Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016
FACTS:
The case is about Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares, who was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo, and was later adopted by celebrity spouses. She married a citizen of the Philippines and the U.S. and obtained U.S. citizenship, but later moved to the Philippines with her family. She then reacquired Philippine citizenship and relinquished her U.S. citizenship. She was appointed as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) but resigned to run for public office. She filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator and later for President, which led to several COMELEC cases filed against her. One of these cases found that her COC contained false material representations, leading to the denial of due course or cancellation of her candidacy.
ISSUE:
(1) WON the COMELEC has the jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates? - NO
(2) WON the petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen? -YES
(3) WON the petitioner satisfies the 10-year residency requirement? - YES
(4) WON petitioners COC can be cancelled due to material misrepresentations? - NO
HELD:
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
(1)
NO. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, Sec. 6 of the Constitution, cannot do it.
It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry intoqualificationsbased onage, residenceandcitizenshipof voters. [Art. IX, C, Sec. 2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other. Bothdo not allow,are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.
(2)
YES. The fact of the petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is demonstrable.
There is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)that from 1965 to 1975 the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was99.83%.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents is the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
The constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Sec. 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
(3)
YES. Petitioner's residency requirement is satisfied.
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; abona fideintention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically beanimus manendicoupled withanimus non revertendi.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. Among those evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; and 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005. The foregoing evidence were undisputed.
The evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently reside in the Philippines. Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
(4)
NO. The COMELECs decision is overruled.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COCwas overcome by evidence.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition forquo warranto.Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six (6) years and six (6) months as she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period.Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senatorwhich was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office.