G.R.
No. L-63915| December 29, 1986
LORENZO
M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to
the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
Topics: Statutes, Constitutional Law, Local Governments, Publication
Ponente: Cruz, J;
Doctrines:
(1) The clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws and not to
the requirement of publication.
(2) The prior publication of laws before they
become effective cannot be dispensed with.
(3) For purposes of the prior publication
requirement for effectivity, the term "laws" refer not only to those of
general application, but also to laws of local application, private laws;
administrative rules enforcing a statute; city charters. Central Bank circulars
to "fill-in the details of the Central Bank Act; but not mere
interpretative rules regulating and providing guidelines for purposes of
internal operations only.
(4) We hold therefore that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless
a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
(5) Covered by this rule are presidential decrees
and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
(6) Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
(7) Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be
published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directy affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must
be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
(8) Internal instructions issued by an
administrative agency are not covered by the rule on prior publication. Also
not covered are municipal ordinances which are governed by the Local Government
Code.
(9) Publication of statutes must be in full or it
is no publication at all.
(10) Prior publication of statutes for purposes of
effectivity must be made in full in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere.
(11) Laws must be published as soon as possible.
Short Facts:
Petitioners demand the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by
law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it
was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become “effective immediately upon their
approval”.
In an earlier decision, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of “presidential issuances which are of general
application.”
Petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that
publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made
forthwith in the Official Gazette.
FACTS:
Due
process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number
of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required
by law.
The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In
the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity
for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive
portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish
in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force
and effect.
The
petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
1.What
is meant by "law of public nature" or "general
applicability"?
2.Must
a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?
3.What
is meant by "publication"?
4.Where
is the publication to be made?
5.When
is the publication to be made?
Resolving
their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication
means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in
the Official Gazette.
In
the Comment required of the then Solicitor General,
he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless
it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when
necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any
case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and
consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply refuting these arguments. Came next the
February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a
Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the
Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the
internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did
not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and
in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration
was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this
Court.
The
subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication.
ISSUE:
1.WON as the government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided,"
as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval. - NO
2.WON that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those which are not; - YES
3.WON that publication means complete publication; and -
YES
4.WON that the publication must be made forthwith in the
Official Gazette. -YES
HELD:
1.
NO.
After
a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on
the original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion
and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Publication
is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An
example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate
concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become
effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but
"one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise
provided.”
It
is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed
with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to
govern the legislature could validly provide that a law effective immediately
upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons
not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because
of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its
existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription,
which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can
begin to operate.
We
note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law,
which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption
is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember
that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies
to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.
2.
YES.
The term
"laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. []
We
hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered
by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Accordingly,
even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the
inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published,
including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued
by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to
interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.
However,
no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of
Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the
rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or
workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically,
municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government
Code.
3.
YES.
We agree that
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential
decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of
the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general
applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. The evident purpose was to withhold
rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming
now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were
categorically for publication in the Official Gazette and that six others felt that
publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently
informed. One reserved his vote and another merely acknowledged the
need for due publication without indicating where it should be made. It is therefore necessary for the
present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter
and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
4.
YES.
At
any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That
function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply
the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article
2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen
days from such publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature.
We
also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is
that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law
could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for
whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter,
however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
Dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE,
it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon
their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the
Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance
with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO
ORDERED.
Other Doctrines enunciated in this Case:
1.ISSUE: WON that
the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be
dismissed.
a.HELD: NO. Finally,
the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request
for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further
comment.
b.The days of the
secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and
available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to
remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government
authority emanating from them.
c.Although they have
delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the
work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights,
through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they
cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.
d.Laws must come out
in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are
confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.