Instances where an accused was acquitted from drug related offenses
Citation: 796 SCRA 675 at 683 - 688
1. Where an extrajudicial admission of the crime was made by the accused during custodial investigation. (People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 [1986]; People v. Santiago, 147 SCRA 141 [1987])
2. Where the marijuana sticks and the marked money were not recovered from the accused himself. (People v. Fernando, 145 SCRA 151 [1986])
3. Where there are inherent defects in the testimony of government witnesses. Such defects suggest that they simply concocted the story of a buy-bust operation. (People v. Fernando, 156 SCRA 35 [1987])
4. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. (People v. Taruc, 157 SCRA 178 [1988]; People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Pagaura, 267 SCRA 17 [1997]; People v. Lagmay, 306 SCRA 157 [1999]; People v. Batoctoy, 401 SCRA 478 [2003])
5. When the accused was made to admit an offense in violation of his Miranda rights. (People v. Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85 [1988])
6. Where the accused was encouraged and instigated to violate the dangerous drugs law by the arresting officers. (People v. Lapatha, 167 SCRA 159 [1988]; People v. Quintana, 174 SCRA 675 [1989])
7. No marijuana was found in the person of the accused and the fact that the house of the accused is far from the site of the raid conducted by police officers. (People v. Garcia, 172 SCRA 262 [1989])
8. Where the informant who acted as buyer was never presented as witness and there is a doubt as to whether the entrapment proceedings ever took place. (People v. Rojo, 175 SCRA 119 [1989])
9. When no money changed hands in the alleged buy-bust operations between the buyer and the seller. (People v. Bagano, 181 SCRA 747 [1990]. See also People v. Ventura, 215 SCRA 789 [1992])
10. Where the evidence is willfully suppressed by the prosecution since it would be adverse to their cause if produced. (People v. Sahagun, 182 SCRA 91 [1990])
11. Where a “close-surveillance” was allegedly made by NARCOM agents but no report was made on the matter and that the testimony of a co-accused came from a polluted source. (People v. Jumao-as, 184 SCRA 49 [1990])
12. Where there is insufficiency of evidence as found in a perplexing decision of the trial court, partly as follows: “Emmanuel Guinto testified that the Narcom team did not find anything when they searched the house of the accused Federico Valencia. Yet, the defense did not explain where the Narcom team was able to get the 25.83 grams of marijuana fruiting tops, Exhibit E. (People v. Guinto, 184 SCRA 287 [1990])
13. Where no evidence was presented pointing to the accused as the one who sold marijuana. (People v. Ramos, 186 SCRA 184 [1990])
14. Where the alleged informant and poseur-buyer is one and the same person and there is no convincing evidence pointing to the accused as having sold marijuana. (People v. Olaes, 188 SCRA 91 [1990])
15. Where there are irreconcilable inconsistencies on material points and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. (People v. Zapanta, 195 SCRA 200 [1991]; People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 [1993]; People v. Crisostomo, 222 SCRA 511 [1993]; People v. Balag-ey, 427 SCRA 384 [1994])
16. Where the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Honrada, 204 SCRA 858 [1991]; People v. Alilin, 206 SCRA 772 [1992])
17. Where the accused was deprived of his right to counsel and to be informed of his right to remain silent. (People v. Canela, 208 SCRA 842 [1992])
18. Where the accused denies selling any marijuana, non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal to the prosecution. They must not suppress any exculpatory evidence. (People v. Yabut, 210 SCRA 394 [1992])
19. Where the prosecution witnesses indulged in inconsistencies and improbabilities and jumping into conclusions (People v. Del Mar, 210 SCRA 448 [1992]) or material discrepancies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimony. (People v. Sillo, 214 SCRA 74 [1992])
20. Inefficient, if not bungled implementation of a poorly prepared buy-bust plan, coupled with the failure of the prosecution to present a vital witness who would have cured the fatal flaw in its evidence. (People v. Tantiado, 213 SCRA 365 [1992])
21. When the charge against the accused is trumped up (People v. Distrito, 214 SCRA 121 [1992]) or he is the victim of a frame-up. (People v. Ambih, 226 SCRA 84 [1993])
22. When the prosecution utterly failed to prove the crime charged and the trial court compounded the contradictory and conflicting testimonies of the witnesses by supplying explanations not apparent from the records. (People v. Cruz, 215 SCRA 339 [1992])
23. If there are two versions of a case. It is a rule that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. (People v. Timtiman, 215 SCRA 364 [1992])
24. Where the buy-bust operation was used as a scheme of police officers whose objective was to protect the real drug pusher or user who happened to be the brother of another policeman. (People v. Rivera, 216 SCRA 363 [1992])
25. Failure to present the informant in court to testify on the details of the buy-bust operations. This seriously impaired the credibility of the lone witness for the prosecution. Besides, the witness for the prosecution (a policeman) testified that he was carrying marijuana during the buy-bust operation which he himself will conduct. (People v. Samson, 219 SCRA 364 [1993])
26. Where no other independent proof was presented by the prosecution that the marijuana came from the accused, other than the self-serving testimony of the lone prosecution witness. (People v. Deocariza, 219 SCRA 488 [1993])
27. Where there are omissions in the affidavit of the prosecution witness which refers to very important details which affects the credibility of the witness. (People v. Ponferada, 220 SCRA 46 [1993])
28. The accused was found drug free after a drug test coupled with contradictory testimonies of prosecution witnesses. (People v. Mapa, 220 SCRA 670 [1993])
29. Where the poseur-buyer as mentioned by the police, denied having posed and participated in the buy-bust operations by executing an affidavit. (People v. Escalona, 227 SCRA 325 [1993])
30. Where the prosecution failed to prove that a buy-bust operation which led to the arrest of the accused, actually occurred. (People v. Malakas, 228 SCRA 310 [1993])
31. Where the defense of the accused is weak but the witnesses of the prosecution lacked credibility which cast a cloud on the veracity of their testimonies. (People v. Cadocio, 228 SCRA 602 [1993])
32. Where the prosecution failed to prove that appellant delivered dangerous drugs. (People v. Jumao-as, 230 SCRA 70 [1994])
33. Where an illegal search was conducted on the car of an accused who was transporting a box of marijuana. (People v. Barros, 231 SCRA 557 [1994]. Cf. People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325 [1996]; People v. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72 [1997]; People v. Estella, 395 SCRA 553 [2003]; People v. Go, 411 SCRA 81 [2003])
34. Where the trial court gave piracy to the weakness of the evidence for the accused instead of relying on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution. This raised grave doubts as to the culpability of the accused. (People v. Baclayon, 231 SCRA 578 [1994])
35. Where there is no proof of conspiracy between the marijuana seller and the person to whom he gave the package for delivery to the poseur-buyer, the latter cannot be held liable in the absence of any showing that he knew what was in the package. (People v. Petilla, 231 SCRA 635 [1994])
36. Where there is serious doubt on the occurrence of a buy-bust operation where there was no clear explanation on how the alleged marked money was recovered from the accused. (People v. Sulit, 233 SCRA 117 [1994])
37. Where the accused was convicted of a crime which is not charged in the information. To do so would deny him the due process of law. (People v. Del Rosario, 234 SCRA 246 [1994])
38. Where the prosecution failed to prove the indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime which casts serious doubt as to the guilt of the accused. (People v. Mendiola, 235 SCRA 116 [1994])
39. Where the prosecution failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused. The evidence relied upon by the prosecution falls short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction. (People v. Alvarado, 242 SCRA 464 [1995])
40. Where guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Briones, 266 SCRA 254 [1997]; People v. De la Cruz, 277 SCRA 173 [1997]; People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432 [1999]; People v. Valdez, 341 SCRA 25 [2000])
41. Where it was alleged that the articles sent for examination was shabu and suspected cocaine, but what was marked was marijuana. (People v. Leodones, 345 SCRA 522 [2000])
42. There is a failure to observe the standard operational procedure in a buy-bust operation specifically in the first link in the chain of custody rule. (People v. Casimiro, 383 SCRA 390 [2002])
43. Mere presence of the accused at the locus criminis cannot be solely interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged. This is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is guilty. (People v. Ambrosio, 427 SCRA 312 [2004])
44. Where the prosecution failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence and to prove with moral certainty the guilt of the accused. (People v. Jubail, 428 SCRA 478 [2004])