People v. DELIMAN and DELIMA, G.R. No. 222645, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
-versus-
MICHAEL DELIMAN and ALLAN DELIMA, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 222645, THIRD DIVISION,
June 27, 2018,
MARTIRES, J.
Synopsis:
This case involves the appeal of two brothers who were found guilty of murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in the Philippines, and whose appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) was denied. The two were convicted of killing Ramel Mercedes Congreso in a stabbing incident. The prosecution presented witnesses who testified that Michael and Allan were holding and stabbing Ramel. The defense argued that Michael was at a disco on the night of the stabbing and slept at home until the following morning. The RTC found the two guilty and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the appeal was partly meritorious, but Michael and Allan were found guilty of homicide and not murder. The court found that there was no proof of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation that would upgrade the crime from homicide to murder. The court emphasized that treachery must be proven through specific details on the manner of the attack, and not just the victim's weakened state, which is not sufficient to appreciate treachery.
FACTS:
Michael and Allan, along with their co-accused, were charged with the murder of Ramel Mercedes Congreso in the Philippines. During their arraignment, Michael and Allan pleaded not guilty. The prosecution's version of events was presented by witnesses who testified that they saw Michael and Allan holding and stabbing Ramel. The defense presented their own version of events, which stated that Michael was at a disco on the night of the stabbing and slept at home until the following morning. Both sides presented evidence and testimony to support their claims.
Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Michael and Allan guilty of murder for the stabbing of Ramel. The court found that Jose had positively identified Allan as the one who stabbed Ramel while Michael held him, and the defenses of denial and alibi had no merit. Michael and Allan were sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of Ramel P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. They appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the RTC decision. The CA found that the perceived inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were minor and tended to prove that their testimonies were not rehearsed. It also found that Michael and Allan conspired to kill Ramel and that treachery attended the killing. The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
(1) WON Jose's testimony not credible because of perceived inconsistencies. - NO
(2) WON Accused-appelant's ALIBI will lie. - NO.
(3) WON conspiracy was not proven because their actions do not establish that they were motivated by a common desire. - NO
(4) WON accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. - NO.
HELD:
(1)
NO.
Inconsistencies over trivial matters
do not discredit the witness.
Positive identification trumps denial and alibi.
Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well-settled that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness.
Here, the apparent inconsistency merely refers to insignificant matters as it only pertained to the sequence of how the events unfolded. Accused appellants earnestly try to refute Jose's credibility on the ground that it is contrary to his affidavit and Anthony's testimony. Nevertheless, the assailed inconsistency is simply whether Jose called Anthony before or after Ramel was stabbed. It does not discount the fact that Jose's testimony categorically identified accused-appellants as those responsible for Ramel's death and clearly narrated their respective participation. His testimony shows consistency on material points, i.e., the elements of the crime and the identity of the perpetrators, xxx
Accused-appellants also challenge the credibility of the prosecution witnesses on account that Anthony had a grudge against them, and that as his friend, Jose could have been easily convinced to testify against them. As correctly observed by the courts a quo, accused-appellants' allegations of ill will on the part of Anthony is specious considering that they offered conflicting versions: Michael claimed that Anthony held a grudge against them because he had a fistfight with his son while Allan alleged that it was he who fought Anthony's son. More importantly, Anthony's purported grudge is not fatal to the prosecution since he merely provided the names to Jose, who was the one who identified accused-appellants as Ramel's attackers.
Further, the Court finds hollow accused-appellants' claim that Anthony could have easily influenced his friend Jose to testify against them because it is purely conjecture. Surely, such unsubstantiated allegations devoid of any proof do not deserve even the faintest merit.
(2)
NO.
In view of Jose's identification of accused-appellants as Ramel's killers, their defenses of denial and alibi have no leg to stand on. It is axiomatic that the denial and alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.
Further, in Escalante v. People, the Court explained that the alibi must show that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the crime scene, to wit:
However, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove
(a) that she was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and(b) that it was physically impossible for her to be at the scene of the crime during its commission.
Physical impossibility refers to the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed. She must demonstrate that she was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.
Accused-appellants claim that they were in their house sleeping at the time Ramel was stabbed. It is noteworthy that they were Anthony's neighbors and that the crime scene was merely 8 meters away from Anthony's home. Obviously, it was physically possible for them to be at the crime scene considering its proximity to their house. From such short distance, they could have easily left their house and proceeded to the crime scene.
In addition, disinterested witnesses must corroborate the defense of alibi, otherwise, it is fatal to the accused. In the case at bar, the only person who could corroborate accused-appellants' alibi was Francisco. He could not be the disinterested witness required by jurisprudence because he is their father. Relatives can hardly be categorized as disinterested witnesses.
Further, accused-appellants' alibi should not be given weight and credence because of inconsistencies in their story. First, Michael testified that Allan was not at home because he lived in a separate house, but according to Allan's testimony, Michael shared a home with him together with their sister and parents. Second, Allan claimed that he was at home drinking with Francisco but the latter narrated that he fetched Allan from Landmark. These incongruities cast doubt on the veracity of their allegations.
(3)
NO
Conspiracy established by overt acts.
Accused-appellants argue that conspiracy was not proven because their actions do not establish that they were motivated by a common desire. They assail that Allan stabbing and Michael holding Ramel were two separate and distinct actions insufficient to prove conspiracy. There is an implied conspiracy if two or more persons aim their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful subject, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, are in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment and may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. The essence of conspiracy is unity of action and purpose.
As early as the initial assault against Ramel, it is readily apparent that Allan and Michael's concerted action was towards the common purpose of hurting Ramel after they ganged up on him together with three other unidentified malefactors. Then, accused-appellants were mutually motivated by the desire to kill Ramel after Allan stabbed Ramel while Michael held the latter by the legs. Their concerted actions cannot be brushed aside as separate and distinct because Michael continued to hold the victim while Allan stabbed him several times.
In addition, accused-appellants err in relying on People v. Pugay because unlike the said case, prior to their attack on Ramel, animosity existed between them and the victim. Immediately prior to the stabbing incident, they already ganged up on the deceased and beat him up. Thus, it is evident that accused-appellants truly wanted to inflict bodily harm on Ramel, ultimately leading to his stabbing. Their desire to hurt Ramel progressed to a desire to kill him.
(4)
NO.
Killing tantamount to murder only
when qualifying circumstances are present
xxx accused-appellants argue that even if they are found responsible for Ramel's death, they could not be found guilty of murder because there was no proof of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
For evident premeditation to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the following elements must be present:
(a) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime;(b) overt act or acts indicating that the accused clung to one's determination; and(c) lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow accused to reflect upon the consequences of one's acts.
In this case, nothing in the records establishes the above-mentioned elements. In fact, it is worth emphasizing that neither the RTC nor the CA discussed the presence of the said qualifying circumstance. Consequently, evident premeditation cannot qualify the crime to murder.
On the other hand, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The requisites for treachery to be appreciated are:
(a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend; and(b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed.
Here, it is unquestionable that Ramel was in no position to defend himself when Allan stabbed him. He was previously mauled by five persons and at the time of the stabbing, Michael was holding him by his legs. Ramel's weakened state and restricted movement rendered him unable to parry the lethal blows Allan inflicted on him. Nevertheless, Ramel's defenseless state alone does not suffice to appreciate the existence of treachery. After all, not only must the victim be shown defenseless, but it must also be shown that the accused deliberately and consciously employed the means and method of attack.
In People v. De Leon, the Court explained that the commencement of the attack is crucial in determining the presence of treachery, to wit:
Inevitably, where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Without any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act that resulted in the victim's death unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated. It is not sufficient that the victim was unarmed and that the means employed by the malefactor brought about the desired result. The prosecution must prove that appellant deliberately and consciously adopted such means, method or manner of attack as would deprive the victim of an opportunity for self-defense or retaliation.
In the case at bar, the prosecution's principal witness testified that he had actually witnessed the stabbing, but not the commencement of the attack. In fact, he himself declared that the commotion had begun outside the establishment he was in.
Where, as in this case, there is no proof of the circumstances surrounding the manner in which the aggression commenced, appellant should be given the benefit of the doubt and treachery cannot be considered.
Similarly, when Jose came out of Anthony's house, Allan and Michael, together with the other unknown assailants, were already assaulting Ramel. The aggression continued until ultimately Allan stabbed Ramel. Jose never saw how the commotion commenced. As a result, there is doubt whether accused-appellants consciously and deliberately adopted the means employed to kill Ramel. It is doctrinal that all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. Consequently, treachery could not be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
In view of the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation, Allan and Michael should be found guilty only of homicide for Ramel's killing.