Writ of Amparo, Mison v. Gallegos

Writ of Amparo as discussed in the case of Mison v. Gallegos, 760 SCRA 363 [2015]

The privilege of the writ of amparo is .an extraordinary remedy adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of Amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

Synopsis:

The court in Mison v. Gallegos (2015) discussed the privilege of the writ of amparo as an extraordinary remedy to address the concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. The court emphasized the need for judicious use of this remedy to prevent its indiscriminate filing for unsubstantiated claims. In the case of Ja Hoon Ku's petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, the court found his allegations to be unfounded and unsubstantiated, and ruled against him, stating that there was no need for the writ of amparo in this case.

FACTS:

In 2014, the Republic of Korea requested assistance from Interpol to locate and deport Ja Hoon Ku for misusing funds. Ku's visa expired on January 1, and on January 16, the BI issued a Summary Deportation Order, and Ku was arrested the same day. On January 17, Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo, which was granted on January 22. On January 28 and 29, the court issued two orders for Ku's custody and protection, which were challenged by the petitioner. On February 4, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, which prompted the petitioner to move for the dismissal of the amparo petition on February 11. The motion was denied on February 18, and the petitioner appealed the matter to the Court. On February 25, Ku filed an appeal memorandum on his deportation order. On March 14, Judge Gallegos granted the privilege of the writ of amparo.

On 19 March 2014, the Office of the President (OP) granted Ku provisional liberty only until 31 August 2014 or until his appeal was resolved, whichever came first. Ku then moved for the release of his passport before the RTC, which petitioner opposed and to which he filed a counter-motion for the RTC to release said passport to the BI, given that such was one of the conditions for the OP’s grant of provisional liberty to Ku. In the Order dated 26 March 2014, however, Judge Gallegos merely noted petitioner’s motion for being moot, considering that he already released Ku’s passport on 20 March 2014, upon the personal request of Ku.

ISSUE:

(1) WON the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar. - NO.

(2) WON Ku is guilty of forum shopping. - YES.

HELD:

(1)

The court rule in negative.

Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among which is the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits, xxx

Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a long period of time without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases against him to hold him under detention.

According to Ku, what he seeks to obtain in filing an amparo petition is the protection it will give to his person against the actions of some government officials who will likely take advantage of their positions and use the power of the government at their command. Ku adds that the longer he stays in confinement the more he is exposed to life-threatening situations and the further the violation of his guaranteed rights.

The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their claims by substantial evidence. Other than making unfounded claims, however, Ku was not able to present evidence that he was exposed to "life-threatening situations" while confined at the BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the records show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has access to his counsel.

Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to file the amparo petition, was that the BI would trump up charges against him so as to justify his detention. The fact remains, however, that even before his arrest, deportation charges against him were already duly filed and ruled upon by the BI.

As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.

(2)

YES.

It is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject of a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order, Ku’s proper recourse is with the BI and, thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP.

Ku knows this and, in fact, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the BI and an Appeal before the OP. When Ku, however, injudiciously filed a Petition and a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo, he committed forum shopping by seeking a remedy which he had already solicited from another tribunal.

The Court clarified that under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to deport aliens is vested in the President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of due process. The Immigration Commissioner is vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Thus, a party aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued by the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus . Conformably with ruling of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer , such party may file a motion for the reconsideration thereof before the BOC.

Citing Balite v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that there is forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. While a party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of Court, such party is not free to resort to them simultaneously or at his/her pleasure or caprice. A party should not be allowed to present simultaneous remedies in two different forums, for it degrades and wreaks havoc to the rule on orderly procedure. A party must follow the sequence and hierarchical order in availing of such remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or playing fast and loose with the said rules. Forum shopping, an act of malpractice, is considered as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the administration of justice.

Dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:

a) GRANT the present petitions, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Resolution dated 14 March 2014 of the Regional Trial Court which granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;

b) DENY the privilege of the Writ of Amparo sought via the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo and the Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo in SP. PROC.No. 14131282 before the Regional Trial of Manila, Branch 47; and

c) DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to file the appropriate administrative charge/s against Judge Paulino Q. Gallegos in accordance with the tenor of this Decision, and to forthwith submit to the Court its report and recommendation thereon.

SO ORDERED.

Doctrines:

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC. (Amparo Rule) provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. 

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances." 

It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people’ s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. 

"Extralegal killings" are ‘killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." 

On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: 

(1) an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; 

(2) the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or where about s of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."

This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. 

As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico42 enumerated the elements constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851,43 to wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

As clarified in Navia v. Pardico, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851, the Amparo Rule is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an ‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is. Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9851.

Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among which is the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits.

It is to be noted that the Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish claims by substantial evidence.

It is to be emphasized that the fundamental function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party.