CIPRIANO v. CA, | G.R. No. 107968|1996

G.R. No. 107968| October 30, 1996

ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MACLIN ELECTRONICS, INC., respondents.

Rationale: A VIOLATION OF A STATUTORY DUTY IS NEGLIGENCE PER SE. - We have already held that violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se. In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we held the owner of a furniture shop liable for the destruction of the plaintiff's house in a fire which started in his establishment in view of his failure to comply with an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In Teaque vs. Fernandez, we stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has happened, none compliance with the ordinance was not only an act of negligence, but also the proximate cause of the death. Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar a finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict, as we recently held in Fabre vs. Court of Appeals. Petitioner's negligence is the source of his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It is therefore immaterial that the loss occassioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioner's negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss.

Case Summary:

Facts:

1.    Petitioner Elias S. Cipriano is the owner of E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, which is engaged in the rustproofing of vehicles, under the style Motobilkote. On April 30, 1991, private respondent Maclin Electronics, Inc., through an employee, brought a 1990 model Kia Pride Peoples car to petitioners shop for rustproofing. The car had been purchased the year before from the Integrated Auto Sales, Inc. for P252,155.00.

2.    The vehicle was received in the shop under Job Order No. 123581,^[3] which showed the date it was received for rustproofing as well its condition at the time. Neither the time of acceptance nor the hour of release, however, was specified. According to the petitioner, the car was brought to his shop at 10 oclock in the morning of April 30, 1991 and was ready for release later that afternoon, as it took only six hours to complete the process of rustproofing.

3.    In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the Lambat restaurant, which petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop. The fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private respondents Kia Pride. The car had been kept inside the building, allegedly to protect it from theft. Petitioner claimed that despite efforts to save the vehicle, there was simply not enough time to get it out of the building, unlike three other cars which had been saved because they were parked near the entrance of the garage.^[4]

4.    On May 8 1991, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner, demanding reimbursement for the value of the Kia Pride. In reply, petitioner denied liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous event. This prompted private respondent to bring this suit for the value of its vehicle and for damages against petitioner. Private respondent alleged that its vehicle was lost due to the negligence and imprudence of the petitioner, citing petitioners failure to register his business with the Department of Trade and Industry under P.D. No. 1572 and to insure it as required in the rules implementing the Decree.^[5]

5.    In his Answer, petitioner invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code and denied liability for the loss which he alleged was due to a fortuitous event. He later testified that he employed an electrician who regularly inspected the lighting in his restaurant and rustproofing shop. In addition, he claimed he had installed fire-fighting devices and that the fire was an accident entirely independent of his will and devoid of any negligence on his part. He further averred that private respondents car was ready for release as early as afternoon of April 30, 1991, and that it was private respondents delay in claiming it that was the cause of the loss.

6.    Petitioner explained that rustproofing involved spraying asphalt-like materials underneath motor vehicle so that rust will not corrode its body and that the materials and chemicals used for this purpose are not inflammable. Therefore, he could not be made to assume the risk of loss due to fire. He also claimed that he was not required to register his business with the Department of Trade and Industry, because he was not covered by P.D. No. 1572.

7.    On the other hand, private respondent argued that petitioner was liable for the loss of the car even if it was caused by a fortuitous event.It contended that the nature of petitioners business required him to assume the risk because under P.D. No. 1572, petitioner was required to insure his property as well as those of his customers.

8.    The trial court sustained the private respondents contention that the failure of defendant to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is in effect a manifest act of negligence which renders defendant [petitioner herein] liable for the loss of the car even if the same was caused by fire,^[6]even as it ruled that the business of rustproffing is definitely covered by P.D. No. 1572. Since petitioner did not register his business and insure it, he must bear the cost of loss of his customers. As already noted, the court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent P252,155.00 with interest at 6% per annum from the filing of the case and attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00.

9.    On appeal, the decision was affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled that the provisions of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner are not applicable to this case, and that the law applicable to the case is P.D. No. 1572, the purpose of which is to protect customers who entrust their properties to service and repair enterprises. The Court of Appeals held that by virtue of the provisions of P.D. No. 1572 and its implementing rules and regulations which require fire insurance coverage prior to accreditation, owners of service and repair enterprises assume the risk of loss of their customers property. The appellate court stated:

a.    Defendant-appellant was operating the business of rustproofing of cars and other motor vehicles illegally at the time of the fire in question; i.e., without the necessary accreditation and license from the Department of Trade and Industry, and it is for this reason that it did not carry at least a fire insurance coverage to protect the vehicles entrusted to it by its customers. Therefore, it must bear the consequences of such illegal operation, including the risk of losses or injuries to the vehicles of its customers brought by unforeseen or fortuitous events like the fire that gutted its shop and completely burned appellees car while said vehicle was in its possession.^[7]

10. Thus the present petition to Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the contention of petitioner that the fire which destroyed private respondents car was a fortuitous event for which he cannot be held responsible is correct. – NO.

Held:

No.

The contention is without merit. 

Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar a finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict, as we recently held in Fabre v. Court of Appeals.^[11] Petitioner's negligence is the source of his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It is therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous event, since it was petitioners negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the proximate cause of the loss.

Thus, P.D. No. 1572, 1 requires service and repair enterprises for motor vehicles, like that of petitioners to register with the Department of Trade and Industry. As condition for such registration or accreditation, Ministry Order No. 32 requires covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage. 

There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply with this duty that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable for damages to private respondent. While the fire in this case may be considered a fortuitous event,^[13] this circumstance cannot exempt petitioner from liability for loss.

Dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated November 18, 1992, of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the award of attorneys fees is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.