People vs. Dueño, 90 SCRA 23, No. L-31102 May 5, 1979

No. L-31102. May 5, 1979;

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE DUEÑO, alias FELIPE CATALAN, SOFRONIO DUEÑO and ANDRESITO BELONIO alias HAPON, defendants-appellants.

DOCTRINES:

Appellants’ contention that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses Dellomos and Dolfo are inherently improbable as not be credible has been successfully traversed by the Solicitor General. For, Dolfo and Dellomos, having been the target of accused-appellants only a few hours earlier in the afternoon of the same day, may and should be expected to take some risks—to the point perhaps of being illogical and reckless—to identify and, if possible, frustrate any further attempts on the part of the three accused to assault and to try to kill them again.

Motive is relevant where the indentity of the persons accused of having committed the crime is in dispute, where there are no eyewitnesses, and where suspicion is likely to fall upon a number of persons (People vs. Portugueza, L-22604, July 31, 1967). In the case at bar, the identity of the accused was positively proved by eyewitnesses, so motive is irrelevant.

The trial court did not err in rejecting alibi as appellants defense. The evidence does not show that it was inherently impossible for the appellants to be at the scene of the crime on that fatal evening. It must be clearly shown not only that the accused was at some other place but as well that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. (People vs. Marquez, L-24373-74, Nov. 28, 1969).

In specific regard to the circumstances attendant in the commission of the offense, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is clear that only one qualifying circumstance is necessary to qualify the offense as murder. In the present case, the trial court found that the two qualifiying circumstances—treachery and evident premeditation—attended the commission of the offense and utilized both conjointly to qualify it to murder. This is error. As treachery sufficiently qualifies the killing to murder—evident premeditation having been also alleged in the information and proved, should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. However, jurisprudence is settled that evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in a case where, although the accused had planned the perpetration of the killing, the victim was different from the person whom the accused had originally intended to kill Thus, in the Mabug-at case, We said that “(e)ven when there is sufficient proof of premeditation x x x, it cannot be considered as a qualifiying circumtance x x x, because the person whom the accused intended to kill was not Perfecta Buralo, who was hit by the bullet, but her aunt Juana Buralo.”

With respect to nighttime, the rule in People vs. Magsilang that except in special cases, the circumstances of treachery and nocturnity “always go together and are absorbed in the same offense” and both “may well be regarded as complementing each other and (are) to be considered as one circumstance only, to qualify the killing as murder,” applies in this case. Nocturnity, like abuse of superiority is absorbed in treachery because it forms part of the peculiar treacherous means and manner adopted to insure the execution of the crime. It facilitates the treacherous character of the attack. As an element of treachery, it would not be just to use it again as an aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, nighttime, like evident premeditation, cannot be separately appreciated in the instant case.

Where all the appellants took part in stabbing the victim, inflicting wounds which all proved to be fatal, said appellants are guilty of murder as principals by direct participation. (People vs. Tila-on, 2 SCRA 653).

In determining whether the utterances of an accused are sufficient to make him guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must appear that the inducement was of such nature and was made in such a way to become the determining cause of the crime and that such inducement was uttered with the intention of producing the result. (People vs. Casalme, 17 SCRA 717).

The assistance rendered by accomplices cannot be considered in estimating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority. (Lumiguis vs. People, 19 SCRA 842).

Where one of the accused embraced the victim and rendered him helpless to stop him from further hitting the other accused, the first accused should be liable as accomplice where he did not stop his co-accused from further hitting the victim. (People vs. Manansala, 31 SCRA 401).

An accused may be found guilty of murder despite the absence of proof of motive. (People vs. Antonio, 34 SCRA 401).

Where the commission of the crime results in death, the civil obligations arising therefrom governed by penal laws, subject to the pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code regulating damages. (Heirs of Raymundo Castro vs. Bustos, 27 SCRA 327).

Where the victims was suddenly attacked by the appellants with the use of deadly weapons, the crime committed is murder qualified by treachery. (People vs. Duenas, 2 SCRA 221; People vs. Tila-on, 2 SCRA 633; People vs. Andia, 2 SCRA 423; People vs. Gensola, 29 SCRA 483.)

The apparent motivation for the murder, that accused was impelled to instigate the crime as the victim was a brother of the then mayor who presumably reneged on his promise to give way in the 1971 election for the position of mayor in favor of the accused, would not of itself prove decisive in convicting the said accused. There is still need for evidence, both competent and credible, to prove his guilt and that of his co-accused. (People vs. Roa, 62 SCRA 51.)

To hold appellant liable as a co-conspirator in the crime of murder, it must be shown that he had actually participated in the shooting of the victims, or in the absence of direct evidence showing a preconceived plan or agreement among the assailants of the deceased, circumstantial evidence must be proven showing clearly and convincingly the existence among them of a common criminal design. (People vs. Macatanaw, 62 SCRA 516.)

Killing was considered as homicide only where there is no proof that the shooting of the victim was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution. (People vs. Samonte, Jr., 64 SCRA 319.)

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, with the modification that the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased should be raised from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. No cost. People vs. Dueño, 90 SCRA 23, No. L-31102 May 5, 1979

FACTS:

The three accused fired at but missed ROQUE when they met him one afternoon near the house of his neighbor Federico. It appeared that the accused resented Federico's having returned to the owner a stolen carabao left by accused Felipe in the case of his father-in-law. On the evening of that same day, BERNARDO DEMONTAÑO, who was mistaken for ROQUE, was shot and killed while he was about to go down the stairs. ROQUE hid behind a bayong of paly near the door while his nephew fell, focused his flashlight outside, and saw, through a hole in the wall, the three accused — Felipe and Sofronio, both armed with guns, and Andresito with a bolo. Felipe fired again but did not hit anybody. Hearing the gunshots, Federico, who almost became a victim of the accused's attack earlier that afternoon went down his house and hid himself behind a banana plantation near the barrio trail. Focusing his ashlight towards persons he saw running by the trail about five meters away from him, he recognized them to be the three accused. The three who were charged with murder interposed a common defense of alibi. The trial court found them guilty as charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. All the accused appealed claiming incredibility of prosecution's testimonies, insufficiency of motive, and error on the part of the trial court in rejecting their defense of alibi which was corroborated by witnesses who had reason to lie. After having submitted their case for resolution, two of the accused withdraw their appeal.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that evidence for the prosecution had established and proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the three; that motive is irrelevant where the identity of the accused were positively proved; and that in the defense of alibi, it must not only be shown that the accused were at some other place, but that it was impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

Judgment affirmed with the modification of raising the civil indemnity from P6,000 to P12,000.