Navaja vs. De Castro, 839 SCRA 232, G.R. No. 180969 September 11, 2017
Full Text:
G.R. No. 180969, September 11, 2017,
NOEL NAVAJA, petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO or his successor, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna & Gracia-Hernandez, Jagna, Bohol, and ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, respondents.
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
Doctrines:
Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes the acts constituting the crime of obstruction of justice, the pertinent portions of which read:
Sec. 1. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;
x x x x
(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
x x x xThe elements of the crime are:
(a) that the accused committed any of the acts listed under Section 1 of PD 1829; and(b) that such commission was done for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or delaying the successful investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.
In Santiago v. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214 (1993), the Court explained the principle of delito continuado as follows: According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist, there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 630, 1987 ed). Accordingly to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152). Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54). x x x x The concept of delito continuado, although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g., violation of [Republic Act] No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war veteran’s benefits x x x. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
Petitioner’s acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly motivated by a single criminal impulse in order to realize only one criminal objective, which is to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238. Thus, applying the principle of delito continuado, petitioner should only be charged with one (1) count of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed either in Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly prevented from appearing and testifying in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, or in Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit in the same case. However, since he was already charged — and in fact, convicted in a Judgment dated July 3, 2007 — in the MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events that transpired in Jagna, Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of petitioner’s single criminal design.
A Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to issue a warrant for a search outside its territorial jurisdiction — the RTC of Manila has no authority to issue a search warrant for offenses committed in Cavite; The instant case involves a transitory or continuing offense of unfair competition under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293. (Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. vs. Supergreen, Incorporated, 518 SCRA 750 [2007])
It is well-settled that violations of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. (Morillo vs. People, 777 SCRA 207 [2015])
SYNOPSIS:
The case involves the husband of a former Regional Sales Manager who allegedly obstructed justice by presenting a notarized affidavit in support of his wife's counter-affidavit and misrepresenting to a witness that her attendance in a scheduled hearing was no longer needed. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the charge pending before one court should have been absorbed by the charge pending before another court. The Court ruled that the acts imputed to petitioner are deemed separate crimes and may be tried separately, but it would expose him to double jeopardy. Therefore, the criminal case must be dismissed as the events that transpired were partial execution of a single criminal design.
FACTS:
The case involves a preliminary investigation proceeding initiated by DKT Philippines against its former Regional Sales Manager for Visayas for the crime of falsification of a private document. The petitioner, who is the former Regional Sales Manager's husband, allegedly obstructed justice by misrepresenting to a material witness that her attendance in a scheduled hearing was no longer needed and presenting a notarized affidavit in support of his wife's counter-affidavit. Criminal complaints were filed against him for obstruction of justice, and he filed a motion to dismiss/quash the information, arguing that the charge pending before one court should have been absorbed by the charge pending before another court, considering that the cases arose from a single preliminary investigation proceeding, involving the same set of facts and circumstances, and flowed from a single alleged criminal intent.
The MCTC-Jagna denied petitioner's Motion to Quash for lack of jurisdiction over his person. The MCTC-Jagna and MTCC-Tagbilaran have two separate cases, one with only one accused and the other with two, and the places of commission are different. The RTC denied the petition, which the CA affirmed, citing that petitioner allegedly committed violations of different provisions of PD 1829, in distinct places and locations, thus warranting two separate crimes. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, and he filed a petition.
ISSUE:
WON the CA correctly ruled that petitioner may be separately tried for different acts constituting violations of PD 1829, namely, violations of Sections 1 (a) and (f) of the same law allegedly committed during the pendency of a single proceeding. - NO.
HELD:
NO. Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be dismissed; otherwise, petitioner will be unduly exposed to double jeopardy, which the Court cannot countenance.
Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes the acts constituting the crime of obstruction of justice, xxx
The elements of the crime are:
(a) that the accused committed any of the acts listed under Section 1 of PD 1829; and
(b) that such commission was done for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or delaying the successful investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.
In ruling that the acts imputed to petitioner are deemed separate crimes and thus, may be tried separately, the CA cited the case of Regis v. People (Regis), wherein it was held that the malversation committed through falsification of document performed on different dates constitute independent offenses which must be punished separately. However, a closer perusal of Regis shows that its factual milieu is not on all fours with the instant case. In Regis, the accused, then municipal treasurer of Pinamungahan, Cebu, signed payrolls on two (2) different dates, i.e., April 30, 1931 and May 2, 1931, making it appear that certain workers worked as laborers in a municipal project when in truth, there were no such workers and that he and his co-accused misappropriated the payroll amounts to themselves. The Court ruled that the accused may be held liable for two (2) separate crimes, considering that when the accused committed the first act constituting malversation committed through falsification of document, it did not appear that he was already predisposed to committing the second act constituting the same crime. Clearly, when the accused in Regis falsified the payroll of April 30, 1931, and later, the payroll of May 2, 1931, he -though committing similar acts - could not be said to have been motivated by a single criminal impulse as he was working towards discernibly distinct criminal objectives.
In contrast, petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly motivated by a single criminal impulse in order to realize only one criminal objective, which is to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238. Thus, applying the principle of delito continuado, petitioner should only be charged with one (1) count of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed either in Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly prevented from appearing and testifying in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, or in Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit in the same case.However, since he was already charged - and in fact, convicted in a Judgmentdated July 3, 2007 - in the MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events that transpired in Jagna, Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of petitioner's single criminal design. The Court's pronouncement in Gamboa v. CA is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as "delito continuado'" or "continuous crime." This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. For Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual character, merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence or delictual acts is called a "delito continuado." In order that it may exist, there should be "plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim."
Dispositive Portion:
Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be dismissed; otherwise, petitioner will be unduly exposed to double jeopardy, which the Court cannot countenance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 26, 2007 and the Resolution dated November 12, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 02354 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Criminal Case No. 2878 pending before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Jagna & Garcia-Hernandez, Jagna, Bohol is DISMISSED.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside, Criminal Case No. 2878 dismissed.