DICHOSO v. MARCOS, 2011
G.R. No. 180282
April 11, 2011
CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, and ROSEMARIE DICHOSO PE BENITO, Petitioners, vs. PATROCINIO L. MARCOS, Respondent
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated January 31, 2007 and Resolution dated October 23, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 85471. The assailed Decision reversed and set aside the July 15, 2005 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 12581-14; while the assailed Resolution denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners Crispin Dichoso, Jr., Evelyn Dichoso Valdez, and Rosemarie Dichoso Pe Benito.
Petitioners filed a complaint for easement of right of way against respondent Patrocinio L. Marcos, alleging that they were the owners of Lot No. 21553 and had been using a portion of Lot No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970, but respondent had blocked the passageway. The trial court granted the petitioners' request for a right of way over an area of 54 square meters and ordered them to pay the respondent the amount of ₱54,000.00 as proper indemnity, and for the right to be annotated on the respondent's title. On appeal, the appellate court overturned the trial court's decision and dismissed the petitioners' complaint, stating that an alternative route had already been granted by the Spouses Arce, and that the convenience of the dominant estate is not the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a grant of legal easement of right of way from their landlocked property through the property of private respondent which is the shortest route in going to and from their property to the public street.
HELD:
The petition is without merit.
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way may be granted.
To be entitled to an easement of right of way, the following requisites should be met: first, the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; second, there is payment of proper indemnity; third, the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; and fourth, the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
In the case at hand, the petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the above-enumerated requirements. Admittedly, they had been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot owned by the Spouses Arce. In fact, other lot owners use the said outlet in going to and coming from the public highway. Clearly, there is an existing outlet to and from the public road.
However, petitioners claim that the outlet is longer and circuitous, and they have to pass through other lots owned by different owners before they could get to the highway. We find petitioners’ concept of what is “adequate outlet” a complete disregard of the well-entrenched doctrine that in order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.
The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal right is “adequacy.” Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is entirely unjustified.
Therefore, the petition is denied. The Court affirms the ruling of the CA.
OTHER DOCTRINE DISCUSSED IN THE CASE:
WON the CA has jurisdiction over the case.
YES. The CA has jurisdiction over the case. It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA by virtue of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the CA are conclusive upon this Court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;(6) when, in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
The present case falls under the 7th exception, as the RTC and the CA arrived at conflicting findings of fact and conclusions of law.