Wassmer vs Velez, G.R. No. L-20089| 1964

G.R. No. L-20089| December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER,  vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ

G.R. No. L-20089

December 26, 1964

Rationale: An affidavit of merit stating no facts, but merely an inference that defendant’s failure was due to fortuitous events and/or circumstances beyond his control, is held to contain a conclusion of fact, not a fact.

Case Summary:

Facts:

1.  The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.

2.  Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day.

3.    On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be.

Dear Bet — Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today. Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal. Paquing

4.    But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE . PAKING

5.        Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

6.    Beatriz file a case for damages against Velez and judgment was rendered against Velez (Velez in here was declared in default because he did not file an answer to the complaint made by Beatriz.

7.      The court ordered Velez to pay Beatriz the following to wit: plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.

8.    Velez  filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration," on the judgment rendered by lower court ordering Velez o pay Beatriz.

9.        Plaintiff moved to strike it out.

10.  But the court, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement."

11.   It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."

12.     Velez failed to appear before court.

13.   Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on Velez’s petition for relief which the court granted.

14. Thereafter, Beatriz manifested that the two weeks given by the court had expired but Velez and his counsel had failed to appear.

15.  Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order calling the parties and their attorneys to appear.

16.  This time, however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.

17.  Because of that, the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition.

18.     Defendant has appealed to this Court (Supreme Court).

19.   In his petition in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default.

20.  Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.

Issue/s:

1.       Whether or not the damages awarded were proper

2.   Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.   

Held:

1.

Yes.

Velez's affidavit of merits attached to his petition stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." [[1]] An affidavit of merits like this, stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid.

The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to marry, because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velez’s unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

2.

NO.

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, [[2]] as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay, [[3]]  is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Dispositive portion of SC’s Judgement:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.

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[1] Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960

[2] (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960)

[3] (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960)