despite receipt, petitioner-intervenor did not take action
to protect his interest.
2. Election Law; Nuisance Candidates; Words and Phrases; A nuisance candidate is defined as one who, based on the
attendant circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for
which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the
reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots
with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not
counted for either of them.-
—In Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
610 SCRA 53 (2010), this Court thoroughly discussed the reasons why nuisance
candidates are abhorred: In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as
in the case at bar, the law contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the
similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate
is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been
filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate,
upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will
be considered stray and not counted for either of them. In elections for
national positions such as President, Vice President and Senator, the sheer
logistical challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for
the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who
obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention to mount a nationwide
campaign. Thus we explained in Pamatong v. Commission on Elections: “The
rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to
run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure
that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this
end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting
elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the
opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation
of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical
difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a
mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be
available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper.
Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of
inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. . . .
. . . . “The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by
allowance of “nuisance candidates” to run in the elections. Our election laws
provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers
in every polling place, watchers in the board of canvassers, or even the
receipt of electoral contributions. Moreover, there are election rules and
regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the number of candidates
in a given election. “Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a
nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The organization of an election
with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix
candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign
would actually impair the electoral process. . . . . . . . Given the realities
of elections in our country and particularly contests involving local
positions, what emerges as the paramount concern in barring nuisance candidates
from participating in the electoral exercise is the avoidance of confusion and
frustration of the democratic process by preventing a faithful determination of
the true will of the electorate, more than the practical considerations
mentioned in Pamatong. A report published by the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism in connection with the May 11, 1998 elections indicated
that the tactic of fielding nuisance candidates with the same surnames as
leading contenders had become one (1) “dirty trick” practiced in at least 18
parts of the country. The success of this clever scheme by political rivals or
operators has been attributed to the last-minute disqualification of nuisance
candidates by the Commission, notably its “slow-moving” decision-making.
3. Same; Same; Despite being given an opportunity to counter private
respondent’s allegations, petitioner failed to deny that he had no campaign
materials using the name “Alfred Zapanta,” or present evidence to the contrary.-
—This Court holds that petitioner was not able to sufficiently
show that voters can clearly identify that his chosen nickname pertains only to
him. The affidavits he presented are not enough to show that he had been using
the name “Alfred” or that he is publicly known by that name. Moreover, despite
being given an opportunity to counter private respondent’s allegations,
petitioner failed to deny that he had no campaign materials using the name
“Alfred Zapanta,” or present evidence to the contrary. He merely banked on his
membership in a political party to support his claim that he had a bona fide
intention to run for office. Association to a political party per se does not
necessarily equate to a candidate’s bona fide intent; instead, he or she must
show that he or she is serious in running for office. This, petitioner failed
to demonstrate. Additionally, private respondent is more recognized by his
constituents as “Alfred Zapanta,” being an incumbent city councilor who was
running for another term.
4. Same; Same; The Santos doctrine must be applied: the
votes for petitioner alone should be counted in favor of private respondent; if there are votes for both petitioner and private
respondent in the same ballot, then only one (1) vote should be counted in the
latter’s favor. This will not only discourage nuisance candidates, but will
also prevent the disenfranchisement of voters.-
—Public respondent explained that it based its ruling on Dela
Cruz v. Commission on Elections, 685 SCRA 347 (2012), where this Court held
that the votes for the nuisance candidate should be added to the votes for the
bona fide candidate. Despite involving a single-slot office, where only one (1)
candidate can win for the position, public respondent applied Dela Cruz as it
was the prevailing doctrine when it decided on this case. More, there were then
no rules or jurisprudence dealing with the votes of a nuisance candidate in a
multi-slot office. This Court finds that public respondent did not exercise its
judgment in an arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical manner when it ordered
adding the votes cast for petitioner to the votes cast for private respondent.
On the contrary, it merely applied “the current state of our law.” With the
recent promulgation of Santos v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 879 SCRA
120 (2018), this Court clarified how the votes of nuisance candidates in a
multi-slot office should be treated: In a multi-slot office, such as membership
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, a registered voter may vote for more than one
candidate. Hence, it is possible that the legitimate candidate and nuisance
candidate, having similar names, may both receive votes in one ballot. The
Court agrees with the OSG that in that scenario, the vote cast for the nuisance
candidate should no longer be credited to the legitimate candidate; otherwise,
the latter shall receive two votes from one voter. Therefore, in a multi-slot
office, the COMELEC must not merely apply a simple mathematical formula of
adding the votes of the nuisance candidate to the legitimate candidate with the
similar name. To apply such simple arithmetic might lead to the double counting
of votes because there may be ballots containing votes for both nuisance and
legitimate candidates. As properly discussed by the OSG, a legitimate candidate
may seek another person with the same surname to file a candidacy for the same
position and the latter will opt to be declared a nuisance candidate. In that
scenario, the legitimate candidate shall receive all the votes of the nuisance
candidate and may even receive double votes, thereby, drastically increasing
his odds. At the same time, it is also possible that a voter may be confused
when he reads the ballot containing the similar names of the nuisance candidate
and the legitimate candidate. In his eagerness to vote, he may shade both ovals
for the two candidates to ensure that the legitimate candidate is voted for.
Similarly, in that case, the legitimate candidate may receive two (2) votes
from one voter by applying the simple arithmetic formula adopted by the COMELEC
when the nuisance candidate’s COC is cancelled. Thus, to ascertain that the
votes for the nuisance candidate is accurately credited in favor of the
legitimate candidate with the similar name, the COMELEC must also inspect the
ballots. In those ballots that contain both votes for nuisance and legitimate
candidate, only one count of vote must be credited to the legitimate candidate.
While the perils of a fielding nuisance candidates against legitimate
candidates cannot be overemphasized, it must also be guaranteed that the votes
of the nuisance candidate are properly and fairly counted in favor of the said
legitimate candidate. In that manner, the will of the electorate is upheld. x x
x Here, the Santos doctrine must be applied: the votes for petitioner alone
should be counted in favor of private respondent; if there are votes for both
petitioner and private respondent in the same ballot, then only one (1) vote
should be counted in the latter’s favor. This will not only discourage nuisance
candidates, but will also prevent the disenfranchisement of voters.
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 233016
Counsel:
Rodvick J. Abarca for petitioner. Dexter A. Francisco for private respondent
Alfred J. Zapanta.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the August 31, 2017 Writ of Execution of public
respondent Commission on Elections En Banc in SPA Case No. 15-212 (DC) is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, as follows: 1. RE-CONVENE the Special Board of
Canvassers of Antipolo City to re-canvass the votes for the position of Members
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the Second District of Antipolo City; 2. COUNT
the votes for Reynaldo S. Zapanta, a nuisance candidate, in favor of Alfred J.
Zapanta. However, if there is a ballot that contains votes in favor of both
Reynaldo S. Zapanta and Alfred J. Zapanta, only one (1) vote shall be counted
in the latter’s favor; and 3. PROCLAIM the duly elected Members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod for the Second District of Antipolo City in accordance
with the result of the proper counting of votes. This Decision is immediately
executory. Public respondent Commission on Elections is ORDERED to complete the
implementation of the August 31, 2017 Writ of Execution, as modified, within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision.
Citation Ref:
78. Malabanan vs. Malabanan, Jr., 895 SCRA 135, March 06,
2019
Case Title : MELINDA M. MALABANAN, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO MALABANAN,
JR., SPOUSES RAMON AND PRESCILA MALABANAN and SPOUSES DOMINADOR III AND GUIA
MONTANO, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Sales ; Buyer in Good Faith ; Innocent
Purchaser for Value ;
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; Innocent Purchaser for Value; A person is a buyer in good faith or an “innocent
purchaser for value” when he or she purchases and pays the fair price for a
property, absent any notice that another has a right over it.-
—We agree with the trial court’s finding that the Montano
Spouses were not buyers in good faith. A person is a buyer in good faith or an
“innocent purchaser for value” when he or she purchases and pays the fair price
for a property, absent any notice that another has a right over it. If the
property is covered by a certificate of title, the buyer may rely on it and is
not obliged to go beyond its four (4) corners. Sigaya v. Mayuga, 467 SCRA 341
(2005), however, provides for situations where this rule does not apply: [T]his
rule shall not apply when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry
or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his
vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire
into the status of the title of the property in litigation. x x x To justify
good faith in merely relying on the certificate of title, the following must be
present: [F]irst, the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the
latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the time of the sale, the buyer
was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or
of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to
convey title to the property.
2. Question of Fact; A question of fact exists when there is doubt on the truth
of the allegations and the issue entails a review of the evidence presented.-
—This Court’s appellate review is discretionary. A question of
fact, which, in this case, is the determination of whether the property
formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-188590 was conjugal,
generally cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. A question
of fact exists when there is doubt on the truth of the allegations and the
issue entails a review of the evidence presented. Moreover, the findings of the
Court of Appeals are generally binding on this Court. These rules allow certain
exceptions enumerated in Pascual v. Burgos, 778 SCRA 189 (2016): (1) When the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
3. Civil Law; Property Relations; Conjugal Properties; Under the Civil Code, property acquired during marriage is
presumed to be conjugal. There is no need to prove that the money used to
purchase a property came from the conjugal fund.-
—Under the Civil Code, property acquired during marriage is
presumed to be conjugal. There is no need to prove that the money used to
purchase a property came from the conjugal fund. What must be established is
that the property was acquired during marriage. Only through “clear,
categorical and convincing” proof to the contrary will it be considered the
paraphernal property of one (1) of the spouses.
4. Same; Land Titles and Deeds; Certificates of Title; Evidence; A certificate of title is the best evidence of ownership
of a property.-
—A certificate of title is the best evidence of ownership of a
property. Respondents neither alleged fraud nor assailed the issuance of the
title in Jose’s favor. This certificate of title, when taken with the Deed of
Absolute Sale between Jose and Rodriguez, as well as the tax declarations in
petitioner’s name, weigh more heavily than respondents’ bare claims in
establishing petitioner and Jose’s ownership of the property. Respondent
Francisco, on the contrary, failed to present any evidence to prove that he
paid for the kind and the construction of the house on the property. Moreover,
the trial court was in a better position to evaluate the evidence and assess
the veracity of the parties’ allegations, since it had observed the litigants’
demeanors when they took the stand. The totality of evidence adduced during
trial leads this Court to sustain the trial court’s finding that the property
was, indeed, conjugal.
5. Conjugal Properties; Sale of Conjugal Properties; The Supreme Court (SC) ruled in a number of cases that the
sale of conjugal property by a spouse without the other’s consent is void.-
—This Court, applying those Civil Code provisions, ruled in a
number of cases that the sale of conjugal property by a spouse without the
other’s consent is void. All subsequent transferees of the conjugal property
acquire no rights whatsoever from the conjugal property’s unauthorized sale. A
contract conveying conjugal properties entered into by the husband without the
wife’s consent may be annulled entirely. In Bucoy v. Paulino, 23 SCRA 248
(1968): As the statute now stands, the right of the wife is directed at “the
annulment of any contract,” referring to real property of the conjugal
partnership entered into by the husband “without her consent.” The plain
meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its
entirety, executed by the husband without the wife’s consent, may be annulled
by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such annulment in so far as the
contract shall “prejudice” the wife, such limitation should have been spelled
out in the statute. It is not the legitimate concern of this Court to recast
the law. As Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court and Judge Ricardo C.
Puno of the Court of First Instance correctly stated, “[t]he rule (in the first
sentence of Article 173) revokes Baello v. Villanueva,. . . and Coque v. Navas
Sioca,. . .” in which cases annulment was held to refer only to the extent of
the one-half interest of the wife.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 187225
Counsel:
Laysa, Aceron-Papa, Sayarot & Associates for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals June 17, 2008 Decision and March 23, 2009 Resolution in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 87400 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 9, 2004 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Trece Martires City in Civil Case No. TM-534
is REINSTATED.
Citation Ref:
79. Metro Bottled Water Corporation vs. Andrada Construction &
Development Corporation, Inc., 895 SCRA 217, March 06, 2019
Case Title : METRO BOTTLED WATER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. ANDRADA CONSTRUCTION
& DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC., respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Arbitration ; Construction Arbitration ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
may employ aids in interpretation when there is ambiguity in the contractual
provisions, or when there is no written instrument that can define what was
agreed upon by the parties.-
—The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission may employ
aids in interpretation when there is ambiguity in the contractual provisions,
or when there is no written instrument that can define what was agreed upon by
the parties. Otherwise, it need not do so when the provisions of the contract
on the matter in dispute are already provided.
2. Quasi-Judicial Agencies; Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission; Jurisdiction; The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
was created by Executive Order (EO) No. 1008, or the Construction Industry
Arbitration Law, to have “original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in
construction in the Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the
completion of the contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof.”-
—The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission was created by
Executive Order No. 1008, or the Construction Industry Arbitration Law, to have
“original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected
with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the
Philippines, whether the dispute arises before or after the completion of the
contract, or after the abandonment or breach thereof.” The extent of its
jurisdiction is clearly provided for in the law: The jurisdiction of the CIAC
may include but is not limited to violation of specifications for materials and
workmanship; violation of the terms of agreement; interpretation and/or
application of contractual time and delays; maintenance and defects; payment,
default of employer or contractor and changes in contract cost. Excluded from
the coverage of this law are disputes arising from employer-employee
relationships which shall continue to be covered by the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
3. Construction Industry; Arbitration; Construction Arbitration; The Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction
Arbitration provides more stringent qualifications for arbitrators and
enumerate specific professions that they may hold, such as “engineers,
architects, construction managers, engineering consultants, and businessmen
familiar with the construction industry.”-
—The Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction
Arbitration provides more stringent qualifications for arbitrators and
enumerate specific professions that they may hold, such as “engineers,
architects, construction managers, engineering consultants and businessmen
familiar with the construction industry”: SECTION 8.1. General qualification of
Arbitrators.—The Arbitrators shall be men of distinction in whom the business
sector and the government can have confidence. They shall be technically
qualified to resolve any construction dispute expeditiously and equitably. The
Arbitrators shall come from different professions. They may include engineers,
architects, construction managers, engineering consultants and businessmen
familiar with the construction industry and lawyers who are experienced in
construction disputes. The Construction Industry Arbitration Law even allows
the appointment of experts if requested by the parties or by the arbitral
tribunal: SECTION 15. Appointment of Experts.—The services of technical or
legal experts may be utilized in the settlement of disputes if requested by any
of the parties or by the Arbitral Tribunal. If the request for an expert is
done by either or by both of the parties, it is necessary that the appointment
of the expert be confirmed by the Arbitral Tribunal. Whenever the parties
request for the services of an expert, they shall equally shoulder the expert’s
fees and expenses, half of which shall be deposited with the Secretariat before
the expert renders service. When only one party makes the request, it shall
deposit the whole amount required.
4. Same; Same; Same; The law mandates that any resort to arbitration must be
voluntary.-
—The law mandates that any resort to arbitration must be
voluntary. Under the Revised Rules, a party’s refusal to submit to arbitration
may result in the dismissal of the complaint without prejudice to its refiling:
Respondent’s refusal to Answer the Complaint or the filing of a Motion to
Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction shall be deemed a refusal to submit to
arbitration. In either case, the Commission (CIAC) shall dismiss the Complaint
without prejudice to its refiling upon a subsequent submission. x x x Due to
the highly technical nature of proceedings before the Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission, as well as its emphasis on the parties’ willingness to
submit to the proceedings, the Construction Industry Arbitration Law provides
for a narrow ground by which the arbitral award can be questioned in a higher
tribunal. Section 19 states: SECTION 19. Finality of Awards.—The arbitral award
shall be binding upon the parties. It shall be final and inappealable except on
questions of law which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court.
5. Same; Same; Same; The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
has since been categorized as a quasi-judicial agency in Metro Construction,
Inc. v. Chatham Properties, Inc., 365 SCRA 697 (2001).-
—The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission has since been
categorized as a quasi-judicial agency in Metro Construction, Inc. v. Chatham
Properties, Inc., 365 SCRA 697 (2001): [The Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission] is a quasi-judicial agency. A quasi-judicial agency or body has
been defined as an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making. The very definition of an administrative agency
includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing
variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the
need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling
for technical knowledge and speed in count controversies which cannot possibly
be handled by regular courts. The CIAC’s primary function is that of a
quasi-judicial agency, which is to adjudicate claims and/or determine rights in
accordance with procedures set forth in E.O. No. 1008.
6. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Appeal from Decisions of Quasi-Judicial
Agencies; To standardize appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that appeals “may be taken to the Court of Appeals (CA) within the period and
in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.-
—To standardize appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that appeals “may be taken to the
Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether
the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law.” The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission is among the
quasi-judicial agencies explicitly listed in the rule. While there is
uniformity between appeals of the different quasi-judicial agencies, Rule 43
does not automatically apply to all appeals of arbitral awards. Fruehauf
Electronics Philippines Corporation v. Technology Electronics Assembly and
Management Pacific Corporation, 810 SCRA 280 (2016), has since distinguished
between commercial arbitration, construction arbitration and voluntary
arbitration under Article 219(n) of the Labor Code. Fruehauf Electronics
Philippines Corporation declared that commercial arbitration tribunals are not
quasi-judicial agencies, but “purely ad hoc bodies operating through
contractual consent and as they intend to serve private, proprietary
interests.” A commercial arbitration tribunal is a “creature of contract” that
becomes functus officio once the arbitral award attains finality.
7. Same; Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that appeals of arbitral awards by the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) may only be allowed on pure
questions of law.-
—The general rule is that appeals of arbitral awards by the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission may only be allowed on pure
questions of law. Even the Construction Industry Arbitration Law does not
provide for any instance when an arbitral award may be vacated. Spouses David
v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, 435 SCRA 654 (2004),
recognized this gap, and thus, applied the provisions of Republic Act No. 876,
or the Arbitration Law: [F]actual findings of construction arbitrators are
final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal, except when
the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by
corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or
corruption of the arbitrators or of any of them; (3) the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as
such under section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from
disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the
rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.
8. Same; Same; Same; “Question of Law” and “Question of Facts,” Distinguished.-
—The difference between a question of law and a question of fact
is settled. In Spouses David: There is a question of law when the doubt or
difference in a given case arises as to what the law is on a certain set of
facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. Thus, for a question to be one of law, it must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the parties and there must be no doubt as to the veracity or falsehood of the
facts alleged.
9. Arbitration; Construction Arbitration; Liquidated Damages; Liquidated damages may be awarded if the contract provides
for a monetary compensation in case of breach.-
—Petitioner further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in
not finding that it was entitled to liquidated damages since respondent
allegedly committed delay in completing the project. Liquidated damages may be
awarded if the contract provides for a monetary compensation in case of breach.
The contractor must agree to pay the owner in case there is delay. Thus, this
provision must be embodied in the contract. A perusal of the Construction
Agreement, however, shows that no such stipulation was provided.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 202430
Counsel:
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioners. Solo V. Tibe for
respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The March 21, 2012 Decision
and June 25, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
70562, as well as the April 24, 2002 Arbitral Award of the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission in CIAC Case No. 30-2001, are AFFIRMED.
Petitioner Metro Bottled Water Corporation is ordered to pay respondent Andrada
Construction & Development Corporation, Inc. the amount of P4,607,523.40,
with legal interest of twelve percent (12%) to be computed from November 24,
2000 to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) from July 1, 2013 until its full
satisfaction. The total amount payable shall also be subject to interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until its
full satisfaction.
Citation Ref:
80. Heirs of Renato P. Dragon vs. Manila Banking Corporation, 895
SCRA 259, March 06, 2019
Case Title : HEIRS OF RENATO P. DRAGON, represented by PATRICIA ANGELI D.
NUBLA, petitioners, vs. THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Jurisdiction ; Docket
Fees ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule on after-judgment liens applies to instances of incorrectly
assessed or paid filing fees, or where the court has discretion to fix the
amount to be awarded.-
—The rule on after-judgment liens applies to instances of
incorrectly assessed or paid filing fees, or where the court has discretion to
fix the amount to be awarded. In Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Banque
Nationale de Paris, 460 SCRA 260 (2005): In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag, in
interpreting the third rule laid down in Sun Insurance regarding awards of
claims not specified in the pleading, this Court held that the same refers only
to damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading as to
which the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. . . . The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or
before the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be specified. While
it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective
damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the
parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of
which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment
of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not
specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the
court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant
to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
2. Civil Law; Novation; Prescription; The existence of novation and prescription of an action is
a question of fact not cognizable under a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.-
—The existence of novation and prescription of an action is a
question of fact not cognizable under a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. To determine if there was novation, the facts on
record must be examined to show if the elements are present. Here, the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that there was no
novation of the Promissory Notes.
3. Same; Same; Novation must be clear and unequivocal, and is never
presumed.-
—Novation must be clear and unequivocal, and is never presumed.
It is the burden of the party asserting that novation has taken place to prove
that all the elements exist.
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; The general rule is that the issue of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.-
—The general rule is that the issue of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel. A party is only estopped from raising the issue when it
does so “in an unjustly belated manner especially when it actively participated
during trial.”
5. Same; Same; Same; Docket Fees; Under Rule 141, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, filing
fees must be paid in full at the time an initiatory pleading or application is
filed. Payment is indispensable for jurisdiction to vest in a court.-
—Under Rule 141, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, filing fees
must be paid in full at the time an initiatory pleading or application is
filed. Payment is indispensable for jurisdiction to vest in a court. The amount
must be paid in full. Nonethe, in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 115 SCRA 193 (1982),
despite insufficient payment of filing fees, a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession was deemed docketed as there had been an “honest
difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid[.]”However, this
Court declined to apply Magaspi in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987). There, the counsel deliberately did not
specify the amount of damages in the complaint’s prayer even though at least
P78 million was alleged in the body. It later even amended the same complaint
to remove all mentions of damages in the body.
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; For actions involving recovery of money or damages, the
aggregate amount claimed should be the basis for assessment of docket fees.-
—For actions involving recovery of money or damages, the
aggregate amount claimed should be the basis for assessment of docket fees. In
Tacay v. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, 180 SCRA 433 (1989):
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket
fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only
of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should,
according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, “specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and
said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case.” Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading
sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise statement
of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will
“not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.”
In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to
which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the
Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees
provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is
where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid
are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a
reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof,
and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take
cognizance of the action, un in the meantime prescription has set in and
consequently barred the right of action.
7. Same; Same; Same; Same; The basis for the assessment of the filing fees for
respondent’s Complaint should not have been only the principal amounts due on
the loans, but also the accrued interests, penalties, and attorney’s fees.-
—The basis for the assessment of the filing fees for
respondent’s Complaint should not have been only the principal amounts due on
the loans, but also the accrued interests, penalties, and attorney’s fees.
These amounts should have all been specified in both the Complaint’s body and
prayer.
8. Same; Same; Same; Same; The payment of correct docket fees cannot be made
contingent on the result of the case.-
—What respondent forgets is that the payment of correct docket
fees cannot be made contingent on the result of the case. Otherwise, the
government and the judiciary would sustain tremendous losses, as these fees
“take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of cost of
supplies, use of equipmen[t], salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc.,
computed as to man hours used in handling of each case.” Concededly, Rule 141,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court states: SEC. 2. Fees in lien.—Where the court
in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from,
or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the
additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction
of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding
fees.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 205068
Counsel:
Morales, Rojas & Risos-Vidal for petitioners. Puyat, Jacinto & Santos
for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals’ June 27, 2012 Decision and December 5, 2012 Resolution in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 92266 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 7, 1999
Complaint filed by respondent The Manila Banking Corporation before the
Regional Trial Court is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction due to nonpayment of
filing fees.
Citation Ref:
81. Tupaz vs. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, 895
SCRA 294, March 06, 2019
Case Title : MARIA SHIELA HUBAHIB TUPAZ, petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS; ATTY. FERNANDO ABELLA, REGISTER OF DEEDS; and
MACRINA ESPINA, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act ;
Causing Injury to Any Party Including the Government ;
Syllabi:
1. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Causing Injury to Any Party Including
the Government; Elements of.-
—Accordingly, a violation of Section 3(e) is deemed to have
occurred when the following elements are demonstrated: (1) the offender is a
public officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer’s
official, administrative or judicial functions; (3) the act was done through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Probable cause for the filing of an information is a
matter which rests on likelihood rather than on certainty.-
—Probable cause for the filing of an information is “a matter
which rests on likelihood rather than on certainty. It relies on common sense
rather than on ‘clear and convincing evidence.’”
3. Same; Same; Same; The determination of probable cause is an executive, not a
judicial, function. It is generally not for a court to disturb the conclusion
made by a public prosecutor.-
—The determination of probable cause is an executive, not a
judicial, function. It is generally not for a court to disturb the conclusion
made by a public prosecutor. This is grounded on the basic principle of
separation of powers. However, “grave abuse of discretion taints a public
prosecutor’s resolution if he [or she] arbitrarily disregards the
jurisprudential parameters of probable cause.” In such cases, consistent with
the principle of checks and balances among the three (3) branches of
government, a writ of certiorari may be issued to undo the prosecutor’s
iniquitous determination.
4. Same; Same; Same; Policy of Noninterference; In keeping with the basic precept of judicial
noninterference, “not even the Supreme Court (SC) can order the prosecution of
a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case.”-
—Assessing the evidence before them, public prosecutors are
vested “with a wide range of discretion, the discretion of whether, what and
whom to charge[.]”As such, “[t]he prosecuting attorney cannot be compelled to
file a particular criminal information.” Public prosecutors are not bound to
adhere to a party’s apparent determination of the specific crime for which a
person shall stand trial. Their discretion “include[s] the right to determine
under which laws prosecution will be pursued. Thus, in Uy v. People, 564 SCRA
542 (2008), the petitioner’s indictment and eventual conviction for estafa was
sustained despite his protestations that “the private complainant’s demand
letter,. . . indicates that the demand was for alleged violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.” In keeping with the basic precept of judicial
noninterference, “not even the Supreme Court can order the prosecution of a
person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support
at least a prima facie case.” In People v. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748 (1967), this
Court sustained the public prosecutor and issued a writ of certiorari,
invalidating the orders of Court of First Instance Judge Hernando Pineda, which
compelled the prosecutor to drop four (4) out of the five (5) cases which the
prosecutor had filed since, according to Judge Pineda, “the acts complained of
‘stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by
different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore
be treated as one crime to the series of shots killed more than one victim[.]’”
5. Same; Same; Same; Determining probable cause must be made in reference to
the elements of the crime charged.-
—Determining probable cause must be made in reference to the
elements of the crime charged. “This is based on the principle that every crime
is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no
criminal offense.” Appraising probable cause for a violation of Section 3(e) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act must begin with the text of Section
3(e): SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby
declared to be unlawful: . . . . (e) Causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. Nos. 212491-92
Counsel:
Atty. Napoleon Uy Galit and Associates Law Offices for petitioner. Rosah Leah
L. Tepace-Estudillo for respondent Macrina Espiña.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed April 23, 2013
Consolidated Evaluation Report and November 5, 2013 Order issued in
OMB-V-C-13-0098 by public respondent Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
are SET ASIDE insofar as they dismissed the criminal charge against private
respondents Atty. Fernando M. Abella and Macrina Espina for violating Section
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Public respondent is directed
to file before the proper court the necessary information for violation of
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against private
respondents.
Citation Ref:
82. People vs. Noah, 895 SCRA 399, March 06, 2019
Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LINA
ACHIENG NOAH, accused-appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ; Illegal
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Illegal Transportation of Dangerous
Drugs; It must be stressed that the act of
transporting illegal drugs is a malum prohibitum. Consequently, proof of
ownership and intent are not essential elements of the crime.-
—In the ordinary course of business, check-in officers attach
airline bag tags to the owner’s check-in lug
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Transportation of Dangerous
Drugs; Elements of.-
—To sustain a conviction for the crime of illegal transportation
of dangerous drugs, the transportation and the identity and integrity of the
seized drugs must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The illegal transportation
of dangerous drugs is punished under Section 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act: SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals.—The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, un authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regard of the quantity and purity involved, or
shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. The essential element for
the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is the movement of the
dangerous drug from one (1) place to another. To establish the accused’s guilt,
it must be proven that: (1) the transportation of illegal drugs was committed;
and (2) the prohibited drug exists.
3. Same; Same; Same; Proof of ownership of the dangerous drugs seized is
immaterial. What is important is that the prosecution prove the act of
transporting as well as the identity and integrity of the seized drugs.-
—Proof of ownership of the dangerous drugs seized is immaterial.
What is important is that the prosecution prove the act of transporting as well
as the identity and integrity of the seized drugs. This is because the
confiscated drug is the corpus delicti of the crime. Since it is not readily
identifiable by sight or touch and may be easily tampered with, its
preservation is paramount. The chain of custody ensures that there would be no
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence.
4. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Words and Phrases; Chain of custody is the duly recorded authorized movements
and custody of seized items at each stage, from seizure to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.-
—Chain of custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and
custody of seized items at each stage, from seizure to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record
of movements and custody of seized items shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date
and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
5. Same; Same; Same; Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 10640, provides the standard for the custody
and disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia, spelling out the requirements for custody prior to the filing of
a criminal case.-
—Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended
by Republic Act No. 10640, provides the standard for the custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia, spelling out the requirements for custody prior to the filing of
a criminal case.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 228880
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney’s
Office for accused-appellant.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals’ July
29, 2016 Decision in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07006 is AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
83. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Heirs of
Redemptor and Elisa Abucay, 896 SCRA 109, March 12, 2019
Case Title : THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
THE DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGION VIII, THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER
OF PROVINCE OF LEYTE, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF TABANGO, LEYTE, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEYTE, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF REDEMPTOR AND ELISA
ABUCAY, namely: RENA B. ABUCAY, RHEA B. ABUCAY-BEDUYA, RIS B. ABUCAY-BUANTE,
ELVER B. ABUCAY, REDELISA ABUCAY-AGUSTIN, RHOTA B. ABUCAY, herein represented
by attorney-in-fact RENA B. ABUCAY, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform ; Jurisdiction ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform; Jurisdiction; View that with the passage on August 7, 2009 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 9700, further amending RA No. 6657, as amended, cases involving
cancellation of registered Emancipation Patents (EPs), Certificate of Land
Ownerships Awardees (CLOAs), and other agrarian titles, whether raised in an
Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) or an agrarian reform disputes (ARD) case,
are now within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary.-
—With the passage on August 7, 2009 of RA 9700, further amending
RA 6657, as amended, cases involving cancellation of registered EPs, CLOAs, and
other agrarian titles, whether raised in an ALI or an ARD case, are now within
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. Section 24 of RA
6657, as amended by RA 9700, pertinently provides: Section 24. Award to
Beneficiaries.—The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiaries shall
commence from their receipt of a duly registered emancipation patent or
certificate of land ownership award and their actual physical possession of the
awarded land. Such award shall be completed in not more than one hundred eighty
(180) days from the date of registration of the title in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the emancipation patents, the
certificates of land ownership award, and other titles issued under any
agrarian reform program shall be indefeasible and imprescriptible after one (1)
year from its registration with the Office of the Registry of Deeds, subject to
the conditions, limitations and qualifications of this Act, the property
registration decree, and other pertinent laws. The emancipation patents or the
certificates of land ownership award being titles brought under the operation
of the torrens system, are conferred with the same indefeasibility and security
afforded to all titles under the said system, as provided for by Presidential
Decree No. 1529, as amended by Republic Act No. 6732. x x x x All cases
involving the cancellation of registered emancipation patents, certificates of
land ownership award, and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program
are within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR.
(Section 9 of RA 9700) x x x Nonethe, the issue of jurisdiction in this case
shall be settled under the statute and rules in force at the time of the
commencement of the cancellation case.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; It is settled that the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs),
sitting as special agrarian courts, have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the determination of the value of just compensation.-
—It is settled that the Regional Trial Courts, sitting as
special agrarian courts, have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
determination of the value of just compensation. Nonethe, the Department of
Agrarian Reform still exercises primary jurisdiction to preliminarily determine
this value. This is different from determining the validity of property transfer
to the farmer-beneficiaries and, consequently, the validity of the certificates
of title issued to them. When the issue in a case hinges on whether a
beneficiary has made insufficient or no payments for the land awarded to him or
her, primary administrative jurisdiction is under the Department of Agrarian
Reform.
3. Same; Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform; Jurisdiction; All cases involving the cancellation of registered
emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership awards, and other titles
issued under any agrarian reform program are now within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary.-
—Indeed, per the rules it has promulgated, the Department of
Agrarian Reform has taken cognizance of cases involving either the issuance or
cancellation of certificates of land ownership award and emancipation patents.
Cases involving registered certificates of land ownership awards, emancipation
patents, and titles emanating from them are agrarian reform disputes, of which
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board takes cognizance.
Meanwhile, cases involving unregistered ones are agrarian law implementation
cases, put under the jurisdiction of the Regional Directors and the Secretary
of the Department of Agrarian Reform. In 2009, however, Congress amended the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law through Republic Act No. 9700. Under the new
Section 24, all cases involving the cancellation of registered emancipation
patents, certificates of land ownership awards, and other titles issued under
any agrarian reform program are now within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary. He or she takes jurisdiction
over cases involving the cancellation of titles issued under any agrarian
reform program, whether registered with the Land Registration Authority or not.
Here, the doctrine should be read amid the ambient facts and without prejudice
to a future case that will deal with transfer certificates of title, considering
the relevant statutes, as well as the equal protection and social justice
provisions of the Constitution.
4. Same; Agrarian Disputes; Words and Phrases; Section 3(d) of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) defines agrarian dispute as those relating to tenurial arrangements,
including leasehold and tenancy.-
—It is “not sufficient that the controversy [simply] involves
the cancellation of a [certificate of land ownership award] already registered
with the Land Registration Authority. What is of primordial consideration is
the existence of an agrarian dispute between the parties.” Section 3(d) of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law defines agrarian dispute as those relating to
tenurial arrangements, including leasehold and tenancy. Thus: SECTION 3.
Definitions.—For the purpose of this Act, un the context indicates otherwise: .
. . . (d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this
Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or or and ee.
5. Same; Tenancy; Tenancy is a real right that is attached to the land and
survives the sale.-
—Tenancy is a real right that is attached to the land and
survives the sale. As such, when Spouses Abucay purchased the land from
Cabahug, they were subrogated to the rights and obligations of Cabahug as an
agricultural landowner. Respondents, being the land buyers’ heirs, were
likewise subrogated to these rights and obligations. A tenancy relationship exists
between respondents and the farmer-beneficiaries. Still, the controversy must
relate to the tenurial arrangement between the parties for the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board to properly take cognizance of the case.
Here, the controversy does not involve negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange the tenurial arrangement’s terms or conditions.
Respondents alleged that emancipation patents should not have been issued to
begin with since no notice of coverage was sent to Cabahug. In other words,
they contend that the property was not properly acquired through the Operation
Land Transfer Program. The controversy involves the administrative
implementation of the agrarian reform program, which, as mentioned, is under
the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary’s jurisdiction.
6. Same; Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform; Jurisdiction; With the enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 9700, the
exclusive and original jurisdiction over cases for cancellation of registered
emancipation patents now belongs to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Secretary.-
—With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9700, the exclusive and
original jurisdiction over cases for cancellation of registered emancipation
patents now belongs to the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary. In line
with this, the Department of Agrarian Reform has issued Administrative Order
No. 07-14, which outlines in Article III the procedure for the cancellation of
registered emancipation patents, certificates of land ownership awards, and
other agrarian titles. The petition for cancellation shall be filed before the
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, which would then
undertake the case buildup before forwarding it to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Secretary for decision. Thus, under Administrative Order No. 07-14, the
Complaint for cancellation of original certificates of title and emancipation
patents filed by respondents should be referred to the Office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Leyte for case buildup. Then, the case shall be
decided by the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary.
7. Agrarian Reform; Agrarian Reform Disputes; Agrarian Law Implementation; View that an agrarian reform disputes (ARD) case
essentially involves an agrarian dispute which, as defined by Section 3(d) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, as amended, refers “to any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.” On the other hand, an agrarian law implementation (ALI) case
refers to matters involving the administrative implementation of RA No. 6657
and other agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative
orders, i.e., matters relating to the scope of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) coverage and the protests/oppositions/petitions for
lifting/exemption/exclusion from such coverage, exercise of right of retention
by landowners, and application for conversion of agricultural lands to
nonagricultural uses, etc.-
—On July 22, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Executive Order No. (EO) 229 vesting the DAR with: (a) the primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform disputes (ARD); and (b) the
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving agrarian law implementation
(ALI) except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department
of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). To be sure, an ARD case essentially involves an agrarian dispute which,
as defined by Section 3(d) of RA 6657, as amended, refers “to any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers’ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements.” On the other hand, an ALI case refers to matters
involving the administrative implementation of RA 6657 and other agrarian laws
as enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders, i.e., matters
relating to the scope of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage
and the protests/oppositions/petitions for lifting/exemp-tion/exclusion from
such coverage, exercise of right of retention by landowners, and application
for conversion of agricultural lands to nonagricultural uses, etc.
Subsequently, the DAR’s primary adjudicatory jurisdiction over ARD cases was
transferred to the DARAB, which was created pursuant to EO 129-A. Neverthe, the
exclusive original jurisdiction over ALI cases (except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR) was retained with the DAR.
8. Same; Same; Same; View that the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) adopted its Rules for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.
Accordingly, the DAR assigned to the Regional Director the task of resolving
ALI cases at the first level, except when a separate special rule vests primary
jurisdiction in a different DAR office; For its part, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) adopted its Rules of Procedure delegating to the
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (RARADs) and the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicators (PARADs) (DARAB Adjudicators) the authority to hear,
determine and adjudicate all agrarian reform disputes (ARD) cases, and
incidents in connection therewith, arising within their assigned territorial
jurisdiction, and reserved for itself the appellate jurisdiction over the DARAB
Adjudicators’ resolution, decision or final order that completely disposes of
the case.-
—Pursuant to its power to issue rules and regulations,
substantive and procedural, to carry out the objects and purposes of RA 6657,
as amended, the DAR adopted its Rules for ALI Cases. Accordingly, the DAR
assigned to the Regional Director the task of resolving ALI cases at the first
level, except when a separate special rule vests primary jurisdiction in a
different DAR office. The ruling of the Regional Director was expressly made
appealable to the DAR Secretary, who, however, may delegate the resolution of
such appeals to any Undersecretary. For its part, the DARAB adopted its Rules
of Procedure delegating to the RARADs and the PARADs (DARAB Adjudicators) the
authority to hear, determine and adjudicate all ARD cases, and incidents in
connection therewith, arising within their assigned territorial jurisdiction,
and reserved for itself the appellate jurisdiction over the DARAB Adjudicators’
resolution, decision or final order that completely disposes of the case.
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 186432
Counsel:
Seares-Del Rosario, Mangubat & Seares Law Firm for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Review on Certiorari are GRANTED.
The September 26, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB-S.P.
No. 02637, the May 10, 2006 Decision and February 27, 2007 Resolution of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 13978, and
the June 16, 2005 Decision of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in DARAB
Case No. R-0800-0015-04 are all SET ASIDE. The Complaint for cancellation of
original certificates of title and emancipation patents dated April 26, 2004 is
REFERRED to the Office of the Provincial ian Reform Adjudicator of Leyte for
case buildup and decision by the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary.
Citation Ref:
84. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Franco, 896 SCRA
148, March 12, 2019
Case Title : LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LUCY GRACE and
ELMA GLORIA FRANCO, represented by Attorney-in-Fact VICENTE GUSTILLO, JR.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Just Compensation ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; The landowner shall receive thirty-five percent (35%) of
the just compensation in cash, while the remaining sixty-five percent (65%)
shall be paid in bonds if the aggregate area acquired by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) is below twenty-four (24) hectares. However, if the
landowner voluntarily offers their land to the DAR, as in this case, the
landowner shall be entitled to an additional five percent (5%) only on the cash
portion.-
—The landowner shall receive 35% of the just compensation in
cash, while the remaining 65% shall be paid in bonds if the aggregate area
acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform is below 24 hectares. However, if
the landowner voluntarily offers their land to the Department of Agrarian
Reform, as in this case, the landowner shall be entitled to an additional five
percent (5%) only on the cash portion. Therefore, instead of receiving only 35%
in cash, the landowner shall now receive 40% in cash and 60% in bonds.
2. Agrarian Reform; Special Agrarian Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; Regional trial courts (RTCs), sitting as special agrarian
courts (SACs), have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for
the determination of just compensation to landowners, as well as the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL).-
—In light of these developments, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, vested in regional trial courts exclusive
and original jurisdiction of civil actions and special proceedings under the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian relations.
Section 56, in relation to Section 57 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
confers “special jurisdiction” on special agrarian courts. Regional trial
courts, sitting as special agrarian courts, have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, as well as the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. In contrast to the special agrarian courts,
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board only has preliminary
administrative determination of just compensation.
3. Same; Just Compensation; Words and Phrases; Just compensation is “the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator.”-
—Just compensation is “the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator.” The measure of the taking
“is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss.” The term “just” intensifies the
term “compensation” to obtain a real, substantial, full, and ample equivalent
for the property taken. The jurisdiction of the trial courts, sitting as special
agrarian courts, is “not any ‘original’
and ‘exclusive’” because the Department of Agrarian Reform passes upon the
question of just compensation first. “[J]udicial proceedings are not a
continuation of the administrative determination. . . the law may provide that
the decision of the [Department of Agrarian Reform] is final and unappealable.
Neverthe, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts
are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.” This Court has
long held that settlement of the value of just compensation is judicial in
nature.
4. Same; Special Agrarian Courts; Jurisdiction; Section 57 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), on the exclusive and original jurisdiction of special agrarian courts,
must be read with Section 16(f).-
—A statute’s provisions should be read in its entirety. Section
57 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, on the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of special agrarian courts, must be read with Section 16(f), which
provides that: SECTION 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.—For
purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be
followed: (a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners
thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place
where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR
to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in
Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof. (b) Within thirty (30)
days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered
mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR
of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. (c) If the landowner accepts the
offer of the DAR, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) shall pay the
landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and
surrenders the Certificate of Title and other monuments of title. (d) In case
of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative
proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the
landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the
just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed
submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days
after it is submitted for decision. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of
the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR
shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries. (f) Any party who
disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper
jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
5. Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation; Special agrarian courts are not merely given appellate
jurisdiction over the findings of administrative agencies. The law has
explicitly vested them with jurisdiction to make a final and binding
determination of just compensation.-
—The use of the word “final” makes the intent of the law clear.
Special agrarian courts are not merely given appellate jurisdiction over the
findings of administrative agencies. The law has explicitly vested them with
jurisdiction to make a final and binding determination of just compensation.
The previous Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 identifies the factors to be
considered for the determination of just compensation: SECTION 17.
Determination of Just Compensation.—In determining just compensation, the cost
of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social
and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered
as additional factors to determine its valuation. x x x To implement Section
17, Administrative Order No. 5 provided the following formula: There shall be
one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or CA: LV = (CNI x
0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1) Where: LV = Land Value CNI = Capitalized Net
Income CS = Comparable Sales MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration.
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; While the formula prescribed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) requires due consideration, the determination of just compensation
shall still be subject to the final decision of the special agrarian court
(SAC).-
—While the formula prescribed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform requires due consideration, the determination of just compensation shall
still be subject to the final decision of the special agrarian court. Most
recently, in Alfonso v. Land Bank, 811 SCRA 27 (2016): For the guidance of the
bench, the bar, and the public, we reiterate the rule: Out of regard for the
DAR’s expertise as the concerned implementing agency, courts should henceforth
consider the factors stated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, as translated
into the applicable DAR formulas in their determination of just compensation
for the properties covered by the said law. If, in the exercise of their
judicial discretion, courts find that a strict application of said formulas is
not warranted under the specific circumstances of the case before them, they
may deviate or depart therefrom, provided that this departure or deviation is
supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record. In
other words, courts of law possess the power to make a final determination of
just compensation. x x x The special agrarian court sitting in a condemnation
action may adopt the value computed using the guidelines promulgated by the
Department of Agrarian Reform. In its exercise of original jurisdiction, the
special agrarian court may deviate from the formulas if it can show that the
value is not equivalent to the fair market value at the time of the taking.
However, an allegation is not enough. The landowner must allege and prove why
the formula provided by the Department of Agrarian Reform does not suffice.
Nonethe, having original and exclusive jurisdiction does not mean that our
courts should be removed from the realities that confront the entire government
bureaucracy and, in so doing, become impervious to the guidelines issued by our
administrative agencies.
7. Same; Just Compensation; As the Supreme Court (SC) held in Alfonso v. Land Bank,
any deviation to the basic formula made in the exercise of judicial discretion
must be “supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on
record.”-
—As this Court held in Alfonso v. Land Bank, any deviation to
the basic formula made in the exercise of judicial discretion must be
“supported by a reasoned explanation grounded on the evidence on record.” A
computation by a court made in “utter and blatant disregard of the factors
spelled out by law and by the implementing rules” amounts to grave abuse of
discretion. It must be struck down. Here, the Special Agrarian Court’s
computation of just compensation resulted in a “double take up” of the market
value per tax declaration of the property. This method of valuation has already
been considered in Palmares as a departure from the mandate of law and basic
administrative guidelines.
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 203242
Counsel:
LBP Legal Services Group for petitioner. Edgardo J. Gil for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’
January 20, 2011 Decision and August 8, 2012 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
03225, which affirmed with modification the September 18, 2007 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Iloilo City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court
in Civil Case No. 00-26367, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The just compensation
to be paid to respondents Lucy Grace Franco and Elma Gloria Franco is Seven
Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Forty-Three
Centavos (P739,461.43), as computed by petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines
and the Department of Agrarian Reform with legal interest of twelve percent
(12%) from the time of taking until June 30, 2013, and legal interest of six
percent (6%) from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction.90
Citation Ref:
85. Marantan vs. Department of Justice, 897 SCRA 1, March
13, 2019
Case Title : POLICE SUPERINTENDENT HANSEL M. MARANTAN, petitioner, vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA,
NATIONAL PROSECUTION SERVICE (represented by PROSECUTOR GENERAL CLARO A.
ARELLANO), and MEMBERS OF THE PANEL OF PROSECUTORS (SENIOR DEPUTY STATE
PROSECUTOR THEODORE VILLANUEVA, CITY PROSECUTOR VIMAR BARCELLANO, ASSISTANT
STATE PROSECUTOR HAZEL DECENA-VALDEZ, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR NIVEN
CANLAPAN, and PROSECUTION ATTORNEY CESAR ANGELO CHAVEZ III), respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Preliminary
Investigation ; Moot and Academic ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Moot and Academic; A petition questioning the preliminary investigation of an
accused becomes moot once an information based on the preliminary investigation
is filed before a trial court, which, in turn, would complete its own
determination of probable cause.-
—A case is rendered moot when, because of supervening events,
this Court is left with no justiciable controversy to resolve, and a
declaration on it would be of no practical use or value. In Secretary De Lima
v. Reyes, 779 SCRA 1 (2016), this Court reiterated its ruling in Crespo v.
Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987), that once an information is filed before a court,
that court acquires jurisdiction over the case. Notably, a petition questioning
the preliminary investigation of an accused becomes moot once an information
based on the preliminary investigation is filed before a trial court, which, in
turn, would complete its own determination of probable cause. After this
judicial determination, the question of an accused’s guilt or innocence would
rest with the trial court’s own sound discretion.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is allowed only for special and
important reasons that must be clearly and specifically set out in the
Petition.-
—Direct invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is allowed only for special and important reasons
that must be clearly and specifically set out in the Petition. In Provincial
Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and
Employment, 872 SCRA 50 (2018), this Court provided circumstances of when it
might take cognizance of a case, despite a failure to exhaust remedies before
the lower courts: For this Court to take cognizance of original actions,
parties must clearly and specifically allege in their petitions the special and
important reasons for such direct invocation. One such special reason is that
the case requires “the proper legal interpretation of constitutional and
statutory provisions.” Cases of national interest and of serious implications,
and those of transcendental importance and of first impression have likewise
been resolved by this Court on the first instance. In exceptional cases, this
Court has also overlooked the rule to decide cases that have been pending for a
sufficient period of time. This Court has resolved original actions which could
have been resolved by the lower courts in the interest of speedy justice and
avoidance of delay. Generally, the rule on hierarchy of courts may be relaxed
when “dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.” For all other cases, the parties must have exhausted the
remedies available before the lower courts. A petition filed in violation of
the doctrine shall be dismissed.
3. Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction is precisely the scope of a petition for certiorari.-
—Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction is precisely the scope of a petition for certiorari. This case is
no such exception that it would merit a direct resort to this Court. This Court
fails to see how public welfare, public policy, or the broader interest of
justice demands the exercise of our jurisdiction here. In the same vein, this
Court does not see why petitioner’s prayer could not have been granted by the
Court of Appeals, which has concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, this case is
4. Same; Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; Petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration
before filing his petition for certiorari. This case is dismissible for
petitioner’s failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.-
—Petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration before
filing his petition for certiorari. This case is dismissible for petitioner’s
failure to exhaust all administrative remedies. Petitioner claims that this
case constitutes an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
reliefs because: (1) the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the
Letter-Denial would be use; (2) he ran the risk of having the motion for
reconsideration being treated as his counter-affidavit and the case being
submitted for resolution; and (3) the prayer for relief as urgent because of
the proximity of the date of the preliminary investigation. These circumstances
do not constitute any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative reliefs.
5. National Bureau of Investigation; Jurisdiction; The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which is under
the Department of Justice (DOJ), was specifically empowered to investigate
crimes and offenses as public interest may require.-
—The National Bureau of Investigation, which is under the
Department of Justice, was specifically empowered to investigate crimes and
offenses as public interest may require. Accordingly, a checkpoint operation
jointly conducted by the police and armed forces personnel, which results in as
many deaths as the Atimonan Encounter, is a matter of public interest proper
for investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation. Moreover, respondent
Department of Justice Secretary De Lima’s assailed statements, as submitted by
petitioner, do not appear to show her bias against petitioner, or that she
conducted the investigation aiming to persecute him. Rather, they reflect an
evolving opinion based on the National Bureau of Investigation’s investigation.
6. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Prima Facie Evidence; During the preliminary investigation, the prosecution only
needs to determine whether it has prima facie evidence to sustain the filing of
the information.-
—The process of preliminary investigation is essentially one
(1)-sided, as it serves only to
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 206354
Counsel:
Faustino S. Tugade, Jr. for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General for
respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is
DISMISSED for being MOOT AND ACADEMIC, and for failure to show that respondents
acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Citation Ref:
86. Regalado vs. People, 897 SCRA 36, March 13, 2019
Case Title : AUGUSTO REGALADO y LAYLAY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ; Chain of Custody
Rule ; Insulating Witnesses ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Insulating Witnesses; The prosecution has “the positive duty to establish that
earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated
under Section 21(1) of [Republic Act (RA) No.] 9165, or that there was a
justifiable ground for failing to do so.”-
—Here, none of the three (3) people required by Section 21(1),
as originally worded, was present during the physical inventory of the seized
items. Moreover, this Court has held that the prosecution has “the positive
duty to establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the
representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of [Republic Act No.] 9165, or
that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so.” Yet, not only did
the prosecution fail to establish that earnest efforts were employed in
securing the presence of the three (3) witnesses; it did not even bother to
offer any justification for the law enforcers’ deviation from the law’s
requirements. Since preliminaries do not appear on record, this Court cannot
speculate why the law enforcers neglected the simple rules in the conduct of a
buy-bust operation. Nonethe, police officers are reminded that lapses like this
— absent any justifiable ground — cast doubt on the integrity of the seized
items and can be fatal to the prosecution’s cause.
2. Findings of Fact; The Supreme Court (SC) accords great respect to the trial
court’s findings, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). An
exception is when either or both of the lower courts “overlooked or
misconstrued substantial facts which could have affected the outcome of the
case.”-
—Generally, “the findings of fact by the trial court, when
affirmed by the [Court of Appeals], are given great weight and credence on
review.” This is because the trial court “is in the best position to assess the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses, their demeanor, conduct and attitude on
the witness stand.” Hence, this Court accords great respect to the trial
court’s findings, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. An
exception is when either or both of the lower courts “overlooked or
misconstrued substantial facts which could have affected the outcome of the
case.”
3. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—As for the conviction of illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
the following elements must be established: “(1) the accused was in possession
of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2)
such possession is not authorized by law and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.”
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 216632
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ January
29, 2015 Decision in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 36216 is AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
87. People vs. Ameril, 897 SCRA 52, March 13, 2019
Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LAH-MODIN
AMERIL y ABDUL @ “AMOR/MHONG,” accused-appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Presumption of Regularity ;
Syllabi:
1. Presumption of Regularity; The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty, which the Court of Appeals (CA) relied on in its Decision,
stands only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the
regularity of the performance of official duty.-
—This Court has stressed that the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty, which the Court of Appeals relied on in its
Decision, “stands only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt
the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance
the presumption of regularity will not be stronger than the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused.”
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—In sustaining a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
“the following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the
transaction or sale took place[;] and (2) the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.”
3. Same; Same; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; The illegal drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of
the offense. Its existence must be-
—The illegal drug itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the
offense. Its existence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. “Proof beyond
reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in establishing
the corpus delicti. The chain of custody rule performs this function as it
ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.” Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended by Republic Act No.
10640, outlines the procedure that police officers must follow in handling
seized illegal drugs: SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment.—The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/para-phernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner: (1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrant
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 222192
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney’s
Office for accused-appellant.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ April 20, 2015 Decision in
C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05502 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Lahmodin Ameril y Abdul @ “Amor/Mhong” is ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention, un he is confined for some other lawful
cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within
five (5) days from receipt of this Decision. For their information, copies
shall also be furnished to the Director General of the Philippine National
Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency. Let
entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
Citation Ref:
88. Manibog vs. People, 897 SCRA 565, March 20, 2019
Case Title : LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Arrests ;
Warrant Arrests ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Arrests; Warrant Arrests; A reasonable suspicion is not synonymous with the personal
knowledge required under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a valid warrant arrest.-
—The tip on petitioner, coupled with the police officers’ visual
confirmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in his waistband,
led to a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun
ban. However, a reasonable suspicion is not synonymous with the personal
knowledge required under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a valid warrant arrest.
Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the search conducted on
petitioner fell under the established exception of a warrant search incidental
to a lawful arrest. Nonethe, the combination of the police asset’s tip and the
arresting officers’ observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner’s shirt
already suffices as a genuine reason for the arresting officers to conduct a
stop and frisk search on petitioner. Hence, the trial court correctly upheld
the reasonableness of the warrant search on petitioner.
2. Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; Illegal Searches and Seizures; Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for
the inviolability of a person’s right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.-
—Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the
inviolability of a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures:
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
3. Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that a search and
seizure must be carried out through a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure violates the
Constitution.-
—The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried
out through a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure violates the
Constitution. Any evidence resulting from it “shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.” However, the constitutional proscription only
covers unreasonable searches and seizures. Jurisprudence has recognized
instances of reasonable warrant searches and seizures, which are: 1. Warrant
search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; 2. Seizure of evidence in “plain
view,” the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the
valid warrant arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent, and (d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity; 4. Consented warrant search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and
Frisk; and 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
4. Same; Same; Arrests; Warrant Arrests; For valid warrant arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the
arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the offense.-
—For valid warrant arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the
arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the offense. The difference
is that under Section 5(a), the arresting officer must have personally
witnessed the crime; meanwhile, under Section 5(b), the arresting officer must
have had probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed an
offense. Nonethe, whether under Section 5(a) or (b), the lawful arrest
generally precedes, or is substantially contemporaneous, with the search. In
direct contrast with warrant searches incidental to a lawful arrest, stop and
frisk searches are conducted to deter crime. People v. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427
(2014), underscored that they are necessary for law enforcement, though never
at the expense of violating a citizen’s right to privacy.
5. Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; Stop and Frisk Searches; For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer
must have had personal knowledge of facts, which would engender a reasonable
degree of suspicion of an illicit act.-
—For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer must
have had personal knowledge of facts, which would engender a reasonable degree
of suspicion of an illicit act. Cogaed emphasized that anything than the arresting officer’s personal observation
of a suspicious circumstance as basis for the search is an infringement of the
“basic right to security of one’s person and effects.”
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 211214
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Petitioner
Larry Sabuco Manibog is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from one (1) year and six (6) months as minimum to two (2) years as maximum,
and is DISQUALIFIED from applying for probation. He is further DISQUALIFIED
from holding public office and DEPRIVED of the right to suffrage. The subject
firearm is CONFISCATED and FORFEITED in favor of the government.
Citation Ref:
89. Tan vs. Great Harvest Enterprises, Inc., 897 SCRA
586, March 20, 2019
Case Title : ANNIE TAN, petitioner, vs. GREAT HARVEST ENTERPRISES, INC.,
respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Common Carriers ; Liability of Common
Carriers ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Liability of Common Carriers; Article 1734 of the Civil Code holds a
common carrier fully responsible for the goods entrusted to him or her; Exceptions.-
—Article 1734 of the Civil Code holds a common carrier fully
responsible for the goods entrusted to him or her, un there is enough evidence
to show that the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods falls under
any of the enumerated exceptions: ARTICLE 1734. Common carriers are responsible
for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, un the same is due to
any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or
other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether
international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the
goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; The Rules of Court is categorical that only questions of
law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45, as the Supreme Court (SC)
is not a trier of facts.-
—The Rules of Court is categorical that only questions of law
may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45, as this Court is not a trier of
facts. Further, factual findings of appellate courts, when supported by
substantial evidence, are binding upon this Court. However, these rules do
admit of exceptions. In particular, petitioner referred to the exception
“[w]hen the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts” to justify the
questions of fact in her Petition for Review on Certiorari.
3. Civil Law; Common Carriers; Words and Phrases; Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as
“persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public.”-
—Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines common carriers as
“persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of
carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air,
for compensation, offering their services to the public.” The Civil Code
outlines the degree of diligence required of common carriers in Articles 1733,
1755, and 1756: ARTICLE 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. . . . .
ARTICLE 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. ARTICLE 1756. In
case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, un they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
4. Same; Same; Extraordinary Diligence; Due to the public nature of their business, common carriers
are compelled to exercise extraordinary diligence since they will be burdened
with the externalities or the cost of the consequences of their contract of
carriage if they fail to take the precautions expected of them.-
—Law and economics provide the policy justification of our
existing jurisprudence. The extraordinary diligence required by the law of
common carriers is primarily due to the nature of their business, with the
public policy behind it geared toward achieving allocative efficiency between the
parties to the transaction. Allocative efficiency is an economic term that
describes an optimal market where customers are willing to pay for the goods
produced. Thus, both consumers and producers benefit and stability is achieved.
The notion of common carriers is synonymous with public service under
Commonwealth Act No. 146 or the Public Service Act. Due to the public nature of
their business, common carriers are compelled to exercise extraordinary
diligence since they will be burdened with the externalities or the cost of the
consequences of their contract of carriage if they fail to take the precautions
expected of them.
5. Same; Same; Contract of Carriage; A contract of carriage is structured in such a way that
passengers or shippers surrender total control over their persons or goods to
common carriers, fully trusting that the latter will safely and timely deliver
them to their destination.-
—Common carriers are mandated to internalize or shoulder the
costs under the contracts of carriage. This is so because a contract of
carriage is structured in such a way that passengers or shippers surrender
total control over their persons or goods to common carriers, fully trusting
that the latter will safely and timely deliver them to their destination. In
light of this inherently inequitable dynamics — and the potential harm that
might befall passengers or shippers if common carriers exercise than extraordinary diligence — the law is
constrained to intervene and impose sanctions on common carriers for the parties
to achieve allocative efficiency. Here, petitioner is a common carrier
obligated to exercise extraordinary diligence over the goods entrusted to her.
Her responsibility began from the time she received the soya beans from
respondent’s broker and would only cease after she has delivered them to the
consignee or any person with the right to receive them.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 220400
Counsel:
Ortega, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma & Carbonell for petitioner. Young Law Office
for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Petitioner Annie Tan is
directed to pay respondent Great Harvest Enterprises, Inc. the sum of Two
Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P230,000.00) with interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from June 2, 1994 until June 30, 2013, and at the rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until its full satisfaction.
She is further directed to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney’s
fees and the costs of suit.
Citation Ref:
90. Ha Datu Tawahig vs. Lapinid, 897 SCRA 602, March 20,
2019
Case Title : HA DATU TAWAHIG (RODERICK D. SUMATRA), TRIBAL CHIEFTAIN,
HIGAONON TRIBE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE CEBU CITY PROSECUTOR I LINETH
LAPINID, CEBU CITY PROSECUTOR II FERNANDO GUBALANE, ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
ERNESTO NARIDO, JR., CEBU CITY PROSECUTOR NICOLAS SELLON, and THE HONORABLE
JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 12, CEBU CITY ESTELA ALMA SINGCO,
respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Mandamus.
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Indigenous People ;
Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Indigenous People; The basic precepts underlying crimes and criminal actions
make it improper for the State to yield “disputes” involving criminal offenses
to indigenous peoples’ customary laws and practices.-
—The basic precepts underlying crimes and criminal actions make
it improper for the State to yield “disputes” involving criminal offenses to
indigenous peoples’ customary laws and practices. To yield criminal prosecution
would be to disregard the State and the Filipino people as the objects of
criminal offenses. The application of customary laws may enable a measure of
reparation for private injuries engendered by criminal offenses, but it will
never enable the consummate recompense owed to the State and the Filipino
people. Ultimately then, yielding prosecution would mean sanctioning a
miscarriage of justice. It was never the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act’s
intent to facilitate such miscarriage of justice. Its view of self-governance
and empowerment is not myopic, but is one that balances. Preservation is
pursued in the context of national unity and is impelled by harmony with the
national legal system. Customary laws cannot work to undermine penal statutes
designed to address offenses that are an affront to sovereignty.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Hierarchy of Courts; The original jurisdiction the Supreme Court (SC) shares with
the Court of Appeals (CA) and Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) is not a license to
immediately seek relief from this Court.-
—The original jurisdiction this Court shares with the Court of
Appeals and regional trial courts is not a license to immediately seek relief
from this Court. Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus must be
filed in keeping with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is grounded on considerations of judicial economy. In Aala
v. Mayor Uy, 814 SCRA 41 (2017): The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a
practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from directly resorting
to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The logic
behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent “inordinate demands upon
the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within
its exclusive jurisdiction,” as well as to prevent the congestion of the
Court’s dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to “satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter[,]” it must remain as a
“court of last resort.” This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the
“task of dealing with causes in the first instance.” x x x Applying this
doctrine is not merely for practicality; it also ensures that courts at varying
levels act in accord with their respective competencies. The Diocese of Bacolod
v. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 (2015), noted that “[t]he doctrine that
requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to
ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an
effective and efficient manner.”
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; A writ of mandamus may issue in either
of two (2) situations: first, “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station”; second, “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person. . . unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled.”-
—Rule 65, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for instances when recourse to a petition for mandamus is proper:
SECTION 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at
some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done
to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by
the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. The petition
shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. Rule 65, Section 3 indicates that a
writ of mandamus is available in two (2) alternative situations: A writ of
mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations: first, “when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station”; second, “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person. . . unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right
or office to which such other is entitled.”
4. Indigenous People; Appeal from Decisions of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples; Disputes still unresolved despite the exhaustion of
remedies under customary laws governing the parties belonging to the same
indigenous cultural community may be brought to the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP); Decisions
of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of a
petition for review.-
—Falling under Chapter IX of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act,
Section 65 is part of a larger framework on “Jurisdiction and Procedures for
Enforcement of Rights.” This framework enables the application of customary
laws and practices in dispute resolution for Indigenous peoples. Section 66
builds on Section 65. It indicates that disputes still unresolved despite the
exhaustion of remedies under customary laws governing the parties belonging to
the same indigenous cultural community may be brought to the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples. Further building on Sections 65 and 66, Section
67 states that “[d]ecisions of the [National Commission on Indigenous Peoples]
shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review.”
The provisions under Chapter IX do not only lend legitimacy to and enable the
continuing efficacy and viability of customary laws and practices to maintain
order and dispense justice within indigenous cultural communities. They also
work to segregate customary laws and practices in two (2) respects. First, they
make customary laws and practices structurally and operationally distinct from
enactments of the legislature and of those upon whom legislative power has been
delegated, as well as regulations of general application. Second, they
distinguish disputants belonging to the same indigenous cultural communities as
the exclusive objects of the application of customary laws and practices.
5. Same; Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act; With the 1987 Constitution in effect, the Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) was adopted precisely recognizing that indigenous
peoples have been “resistant to political, social, and cultural inroads of
colonization, nonindigenous religions and cultures, and became historically
differentiated from the majority of Filipinos.”-
—The 1987 Constitution reorients the State toward enabling
indigenous peoples to maintain their identity. It declines articulating
policies of integration and assimilation and transcends the 1973 Constitution’s
undertaking to “consider.” Instead, it commits to not only recognize, but also
promote, “the rights of indigenous cultural communities.” It expressly aims to
“preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions.” It
elevates to the level of constitutional text terms such as “ancestral lands”
and “customary laws.” Because the Constitution is the “fundamental and organic
law of the land,” these terms’ inclusion in the Constitution renders them
integral to the Republic’s being. Through the same inclusion, the State
manifestly assents to the distinctiveness of indigenous peoples, and undertakes
obligations concomitant to such assent. With the 1987 Constitution in effect,
the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act was adopted precisely recognizing that
indigenous peoples have been “resistan[t] to political, social[,] and cultural
inroads of colonization, nonindigenous religions and cultures, [and] became
historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos.”
6. Same; Same; Section 15 limits indigenous peoples’ “right to use their
own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace
building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws and practices.”-
—Among the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act’s provisions on
self-governance and empowerment is Section 15: SECTION 15. Justice System,
Conflict Resolution Institutions, and Peace Building Processes.—The ICCs/IPs
shall have the right to use their own commonly accepted justice systems,
conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and
other customary laws and practices within their respective communities and as
may be compatible with the national legal system and with internationally
recognized human rights. x x x Section 15 limits indigenous peoples’ “right to
use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution
institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other customary laws
and practices[.]” It explicitly states that this right is applicable only
“within their respective communities” and only for as long as it is “compatible
with the national legal system and with internationally recognized human
rights.” It is a basic rule of statutory construction that “courts have to take
the thought conveyed by the statute as a whole; construe the constituent parts
together; ascertain the legislative intent from the whole act; consider each
and every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the statute;
and endeavor to make every part effective, harmonious[,] and sensible.” Section
65 ought not be read as an all-encompassing, unqualified authorization. Rather,
it must be viewed within the confines of how it is a component of a larger
mechanism for self-governance. Section 65 is qualified by Section 15. With
respect to dispensing justice, resolving conflicts, and peace-building, the
application of customary laws and practices is permissible only to the extent
that it is in harmony with the national legal system. A set of customary laws
and practices is effective only within the confines of the specific indigenous
cultural community that adopted and adheres to it.
7. Criminal Law; One who commits a crime commits an offense against all the
citizens of the state penalizing a given act or omission: “a criminal offense
is an outrage to the very sovereignty of the State.”-
—A criminal action, where “the State prosecutes a person for an
act or omission punishable by law,” is thus pursued “to maintain social order.”
It “punish[es] the offender in order to deter him [or her] and others from
committing the same or similar offense. . . isolate[s] him [or her] from
society, reform[s] and rehabilitate[s] him [or her].” One who commits a crime
commits an offense against all the citizens of the state penalizing a given act
or omission: “a criminal offense is an outrage to the very sovereignty of the
State[.]” Accordingly, a criminal action is prosecuted in the name of the
“People” as plaintiff. Likewise, a representative of the State, the public
prosecutor, “direct[s] and control[s] the prosecution of [an] offense.” As
such, a public prosecutor is: [T]he representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he [or she] is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 221139
Counsel:
Ernesto E. Narido, Jr. for himself and the Office of the City Prosecutor.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Respondents are directed to
proceed with dispatch in the resolution of Criminal Case No. CBU-81130.
Citation Ref:
91. Jaka Investments Corporation vs. Urdaneta Village Association,
Inc., 899 SCRA 300, April 01, 2019
Case Title : JAKA INVESTMENTS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. URDANETA VILLAGE
ASSOCIATION, INC. and AYALA LAND, INC. (as successor-in-interest of Makati
Development Corporation), respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Administrative Agencies ; Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board ; Jurisdiction ; Intra-Corporate Relations ; Homeowners’ Association ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is the
appropriate government agency to resolve whether the extension of the Deed
Restrictions is valid, and whether petitioner is estopped to question it. It
has the technical expertise to analyze contracts between petitioner and
respondent Association.-
—The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board is the appropriate
government agency to resolve whether the extension of the Deed Restrictions is
valid, and whether petitioner is estopped to question it. It has the technical
expertise to analyze contracts between petitioner and respondent Association.
In Spouses Chua v. Ang, 598 SCRA 229 (2009), this Court declared that the agency,
“[i]n the exercise of its powers . . . is empowered to interpret and apply
contracts, and determine the rights of private parties under these contracts.”
This Court reminds litigants, counsels, and judges alike on the doctrine of
primary administrative jurisdiction. Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc.
instructs: [U]nder the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution
demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.
2. Administrative Agencies; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board; Jurisdiction; In Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc. v. Almendras, 588
SCRA 663 (2009), the Supreme Court (SC) discussed the scope of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board’s (HLURB’s) jurisdiction at length.-
—In Maria Luisa Park Association, Inc. v. Almendras, 588 SCRA
663 (2009), this Court discussed the scope of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board’s jurisdiction at length:
3. Same; Same; Same; Intra-Corporate Relations; Homeowners’ Associations; Intra-corporate Relations Falling under the Jurisdiction
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).-
—To determine if this case falls under the agency’s
jurisdiction, it is necessary to examine whether the controversy arose “from
any of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between and among members
of the association; (2) between any and/or all of them and the association of
which they are members; and (3) between the association and the state insofar
as the controversy concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity.”
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Clearly, the controversy arose from an
intra-corporate relation between an association and its member; Accordingly, it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB), not the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which has jurisdiction over
the case.-
—This Court resolves whether the controversy arose from the
parties’ intra-corporate relation. In its Petition before the trial court,
petitioner sought for the cancellation of the Deed Restrictions annotated in
its lot titles. Petitioner claimed that with the Deed Restrictions’ term expiration,
its legal or contractual basis no longer existed. However, petitioner failed to
disclose that the same Deed Restrictions had already been extended by a vote of
more than two-thirds (2/3) of respondent Association’s members on September 6,
2007, or 10 months before it filed its Petition. Petitioner, then, cannot have
the restrictions canceled without first invalidating the act of respondent
Association in extending the Deed Restrictions’ term. Here, respondent
Association maintains that the extension is valid, while petitioner insists on
its invalidity. Clearly, the controversy arose from an intra-corporate relation
between an association and its member. Even the Regional Trial Court, despite
proceeding with the case, acknowledged in its July 19, 2010 Order that the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board had jurisdiction over the controversy:
Although this Court agrees on the contention of the oppositor [respondent UVAI]
that the issue is intra-corporate, thus, the jurisdiction is lodged in the HLURB,
such issue is now deemed mooted by the fact that the Office of the President
rendered a Decision dated December 29, 2009 in the case of Cesar (sic) Yatco
Real Estate Services, Inc., et al., v. Bel-Air Village Asso., Inc. . . . which
settled the issue and resolved that the Deed of Restrictions had already lapsed
on January 15, 2007. x x x Moreover, the Office of the President later reversed
its Decision in Cezar Yatco. As the Court of Appeals found: Assuming arguendo
that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case, it still erred when it ruled that
the Deed Restrictions cannot be extended by virtue of the Bel-Air case. The
Office of the President on December 29, 2009 reversed and set aside the
decision of the HLURB and ruled that Bel-Air’s Deed Restrictions cannot be
extended by amendment under Article VI of the Deed Restrictions. However, on
May 19, 2011, the said office issued a Resolution reversing and setting aside
its December 29, 2009 decision and reinstated the decision of the HLURB. Hence,
the basis of the decision by the RTC has now become ineffective and the Orders
of the RTC should be disregarded. x x x Accordingly, it is the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board, not the Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over
the case.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. Nos. 204187 and 206606
Counsel:
Cathleen Elizabeth L. Cotay for petitioner. Abes, Mariano & Malong Law
Offices for respondent Urdaneta Village Association. Padilla Law Office for
respondent Ayala Land.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The June 13, 2012 Decision
and October 15, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. Nos.
121443 and 121676 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
92. Kilusang Mayo Uno vs. Aquino III, 899 SCRA 492, April
02, 2019
Case Title : KILUSANG MAYO UNO, represented by its Secretary General
ROGELIO SOLUTA; REP. FERNANDO HICAP for himself and as representative of the
ANAKPAWIS PARTY-LIST; CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, represented by
its Executive Director DAISY ARAGO; JOSELITO USTAREZ and SALVADOR CARRANZA, for
themselves and in representation of the NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR
UNIONS-KMU; NENITA GONZAGA, PRESCILA A. MANIQUIZ, REDEN ALCANTARA, petitioners,
vs. HON. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SOCIAL
SECURITY COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, and EMILIO S. DE QUIROS, JR.,
respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
and Prohibition.
Syllabi Class :Grave Abuse of Discretion ;
Syllabi:
1. Grave Abuse of Discretion; Any act of a government branch, agency, or instrumentality
that violates a statute or a treaty is grave abuse of discretion.-
—Grave abuse of discretion denotes a “capricious, arbitrary[,]
and whimsical exercise of power. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as not to act at all in contemplation of law,
or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
of passion or hostility.” Any act of a government branch, agency, or
instrumentality that violates a statute or a treaty is grave abuse of
discretion. However, grave abuse of discretion pertains to acts of discretion
exercised in areas outside an agency’s granted authority and, thus, abusing the
power granted to it. Moreover, it is the agency’s exercise of its power that is
examined and adjudged, not whether its application of the law is correct. Here,
respondents were only complying with their duties under the Social Security Act
when they issued the assailed issuances. There is no showing that respondents
went beyond the powers under the law that amounts to lack of or in excess of
their jurisdiction. Petitioners’ claims are unsubstantiated and, as such, merit
no finding of grave abuse of discretion.
2. Presidency; Immunity from Suit; The president cannot be charged with any suit, civil or
criminal in nature, during his or her incumbency in office.-
—Procedural infirmities attend the filing of this Petition. To
begin with, former President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, as President of the
Philippines, is improperly impleaded here. The president is the head of the
executive branch, a coequal of the judiciary under the Constitution. His or her
prerogative is entitled to respect from other branches of government.
Interbranch courtesy is but a consequence of the doctrine of separation of
powers. As such, the president cannot be charged with any suit, civil or criminal
in nature, during his or her incumbency in office. This is in line with the
doctrine of the president’s immunity from suit.
3. Judicial Power; Courts are not only expected to “settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable[,]”
but are also empowered to determine if any government branch or instrumentality
has acted beyond the scope of its powers, such that there is grave abuse of
discretion.-
—This Court has discussed in several cases how the 1987
Constitution has expanded the scope of judicial power from its traditional
understanding. As such, courts are not only expected to “settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable[,]”
but are also empowered to determine if any government branch or instrumentality
has acted beyond the scope of its powers, such that there is grave abuse of
discretion. This development of the courts’ judicial power arose from the use
and abuse of the political question doctrine during the martial law era under
former President Ferdinand Marcos. In Association of Medical Clinics for
Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc., 812
SCRA 452 (2016), this Court held: In Francisco v. The House of Representatives,
we recognized that this expanded jurisdiction was meant “to ensure the potency
of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by ‘any
branch or instrumentalities of government.’” Thus, the second paragraph of
Article VIII, Section 1 engraves, for the first time in its history, into black
letter law the “expanded certiorari jurisdiction” of this Court, whose nature
and purpose had been provided in the sponsorship speech of its proponent,
former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion.
4. Same; Certiorari; Prohibition; Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court provides
remedies to address grave abuse of discretion by any government branch or
instrumentality, particularly through petitions for certiorari and prohibition.-
—Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court provides
remedies to address grave abuse of discretion by any government branch or
instrumentality, particularly through petitions for certiorari and prohibition:
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of Section 3,
Rule 46. SECTION 2. Petition for Prohibition.—When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition
shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order
or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. While these provisions
pertain to a tribunal’s, board’s, or an officer’s exercise of discretion in
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, Rule 65 still applies to
invoke the expanded scope of judicial power. In Araullo v. Aquino III, 728 SCRA
1 (2014), this Court differentiated certiorari from prohibition, and clarified
that Rule 65 is the remedy to “set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise
judicial, quasi-judicial[,] or ministerial functions.”
5. Judicial Review; Requisites for the Exercise of the Power of Judicial
Review.-
—Petitioners must, thus, comply with the requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review: (1) there must be an actual case or
justiciable controversy before this Court; (2) the question before this Court
must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must be a
proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case.
6. Judicial Power; Actual Case or Controversy; There is an actual case or controversy if there is a
“conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution.”-
— Most important in this list of requisites is the existence of
an actual case or controversy. In every exercise of judicial power, whether in
the traditional or expanded sense, this is an absolute necessity. There is an
actual case or controversy if there is a “conflict of legal right, an opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution.” A petitioner bringing a case
before this Court must establish that there is a legally demandable and
enforceable right under the Constitution. There must be a real and substantial
controversy, with definite and concrete issues involving the legal relations of
the parties, and admitting of specific relief that courts can grant. This
requirement goes into the nature of the judiciary as a coequal branch of
government. It is bound by the doctrine of separation of powers, and will not rule
on any matter or cause the invalidation of any act, law, or regulation, if
there is no actual or sufficiently imminent breach of or injury to a right. The
courts interpret laws, but the ambiguities may only be clarified in the
existence of an actual situation.
7. Same; Same; The existence of an actual case or controversy depends on
the allegations pleaded.-
—The existence of an actual case or controversy depends on the
allegations pleaded. Here, petitioners allege that the premium hike, through
the assailed issuances, violates their rights as workers whose welfare is
mandated to be protected under the Constitution. They further allege that the
issuances are grossly unjust to the working class and were issued beyond the
scope of constitutional powers. Thus, petitioners’ allegations present
violations of rights provided for under the Constitution on the protection of
workers, and promotion of social justice. They likewise assert that respondents
Social Security Commission and Social Security System acted beyond the scope of
their powers.
8. Same; Same; An actual case or controversy requires that the right must
be enforceable and legally demandable.-
—This Court, however, notes that petitioners failed to prove how
the assailed issuances violated workers’ constitutional rights such that it
would warrant a judicial review. Petitioners cannot merely cite and rely on the
Constitution without specifying how these rights translate to being legally
entitled to a fixed amount and proportion of Social Security System
contributions. Moreover, an actual case or controversy requires that the right
must be enforceable and legally demandable. A complaining party’s right is,
thus, affected by the rest of the requirements for the exercise of judicial
power: (1) the issue’s ripeness and prematurity; (2) the moot and academic
principle; and (3) the party’s standing.
9. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Courts may only take cognizance of a case or controversy
if the petitioner has exhausted all remedies available to it under the law.-
—A case is ripe for adjudication when the challenged
governmental act is a completed action such that there is a direct, concrete,
and adverse effect on the petitioner. It is, thus, required that something had
been performed by the government branch or instrumentality before the court may
step in, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. In connection
with acts of administrative agencies, ripeness is ensured under the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Courts may only take cognizance of a
case or controversy if the petitioner has exhausted all remedies available to
it under the law. The doctrine ensures that the administrative agency exercised
its power to its full extent, including its authority to correct or reconsider
its actions. It would, thus, be premature for courts to take cognizance of the
case prior to the exhaustion of remedies, not to mention it would violate the
principle of separation of powers. Thus, in Rule 65 petitions, it is required
that no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy is available to the party.
10. Administrative Agencies; Social Security Commission; Jurisdiction; Sections 4 and 5 of the Social Security Act are clear that
the Social Security Commission (SSC) has jurisdiction over any dispute arising
from the law regarding coverage, benefits, contributions, and penalties.-
—Here, it is clear that petitioners failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies. Petitioners allege that they “have no appeal nor any
plain, speedy[,] and adequate remedy under the ordinary course of law except
through the instant Petition.” However, Sections 4 and 5 of the Social Security
Act are clear that the Social Security Commission has jurisdiction over any
dispute arising from the law regarding coverage, benefits, contributions, and
penalties. The law further provides that the aggrieved party must first exhaust
all administrative remedies available before seeking review from the courts.
11. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
ensures that this legislative power is respected by courts.-
—Jurisdiction is determined by laws enacted by Congress. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies ensures that this legislative
power is respected by courts. Courts cannot ignore Congress’ determination that
the Social Security Commission is the entity with jurisdiction over any dispute
arising from the Social Security Act with respect to coverage, benefits,
contributions, and penalties. Here, nothing in the records shows that
petitioners filed a case before the Social Security Commission or asked for a
reconsideration of the assailed issuances. Moreover, petitioners did not even
try to show that their Petition falls under one (1) of the exceptions to the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: However, we are not
unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not an ironclad rule. It may be disregarded (1) when there is a
violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when
the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when
it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention, (12) when no administrative review is
provided by law, (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and
(14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot.
12. Principle of Primary Administrative
Jurisdiction; The principle of primary administrative
jurisdiction states that: . . . courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.-
—Notably, petitioners failed to abide by the principle of
primary administrative jurisdiction. This principle states that: . . . courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact.
13. Moot and Academic; Courts cannot render judgment after the issue has already
been resolved by or through external developments.-
—As for mootness, as earlier mentioned, moot cases prevent the
actual case or controversy from becoming justiciable. Courts cannot render
judgment after the issue has already been resolved by or through external
developments. This entails that they can no longer grant or deny the relief
prayed for by the complaining party. This is consistent with this Court’s
deference to the powers of the other branches of government. This Court must be
wary that it is ruling on existing facts before it invalidates any act or rule.
Nonethe, this Court has enumerated circumstances when it may still rule on moot
issues. In David: Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.
14. Legal Standing; Words and Phrases; Legal standing is the personal and substantial interest of
a party in a case “such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging
more than a generalized grievance.”-
—Legal standing is the personal and substantial interest of a
party in a case “such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged, alleging
more than a generalized grievance.” Petitioners Joselito Ustarez, Salvador T.
Carranza, Nenita Gonzaga, Prescila A. Maniquiz, Reden R. Alcantara, and
Anakpawis Party-List Representative Fernando Hicap, for himself, are Social
Security System members who stand to suffer direct and material injury from the
assailed issuances’ enforcement. They are, thus, clothed with legal personality
to assail the imposed increase in contribution rates and maximum monthly salary
credit. On the other hand, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno, Anakpawis Party-List,
Center for Trade Union and Human Rights, and National Federation of Labor
Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno all failed to show how they will suffer direct and
material injury from the enforcement of the assailed issuances. However,
jurisprudence is replete with instances when a liberal approach to determining
legal standing was adopted. This has allowed “ordinary citizens, members of
Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations[,] and rulings.” This Court
has provided instructive guides to determine whether a matter is of
transcendental importance: “(1) the character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.”
15. Collateral Attacks; Collateral attacks on a presumably valid law are not
allowed.-
—Collateral attacks on a presumably valid law are not allowed.
Un a law, rule, or act is annulled in a direct proceeding, it is presumed
valid. Furthermore, the “delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies is allowed in the face of increasing complexity of
modern life.” In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs,
502 SCRA 295 (2006): Given the volume and variety of interactions involving the
members of today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate
laws dealing with the minutiae aspects of everyday life. Hence, the need to
delegate to administrative bodies, as the principal agencies tasked to execute
laws with respect to their specialized fields, the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies.
16. Delegation of Powers; What are needed for a valid delegation
are: (1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and (2) the presence of a sufficient standard.-
—For a valid exercise of delegation, this Court enumerated the
following requisites: All that is required for the valid exercise of this power
of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; and that the regulation be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.
Under the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test or the sufficient standard test, mandates that
there should be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. Simply put, what are needed for a valid delegation are: (1) the
completeness of the statute making the delegation; and (2) the presence of a
sufficient standard. To determine completeness, all of the terms and provisions
of the law must leave nothing to the delegate except to implement it. “What
only can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be
but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced.”
17. Same; The legislature has vested the necessary powers in the
Social Security Commission (SSC) to fix the minimum and maximum amounts of
monthly salary credits and the contribution rate.-
—The legislature has vested the necessary powers in the Social
Security Commission to fix the minimum and maximum amounts of monthly salary
credits and the contribution rate. The agency does not have to do anything
except implement the provisions based on the standards and limitations provided
by law. In fixing the contribution rate and the minimum and maximum amounts of
monthly salary credits, the legislature specified the factors that should be
considered: “actuarial calculations and rate of benefits” as an additional
limit to the Social Security Commission’s rate fixing power under Section 18,
the legislature required the approval of the President of the Philippines. The
Social Security Act clearly specifies the limitations and identifies when and
how the Social Security Commission will fix the contribution rate and the
monthly salary credits.
18. Actuary; The work of the actuary includes assessing the financial
implications of establishing a new scheme, regularly following up its financial
status and estimating the effect of various modifications that might have a
bearing on the scheme during its existence.-
—Actuarial science is “primarily concerned with the study of
consequences of events that involve risk and uncertainty. Actuarial practice
identifies, analyzes and assists in the management of the outcomes — including
costs and benefits — associated with events that involve risk and uncertainty.”
Actuarial science is relevant to the operation of a social security system, in
that “the actuary plays a crucial role in analysing [the system’s] financial
status and recommending appropriate action to ensure its viability. More
specifically, the work of the actuary includes assessing the financial implications
of establishing a new scheme, regularly following up its financial status and
estimating the effect of various modifications that might have a bearing on the
scheme during its existence.” The application of actuarial calculations in the
operation of a social system scheme requires the determination of benefits. To
question the use of “actual calculations” as factor for fixing rates is to
question the policy or wisdom of the legislature, which is a coequal branch of
government.
19. Delegation of Powers; Congress has expressly provided the Social Security System
(SSS), through the Social Security Commission (SSC), power to fix the minimum
and maximum monthly salary credits and the contribution rate.-
—The two (2) provisos refer to the last part of Section 4(b)(2),
or on the System’s duty to “provide for feasible increases in benefits every
four (4) years, including the addition of new ones[.]” Section 4(b)(2) states
that the “actuarial soundness of the reserve fund shall be guaranteed” in
providing any increase in benefits. As established earlier, Congress has
expressly provided the Social Security System, through the Social Security
Commission, power to fix the minimum and maximum monthly salary credits and the
contribution rate. To disregard actuarial soundness of the reserves would be to
go against the policy of the law on maintaining a sustainable social security
system: SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is the policy of the State to
establish, develop, promote and perfect a sound and viable tax-exempt social
security system suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines
which shall promote social justice and provide meaningful protection to members
and their beneficiaries against the hazards of disability, sickness, maternity,
old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of income or
financial burden. Towards this end, the State shall endeavor to extend social
security protection to workers and their beneficiaries.
20. Same; The Social Security System (SSS) and the Social Security
Commission (SSC) are empowered to adjust from time to time the contribution
rate and the monthly salary credits.-
—To be a valid exercise of police power, there must be a lawful
subject and the power is exercised through lawful means. The second requisite
requires a reasonable relation between the purpose and the means. Using the
parameters above, we hold that the increases reflected in the issuances of
respondents are reasonably necessary to observe the constitutional mandate of
promoting social justice under the Social Security Act. The public interest
involved here refers to the State’s goal of establishing, developing,
promoting, and perfecting a sound and viable tax-exempt social security system.
To achieve this, the Social Security System and the Social Security Commission
are empowered to adjust from time to time the contribution rate and the monthly
salary credits. Given the past increases since the inception of the law, the
contribution rate increase of 0.6% applied to the corresponding monthly salary
credit does not scream of unreasonableness or injustice.
21. Judicial Review; As another parameter of judicial review, adjudicative
pragmatism entails deciding a case with regard to the “present and the future,
unchecked by any felt duty to secure consistency in principle with what other
officials have done in the past[.]”-
—As such, courts, in exercising judicial review, should also
account for the concept of “pragmatic adjudication.” As another parameter of
judicial review, adjudicative pragmatism entails deciding a case with regard to
the “present and the future, unchecked by any felt duty to secure consistency in
principle with what other officials have done in the past[.]” The pragmatist
judge is: . . . not uninterested in past decisions, in statutes, and so forth.
Far from it. For one thing, these are repositories of knowledge, even,
sometimes, of wisdom, and so it would be folly to ignore them even if they had
no authoritative significance. For another, a decision that destabilized the
law by departing too abruptly from precedent might have, on balance, bad
results. There is often a trade-off between rendering substantive justice in
the case under consideration and maintaining the law’s certainty and
predictability. This trade-off, which is perhaps clearest in cases in which a
defense of statute of limitations is raised, will sometimes justify sacrificing
substantive justice in the individual case to consistency with previous cases
or with statutes or, in short, with well-founded expectations necessary to the
orderly management of society’s business. Another reason not to ignore the past
is that often it is difficult to determine the purpose and scope of a rule
without tracing the rule to its origins. The pragmatist judge thus regards
precedent, statutes, and constitutions both as sources of potentially valuable
information about the likely best result in the present case and as signposts
that must not be obliterated or obscured gratuitously, because people may be
relying upon them.
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 210500
Counsel:
Remegio D. Saladero and Noel V. Neri for petitioners.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Resolution
Nos. 262-S. 2013 and 711-S. 2013 issued by the Social Security Commission, as
well as Circular No. 2013-010 issued by the Social Security System, are valid.
The prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction is also DENIED.
Citation Ref:
93. BNL Management Corporation vs. Uy, 899 SCRA 574, April
03, 2019
Case Title : BNL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and ROMEO DAVID, petitioners, vs.
REYNALDO UY, RODIEL BALOY, ATTY. LUALHATI CRUZ, ALBERTO WONG, TERESITA PASIA,
ROLAND INGEL, and MARISSA SEVILLA, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Damages ; Exemplary Damages ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary damages may only be awarded if a party proves
entitlement to temperate, liquidated, actual, or moral damages.-
—As the Court of Appeals aptly pointed out, exemplary damages
may only be awarded if a party proves entitlement to temperate, liquidated,
actual, or moral damages. Petitioners have already admitted that they will not
quantify the actual damages they sustained. They have also neither sought for
nor been granted temperate or liquidated damages.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Questions of fact are not reviewable in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as they dwell on the
truth or falsity of facts.-
—This Court can no longer review this finding, being a question
of fact. Questions of fact are not reviewable in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as they dwell on the truth or
falsity of facts. Hence, this Court would have to evaluate the evidence
presented. In contrast, questions of law are those which occur when there is
“doubt or difference. . . on what the law is on a certain state of facts.”
Here, the conclusion of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals that
petitioners were first in fault was based on evidence presented by the parties,
and for this Court to review their conclusions would require weighing the
probative value of the parties’ evidence.
3. Condominiums; Under Section 9 of the Condominium Act, the owner of the
condominium shall register a declaration of restrictions to be annotated to the
certificate of title of land included within the project.-
—The creation and incidents of the Imperial Bay front are
governed by the Condominium Act. Under Section 9, the owner of the condominium
shall register a declaration of restrictions to be annotated to the certificate
of title of land included within the project. The declaration of restrictions
provides for, among others, the management of the project: SECTION 9. The owner
of a project shall, prior to the conveyance of any condominium therein,
register a declaration of restrictions relating to such project, which
restrictions shall constitute a lien upon each condominium in the project, and
shall insure to and bind all condominium owners in the project. Such liens, un
otherwise provided, may be enforced by any condominium owner in the project or
by the management body of such project. The Register of Deeds shall enter and
annotate the declaration of restrictions upon the certificate of title covering
the land included within the project, if the land is patented or registered
under the Land Registration or Cadastral Acts. The declaration of restrictions
shall provide for the management of the project by anyone of the following
management bodies: a condominium corporation, an association of the condominium
owners, a board of governors elected by condominium owners, or a management
agent elected by the owners or by the board named in the declaration. It shall
also provide for voting majorities quorums, notices, meeting date, and other
rules governing such body or bodies.
4. Same; The declaration of restrictions is enforceable by the
management body of the condominium.-
—The declaration of restrictions is enforceable by the
management body of the condominium. In Twin Towers Condominium Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, 398 SCRA 203 (2003): To reiterate, the Condominium Act
expressly provides that the Master Deed may empower the management body of the
Condominium “to enforce the provisions of the declaration of restrictions.” The
Master Deed authorizes petitioner, as the management body, to enforce the
provisions of the Master Deed in accordance with petitioner’s Bylaws. Thus,
petitioner’s Board of Directors is authorized to determine the reasonableness
of the penalties and interests to be imposed against those who violate the
Master Deed. Petitioner has validly done this by adopting the House Rules. The
Master Deed binds ALS since the Master Deed is annotated on the condominium
certificate of title of ALS’ Unit. The Master Deed is ALS’ contract with all
Condominium members who are all co-owners of the common areas and facilities of
the Condominium. Contracts have the force of law between the parties and are to
be complied with in good faith. From the moment the contract is perfected, the
parties are bound to comply with what is expressly stipulated as well as with
what is required by the nature of the obligation in keeping with good faith,
usage and the law. Thus, when ALS purchased its Unit from petitioner, ALS was
bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the contract, including the
stipulations in the House Rules of petitioner, such as House Rule 26.2.
5. Civil Law; Damages; Moral Damages; Requisites for the Award of Moral Damages.-
—For moral damages to be awarded, the following requisites must
be present: Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate result of a
wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily
established by the aggrieved party. An award of moral damages would require
certain conditions to be met; to wit: (1) First, (sic) there must be an injury,
whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
(2) second, (sic) there must be a culpable: act or omission factually
established; (3) third, (sic) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is
the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth,
(sic) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article
2219.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 210297
Counsel:
Telan, Hipe, Flores, Telan & Associates for petitioners. Patrick M. Legaspi
for respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
July 25, 2012 Decision and December 4, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 90493 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
94. Constantino vs. People, 900 SCRA 304, April 08, 2019
Case Title : ATTY. BERNARDO T. CONSTANTINO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Notarial Law ; 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice ;
Syllabi:
1. Notarial Law; 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; While the previous Notarial Law did not contain a
provision on false and incomplete certificates, the Supreme Court (SC) has
already cautioned notaries public from notarizing incomplete documents even
before the applicability of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.-
—To be sure, the incidents here occurred in 2001, or before the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice was promulgated. While the previous Notarial
Law did not contain a provision on false and incomplete certificates, this
Court has already cautioned notaries public from notarizing incomplete
documents even before the applicability of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
In Bote v. Eduardo, 451 SCRA 9 (2005): Respondent [notary public] was. . .
negligent when he notarized the deed with unfilled spaces and incomplete
entries, making uncertified and fraudulent insertions easy to accomplish.
Notarization is not an empty, meaning, routinary act. It is invested with such
substantial public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may
act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of
its authenticity. For this reason, notaries must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined.
2. Constitutional Law; Presumption of Innocence; Elements of.-
—In falsification of public documents under Article 171(2) of
the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must prove that these elements exist:
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2. That
he takes advantage of his official position; 3. That he falsifies a document by
causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding;
4. That such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding.
3. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Since Dr. Asuncion did not sign the Joint Acknowledgment
before it was notarized, he cannot be considered as having attested and
subscribed to its due execution at the time of its notarization. Thus, when
petitioner certified that the persons who attested and subscribed to the
document were present before him, there could have been no falsity.-
—Based on the findings of the trial court, at the time
petitioner notarized the Last Will and Testament, only three (3) witnesses had
signed it. The trial court, however, did not make any finding that petitioner
had falsified the participation of the three (3) witnesses who attested and
subscribed to its due execution. It likewise found that Dr. Asuncion signed the
document at the urging of Saliganan’s son-in-law, Ferrer, and that petitioner
seemed unaware that Dr. Asuncion later signed the document. Dr. Asuncion also
admitted that his signature was genuine and that he was aware of what he was
signing. Since Dr. Asuncion did not sign the Joint Acknowledgment before it was
notarized, he cannot be considered as having attested and subscribed to its due
execution at the time of its notarization. Thus, when petitioner certified that
the persons who attested and subscribed to the document were present before
him, there could have been no falsity. It was not petitioner who made it appear
that Dr. Asuncion participated in the execution of the Joint Acknowledgment,
but Ferrer and Dr. Asuncion himself. Petitioner, therefore, must be acquitted.
4. Criminal Law; Falsification of Public Documents; Before one can be held criminally liable for falsification
of public documents, it is essential that the document allegedly falsified is a
public document.-
—Before one can be held criminally liable for falsification of
public documents, it is essential that the document allegedly falsified is a
public document. Public documents are defined in Cacnio v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742
(1906), as “those instruments authorized by a notary public or by a competent
public official with all the solemnities required by law[.]” By this
definition, any notarized document is considered a public document. Rule 132,
Section 19 of the Rules of Court, however, provides: SECTION 19. Classes of
documents.—For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are
either public or private. Public documents are: (a) The written official acts,
or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills
and testaments; and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private
documents required by law to be entered therein. All other writings are
private.
5. Notarized Documents; Notarization confers a public character upon private
documents so that, for the purposes of admissibility in court, no further
evidence is required to prove the document’s authenticity.-
—Notarization confers a public character upon private documents
so that, for the purposes of admissibility in court, no further evidence is
required to prove the document’s authenticity. The notary public swears to the
truth of the document’s contents and its due execution. In Antillon v.
Barcelon, 37 Phil. 148 (1917): The principal function of a notary public is to
authenticate documents. When a notary public certifies the due execution and
delivery of a document under his hand and seal, he thereby gives such a
document the force of evidence. . . . . Indeed, one of the very purposes of requiring
documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the
solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given in evidence without further proof of their
execution and delivery. Thus, notaries public are cautioned to take due care in
notarizing documents to ensure the public’s confidence in notarized documents.
In Ramirez v. Ner, 21 SCRA 207 (1967): A notarial document is by law entitled
to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason notaries public
must observe the utmost care to comply with the elementary formalities in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise the confidence of the public in the
integrity of this form of conveyancing would be undermined.
6. Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Last Will and Testament; When the document being presented as evidence is a last
will and testament, further evidence is necessary to prove its due execution,
whether notarized or not.-
—Under the Rules on Evidence, notarized documents are clothed
with the presumption of regularity; that is, that the notary public had the
authority to certify the documents as duly executed. A last will and testament,
however, is specifically excluded from the application of Rule 132, Section 19
of the Rules of Court. This implies that when the document being presented as
evidence is a last will and testament, further evidence is necessary to prove
its due execution, whether notarized or not. A last will and testament is a
“species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate
after his death.” A notarial will is one that is “acknowledged before a notary
public by a testator and the attesting witnesses[.]”
7. Civil Law; Succession; Last Will and Testament; Attestation Clause; An authentic attestation clause must not only contain the
names of the instrumental witnesses. Mere mention of their names in the attestation
clause will not accurately represent the fact of their attestation and
subscription. Instead, the instrumental witnesses must also sign the instrument
before it is notarized by the notary public.-
—Moreover, Article 806 of the Civil Code provides: ARTICLE 806.
Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the
will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court. This
acknowledgment is embodied in an attestation clause at the end of the
instrument. An attestation clause, in Caneda v. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 781
(1993), is: . . . that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses
certify that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of
the execution of the same. It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts
surrounding the conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses, it gives
affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required
by law has been observed. It is made for the purpose of preserving in a
permanent form a record of the facts that attended the execution of a
particular will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the attesting
witnesses, or other casualty, such facts may still be proved. By this
definition, the formalities required by law to prove a notarial will’s
authenticity do not pertain to the notarization, but to the attestation and
subscription of the testator and the attesting witnesses. In Caneda, this Court
further explained: [T]he subscription of the signatures of the testator and the
attesting witnesses is made for the purpose of authentication and
identification, and thus indicates that the will is the very same instrument
executed by the testator and attested to by the witnesses. Further, by
attesting and subscribing to the will, the witnesses thereby declare the due
execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause. The attestation
clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the due execution of a
will and to insure the authenticity thereof. As it appertains only to the
witnesses and not to the testator, it need be signed only by them. Where it is
left unsigned, it would result in the invalidation of the will as it would be possible
and easy to add the clause on a subsequent occasion in the absence of the
testator and the witnesses. Hence, an authentic attestation clause must not
only contain the names of the instrumental witnesses. Mere mention of their
names in the attestation clause will not accurately represent the fact of their
attestation and subscription. Instead, the instrumental witnesses must also
sign the instrument before it is notarized by the notary public.
8. Criminal Law; Falsification of Public Documents; There is falsification of a public document when the
public document is simulated “in a manner so as to give it the appearance of a
true and genuine instrument, thus, leading others to errors as to its
authenticity.”-
—There is falsification of a public document when the public
document is simulated “in a manner so as to give it the appearance of a true
and genuine instrument, thus, leading others to errors as to its
authenticity[.]” Moreover, “[w]hat is punished in falsification of public
document is principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction
of truth as solemnly proclaimed therein.” When a notary public falsifies a
public document, his or her act effectively undermines the public’s trust and
reliance on notarized documents as evidence. Thus, he or she is held criminally
liable for the offense when the falsity committed leads others to believe the
document was authentic when it is not.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 225696
Counsel:
Bernie Francis B. Constantino for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General
for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The January 19, 2016
Decision and June 9, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR
No. 36327 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Atty. Bernardo T. Constantino
is ACQUITTED of the crime of falsification of a public document, and the bail
bond posted for his provisional liberty is ordered canceled. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the filing of the
appropriate administrative action.
Citation Ref:
95. Guy vs. Tulfo, 901 SCRA 159, April 10, 2019
Case Title : MICHAEL C. GUY, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAFFY TULFO, ALLEN
MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., JANET BAY, JESUS P. GALANG, RANDY HAGOS,
JEANY LACORTE, and VENUS TANDOC, accused-appellant.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Libel ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Libel; Journalists should observe high standards expected from
their profession. They must take responsibility for the accuracy of their work,
careful never to deliberately distort facts or context by verifying information
before releasing it for public consumption.-
—More often than not, journalists are at the forefront of
information publication and dissemination. Owing to the nature of their work,
they have the prerogative to shape the news as they see fit. This Court does
not turn a blind eye to some of them who twist the news to give an ambiguous
interpretation that is in reck disregard of the truth. Crafting inaccurate and
misleading news is a blatant violation of the Society of Professional
Journalists Code of Ethics. The Society of Professional Journalists is a
journalism organization dedicated toward stimulating high standards of ethical
behavior, promoting the free flow of information vital to a well-informed
citizenry, and inspiring and educating current and future journalists through
professional development. Its Code of Ethics espouses the practice that
journalism should be accurate and fair, and mandates accountability and
transparency in the profession. As such, journalists should observe high
standards expected from their profession. They must take responsibility for the
accuracy of their work, careful never to deliberately distort facts or context
by verifying information before releasing it for public consumption.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; When a criminal act is committed, two
(2) different entities are offended: (1) the State, whose law has been violated; and (2) the person directly injured by the offender’s act
or omission.-
—“Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the
criminal.” This notion is rooted in the fundamental theory that when a criminal
act is committed, two (2) different entities are offended: (1) the State, whose
law has been violated; and (2) the person directly injured by the offender’s
act or omission. As explained in Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325 (1987):
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that “Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable”
(Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the
traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities
namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the
State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society
whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly
injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. . . . While an act
or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to
civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage
to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives
rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his
own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same
be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to
civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or
injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not
the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that
the act or omission complained of is punishable, regard of whether or not it
also causes material damage to another.
3. Same; Same; Civil Liability; The private offended party’s interest in a criminal case
is limited to the civil liability arising from it.-
—The private offended party’s interest in a criminal case is
limited to the civil liability arising from it. It is a fundamental principle
in remedial law that if the trial court dismisses the case or renders a
judgment of acquittal, the private offended party cannot appeal the criminal
aspect of the case. Only the Office of the Solicitor General can represent the
State in actions brought before the Court of Appeals or this Court.
4. Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Settled is the rule that only questions
of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari; Exceptions.-
—Significantly, “[t]he issue on the amount of damages is a
factual question that this [C]ourt may not resolve in a Rule 45 petition.”
Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari. “[This] Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its
duty to review, evaluate, and weigh the probative value of the evidence adduced
before the lower courts.” Absent “any clear showing that the trial court overlooked
or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or
revising such findings and evaluation[,]” this Court will not disturb, let
alone overturn the lower courts’ findings of fact and appreciation of the
witnesses’ testimonies. Nonethe, jurisprudence has carved out certain
exceptions to this rule: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises or conjectures. . . ; (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible. . . ; (3) Where there is a grave
abuse of discretion. . . ; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts. . . ; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting. . . ; (6) When
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.
. . ; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court. . . ; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based. . . ; (9) When the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents. . . ; and (10) The finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record.
5. Criminal Law; Actual Damages; A party may only be awarded actual damages when the
pecuniary loss he or she had suffered was duly proven.-
—Actual damages are “compensation for an injury that will put
the injured party in the position where it was before the injury. They pertain
to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of
measurement.” Actual damages constitute compensation for sustained pecuniary
loss. Neverthe, a party may only be awarded actual damages when the pecuniary
loss he or she had suffered was duly proven.
6. Same; Same; The award of unrealized profits cannot be based on the
sole testimony of the party claiming it.-
—As the Court of Appeals correctly found, petitioner failed to
substantiate the loss he had allegedly sustained. Save for his testimony in
court, he presented no evidence to support his claim. His allegation of
possibly earning P50,000,000.00 in 10 years is a mere assumption without any
foundation. This bare allegation is insufficient to prove that he has indeed
lost P5,000,000.00 as earnings. As this Court has previously held, “the award
of unrealized profits cannot be based on the sole testimony of the party
claiming it.”
7. Same; Same; Temperate Damages; Notwithstanding the absence of any evidence on the amount
of actual damages suffered, a party may be awarded temperate damages should the
Supreme Court (SC) find that he or she has suffered some pecuniary loss even if
its amount cannot be determined with exact certainty.-
—Notwithstanding the absence of any evidence on the amount of
actual damages suffered, a party may be awarded temperate damages should the
court find that he or she has suffered some pecuniary loss even if its amount
cannot be determined with exact certainty. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to
prove that he has suffered any pecuniary loss. While he testified that he lost
clients as a result of the libelous article, records reveal that he lost only
one (1) client, Jayson Mallari (Mallari). On cross-examination, Mallari even
testified “that he was not immediately convinced by the article and called
[petitioner] before terminating his business with him[.]” Moreover, as the
records show, Mallari started transacting with petitioner again sometime in
2005.
8. Same; Moral Damages; Moral damages are “compensatory damages awarded for mental
pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong.”-
—Moral damages are “compensatory damages awarded for mental pain
and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong.” They are awarded to
the injured party to enable him to obtain means that will ease the suffering he
sustained from respondent’s reprehensible act. “Moral damages are not punitive
in nature,” but are instead a type of “award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered[.]
9. Same; Same; Article 2219 of the Civil Code specifically states that
moral damages may be recovered in cases of libel, slander, or defamation.-
—Unlike actual and temperate damages, moral damages may be
awarded even if the injured party failed to prove that he has suffered
pecuniary loss. As long as it was established that complainant’s injury was the
result of the offending party’s action, the complainant may recover moral
damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code specifically states that moral damages
may be recovered in cases of libel, slander, or defamation. The amount of moral
damages that courts may award depends upon the set of circumstances for each
case. There is no fixed standard to determine the amount of moral damages to be
given. Courts are given the discretion to fix the amount to be awarded in favor
of the injured party, so long as there is sufficient basis for awarding such
amount.
10. Same; Same; While the Supreme Court (SC) recognizes
the embarrassment and unease suffered by petitioner, it must be emphasized that
moral damages may only be awarded when the claimant has sufficiently proved:
(1) the factual foundation of the award; and (2) the causal connection of petitioner’s suffering to
respondents’ act.-
—While this Court recognizes the embarrassment and unease
suffered by petitioner, it must be emphasized that moral damages may only be
awarded when the claimant has sufficiently proved: (1) the factual foundation
of the award; and (2) the causal connection of petitioner’s suffering to
respondents’ act.
11. Same; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary damages may be awarded even in the absence of
aggravating circumstances.-
—Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement, exemplary
damages may be awarded even in the absence of aggravating circumstances. It may
be awarded “where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible
or outrageous conduct of the offender.” “Exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good[.]” “It is imposed
as a punishment for highly reprehensible conduct” and serves as a notice to
prevent the public from “the repetition of socially deleterious actions.” “Such
damages are required by public policy, for wanton acts must be suppressed. They
are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the body
politic.”
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 213023
Counsel:
Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for plaimtiff-appellee. Tan, Acut, Lopez and
Pison Law Offices for accused-appellant Macasaet, et al. Abigail Patricia N.
Dela Cruz for respondent Tulfo.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 13, 2014
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 33256 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Respondents Raffy Tulfo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas V. Quijano,
Jr., Janet Bay, Jesus P. Galang, Randy Hagos, Jean y Lacorte, and Venus Tandoc
are ORDERED to solidarity pay petitioner Michael C. Guy: (1) Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages; (2) One Million Pesos
(P1,000.000.00) as exemplary damages; and (3) Two Hundred Eleven Thousand Two
Hundred Pesos (P211,200.00) as attorney’s fees. All damages awarded shall be
subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality
of this Decision until its full satisfaction.103
Citation Ref:
96. Cordillera Global Network vs. Paje, 901 SCRA 261, April
10, 2019
Case Title : CORDILLERA GLOBAL NETWORK, represented by its President,
GLORIA ABAEO; CORDILLERA PEOPLES ALLIANCE, represented by its
Secretary-General, ABIGAIL B. ANONGOS; CORDILLERA INDIGENOUS PEOPLES LEGAL
CENTER, Represented by its Executive Director, RHODA DALANG-GARCIA; CORDILLERA
ECOLOGICAL PINE TREE CENTER, represented by its Executive Director, DR. MICHAEL
BENGWAYAN; LEON ALTOMONTE, GABRIELA ALTOMONTE, and AENEAS ALTOMONTE,
represented by their Father, KARLO MARKO ALTOMONTE; KATHLEA FRANCYNN GAWANI D.
YAÑGOT and LEANDRO KIERAN LUGAT D. YAÑGOT III, Represented by their Mother,
CHERYL L. DAYTEC-YAÑGOT; ZACHARY T. DISTOR and AGATHA ZITA T. DISTOR,
represented by their Father, MILO S. DISTOR; JUSTICE YVONNE D. DONAAL,
represented by her Father, CHRISTOPHER DONAAL, TRICIA KATRINA M. ARNEDO and
MARGARET JALREYE M. ARNEDO, represented by their Mother, MA. TERESA M. ARNEDO;
KENSWORTH CORPUZ, represented by CARLITO C. TAAWAN; MARIE A. BALANGUE, MIGUEL
ARVISU, GIDEON OMERO, PAUL ALLAIN R. ISICAN, KARMINN CHERYL DINNEY D. YANGOT,
CRISTINA LAPPAO, NELSON LAPPAO, FLORENDA PEDRO, EDGAR Z. KAWIG, JUDITH G.
FANAO, JULIO PUNAY, ARNOLD ABRIL, JEMELYN CORPUZ, MARY LEITH “SUMITRA”
GUTIERREZ, ANDREA M. COSALAN, RHADA JUNE MANTILEZ, NELSON JOSEPH S. ALABANZA,
RHIS BAYUCCA, JOSE OLARTE II, SONIA F. GALANG, SHIELO G. SABAOT, ANTHONY B.
LAKING, DONATELA S.R. MOLINTAS, RUTH W. DEMOT, ROCKY A. CAJIGAN, RONALDO
VILLAMOR, GLENN V. VILLAMOR, FIDEL DEMOT, SCOT MAGKACHI SABOY, ANNIELYN
PUCKING, LUCIA B. RUIZ, CHESTER LAB-ING, MARISSA A. DERIJE FAITH MARIETTE
DAO-AY, GABRIEL CRISTOBAL IV, ISIDRO GAYO, EDWIN A. NGINA, JASON DOMLING, J.P.
PUNO, JULIA A. BAEYENS, WESLEY E. SAYUD, CLIFFORD M. LORENA, JERRY MAYONA,
ZABRINA D. IBASCO, PRINCESS EUNICE CABURAO, ZITA J. GONGON, ALBERTO ROMAR R.
ORDOÑA, MAURICIO PITAG, RYLYN JOHAN A. DANGANAN, JEFFREY C. CHIU, MICHAEL
ANGELO A. SOTERO, LINDA ALISTO, GREGORY P. RUGAY, VANESSA B. OLARTE, BRIAN
BATONG, MILAGROS LIWANAG JOSE, BABYLYNN M. DEGAY, EDEN JARLAWE T. VIRGINIO, IVY
JOY D. BUENAOBRA, RICO M. GUTIERREZ, JOHN PAWI, CARMELLIE ANJOY M. SALVADO,
JOAN MULLER, ROBERTO R. OCAMPO, DINAH DAYTEC AGCAOILI, CARMEN DAYTEC, ERVEEN
ROSS PALMA, BUMBO VILLANUEVA, KHRISTINE E. MOLITAS, KATHLEEN G. BUGNOSEN,
GLORIA B. LIMPIN, REY ANGELO E. AURELIO, RESTITUTO REFUERZO, MARCH FIANZA,
FLORABEL M. SALES, DEAN MICHAEL CUANSO, BENJAMIN BIDANG, JR., JEANNIE MAY
DAMOSLOG, JANICE M. DONAAL, CRISTOBAL SANTIAGO, ETHAN ANDREW VENTURA, MA.
CRISTINA BALAJADIA, RODELIZA ABELLA ALTAMONTE, BEDE BAWAYAN, JR., CHRISTEL PAY
SENG, PAUL LESTER DONAAL, VIROLABEL LADIO, HENDRIX SANCHEZ, GASPAR ELIZUR
DONAAL, MICHAEL VINCENT CABRERA, SANTOS BAYUCCA, ELMER M. DATAYAN, ASH Y.
VELASCO, POLEEN CARLA C. ROSITO, MIGHT GUPIT, JULIUS B. MANABENG, JENNY GRACE
M. ABOEN, JOJO LA MARIA, VLADIMIR D. CAYABAS, JOHN LAKING, CHARLENE DAVID,
GERALDINE D. CACHO, PERRY JOHN P. MENDOZA, HONORIO B. SAGMAYAO, RODOLFO “RUDZ”
A. PARAAN, JOHN ERIC JOSEPH S. AGUILAR, CERI PAUL A. LOMAS-E, HECTOR ZARATE
KAWIG, RICHARD DEAN F. BASA, MICHELLE B. SAMUEL, FERDY K. BAYASEN, and
SILVESTRE QUINTOS, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY RAMON J.P. PAJE, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources; ATTY. JUAN
MIGUEL T. CUNA, in his capacity as the Director of the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and SM
INVESTMENTS CORPORATION; SECRETARY ROGELIO SINGSON, in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, respondents. JUDY LYN
C. ADAJAR, RUBY C. ALTERADO, LEONOLYN M. ANAYASAN, MYLA A. APIGO, MARILOU N.
ARAGON, LOIDA A. BACBAC, JULIET M. BADILLA, OLIVIA M. BALADLAD, ROXANNE K.
BALANGCOD, MARIA JOCELYN J. BALDERAS, MARIVIC BALWAYAN, YVONNE F. BANGASAN,
DIONISIA E. BANGLAY, RODEL E. BANIAGA, GRACIA D. BARIA, MA. ADA E. BASILIO,
ESTRELLA C. BAUTISTA, EVA M. BAUTISTA, MARIBEL S. BINAY-AN, JOSEPHINE A.
BORILLO, ANNIE MARIE B. BUENAFE, CHERRY H. BULONG, MARISOL B. CABUNAG, EDITH L.
CALDITO, ANGELICA W. CAMBA, MARLON L. CAOILE, BRIGETTE M. CHALMAS, MYAN P.
CUGA-AY, ELIZABETH A. DALAN, MA. GLENDA D. DE LA PENA, JESSICA A. DE VERA, JOHN
PAUL A. DELA CRUZ, CARMILLA V. DELOS SANTOS, MARICRIS DIPASUPIL, BEATRIZ CONNIE
M. ESCANO, DEBBIE B. ESGUERRA, PATRICIA PAULINE A. ESTOESTA, LADY DIANA D.
ESTRADA, PRECILLA L. FUYAG, JANINA G. GALLEGOS, NOMER L. GINGO, JOCELYN T.
BUMPENG, CECILIA G. GUNDRAN, JENNY M. HIPONA, LUNA C. IBAÑEZ, FLORIDA F.
IDMILAO, JOE PIT R. LAURENCIO, AILENE M. LAYNO, JEANETTE S. MANANSALA, HILARIA
M. MANUGUID, BRENNY MAY K. MENDOZA, DINAH D. NAVARRO, AMANDA M. PADER, SAMUEL
A. PALEYAN, DENNIS JULIUS R. PANEDA, RUBY L. PARAZO, MARY GRACE A. PASTOR,
DONNALYN F. PRADO, SHENNA APRIL V. QUINTO, ESPERANZA E. ROSIDO, ROSALINA N.
SAMPAGA, JUDY P. SIA, MARY-AN L. SUPSUPIN, MARILOU A. TA-A, MARY ANN L.
TABAO-EC, MICAH JOY H. MATAROMA, EUGENIA N. TAYABAN, RUBY L. TAYNEC, RITA M.
TINIPAC, MICHELLE R. TUALLA, JOAN D. VALDEZ, RODRIGO B. VALDEZ, HAZEL P.
VALENTIN, VICTORIA A. VENTURA, ESTELITA A. WALLANG, and VERONICA P. ZARATE,
petitioners, vs. SECRETARY RAMON J.P. PAJE, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources; ATTY. JUAN MIGUEL T. CUNA, in
his capacity as the Director of the Environmental Management Bureau of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources; DIRECTOR CLARENCE BAGUILAT, in
his capacity as the Regional Executive Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources-Cordillera Administrative Region; SECRETARY
ROGELIO SINGSON, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Highways; HON. MAURICIO DOMOGAN, in his capacity as Mayor of Baguio
City; SM PRIME HOLDINGS and SM SUPERMALLS, AND THEIR OFFICERS AND AGENTS ACTING
ON THEIR BEHALF, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Environmental Law ; Environmental Compliance Certificate
;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Environmental Compliance Certificate; The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
required private respondents to obtain a separate environmental compliance
certificate for the cutting or earth-balling of the affected Benguet pine and
Alnus trees. This was to ascertain that the removal or replanting of the trees
would not lead to a significant negative environmental impact.-
—The Department of Environment and Natural Resources required
private respondents to obtain a separate environmental compliance certificate
for the cutting or earth-balling of the affected Benguet pine and Alnus trees.
This was to ascertain that the removal or replanting of the trees would not
lead to a significant negative environmental impact. While this Court
acknowledges and lauds private respondents efforts to plant a considerable
amount of pine seedlings in and around Baguio City, it cannot make up for the
removal or replanting of the trees affected by the Expansion Project, which was
patently illegal. It does not escape this Court’s attention that both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals missed private respondents’
application for the cutting of 182 trees — in addition to 112 already allowed
in the earlier Environmental Compliance Certificate — merely through an amended
Environmental Compliance Certificate and almost nine (9) years after the
original had been used. This Court also notes the lower court’s nonchalant attitude
when it failed to notice the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
failure to distinguish indigenous long-standing pine trees from those recently
planted when it issued the amended Environmental Compliance Certificate despite
the existence of Executive Order No. 23.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; In providing the formal requirements of
an appeal by certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Section 1
requires that a verified petition raising only questions of law may be filed
before the Supreme Court (SC); Rule
45, Section 4(e) further provides that the petition should “contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 42.”-
—In providing the formal requirements of an appeal by certiorari
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Section 1 requires that a verified
petition raising only questions of law may be filed before this Court: SECTION
1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth. x x x The requirements for verification can be found
in Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure: SECTION 4.
Verification.—Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,
pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. A
pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
“information and belief,” or upon “knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks
a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. Rule 45, Section
4(e) further provides that the petition should “contain a sworn certification
against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule
42.”
3. Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Rule 45, Section 5 sets forth that the petitioner’s
failure to comply with any of the enumerated formal requirements is sufficient
ground for the petition’s dismissal.-
—Rule 45, Section 5 sets forth that the petitioner’s failure to
comply with any of the enumerated formal requirements is sufficient ground for
the petition’s dismissal. Private respondents SM Prime Holdings, Inc. and
Shopping Center Management Corporation assert that the Petition should be
dismissed outright for its defective Verification and Certification Against
Forum Shopping. It points out that of the 202 or so claimed petitioners, only
30 actually signed the document. Further, two (2) of the 30 signatories were
not even plaintiffs in either the first or second environmental case before the
Regional Trial Court. Private respondents SM Prime Holdings, Inc. and Shopping
Center Management Corporation are mistaken.
4. Same; Same; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Verification; The signing of the verification by some petitioners
already served the purpose contemplated by the verification.-
—This Court, as emphasized in Altres v. Empleo, 573 SCRA 583
(2008), has consistently applied the substantial compliance rule when it comes
to a supposedly defective verification and certification against forum shopping
attached to a petition. Altres, citing Tan v. Ballena, 557 SCRA 229 (2008),
mentioned that the purpose of a verification was to assure this Court that a
petition contains allegations that are true, and that it was filed in good
faith. Thus, the signing of the verification by some petitioners already served
the purpose contemplated by the verification. However, when it comes to the
certification against forum shopping, Altres ruled that the non-signing
petitioners shall be dropped from the petition.
5. Same; Same; Same; Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping; For the certification against forum shopping, Altres
stated the general rule that non-signing petitioners will be dropped as parties
to the case. Nonethe, there is an exception: when all petitioners share a
common interest, the signature of one (1) petitioner in the certification
against forum shopping is enough to satisfy the substantial compliance rule.-
—Here, there were around 200 petitioners in the two (2)
environmental cases on appeal before this Court; yet, only 30 petitioners
signed the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping. However,
contrary to private respondents SM Prime Holdings, Inc. and Shopping Center
Management Corporation’s assertions, the failure of all petitioners to sign the
document is not a sufficient ground for the Petition’s outright dismissal.
Jurisprudence confirms that petitioners substantially complied with the
verification requirement. The 30 signatories provided the guarantee that: (1)
they had ample knowledge as to the truth of the allegations in the Petition;
and (2) the Petition was made in good faith. For the certification against
forum shopping, Altres stated the general rule that non-signing petitioners
will be dropped as parties to the case. Nonethe, there is an exception: when
all petitioners share a common interest, the signature of one (1) petitioner in
the certification against forum shopping is enough to satisfy the substantial
compliance rule. Here, petitioners all share a common interest, which is to
declare the cutting or earth-balling of the trees affected by the Expansion
Project illegal. Hence, the signature of 30 petitioners to the certification
against forum shopping amounts to substantial compliance with the requirement
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; The Rules of Court requires that only
questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45, as factual
questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari; Exceptions.-
—It is well-established that a review of appeals filed before
this Court is “not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion[.]” The
Rules of Court requires that only questions of law should be raised in
petitions filed under Rule 45, as factual questions are not the proper subject
of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court’s function to weigh all over
again evidence that were already considered in the lower courts. However, these
rules do admit of 10 exceptions, as listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., 191
SCRA 218 (1990): (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures. . . ; (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible. . . ; (3) Where there is a grave
abuse of discretion. . . ; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts. . . ; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting. . . ; (6) When
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.
. . ; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court. . . ; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based. . . ; (9) When the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents. . . ; and (10) The finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record.
7. Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The general rule is to first exhaust the available
administrative remedies before a party can bring the case to a court for
judicial review.-
—The general rule is to first exhaust the available
administrative remedies before a party can bring the case to a court for
judicial review.” In connection with the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, courts
will hold off from determining a controversy involving a question within the
jurisdiction of an administrative agency, particularly when its resolution
demands the “special knowledge, experience[,] and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.”
8. Environmental Law; Environmental Compliance Certificate; The remedy of appeal is only available to a party that
applied for an environmental compliance certificate or certificate of
noncoverage.-
—The first sentence of Section 6 shows that the remedy of appeal
is only available to a party that applied for an environmental compliance
certificate or certificate of noncoverage. This is bolstered by the period
provided for the filing of an appeal — within 15 days from receipt of such
decision — since only a party to the application is entitled to receive it.
However, as respondents posit, stakeholders are not precluded from filing an
appeal as stated in Section 6’s last sentence. This apparent contradiction was
clarified in Boracay Foundation, Inc., where this Court ruled that an appeal
under Section 6 only applies to a party to the proceedings before the
appropriate agency.
9. Same; Zoning Ordinances; By creating distinct zones and ensuring strict compliance,
the local government can control the growth and development of its territory,
optimizing its potential without sacrificing the safety and comfort of its
constituents.-
—Zoning ordinances are integral to urban planning. Their primary
purpose is to regulate land use to ensure the general welfare of the community.
By creating distinct zones and ensuring strict compliance, the local government
can control the growth and development of its territory, optimizing its
potential without sacrificing the safety and comfort of its constituents.
Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1993 (Providing for the Preparation and
Implementation of the Comprehensive Land Use Plans of Local Government Units
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991 and other Pertinent Laws)
devolved the power of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to issue
permits and locational clearances for local projects to cities and
municipalities with approved comprehensive land use plans. The Planning and
Development Office of Baguio City was tasked with the preparation of the
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and its implementation based on the Zoning
Ordinance. It performs the discretionary act of issuing a zoning compliance
certification or a locational clearance based on its interpretation of the Zoning
Ordinance.
10. Same; Same; Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board; Jurisdiction; As the agency mandated with establishing standards and
guidelines for land use plans and zoning ordinances, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) has the necessary knowledge and expertise to pass
judgment upon questions within its sphere of expertise.-
—As the agency mandated with establishing standards and
guidelines for land use plans and zoning ordinances, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board has the necessary knowledge and expertise to pass judgment
upon questions within its sphere of expertise. Questions on which zone the SM
Pines Resort Project and Expansion Project correctly belonged in, and whether
their locational clearances were validly issued, should have been raised before
the agency.
Division:
EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 215988
Counsel:
Cheryl L. Daytec-Yangot for petitioners. Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for
respondent SM Investments Corporation. Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala &
Cruz for respondents SM Prime Holdings, Inc. and Shopping Center Management
Corporation.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The March 24, 2015
Temporary Restraining Order, amended on April 19, 2016, is made PERMANENT
without prejudice to the filing of an application for a new environmental
compliance certificate. This is in compliance with the conditions in the
October 17, 2011 Memorandum, as well as Executive Order No. 23, other
applicable laws, regulations, and requirements.
Citation Ref:
97. People vs. Comoso, 901 SCRA 387, April 10, 2019
Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIOSCORO
COMOSO y TUREMUTSA, accused-appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Policy that Must be Followed in Prosecuting Drugs Cases.-
—This Court has already recognized the numerous “orchestrated or
poorly built up drug-related cases” that have been languishing in the clogged
dockets of our lower courts. Thus, in People v. Lim, 879 SCRA 31 (2018), this
Court mandated the policy that must be followed in prosecuting drugs cases:
[T]o weed out early on from the courts’ already congested docket any
orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases, the following should
henceforth be enforced as a mandatory policy: 1. In the sworn
statements/affi-davits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their
compliance with the requirements of Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended,
and its IRR. 2. In case of nonobservance of the provision, the
apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or explanation
therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items. 3. If there is
no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or
affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before
the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary
investigation in order to determine the (non)existence of probable cause. 4. If
the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may
exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or
warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court.
2. Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of Innocence; An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven. To secure conviction, the prosecution must overcome this presumption by
presenting evidence of the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.-
—An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven.
To secure conviction, the prosecution must overcome this presumption by
presenting evidence of the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 2. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt.—In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, un his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. A
guilty verdict relies on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, not on the
weakness of the defense: Proof beyond reasonable doubt is ultimately a matter
of conscience. Though it does not demand absolutely impervious certainty, it
still charges the prosecution with the immense responsibility of establishing
moral certainty. Much as it ensues from benevolence, it is not merely
engendered by abstruse ethics or esoteric values; it arises from a
constitutional imperative[.] The burden of proof lies with the prosecution.
Failure to discharge this burden warrants an accused’s acquittal.
3. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—The sale of illegal drugs is punished under Article II, Section
5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act: SECTION 5. Sale, Trading,
Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.—The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, un authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium
poppy regard of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in
any of such transactions. To secure conviction, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: “(1) proof that the transaction or sale took place[;] and
(2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence.”
4. Same; Same; Buy-Bust Operations; Evidence proving that a transaction took place “must be
credible and complete.” In buy-bust operations, this is usually proven by the
testimony of the poseur-buyer.-
—Evidence proving that a transaction took place “must be
credible and complete.” In buy-bust operations, this is usually proven by the
testimony of the poseur-buyer. In People v. Andaya, 738 SCRA 105 (2014), the
prosecution failed to present their informant, who was also their poseur-buyer,
to testify on the sale of illegal drugs. Despite the police officers occupying
“different positions where they could see and observe the asset[,]” this Court
noted that none of them had witnessed the transaction and only acted upon the
informant/poseur-buyer’s prearranged signal. This proved fatal to the
prosecution’s case: Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer.
He was designated to be the poseur-buyer himself. It is notable that the
members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the prearranged
signal from the poseur-buyer. The prearranged signal signified to the members
of the buy-bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the
poseur-buyer and Andaya. However, the State did not present the confidential
informant/poseur-buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction
between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue against
that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly
witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur-buyer due to
their being positioned at a distance from the poseur-buyer and Andaya at the
moment of the supposed transaction. Andaya recognized that not presenting the
informant was different from not presenting the poseur-buyer. As held in prior
cases, there was no need to present the confidential informant since the
testimony would merely corroborate the testimonies of those who actually
witnessed the transaction. The case is different, however, if the confidential
informant and the poseur-buyer were one and the same person.
5. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; In proving the second element of the offense, the
prosecution must establish compliance with the chain of custody requirements
outlined in Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 10640.-
—In proving the second element of the offense, the prosecution
must establish compliance with the chain of custody requirements outlined in
Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic Act
No. 10640.
6. Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the records shows that the witnesses required
to be present and sign the inventory-
— an elected public official and a representative of the
National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the media — were present, even though
this was a pre-planned entrapment operation.—Worse, nothing in the records
shows that the witnesses required to be present and sign the inventory — an
elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media — were present, even though this was a preplanned
entrapment operation. Moreover, the prosecution did not justify the law
enforcement officers’ noncompliance with the chain of custody. It merely stated
that “the integrity of the evidence is presumed preserved un there is a showing
of bad faith, ill will[,] or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.”
7. Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Regularity; The prosecution cannot merely sweep the police officers’
lapses under the mantle of the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their official duties.-
—Generally, noncompliance with these requirements would not have
rendered the search and seizure invalid “under justifiable grounds.” However,
the absence of any justification only serves to magnify the irregularity of the
police officer’s performance of their official duties: To sanction
noncompliance, two requisites must be satisfied. First, the prosecution must
identify and prove “justifiable grounds.” Second, it must show that, despite
noncompliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
properly preserved. To satisfy the second requirement, the prosecution must
establish that positive steps were observed to ensure such preservation. The
prosecution cannot rely on broad justifications and sweeping guarantees that
the integrity and evidentiary value of seized items were preserved. The
prosecution cannot merely sweep the police officers’ lapses under the mantle of
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties. This
presumption only applies when nothing in the evidence shows that the police
officers deviated from the standard procedures required by law.
8. Same; Same; Same; Reasonable doubt arises in the prosecution’s narrative
when the links in the chain of custody cannot be properly established.-
—Indeed, the often minuscule amounts of dangerous drugs seized
by law enforcement officers compel courts to be more circumspect in the
examination of the evidence. Reasonable doubt arises in the prosecution’s
narrative when the links in the chain of custody cannot be properly
established. There is no guarantee that the evidence had not been tampered
with, substituted, or altered. In People v. Holgado, 732 SCRA 554 (2014): Trial
courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving
violations of Republic Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly
uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be scrupulously considered. Courts
must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of
drugs. These can be readily planted and tampered. Also, doubt normally follows
in cases where an accused has been discharged from other simultaneous offenses
due to mishandling of evidence. Had the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals been so judicious in this case, a speedier resolution would have been
handed to Holgado and Misarez whose guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not
established.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 227497
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney’s
Office for accused-appellant.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ October
9, 2015 Decision in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05992 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant Dioscoro Comoso y Turemutsa is ACQUITTED for the
prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered
immediately RELEASED un he is confined for any other lawful cause. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished to the Superintendent of the Iwahig Prison and
Penal Farm, Puerto Princesa City for immediate implementation. The
Superintendent is ORDERED to REPORT the action he or she has taken to this
Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
Citation Ref:
98. Aldovino vs. Gold and Green Manpower Management and Development
Services, Inc., 904 SCRA 573, June 19, 2019
Case Title : JULITA M. ALDOVINO, JOAN B. LAGRIMAS, WINNIE B. LINGAT, CHITA
A. SALES, SHERLY L. GUINTO, REVILLA S. DE JESUS, and LAILA V. ORPILLA,
petitioners, vs. GOLD AND GREEN MANPOWER MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT SERVICES,
INC., SAGE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD., and ALBERTO C. ALVINA,
respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Statutes ;
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Statutes; A statute declared unconstitutional
“confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”
Incorporating a similarly worded provision in a subsequent legislation does not
cure its unconstitutionality.-
—A statute declared unconstitutional “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.” Incorporating a similarly
worded provision in a subsequent legislation does not cure its
unconstitutionality. Without any discernable change in the circumstances
warranting a reversal, this Court will not hesitate to strike down the same
provision. As such, we reiterate our ruling in Sameer that the reinstated
clause in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 has no force and effect of law.
It is unconstitutional. Hence, petitioners are entitled to the award of
salaries based on the actual unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
The award of petitioners’ salaries, in relation to the three (3)-month cap,
must be modified accordingly.
2. Civil Law; Labor Law; Contracts; Conflict of Laws; Lex Loci Contractus; We follow the lex loci contractus principle, which means
that the law of the place where the contract is executed governs the contract.-
—It must be noted that this case is governed by Philippine laws.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code guarantee the security of tenure. It
is not stripped off when Filipinos work in a different jurisdiction. We follow
the lex loci contractus principle, which means that the law of the place where
the contract is executed governs the contract. In Triple Eight Integrated
Services, Inc. v National Labor Relations Commission, 299 SCRA 608 (1998):
First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place
where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question
that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the
Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations,
and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the
rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious
to the forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements
are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII,
Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers.
3. Labor Law; Quitclaims; Quitclaims do not bar employees from filing labor
complaints and demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled.-
—Waivers and quitclaims executed by employees are generally
frowned upon for being contrary to public policy. This is based on the
recognition that employers and employees do not stand on equal footing. x x x
Quitclaims do not bar employees from filing labor complaints and demanding
benefits to which they are legally entitled. They are “ineffective in barring
recovery of the full measure of a worker’s rights, and the acceptance of
benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel.” The law does not recognize
agreements that result in compensation than what is mandated by law. These quitclaims
do not prevent employees from subsequently claiming benefits to which they are
legally entitled.
4. Same; Same; Blanket waivers exonerating employers from liability on
the claims of their employees are ineffective.-
—Paragraph 7 of the Compromise Agreement, which stipulates that
petitioners “shall give up other rights of compensation . . . [and] shall not
ask for any compensation based on any other causes[,]” cannot bar petitioners
from filing this case and from being indemnified should respondents be adjudged
liable. Blanket waivers exonerating employers from liability on the claims of
their employees are ineffective. Besides, at the time the parties’ Compromise
Agreement was executed, respondents had just terminated petitioners from
employment. Petitioners, therefore, had no other choice but to accede to the
terms and conditions of the agreement to recover the difference in their salaries
and overtime pay. With no means of livelihood, they signed the Compromise
Agreement out of dire necessity.
5. Same; Termination of Employment; Due Process; Under the Labor Code, employers may only terminate
employment for a just or authorized cause and after complying with procedural
due process requirements.-
—Under the Labor Code, employers may only terminate employment
for a just or authorized cause and after complying with procedural due process
requirements. Articles 297 and 300 of the Labor Code enumerate the causes of
employment termination either by employers or employees: ARTICLE 297[282].
Termination by employer.—An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work; (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative; (d) Commission of a crime or
offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and (e) Other
causes analogous to the foregoing. . . . . ARTICLE 300[285]. Termination by
employee.—(a) An employee may terminate without just cause the
employee-employer relationship by serving a written notice on the employer at
least one (1) month in advance. The employer upon whom no such notice was
served may hold the employee liable for damages. (b) An employee may put an end
to the relationship without serving any notice on the employer for any of the
following just causes: 1. Serious insult by the employer or his representative
on the honor and person of the employee; 2. Inhuman and unbearable treatment
accorded the employee by the employer or his representative; 3. Commission of a
crime or offense by the employer or his representative against the person of
the employee or any of the immediate members of his family; and 4. Other causes
analogous to any of the foregoing.
6. Same; Same; Illegal Dismissal; A review of the records here shows that the termination of
petitioners’ employment was effected merely because respondents no longer
wanted their services. This is not an authorized or just cause for dismissal
under the Labor Code. Employment contracts cannot be terminated on a whim.-
—In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof that employees
were validly dismissed rests on the employers. Failure to discharge this burden
means that the dismissal is illegal. A review of the records here shows that
the termination of petitioners’ employment was effected merely because
respondents no longer wanted their services. This is not an authorized or just
cause for dismissal under the Labor Code. Employment contracts cannot be
terminated on a whim. Moreover, petitioners did not voluntarily sever their
employment when they signed the Compromise Agreement, which, again, cannot be
used to justify a dismissal.
7. Same; Same; Due Process; A valid dismissal must comply with substantive and
procedural due process: there must be a valid cause and a valid procedure.-
—Petitioners were not accorded due process. A valid dismissal
must comply with substantive and procedural due process: there must be a valid
cause and a valid procedure. The employer must comply with the two (2)-notice
requirement, while the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard. Here,
petitioners were only verbally dismissed, without any notice given or having
been informed of any just cause for their dismissal. This Court cannot rest
easy on respondents’ insistence that petitioners voluntarily terminated their
employment. Contrary to their assertion, petitioners were left with no choice
but to accept the Compromise Agreement and to go back to the Philippines.
8. Same; Same; Illegal Dismissal; Moral Damages; Being deprived of their hard-earned salaries and,
eventually, of their employment, caused petitioners mental anguish, wounded
feelings, and serious anxiety.-
—Petitioners have sufficiently shown how bad faith attended respondents’
actions. They were made to sign a new employment contract on a piece-rate
basis, which violates the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act. Under
that contract, petitioners were underpaid and deprived of their overtime
premium. Moreover, petitioners’ employment contracts were unilaterally
terminated. After their meeting before the Bureau of Labor, respondents told
petitioners that they were no longer employed. As the Court of Appeals noted,
respondents did not refute petitioners’ narration that they were immediately
escorted back to the factory, ordered to pack their possessions, and were left
at a train station. Petitioners were forced to stay in shelters for months
without any means of livelihood. Worse, they were deprived of due process when
they were terminated without any notice or opportunity to be heard. Being
deprived of their hard-earned salaries and, eventually, of their employment,
caused petitioners mental anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety. The
award of moral damages is but appropriate.
9. Same; Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; The award of attorney’s fees is proper
because: (1) exemplary damages is also awarded; (2) respondents acted in gross bad faith
in refusing to pay petitioners their hard-earned salaries in form of overtime
premiums; and (3) this case is also a complaint
for recovery of wages.-
—The award of attorney’s fees is proper because: (1) exemplary
damages is also awarded; (2) respondents acted in gross bad faith in refusing
to pay petitioners their hard-earned salaries in form of overtime premiums; and
(3) this case is also a complaint for recovery of wages.
10. Same; Same; Same; Placement Fees; As they were terminated without just, valid, or authorized
cause, petitioners are entitled to the full reimbursement of their placement
fees with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum in accordance with Section
7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 10022.-
—In addition, we further sustain the Court of Appeals’ ruling in
having ordered the reimbursement of petitioners’ placement fees. As they were
terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause, petitioners are entitled
to the full reimbursement of their placement fees with interest at 12% per
annum in accordance with Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 200811
Counsel:
Dela Cruz, Entero and Associates for petitioners. David F. Daclag for
respondents.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 116953 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Respondents Gold and Green Manpower Management and Development
Services, Inc., Sage International Development Company, Ltd., and Alberto C.
Alvina are ORDERED to pay petitioners Julita M. Aldovino, Joan B. Lagrimas,
Winnie B. Lingat, Chita A. Sales, Sherly L. Guinto, Revilla S. De Jesus and
Laila V. Orpilla the following: (a) the amount equivalent to their salary for
the unexpired portion of their employment contract; (b) the amount equivalent
to their placement fee with an interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum; (c)
moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each; (d)
exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00)
each; (e) attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective
monetary awards; and (f) legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum of the
total monetary awards, except for the reimbursement of placement fee, which has
an interest of 12% per annum, computed from the finality of this Decision until
its full satisfaction.
Citation Ref:
99. People vs. Dela Cruz, 909 SCRA 465, July 17, 2019
Case Title : PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JORDAN
CASACLANG DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ; Chain of Custody
Rule ; Saving Clause ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Saving Clause; Noncompliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21
of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act “negates the presumption of regularity
accorded to acts undertaken by police officers in the pursuit of their official
duties.”-
—Similarly, the prosecution cannot seek refuge in the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Noncompliance
with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act “negates the presumption of regularity accorded to acts undertaken by
police officers in the pursuit of their official duties.” More to the point,
Que elaborated the limitations of the presumption of regularity vis-Ã -vis the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; Beyond being fleshed out by procedural rules, the
requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt occupies a constitutional stature,
as it finds basis not only in the due process clause of the Constitution, but
also in the accused’s presumption of innocence under the Bill of Rights.-
—In a criminal case, the prosecution must discharge the burden
of proving the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt to secure a conviction
for the crime charged. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require absolute
certainty that excludes error. Rather, this standard requires moral certainty,
“or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.”
Beyond being fleshed out by procedural rules, the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt occupies a constitutional stature, as it finds basis not only
in the due process clause of the Constitution, but also in the accused’s
presumption of innocence under the Bill of Rights. The right to be presumed
innocent puts the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt above the reasonable
doubt standard.
3. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; Elements.-
—Settled are the requisites to sustain convictions for Section
5, the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, and Section 11, the illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act: In actions
involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must
first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2)
the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence. On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal possession of a
dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an
item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case,
the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
4. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Compliance with the chain of custody requirements is
critical to ensure that the seized items were the same ones brought to court.-
—Compliance with the chain of custody requirements is critical
to ensure that the seized items were the same ones brought to court. It
protects the integrity of the corpus delicti in four (4) aspects: [F]irst, the
nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight)
of the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or
items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the
relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been
in possession of or peddling them. Nonethe, this Court recognizes that narcotic
substances are not readily identifiable and, thus, require further examination
for their composition and nature to be determined.
5. Same; Same; Same; Marking; The mere marking of the seized paraphernalia is
insufficient to comply with the specific requirements laid down in the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.-
—As this Court has repeatedly emphasized, the mere marking of
the seized paraphernalia is insufficient to comply with the specific
requirements laid down in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. Que explained
the significance of strict compliance on the conduct of inventory, marking and
photographing in the presence of third-party witnesses: What is critical in
drug cases is not the bare conduct of inventory, marking and photographing. Instead,
it is the certainty that the items allegedly taken from the accused retain
their integrity, even as they make their way from the accused to an officer
effecting the seizure, to an investigating officer, to a forensic chemist, and
ultimately, to courts where they are introduced as evidence. . . . What is
prone to danger is not any of these end points but the intervening transitions
or transfers from one point to another.
6. Same; Same; Same; Saving Clause; Republic Act (RA) No. 10640 did introduce amendments that
permit deviations from the law’s express requirements when there are
justifiable grounds.-
—Republic Act No. 10640 did introduce amendments that permit
deviations from the law’s express requirements when there are justifiable
grounds: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items. Que laid
down two (2) requisites that must be met to successfully invoke this proviso:
In order that there may be conscionable noncompliance, two (2) requisites must
be satisfied: first, the prosecution must specifically allege, identify and
prove “justifiable grounds”; second, it must establish that despite
noncompliance, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs and/or
drug paraphernalia were properly preserved. Satisfying the second requisite
demands a showing of positive steps taken to ensure such preservation. Broad
justifications and sweeping guarantees will not suffice.
7. Same; Same; Same; Same; Justification for the absence of third-party witnesses
must be alleged, identified and proved.-
—Justification for the absence of third-party witnesses must be
alleged, identified and proved. Further, there must be an earnest effort to
secure their presence during the inventory: Earnest effort to secure the
attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People v. Ramos requires:
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se
render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for
such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required
witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang,
the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were
employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for “a
sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an
explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse.”
Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to
contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for
noncompliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers
are ordinarily given sufficient time — beginning from the moment they have
received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of
his arrest — to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the
necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to
strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As
such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their
noncompliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted
earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given
circumstances, their actions were reasonable.
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 229053
Counsel:
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Public Attorney’s
Office for accused-appellant.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.:
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ October 5, 2016 Decision in
C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07660 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Jordan
Casaclang Dela Cruz is ACQUITTED for the prosecution’s failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from
detention, un he is confined for some other lawful cause. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for
immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed
to report to this Court the action he has taken within five (5) days from
receipt of this Decision. Copies shall also be furnished to the Director
General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency for their information. Let entry of final judgment be
issued immediately.
Citation Ref:
100. Government Service Insurance System vs.
Datoy, 910 SCRA 364, July 24, 2019
Case Title : GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPAL
AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER ROMERICO DATOY, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Section 7 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
explicitly states that “lands foreclosed by government financial institutions”
are subject to agrarian reform.-
—Section 7 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is even more
specific. It explicitly states that “lands foreclosed by government financial
institutions” are subject to agrarian reform: SECTION 7. Priorities.—The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in coordination with the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) shall plan and program the acquisition and
distribution of all agricultural lands through a period of ten (10) years from
the effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as
follows: Phase One: Rice and corn lands under Presidential Decree No. 27; all
idle or abandoned lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by the owners
for agrarian reform; all lands foreclosed by government financial institutions;
all lands acquired by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG);
and all other lands owned by the government devoted to or suitable for
agriculture, which shall be acquired and distributed immediately upon the
effectivity of this Act, with the implementation to be completed within a
period of not more than four (4) years[.]
2. Agrarian Reform; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, 541 SCRA 304 (2007), has settled that the exemptions from
agrarian reform coverage are contained in “an exclusive list” which are
enumerated under Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).-
—Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, 541 SCRA 304 (2007), has settled that the exemptions from agrarian
reform coverage are contained in “an exclusive list” which are enumerated under
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law: Section 4 of RA 6657 states, “The Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regard of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation
No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.” The lands in Archbishop’s name are agricultural
lands that fall within the scope of the law, and do not fall under the
exemptions. The exemptions under RA 6657 form an exclusive list, as follows:
SEC. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.—(a) Lands actually, directly and
exclusively used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish
sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves shall be exempt from
the coverage of this Act. (b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively
used for prawn farms and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this
Act: Provided, That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed
and Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued under the Agrarian Reform
Program. In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or commercial
farms deferment or notices of compulsory acquisition, a simple and absolute
majority of the actual regular workers or tenants must consent to the exemption
within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act. When the workers or
tenants do not agree to this exemption, the fishponds or prawn farms shall be
distributed collectively to the worker-beneficiaries or tenants who shall form
cooperative or association to manage the same. In cases where the fishponds or
prawn farms have not been subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
the consent of the farmworkers shall no longer be necessary; however, the
provision of Section 32-A hereof on incentives shall apply. (c) Lands actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense,
school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by
public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings
research and pilot production center, church sites and convents appurtenant
thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial
grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the
inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands
with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed,
shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. (As amended by R.A. 7881)
Division:
THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 232863
Counsel:
GSIS Legal Service Group for petitioner. Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance
for respondent.
Ponente:
LEONEN, J.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed October 13, 2016
Decision and July 19, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 134933 are AFFIRMED.
Citation Ref:
101. Go To SUN, by his father
and natural guardian, Manuel Nubla Co Siong, petitioner and appellant, vs. H.
B. McCoY, Insular Collector of Customs, respondent and appellee., 16 Phil.
497, August 23, 1910
Excerpt : 1. Go To SUN, by his father
and natural guardian, Manuel Nubla Co Siong, petitioner and appellant, vs. H.
B. McCoY, Insular Collector of Customs, respondent and appellee.
More Excerpts
Case Title : Go To SUN, by his father and natural guardian,
Manuel Nubla Co Siong, petitioner and appellant, vs. H. B. McCoY, Insular
Collector of Customs, respondent and appellee.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a judgement of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. Crossfield, J
Syllabi Class :ALIEN IMMIGRATION LAW|
Syllabi:
1. ALIEN IMMIGRATION LAW; CHINESE EXCLUSION.-
A Chinaman over 21
years of age is not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands in order to be
under the care and protection of his father. (Lo Po vs. McCoy, 8 Phil. Rep.,
343.)
Docket Number: No. 5785
Counsel: Claro Reyes Panlilio, Attorney-General
Villamor
Ponente: JOHNSON