Nedira v. NJ World Corporation, G.R. No. 240005, 2022

Florencio B. Nedira substituted by his wife Emma G. Nedira v. NJ World Corporation, represented by MICHELLE Y. BUALAT, represented by MICHELLE Y. BUALAT,

G.R. No. 240005. December 6, 2022

Ponente: GESMUNDO, C.J.:

Nature of Petition: This is an Appeal by Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the December 6, 2017 Decision3 and the June 6, 2018 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142044. The CA annulled and set aside the May 29, 20155 and July 30, 20156 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 01-000095-15, and reinstated the November 17, 2014 Decision7 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) in NLRC Case No. NCR 10-14386-13.8 The LA dismissed for lack of merit the complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Florencio B. Nedira (Florencio), substituted by his wife Emma G. Nedira (Emma), against NJ World Corporation (respondent).

Synopsis:

In the case of Florencio B. Nedira substituted by his wife Emma G. Nedira v. NJ World Corporation, represented by Michelle Y. Bualat, the Supreme Court was asked to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, which annulled the resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in favor of the complainant. The NLRC had ruled that Florencio, who was hired as a taxi driver by the respondent, was illegally dismissed and ordered the respondent to pay back wages, separation pay, and attorney's fees to the heirs of Florencio. 

The Supreme Court held that Florencio, through his wife Emma, failed to provide sufficient proof of his illegal dismissal. The fact of dismissal was not established, and there was a lack of evidence regarding the nature of the supposed suspension and the circumstances of the alleged constructive dismissal. No documentary proof was presented to substantiate the claims made in the complaint. Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that a complaint for illegal dismissal cannot be treated as a regular civil action for the purpose of determining the effect of death on the case. Substitution by the heirs of the deceased complainant in a pending complaint for illegal dismissal should be allowed, as the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that there was constructive dismissal. 

Facts:

Florencio was hired as a taxi driver by Respondent on September 2, 2010. On October 29, 2013, he filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, but died during the proceedings. His wife, Emma, took over and filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution and an extension to file a position paper. Emma claimed that Florencio was illegally suspended and placed on floating status, unable to pay a imposed penalty, and was never paid his unused service incentive leaves or 13th month pay. She also requested the return of the bond given to Respondent.

Citing Cruz v. Cruz, respondent countered ·hat the complaint for constructive dismissal does not involve property or ptoperty rights. Thus, it did not survive the death of Florencio, and Emma cJn no longer pursue it. Respondent also denied that Florencio was constru!tively dismissed, and instead averred that Florencio was an on-call taxi driver who stopped driving after failing to remit boundary payments in 2013. Lastly, respondent asserted that there is no documentary evidence supporting the allegations in the complaint.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for illegal dismissal in their November 17, 2014 decision. The LA allowed Emma, the widow of Florencio, to pursue the complaint, but found that she could not testify on the facts of the case as she lacked personal knowledge. The LA stated that the claims of constructive dismissal and illegal suspension were personal to Florencio and were not substantiated as Emma could not state the exact dates or reasons behind them. The LA concluded that the case lacked merit.

The NLRC granted the appeal of Emma and ordered the respondent to pay back wages, separation pay, and attorney's fees to the heirs of Florencio, who was found to be an employee of the respondent. The NLRC declared that the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Florencio was not illegally dismissed. The respondent was unable to prove that they did not dismiss Florencio and was found to have control over him as an on-call taxi driver. The NLRC's decision was not changed after the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.

The respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, challenging the resolutions of the NLRC. The CA granted the petition and annulled the NLRC's May 29, 2015 and July 30, 2015 Resolutions, reinstating the November 17, 2014 Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The CA found that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that there was constructive dismissal, as the complaint filed by Emma (the surviving spouse of Florencio) was not substantiated by evidence. The CA held that while an employer-employee relationship existed between Florencio and the respondent, there was no evidence of constructive dismissal and that the suspension of Florencio was a fair exercise of management prerogative. Emma filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied. This led to the present appeal.

Issue:

(1) WON Florencio, through his wife Emma, was able to provide sufficient proof of his illegal dismissal by the respondent. - NO

(2) WON a complaint for illegal dismissal can be treated as a regular civil action for purposes of determining the effect of death on the case, or if it should be considered differently. - NO

(3) WON substitution by the heirs of the deceased complainant in a pending complaint for illegal dismissal should be allowed. - YES

Held:

(1) 

NO. 

Florencio, through Emma, failed to prove the fact of his illegal dismissal. The fact of dismissal was not established in the instant case. 

It is well-established that the employee must first prove the fact of dismissal before the burden shifts to the employer to prpve that the dismissal was legal.

It is regrettable that there is a dearth of proof abo t the fact of dismissal of Florencio. The records are absent of any evidence Js to the nature of the supposed suspension, as well as the circumstances ofth~ alleged constructive dismissal. No documentary proof was presented to substantiate the claim that respondent required Florencio to pay P6,000.00, and tliat, due to his alleged nonpayment, he was not permitted to work. Thus, as a result of the lack of evidence to substantiate this claim, the charge of constctive dismissal was not established.

It must also be emphasized that Florencio pas~ed away before the position paper was filed before the LA. Thus, apart from his complaint, which merely stated as causes of action the constructive dismissal and nonpayment I of monetary amounts, there is nothing from Florencio himself to establish the fact of his dismissal. The lack of specificities in Emma' s narration of events simply does not establish the purported constructive dismmissal. 

For this reason, the Court cannot grant the relief prayed for. 

(2)

NO. 

A complaint for illegal dismissal may not be classified, like an ordinary civil action, as to cause or foundation for purposes of determining the effect of death of any of the parties to the case. The CA held that the substitution of Emma for Florencio was proper. While this conclusion is correct, the CA was mistaken on its basis for arriving at such determination.

We rule that an illegal dismissal complaint cannot be classified as to cause or foundation like an ordinary civil action insofar as the effect of death of any of the parties is concerned. To do so would be to oversimplify the nature of a complaint for illegal dismissal and, in the process, ignore certain characteristics of illegal dismissal complaints which distinguish and prevent them from fitting said mold of ordinary civil actions. The abundance of cases where substitution was allowed demonstrate and reflect this view.

The Court begins its analysis with the following considerations. 

First, an employment contract is one imbued with public interest. 

The Civil Code is firm in its declaration that the relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. It is, in fact, one impressed with public interest.

Accordingly, the interest involved in an employment contract is not merely private and individual, but also public.

Considering that such contractual relations are imbued with public interest, the enforcement of rights and obligations under such employment contract is also of public interest. Concomitantly, any violation of the employment contract would necessarily be of public interest. 

Second, an illegal dismissal is a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. 

At first blush, it is easy to mistake a complaint tor illegal dismissal as one that is personal to the complainant, the alleged illegally dismissed employee. However, such characterization fails to take into consideration an important matter. The Labor Code expressly upholds the constitutitionally guaranteed right to security of tenure by ordaining that a regular employee may not be terminated from service except for just or authorized clause: xxx

Thus, an illegal dismissal - a dismissal without just or authorized cause is not only a violation of the contractual relations between the employer and the employee but is, in fact, a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. In short, when an employer illegally dismisses an employee, said employer is essentially vidlating a statute. 

These two important considerations, which affect the very nature of a complaint for illegal dismissal, separate and distinguish it from the realm of mere contractual obligations normally implicated in a civil complaint. These considerations are of such character and weight that a complaint for illegal dismissal should not and cannot be classified in the same manner as ordinary civil actions. 

As the Court previously noted, one's employment is a right and its violation is an injury. At the same time, the award arising from the finding of illegal dismissal - the payment of back.wages - is not merely for redress of a private right, but a command for the employer to make public reparation for his or her violation of the Labor Code. 

Couple this dual character with the public interest imbued in labor contractual relations and it is evident that complaints for illegal dismissal cannot be classified as to cause or foundation in the same manner as ordinary civil actions insofar as the death of any of the parties and its effects are concerned. 

(3)

YES. 

Substitution by the heirs of the deceased complainant in a pending complaint for illegal dismissal should be allowed. This approach respects and breathes life to the public interest imbued in contractual relations between the employer and the employee. Further, it allows for public reparation by the employer in case he or she is found to have violated the Labor Code.

Accordingly, the statement in Fontana Development that a complaint for illegal dismissal is one that involves injury to the person and does not survive the death of the employee loses its efficacy. One cannot simply classify a complaint for illegal dismissal as either personal or real, like an ordinary civil action, in order to invoke the rules on the death of parties and its effects.

In keeping with the peculiar nature of a complaint for illegal dismissal, the rule is that in case any of the parties to a complaint for illegal dismissal dies during the pendency of such proceedings, he or she may be substituted by his or her heirs. This perspective is embodied in the present NLRC Rules of Procedure. In 2017, the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, was revised to allow substitution where any of the parties die during the pendency of the proceedings: 

xxx

This revision reflects and solidifies the prevailidg rule on the death of any of the parties in a complaint for illegal dismissal. It must be emphasized that, while the revision to the 2011 NLRC Rules of Probedure was introduced only in 2017, substitution has repeatedly been aUoJled in complaints for illegal dismissal filed even before such revision.