Sps. Bernabe Mercader, Jr., et al. v. Sps. Jesus and Letecia Bardillas, G.R. No. 163157, June 27, 2016
.png)
This case concerns a dispute over a right of way between the owners of three parcels of land in Clarita Village: Lot No. 5808-F-1, Lot No. 5808-F-2-A, and Lot No. 5808-F-2-B. The Spouses Bardilas owned Lot No. 5808-F-2-B and had a right of way that exited into Clarita Village. The Clarita Village Association erected a fence that blocked the exit point of the right of way, which led to a meeting between the parties involved. A subsequent investigation by an engineer revealed that the fence and a portion of a house owned by the Spouses Mercader had encroached on the right of way. The Spouses Bardilas demanded P30,000 from the Spouses Mercader for the encroachment. The Spouses Mercader claimed they were entitled to the right of way as owners of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A and proposed to buy the equivalent portion of the right of way. The Spouses Bardilas rejected this claim, and both parties brought lawsuits against each other. The RTC held in favor of the Spouses Mercader, while the CA partially granted the Spouses Bardilas' appeal, declaring them as owners of the easement and ordering the Spouses Mercader to pay attorneys' fees.
Court of Appeals Decision is affirmed.
Spouses Bardilas remained entitled to avail themselves of all the attributes of ownership under the Civil Code
Easement or servitude, according to Valdez v. Tabisula, G.R. No. 175510, is a real right constituted on another's property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person. It exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the easement is an admission that the property belongs to another.
It is settled that road right of way is a discontinuous apparent easement in the context of Article 622 of the Civil Code, which provides that continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of title. But the phrase with existing Right of Way in the TCT is not one of the modes of acquisition of the easement by virtue of a title. Acquisition by virtue of title, as used in Art. 622 of the Civil Code, refers to "the juridical act which gives birth to the easement, such as law, donation, contract, and will of the testator."
A perusal of the technical description of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A indicates that the phrase with existing Right of Way (3.00 meters wide) referred to or described Lot No. 5808-F-2-B, which was one of the boundaries defining Lot F-2-A. Moreover, under the Torrens system of land registration, the certificate of title attests to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. The objective is to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land. The Torrens certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title in the particular property described therein.
What really defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. As shown in the subdivision plan of Lot No. 5808-F-2, and based on the technical description of Lot No. 5808-F-2-B as appearing in TCT No. 107915, the right of way in dispute was part of Lot No. 5808-F-2-B of the Spouses Bardilas.
It is noteworthy that an encumbrance "subject to 3 meters wide right of way" was annotated on TCT No. 107915, which covers Lot No. 5808-F-2-B of the Spouses Bardilas. As the owners of the servient estate, the Spouses Bardilas retained ownership of the road right of way even assuming that said encumbrance was for the benefit of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A of the Spouses Mercader. The latter could not claim to own even a portion of the road right of way because Article 630 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "[t]he owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement."
With the right of way rightfully belonging to them as the owners of the burdened property, the Spouses Bardilas remained entitled to avail themselves of all the attributes of ownership under the Civil Code, specifically: jus utendi, jus fruendi, jus abutendi, jus disponendi and jus vindicandi. Article 428 of the Civil Code recognizes that the owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. In that regard, the CA cogently pointed out that the Spouses Bardilas may rightfully compel the Spouses Mercader to pay to them the value of the land upon which a portion of their (Spouses Mercader) house encroaches, and in case they fail to pay, the Spouses Bardilas may remove or demolish the encroaching portion of the petitioners-appellees' house.
As to Attorney's fees
It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general rule; counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Attorney's fees, as part of damages, are not necessarily equated to the amount paid by a litigant to a lawyer. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter; while in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. Attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the court to make findings of fact and law that would bring the case within the ambit of these enumerated instances to justify the grant of such award, and in all cases it must be reasonable.
In awarding attorney's fees, the CA relied on Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code, which states that: In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: xxx (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
The exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorney's fees under Article 2208 (11) of the Civil Code demands a factual, legal or equitable justification upon the basis of which the court exercises its discretion. Without such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture.
Considering that the decision of the CA does not express any justification other than stating that attorney's fees were being awarded to the respondents "pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article 2208 of the New Civil Code" the award by the CA must be set aside; otherwise, attorney's fees would be turned into a premium on the right to litigate, which is prohibited. Moreover, attorney's fees, being in the nature of actual damages, should be based on the facts on record and the Court must delineate the legal reason for such award.