AFP-RSBS VS REPUBLIC ; G.R. NO.180086; JULY 2, 2014

 

G.R. No.180086 July 2, 2014

AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM [AFP-RSBS] vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

Ponente: LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:

• AFP-RSBS filed an application for original registration of parcels of land in Silang, Cavite.
• AFP-RSBS alleged that:
  1997. These parcels of land were allegedly acquired from Narciso Ambrad, Alberto Tibayan, and Restituto Tibayan on March 13, 1997.
  1998. That their predecessors-in interest had been in possession of the properties since June 12, 1945.
• In a decision dated July 28, 2001, the MCTC approved AFP-RSBS’s application for original registration.
• The ROD was directed to cause the registration of the properties in the name of AFP-RSBS.
• The Republic moved for the reconsideration of the decision.
• However, the motion was denied in an order dated February 19, 2003.
• On March 14, 2003, the Republic appealed the decision and order of the trial court, alleging:
  1. improper identification of the properties,
  2. noncompliance with SC Administrative Circular No. 7-96 dated July 15, 1996 requiring that copies of a list of lots applied for be furnished to the Bureau of Lands,
  3. non-submission of a tracing cloth plan, and
  4. lack of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources certification showing that the properties were already declared alienable and disposable at the time of possession by the predecessors-in-interest.
• On January 10, 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed AFP-RSBS’s application.
• The Court of Appeals found that:
  1. the properties had no pending land application and that there were no overlapping lots.
  2. Hence, no person needed to be notified of the land registration proceedings. The Court of Appeals also found that AFP-RSBS complied with the requirement to submit a tracing cloth plan.
• However, according to the Court of Appeals, since Lot 2969 was declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, the period of possession of the predecessors-in-interest before that date should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Hence, AFPRSBS’s and its predecessors-in-interest’s possessions could not ripen into ownership.
• The Court of Appeals also ruled that AFP-RSBS, as a private corporation or association, may not own alienable lands of the public domain pursuant to Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution.
• On February 7, 2007, AFP-RSBS filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Court of Appeals denied this motion in a resolution promulgated on October 5, 2007.
• Hence, this petition was filed.

Summarized facts:

• AFP-RSBS argued that "[w]hat is required is that the property sought to be registered has already been declared to be alienable and disposable land of the public domain at the time [of] the application for registration . . . before the court."
• In support of this argument, AFP-RSBS cited Republic v. CA and Naguit and Republic v. Bibonia and Manahan.
• Hence, AFPRSBS and its predecessors-in-interest’s possession before June 12, 1945 should have ripened into a bona fide claim of ownership.
• AFP-RSBS also argued that the land had already been private before its acquisition in 1997 by virtue of the claim of ownership of its predecessors-in-interest before 1945.
• Therefore, petitioner corporation may acquire the property.
• In its comment, the Republic argued that the classification of land as alienable and disposable is required before possession can ripen into ownership.
• The period of possession before declaration that the land is alienable and disposable cannot be included in computing the period of adverse possession.
• Hence, before March 15, 1982, there could have been no possession in the concept of an owner.
• The Republic also argued that there was no sufficient evidence of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership before June 12, 1945.

ISSUE:

WON the period of possession before the declaration that land is alienable and disposable agricultural land should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession for purposes of original registration

 

HELD:

NO.

The period of possession prior to the declaration that land is alienable and disposable agricultural land is included in the computation of possession for purposes of acquiring registration rights over a property if the land has already been declared as such at the time of the application for registration.

Based on these provisions [1], an applicant for original registration based on a claim of exclusive and continuous possession or occupation must show the existence of the following:

• Open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, of land;
• The land possessed or occupied must have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land of public domain;
• The possession or occupation was under a bona fide claim of ownership;
• Possession dates back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Therefore, what is important in computing the period of possession is that the land has already been declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration. Upon satisfaction of this requirement, the computation of the period may include the period of adverse possession prior to the declaration that land is alienable and disposable.

Persons are entitled to the registration of their titles upon satisfaction of all the requirements enumerated under our laws. No presumption or doctrine in favor of state ownership can deprive them of their titles once all the conditions are satisfied. Our Constitution contains no such limit upon our citizens or privilege upon the state. Neither was this doctrine extended to our organic acts.

Other doctrines:

• Respondent argued that "[s]ince the land subject of petitioner’s application for registration was classified alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, it follows that petitioner could not have possessed the same in the concept of owner, earlier than the said date."

Respondent is mistaken. Although adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law to be determined by courts, it has more to do with a person’s belief in good faith that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is occupying. It is unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable or disposable. A possessor or occupant of property may, therefore, be a possessor in the concept of an owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land. His or her rights, however, are still to be determined under the law.

Petitioner’s right to the original registration of title over the property is, therefore, dependent on the existence of:

1. a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration and
2. open and continuous possession in the concept of an owner through itself or through its predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

In this case, there is no dispute that the properties were already declared alienable and disposable land on March 15, 1982. Hence, the property was already alienable and disposable at the time of petitioner’s application for registration on July 10, 1997.

As to the required period of possession, petitioner was able to show that it, through itself or its predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession before 1945 through testimonies and documents.

One of petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest, Emilia Amadure, testified that as early as her birth in 1917, her family was already residing in Barangay Biluso, Silang, Cavite. Her father, Maximo Amadure, was the properties’ previous owner. She was able to describe the lots’ metes and bounds as well as the adjoining properties’ owners.43 She also testified that "the first time she came to know aboutsaid lots was at the age of reason"44 at which time, she saw her father in possession of the properties. By June 12, 1945, she was already 28 years old.Tax declarations between 1948 to 1998 under Maximo’s name and other previous owners’ names were also presented.

Maximo Amadure’s grandson, Rogelio Amadure, corroborated Emilia’s testimony. He testified thathis grandfather owned and tilled the properties with his five children: Catalino, Dominador, Margarita, Gregonia, and Emelia Amadure. They cultivated banana, corn, papaya, and palay on the properties.47 Before the war, Rogelio’s father informed him that Maximo owned the properties.48 Maximo’s children took possession of the properties after Maximo’s death.

Based on the testimonies, we can already deduce that petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest had possessed the properties in the concept of an owner even earlier than 1945.

Petitioner was, therefore, able to prove all the requisites for the grant of an original registration of title under our registration laws.

 

• Respondent argues that although petitioner is a government-owned and -controlled corporation, it cannot acquire title through acquisitive prescription.

This argument is unmeritorious.

The type of corporation that petitioner is has nothing to do with the grant of its application for original registration. Petitioner also acquired title to the property under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not through acquisitive prescription.

If respondent’s argument stems from the Court of Appeals’ ruling that petitioner cannot acquire title to the property because of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits private corporations from acquiring public land, respondent is, again, mistaken. The prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution applies only to private corporations. Petitioner is a government corporation organized under Presidential Decree No. 361, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1656.

 

Dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' decision of January 10, 2007 and resolution of October 5, 2007 are SET ASIDE. The July 28, 2001 trial court decision is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

[1] Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. And Commonwealth Act No. 141 or Public Land Act: