ISAGANI CRUZ VS SECRETARY
CRUZ [1] VS SECRETARY [2][3]
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Acronyms and shortcuts:
IPRA - Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
NCIP - National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
DENR - Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DBM - Department of Budget and Management
SG - Solicitor General
CHR - Commission on Human Rights
Haribon, et al. - Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc.
Doctrine:
Q. What if the votes of court en banc are equally
divided?
A. Where the votes in the Court en banc are equally divided and
the necessary majority is not obtained, the case is redeliberated upon,
but if after deliberation, the voting remains the same, the petition is dismissed
pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Section 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. — Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed, in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
| Facts: |
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought
this suit for PROHIBITION and MANDAMUS as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA law [4] and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).
In its
resolution, [5] the Court required respondents to comment.
In compliance, respondents Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP, the government agency created under the IPRA to
implement its provisions, filed [6] their Comment to the Petition, in which
they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.
[7] Respondents
Secretary of the DENR and Secretary of the DBM filed through the SG a
consolidated Comment. The SG is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources
to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.
[8] Thereafter,
A group of intervenors, filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They
join the NCIP in defending the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the
dismissal of the petition, which composed of:
1.
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Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the
IPRA,
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2.
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Mr. Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission,
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3.
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leaders and members of 112 groups of indigenous
peoples (Flavier, et. al)
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[9] The CHR
likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR
asserts that:
1.
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IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens
patriae
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2.
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that the State has the responsibility to protect
and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples.
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3.
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For this reason it prays that the petition be
dismissed.
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[10] Another
group, composed of the Haribon, et al., filed a motion to Intervene with
attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al.
that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition for
prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The
motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations WERE
GRANTED.
Oral
arguments were heard. [11]
Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their
respective memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their
earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners
contends that:
1.
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They assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the IPRA and
its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
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Sec. 3(a)
Sec. 3(b)
Sec. 5, in relation to sec. 3(a)
Sec. 6 in relation to sec. 3(a) and 3(b)
Sec. 7
Sec. 8
Sec. 57
Sec. 58
(see footnote 12)
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2.
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that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.
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Sec. 3(a)
Sec. 3(b)
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3.
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In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining
the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable
to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution
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Sec. 51
Sec. 53
Sec. 59
Sec. 52[i]
Sec. 63
Sec. 65
Sec. 66
(see footnote 13)
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4.
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The validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, [14] They contend that said Rule
infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive departments
under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution.6
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Petitioners pray for the following:
1.
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A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65
and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and
invalid;
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2.
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The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and
Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and desist from implementing the assailed
provisions of R.A. 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
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3.
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The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
implementing Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular No. 2,
series of 1998;
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4.
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The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of
Budget and Management to cease and desist from disbursing public funds for
the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
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5.
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The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment
and Natural Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources
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HELD:
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After due
deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7)
voted to dismiss the petition.
Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief
Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a
separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the
exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57
of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction
with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand,
Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does
not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7)
other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.
Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related
provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the
constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes
must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional.
Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate
opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the
votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
Attached
hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes:
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[1] Petitioners:
ISAGANI CRUZ CESAR EUROPA
[2] Respondents:
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and
[3] Intervenors:
1.
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HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO, LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY, BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN, VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S. SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS,
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2
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COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, |
3
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IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE |
4
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HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, INC.,
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[4] Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA),
[5] of September 29, 1998
[6] on October 13, 1998
[7] On October 19, 1998,
[8] On November 10, 1998,
[9] On March 22, 1999
[10] On March 23, 1999
[11] on April 13, 1999.
[12] provisions of IPRA on issue:
Sec. 3(a),
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Which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains,
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Sec. 3(b)
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Defines ancestral lands;
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Sec. 5, in relation to sec. 3(a)
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Which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public
lands, bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous peoples;
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Sec. 6 in relation to sec. 3(a) and 3(b)
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Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
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Sec. 7
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Which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral
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Sec. 8
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Which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples
over the ancestral lands;
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Sec. 57
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Which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of minerals and other
natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and
the right to enter into agreements with nonindigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years;
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Sec. 58
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Which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and portions thereof
which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."2
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[13] provisions of IPRA on issue in relation to powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP:
Sec. 51 to 53 and 59
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Which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral
domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
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Section 52[i]
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Which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular
area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following officials,
namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of
Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over
said area terminates;
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Section 63
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Which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights,
claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes,
and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be
resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;
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Section 65
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Which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
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Section 66
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Which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples.
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[14] which provides that "the administrative relationship of the
NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized as a lateral but
autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination."