G.R. No. 185240: January 20, 2010
SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON,Petitioners,
v.
SPS. SANTOS AND ERLINDA TAN,Respondents.
ABAD,J.:
FACTS:
This case is about the admissibility of testimony that tends to modify a written agreement among the parties and the extinction of the easement of right of way upon consolidation in one person of the ownership of the dominant and the servient estates.
Guillermo Ceniza died in 1951 and left a parcel of land in Poblacion, Mandaue City, which his children divided among themselves through an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition. The partition established an easement of right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between two of the lots, Lots D and E, to give them access to the street. Later, the heirs modified the agreement to impose the easement of right of way along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E to the street. Victoria Salimbangon, one of the heirs, later swapped lots with another heir, Benedicta, and became the owner of Lot A, which was adjacent to the city street. Victoria and her husband built a house on the lot and used the alley as an easement of right of way to access the street. The respondents, the Tans, later bought the other lots and built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement area and closed the gate that the Salimbangons built. The Salimbangons filed a complaint with the City Engineer of Mandaue and the Tans filed an action in court to extinguish the easement of right of way on Lot B and for damages. The Regional Trial Court upheld the Salimbangons' easement of right of way but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and extinguished the easement of right of way and denied the Salimbangons' claim for damages.
Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner files the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in admitting in evidence contrary to the parol evidence rule - NO.
HELD:
No.
The parol evidence rule, said the Salimbangons, precluded the parties from introducing testimony that tended to alter or modify what the parties had agreed on above.
But the exclusionary provision of the parol evidence rule admits of exceptions. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence states:
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;(c) The validity of the written agreement; or(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
Here, the Tans had put in issue the true intent and agreement of the parties to the partition when they alleged in their complaint that, contrary to what the agreement seems to imply, the easement was actually for the benefit of Lots D and E only. Consequently, with the above averment, the Tans were entitled to introduce evidence to establish the true intent and agreement of the parties although this may depart from what the partition agreement literally provided.
At any rate, as the CA said, the Salimbangons did not object at the hearing to admission of Eduardo Cenizas testimony even when this seemed at variance, as far as they were concerned, with the partition agreement among the heirs. Consequently, the Salimbangons may also be deemed to have waived their right to now question such testimony on appeal.
As Eduardo Ceniza testified, the true agreement of the heirs was for the establishment of an easement of right of way for the benefit solely of the lots that did not have direct access to the street, namely Lots D and E. His testimony made sense. Consequently, when the owner of Lots D and E also became the owner of Lot B, the easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct by operation of law.The existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with the idea that both estates belong to the same person.
Also, there is no question that when the heirs realized that it was not fair to take strips of 1.5 meters from each of Lots A, D, and E for the easement of right of way when these lots were already small, the heirs executed a "Cancellation of Annotation of Right of Way, etc." that cancelled the easement of right of way they earlier established on Lots A, D, and E and in its place imposed a 3-meter wide easement of right of way solely on Lot B.
Obviously, in establishing the new easement of right of way, the heirs intended to abandon the old one. Since this 3-meter alley on Lot B directly connected Lots D and E to the street, it is also obvious that only the latter lots were its intended beneficiary. And, with the ownership of Lots B, D, and E now consolidated in a common owner, namely, the Tans, then the easement of right of way on Lot B may be said to have been extinguished by operation of law.
Petition Denied