Public Estates Authority (PEA) v. Alaras
G.R. No. 182678| August 3, 2010
Public Estates Authority [1], v. ALARAS, et. al. [2]
FACTS:
Ruling squarely on the issue adduced before it, the Supreme Court declared that Lot 5155 was a public land so that De Leon's occupation thereof, no matter how long ago, could not confer ownership or possessory rights. Prescinding therefrom, no writ of injunction may lie to protect De Leon's nebulous right of possession. Accordingly, in its Decision dated 20 November 2000, [3] the Supreme Court disposed of the controversy.
The aforesaid Decision became final and executory as no motion for reconsideration was filed.
In due course, PEA moved for the issuance of a writ of execution praying that De Leon and persons claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate and peaceably surrender possession of Lot 5155.
Acting on PEA's motion, the court a quo issued the first assailed Order granting the Writ of Execution dated 15 September 2004. [4]
As could well be expected, De Leon moved for reconsideration thereof and quashal of the writ of execution.
He adamantly insisted that the court a quo's Order for the issuance of the writ of execution completely deviated from the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court's Decision dated 20 November 2000 as it did not categorically direct him to surrender possession of Lot 5155 in favor of PEA.
However, both motions met the same fate as these were denied by the court a quo in the second disputed Order dated 29 April 2005.
ISSUE:
WON the court a quo's Order for the issuance of the writ of execution completely deviated from the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court's Decision dated 20 November 2000 as it did not categorically direct him to surrender possession of Lot 5155 in favor of PEA.
HELD:
NO.
As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award. The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must:
- conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and
- may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce,
- nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.
In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him. No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time. The removal of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of the improvements.
It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. In the present case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to court and file an ejectment case simply to establish its right to possess the subject property. Contrary to De Leon's claims, the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted modification of this Court's decision in PEA v. CA, but rather, was a necessary complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential consequence of this Court's ruling affirming the nature of the subject parcel of land as public and at the same time dismissing De Leon's claims of ownership and possession. To further require PEA to file an ejectment suit to oust de Leon and his siblings from the disputed property would, in effect, amount to encouraging multiplicity of suits.
Finally, the Court reminds the De Leon that it does not allow the piecemeal interpretation of its Decisions as a means to advance his case. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and read in this context, but the same must be considered in its entirety. Read in this manner, PEA's right to possession of the subject property, as well as the removal of the improvements or structures existing thereon, fully follows after considering the entirety of the Court's decision in PEA v. CA. This is consistent with the provisions of Section 10, paragraphs (c) and (d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which provide for the procedure for execution of judgments for specific acts.
[1] now PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY, substituted by the CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, Petitioner,
[2] HON. SELMA PALACIO ALARAS, in her capacity as the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 135, Regional Trial Court of Makati City, and BERNARDO DE LEON. Respondents.
[3] Decision dated 20 November 2000:
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 30630, and DISMISSES the complaint in Civil Case No. 93-143 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati.
No costs.[4] Order dated 15 September 2004
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the "Motion For Issuance Of Writ of Execution" filed by defendant Public Estate[s] Authority, and finding the same to be impressed with merit, the same is GRANTED.
Let a Writ of Execution issue directing plaintiff, his agents, principals, successors-in-interest and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate and peaceably turn over possession of Lot 5155 to defendant Public Estate[s] Authority.
SO ORDERED.