Arcaba vs. Vda. de Batocael, 370 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 146683|November 22, 2001

Case Title: 

CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.

Case Nature: 

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Division: 

    SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: 

    G.R. No. 146683

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

Doctrines:

1. The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and (j) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different concusion. It appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by both parties, the general rule should apply.
2. In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term “cohabitation” or “living together as husband and wife” means not only residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of illegitimate children.
3. Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.—Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
4. Where a woman who cohabited with a married man fails to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of a riceland, there is no basis to justify her co-ownership over the same—the riceland should revert to the conjugal partnership property of the man and his lawful wife. (Agapay vs. Palang, 276 SCRA 340 [1997])
5. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage—marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. (Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1 [2001]) 

FACTS:

Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco Comille, then a widower, asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian, and petitioner Cirila Arcaba to take care of his house, as well as the store inside. A few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of his lot consisting of 150 square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are Francisco's nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco, and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room, while Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could enter the master's bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the donation void under the provision of the Family Code. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE

The main issue is whether Cirila is an employee or the common-law wife of Francisco.

HELD:

Cirila was Francisco's common-law spouse.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. According to the Court, human reason would lead to the conclusion that Cirila was Francisco's common-law spouse. Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time and the possibility that the two consummated their relationship could be established from Leticia Bellosillo's testimony that Cirila and Francisco slept in the same bedroom. The Court also considered the fact that Cirila signed some documents using Francisco's surname clearly indicating that she saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiver employee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law, and it is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Their public conduct, therefore, indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.