De Los Santos v. De La Cruz GR L-29192|February 22, 1971
G.R. No. L-29192|February 22, 1971
37 SCRA 555
FACTS:
1. Pelagia De la Cruz died intestate and without issue.
2. Subsequently, Gertrudes De los Santos, who was the grandniece of Pelagia, and several co-heirs, including Maximo De la Cruz, who was the nephew of the deceased Pelagia, executed an extra judicial partition agreement over the deceased estate. The parties agreed to adjudicate 3 lots to Maximo in addition to his corresponding share, on condition that he would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate with all expenses in connection therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the said 3 lots.
3. However, despite demands of Gertrudes, other co-heirs, and residents of the subdivision, Maximo failed to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the lots. Thus, Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific performance.
4. Maximo answered that while he admits the due execution of the extra judicial partition, Gertrudes had no cause of action against him because the said agreement was void as to her, for she was not an heir of Pelagia, the deceased owner of the property. The lower court ruled that Maximo, being a party to the extra judicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right of Gertrudes to inherit from Pelagia and hence he must abide by its terms.
1. Pelagia De la Cruz died intestate and without issue.
2. Subsequently, Gertrudes De los Santos, who was the grandniece of Pelagia, and several co-heirs, including Maximo De la Cruz, who was the nephew of the deceased Pelagia, executed an extra judicial partition agreement over the deceased estate. The parties agreed to adjudicate 3 lots to Maximo in addition to his corresponding share, on condition that he would undertake the development and subdivision of the estate with all expenses in connection therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the said 3 lots.
3. However, despite demands of Gertrudes, other co-heirs, and residents of the subdivision, Maximo failed to perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the lots. Thus, Gertrudes filed a complaint for specific performance.
4. Maximo answered that while he admits the due execution of the extra judicial partition, Gertrudes had no cause of action against him because the said agreement was void as to her, for she was not an heir of Pelagia, the deceased owner of the property. The lower court ruled that Maximo, being a party to the extra judicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right of Gertrudes to inherit from Pelagia and hence he must abide by its terms.
ISSUE:
1. WON in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is an heir of the decedent. - NO
2. WON the extra judicial partition is valid with respect to Gertrudes as to give her a cause of action against Maximo. – NO
3. WON the court a quo erred in holding that defendant-appellant is estopped from questioning plaintiff-appellee’s right to have the agreement enforced. – YES
HELD:
1.
The court said that they are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of representation.
ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood."
Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place..."
Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia v. Ugarte y Iturralde, 5 Phil., 176 (1905), said:
". . . [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased cannot participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle."
In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece, is excluded by law from the inheritance.
2.
In the stipulation of facts submitted, the parties admit that the owner of the estate was Pelagia who died intestate; that Maximo is a nephew of the said decedent; and that Gertrude is a grandniece of Pelagia; (her mother Marciana de la Cruz being a niece of said Pelagia); that Gertrudes’ mother predeceased Pelagia; and that the purpose of the extra judicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia.
In the present case, the relatives ‘nearest in degree’ to Pelagia are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is Maximo. Necessarily, Gertrudes, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance. Gertrudes’ inclusion and participation in the extra judicial partition agreement did not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the agreement was to divide the estate among the heirs of Pegalia. The agreement itself states that Gertrudes was participating therein in representation of her deceased mother. It is apparent that in executing the partition, the parties were laboring under the erroneous belief that Gertrudes was one the legal heirs of Pelagia. But Gertrudes not being such heir, the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 which states that “(a) partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to that person.”
3.
The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against defendant-appellant. Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void contract (17 Am. Jur. 605), or on acts which are prohibited by law or are against public policy (Baltazar v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Et Al., G.R. Nos. 16236-38, June 30, 1965 [14 SCRA 522]). In Ramiro v. Graño, Et Al., 54 Phil., 744 (1930), this Court held:
"No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon a mistake. And while there is authority to the contrary, the weight of authority is that the acts and declarations of a party based upon an innocent mistake as to his legal rights will not estop him to assert the same, especially where every fact known to the party sought to be estopped is equally well known to the party setting up the estoppel. (21 C.J., 1125, 1126.)"
And in Capili, Et. Al. v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., G.R. No. L-18148, February 28, 1963 (7 SCRA 367), this Court said:
"Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be apprised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppels.