Doctrines in Constitutional Construction
Interpretation and Construction of
1987 Philippine Constitution
The following are the well settled principles of constitutional construction based on jurisprudence:
(1) Verba Legis - that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed; [1]
(2) Ratio legis est anima - The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers; [2]
(3) Ut magis valeat quam pereat - The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole; [3]
(4) De Castro Doctrine - [4] (NOTE: depends where it is written - as our professor in constitutional law said, and for review and class purposes, you can term it De Castro Doctrine or Positioning Doctrine); It did not apply the construction and interpretation laid down in the case of Francisco vs. HREP, but rather created another interpretation, thus:
[The interpretation of] Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 [of Article VII of 1987 constitution] are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof. [5]Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, the appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBCs prior processing of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on the law of the statute, i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it. [6]
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[1] Francisco vs HREP; GR. no. 160261, Nov. 10 2003
[2] Francisco vs HREP; GR. no. 160261, Nov. 10 2003
[3] Francisco vs HREP; GR. no. 160261, Nov. 10 2003
[4] De Castro vs JBC; GR no. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010 and Apr. 20, 2010,
[5] De Castro vs JBC; GR no. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010 and Apr. 20, 2010,
[6] De Castro vs JBC; GR no. 191002, Mar. 17, 2010 and Apr. 20, 2010,