Imani vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, 635 SCRA 357, G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010

Case Title : EVANGELINE D. IMANI,** petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, respondent.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Division: SECOND DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 187023
Ponente: NACHURA
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93061 sustaining the validity of the writ of execution, the auction sale, and the certificate of sale are AFFIRMED.

DOCTRINES:

• Contrary to the CA’s advice, the remedy of terceria or a separate action under Section 16, Rule 39 is no longer available to Sina Imani because he is not deemed a stranger to the case filed against petitioner: [T]he husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. Thus, it would have been inappropriate for him to institute a separate case for annulment of writ of execution.
• All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.
• In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative value. In Concepcion v. Atty. Fandiño, Jr., 334 SCRA 136 (2000), and Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 733 (1996), we held that a photocopy of a document has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the CA was correct in disregarding the said pieces of evidence.
• The certificate of title could not support petitioner’s assertion. As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
• The argument must be rejected because it was raised for the first time in this petition. In the trial court and the CA, petitioner’s arguments zeroed in on the alleged conjugal nature of the property. It is well-settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. 

FACTS:

1. (Petitioner) Umani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank), with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (₱6,000,000.00).

2. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner.

3. After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision4 in favor of Metrobank.

4. Therein defendants appealed to the CA. The CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal.

5. A writ of execution was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-27957 P(M) and registered in the name of petitioner. A public auction was conducted and the property was awarded to Metrobank, as the highest bidder.

6. Petitioner opposed the motion and filed her Comment and argued that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy on execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the levy on execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank.

7. The RTC issued an Order denying Metrobank’s motion explaining that: “It cannot therefore be presumed that the loan proceeds had redounded to the benefit of her family. It is also worth stressing that the records of this case is bereft of any showing that at the time of the signing of the Suretyship Agreement and even at the time of execution and sale at public auction of the subject property, [petitioner] Evangelina D. Imani has the authority to dispose of or encumber their conjugal partnership properties. Neither was she conferred the power of administration over the said properties. Hence, when she executed the Suretyship Agreement, she had placed the Conjugal Partnership in danger of being dissipated.”

8. Metrobank filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.

9. However, despite petitioner’s opposition, the RTC issued an Order setting aside its former order in favor of petitioner.

10. But on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued a new Order reinstating its first Order in favor of petitioner.

11. Metrobank assailed the Order via a petition for certiorari in the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for annulling the levy on execution and the auction sale, and for canceling the certificate of sale. The CA rendered the now challenged Decision reversing the RTC.

ISSUE:

WON THE CA ERRS, IN REVERSING THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE PROPERTY IS CONJUGAL IN NATURE BASED ON MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES

HELD:

NO.

The Supreme Court sustains the CA’s ruling on this point.

Indeed, all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal.

However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.31Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material.

To support her assertion that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, petitioner submitted the Affidavit35of Crisanto Origen, attesting that petitioner and her husband were the vendees of the subject property, and the photocopies of the checks36 allegedly issued by Sina Imani as payment for the subject property.

Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly be considered sufficient evidence to prove her claim that the property is conjugal. As correctly pointed out by Metrobank, the said Affidavit has no evidentiary weight because Crisanto Origen was not presented in the RTC to affirm the veracity of his Affidavit:

The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination.

In the same vein, the photocopies of the checks cannot be given any probative value. In Concepcion v. Atty. Fandiño, Jr. and Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals,39 we held that a photocopy of a document has no probative value and is inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the CA was correct in disregarding the said pieces of evidence.

Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioner’s assertion. As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.

Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership. Thus, it cannot be rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid basis.