SERRANO V. GALLANT| GR No. 167614, March 24, 2009

SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC.

GR No. 167614 - March 24, 2009 

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.

 

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000 upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

 

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998, serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

 

Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640 for March 1999) as well as moral and exemplary damages.

The LA declared the petitioner's dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing his salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment, plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no compensation for damages as prayed was awarded.

 

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445 salary differential and 10% for attorney's fees. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July 15, 1995.

 

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:

 

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

 

The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised by herein petitioner Serrano.

 

ISSUES:

 

1.    Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts; NO

 

2.      Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector; YES

 

HELD:

1.  NO. The answer is in the negative.

 

Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.

 

Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides: 

 

No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

 

The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

 

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No. 8042.

 

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.

2.  YES. The answer is in the affirmative.

 

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.

 

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

 

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

 

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements:

1)     it is based on substantial distinctions;

2)     it is germane to the purposes of the law;

3)     it is not limited to existing conditions only; and

4)     it applies equally to all members of the class.

 

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law:

 

a)   the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest;

 

b)  the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest; and

 

c)   strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

 

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

 

1)   First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;

2)    Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and

3)    Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed – period employment;

 

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

 

There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.

 

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.

 

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.

 

In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.

 

Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.

 

Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.

 

The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contain similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring foreign employers.

 

Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign principals.

 

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.

 

The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.