IMANI, vs. MBTC | .R. No. 187023; November 17, 2010

G.R. No. 187023; November 17, 2010 

IMANI, vs. MBTC 

Doctrines:

1. Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. 
2. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material. 
3. The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay. 
4. In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative value. 
5. a photocopy of a document has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence.

FACTS: 

1. (Petitioner) Umani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (₱6,000,000.00). 
2. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. 
3. After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision4 in favor of Metrobank. 
4. Therein defendants appealed to the CA. The CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal. 
5. A writ of execution was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-27957 P(M) and registered in the name of petitioner. A public auction was conducted and the property was awarded to Metrobank, as the highest bidder. 
6. Petitioner opposed the motion and filed her Comment and argued that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy on execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the levy on execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank. 
7. The RTC issued an Order denying Metrobank’s motion explaining that: “It cannot therefore be presumed that the loan proceeds had redounded to the benefit of her family. It is also worth stressing that the records of this case is bereft of any showing that at the time of the signing of the Suretyship Agreement and even at the time of execution and sale at public auction of the subject property, [petitioner] Evangelina D. Imani has the authority to dispose of or encumber their conjugal partnership properties. Neither was she conferred the power of administration over the said properties. Hence, when she executed the Suretyship Agreement, she had placed the Conjugal Partnership in danger of being dissipated.” 
8. Metrobank filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership. 
9. However, despite petitioner’s opposition, the RTC issued an Order setting aside its former order in favor of petitioner. 
10. But on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued a new Order reinstating its first Order in favor of petitioner. 
11. Metrobank assailed the Order via a petition for certiorari in the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for annulling the levy on execution and the auction sale, and for canceling the certificate of sale. The CA rendered the now challenged Decision reversing the RTC. 

ISSUE: 

WON THE CA ERRS, IN REVERSING THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PROPERTY IS CONJUGAL IN NATURE BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES 

HELD: 

NO. 

The Supreme Court sustains the CA’s ruling on this point. 

Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. 

However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material. 

To support her assertion that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit of Crisanto Origen, attesting that petitioner and her husband were the vendees of the subject property, and the photocopies of the checks allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property. 

Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly be considered sufficient evidence to prove her claim that the property is conjugal. As correctly pointed out by Metrobank, the said Affidavit has no evidentiary weight because Crisanto Origen was not presented in the RTC to affirm the veracity of his Affidavit.

The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination. 

In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative value. In Concepcion v. Atty. Fandiño, Jr. and Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, we held that a photocopy of a document has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the CA was correct in disregarding the said pieces of evidence. 

Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioner’s assertion. As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. 

Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership. Thus, it cannot be rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis.