Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, 2021

Full Text of the case: See: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/20821/

ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL (Petitioner) v.

MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL, (Respondent)

May 11, 2021

Ponente: Leonen, J.

FACTS:

Mario Andal and Rosanna Tan got married in 1995 and had a daughter named Ma. Samantha in 1996. They separated in 2000, and Rosanna has since had sole custody of their child. In 2001, Mario filed a petition for custody of their daughter, arguing that they had equal rights. However, in 2003, Rosanna filed a petition for the nullity of their marriage, claiming that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. The prosecutor found no signs of collusion between the two, and the cases for custody and nullity were consolidated in 2004.

The case involves Rosanna and Mario, who first met in 1975 and reconnected in 1995. They eventually got married in December of the same year, but Mario exhibited irresponsible and erratic behavior, including drug use, financial mismanagement, and paranoia. Rosanna eventually left him with their child, but Mario followed and pleaded for another chance.

It was Mario's drug addiction, which ultimately causes Rosanna to drive him out of their home. Mario tries to return but is turned away by Rosanna. After this incident, Mario's siblings bring him to the Medical City for detoxification. He is later committed for treatment at the Medical City for 14 days after doctors found him positive for drug use. Mario's siblings are advised to commit him to a drug rehabilitation center for treatment, but they discharge him without bringing him to a drug rehabilitation facility. Due to financial losses allegedly caused by Mario's drug use, Rosanna closed Design and Construction Matrix, the couple's firm. To save rent on the Makati apartment where they used to live, Mario, Rosanna, and Ma. Samantha moved into an unfinished Parafiaque duplex that Rosanna decided to have built. In July 1999, an electrician found Mario and Ma. Samantha in a small room inside the duplex filled with smoke that did not quite smell of cigarettes, prompting Rosanna to realize that Mario had relapsed into drug use. Rosanna tried to persuade Mario to get treatment, but he got furious, and the police had to be called to pacify him.

Mario started using drugs, and Rosanna reported this to the court, which ordered Mario's confinement in a rehabilitation center. However, Mario was released prematurely and did not complete his rehabilitation program. Rosanna and Mario separated and did not live together. Rosanna filed a petition to nullify their marriage, claiming that Mario's drug use was a manifestation of a grave personality disorder that made him psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. Dr. Garcia testified that Mario had narcissistic antisocial personality disorder, which was grave, with juridical antecedence, and incurable. Mario countered that it was Rosanna who was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.

In its May 9, 2007 Decision, 122 the Regional Trial Court found that Rosanna discharged the burden of proving Mario's psychological incapacity. In addition, The trial court voided Mario and Rosanna's marriage. It awarded the custody of Ma. Samantha to Rosanna, with Mario having visitation rights. As to the Parafiaque duplex, the trial court declared Rosanna as its sole and absolute owner, including the parcel of land on which it was built.

Mario moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its August 29, 2007 Order. Thus, the Court of Appeals declared Mario and Rosanna's marriage valid and subsisting. Reversing the trial court's ruling, the Court of Appeals found Dr. Garcia's psychiatric evaluation of Mario to be "unscientific and unreliable" since she diagnosed Mario without interviewing him. The Court of Appeals ruled that Dr. Garcia "was working on pure suppositions and second-hand infonnation fed to her by one side."

Rosanna moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its April 6, 2011 Resolution. Thus the petition int the Supreme Court proceeds.

ISSUES:

(1) 

WON the marriage between Mario and Rosanna is void due to psychological incapacity. - YES

(2.1) 

WON the Court of Appeals erred in not giving credence to Dr. Garcia's expert opinion just because Mario did not appear for psychiatric evaluation. - YES

(2.2) 

WON That drug addiction is a ground for legal separation - YES

(3) 

WON half of the duplex and the lot on which it is situated are community properties of Mario and Rosanna - NO

(4) 

WON Ma. Samantha's custody was rightfully awarded to Rosanna. - YES

HELD:

This Petition must be granted. With clear and convincing evidence, Rosanna proved that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to her. Their marriage is void ab initio.

(1)

YES

Below is the Supreme Court’s new set of guidelines in determining the existence of psychological incapacity: 

1. xxx we now hold that the plaintiff-spouse must prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence. This is a quantum of proof that requires more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. As with any presumption-such as the presumption of regularity in the issuance of public documents, regularity in the performance of duty, of good faith, or of sufficient consideration - it can only be rebutted

2. Psychological incapacity must consist in a lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage, making the marriage void ab initio. xxx Psychological incapacity is also not a personality disorder, xxx In light of the foregoing, this Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person's personality, called "personality structure," which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations.

3. Difficult to prove as it may be, a party to a nullity case is still required to prove JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE because it is an explicit requirement of the law. From this, proof of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may f consist of testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior. Furthermore, not being an illness in a medical sense, psychological incapacity is not something to be cured.

4. Reading together the deliberations of the Code Committee and our rulings in Santos and Molina, we hold that the psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is INCURABLE, not in the medical, but in the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended accordingly. This means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. "[A]n undeniable pattern of such f persisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other." 

5. With respect to GRAVITY, the requirement is retained, not in the sense that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be a serious or dangerou sillness, but that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" are excluded. The psychological incapacity cannot be mere "refusal, neglect[,] or difficulty, much less ill will." In other words, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.

6. Essential marital obligations are "those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 [,] and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. It is true that marriage is a contract primarily between the spouses; but its cause remains to be the establishment of not just conjugal but also family life. The Constitution treats marriage as the foundation of the family. 246 Furthermore, Article 70 of the Family Code provides that the spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. As such, once the parties decide and do have children, their obligations to their children become part of their obligations to each other as spouses.

7. The persuasive effect of the decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines on nullity cases pending before secular courts is retained. This persuasive effect is especially true in cases where the Catholic Church had already voided the canonical marriage, because it is the explicit intent of the Code Committee to solve "the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law." The above discussions notwithstanding, canonical decisions are, to reiterate, merely persuasive and not binding on secular courts. Canonical decisions are to only serve as evidence of the nullity of the secular marriage, but ultimately, the elements of declaration of nullity under Article 36 must still be weighed by the judge.

Considering the foregoing, this Court finds Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. Rosanna discharged the burden of proof required to nullify her marriage to Mario. 

Clear and convincing evidence of Mario's psychological incapacity consisted mainly of testimony on Mario's personality structure and how it was formed primarily through his childhood and adult experiences, well before he married Rosanna. In addition to Rosanna's testimony, Dr. Garcia recounted how Mario developed traits exhibiting chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse, lack of empathy, and sense of entitlement-behaviors manifesting his inherent psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations xxx

(2.1)

YES.

It is true that Dr. Garcia gave the expert opinion-which, we reiterate, is no longer required but is considered here given that it was offered in evidence-without having to interview Mario.

xxx

Applying Tortona here, we find that Dr. Garcia was sufficiently qualified as an expert in psychiatry. She possesses the special knowledge to practice her profession, holding degrees in medicine and special education. She has been practicing her profession as a physicianpsychiatrist since 1990, including working at the Philippine Mental Health Association as a psychiatrist for 11 years.

On the principles and methodology Dr. Garcia applied in evaluating Rosanna and Mario, she conducted a psychiatric clinical interview and mental status examination of Rosanna. She likewise interviewed Ma. Samantha and Jocelyn Genevieve, Rosanna's sister. The psychiatric clinical interview and mental status examination remain to be the principal techniques in diagnosing psychiatric disorders. While ideally, the person to be. diagnosed should be personally interviewed, it is accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person's psychiatric history on collateral information, or information from sources aside from the person evaluated.This is usually done if the patient is not available, incapable, or otherwise refuses to cooperate, as in this case.

In any case, it cannot be said that the psychiatric evaluation of Mario was exclusively based on collateral information. Dr. Garcia likewise based her diagnosis on a personal history handwritten by Mario himself while staying at Seagulls, an "independent evidence."

At any rate, this Court said in Marcos that personal examination of the allegedly psychologically incapacitated spouse is "not [required] for a declaration of [ nullity of marriage due to] psychological incapacity." So long as the totality of evidence, as in this case, sufficiently proves the psychological incapacity of one or both of the spouses, a decree of nullity of marriage may be issued.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in not giving credence to Dr. Garcia's expert opinion just because Mario did not appear for psychiatric evaluation.

(2.2)

YES.

That drug addiction is a ground for legal separation will not prevent this Court from voiding the marriage in this case. A decree of legal separation entitles spouses to live separately from each other without severing their marriage bond, but no legal conclusion is made as to whether the marriage is valid.320 Therefore, it is possible that the marriage is attended by psychological incapacity of one or both spouses, with the incapacity manifested in ways that can be considered as grounds for legal separation. At any rate, so long as a party can demonstrate that the drug abuse is a manifestation of psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage, this should be enough to render the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code. 

Here, the totality of evidence presented by Rosanna clearly and convincingly proved that Mario's drug abuse was of sufficient durability that antedates the marriage. Admittedly, part of marriage is accepting a person for who they are, including their addictions. However, in Mario's case, his persistent failure to have himself rehabilitated, even bringing his child into a room where he did drugs, indicates a level of dysfunctionality that shows utter disregard of his obligations not only to his wife, but to his child.

We agree with the trial court that Mario failed to render mutual help and support to his wife, failing to find gainful employment and even driving to bankruptcy the construction firm founded by Rosanna by siphoning its funds for his drug use. He failed to exercise his rights and duties as a parent to Ma. Samantha.

Even assuming that Mario has since lived a drug-free life, he only did so after separating from Rosanna. This confirms Dr. Garcia's finding that his psychological incapacity was enduring relative to his long-estranged wife and can manifest again ifhe is forced to stay with her.

All told, we find that Rosanna proved with clear and convincing evidence that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. Their marriage, therefore, is void under Article 36 of the Family Code.  

(3)

NO.

Here, Mario and Rosanna are parties to a void marriage due to psychological incapacity. When they were married in 1995, Mario was 33 years old while Rosanna was 31. There is no showing that the marriage was incestuous or void due to public policy. They likewise lived exclusively with· each other as husband and wife until they separated in 2000. Being capacitated to marry each other and having lived exclusively with each other albeit under a void marriage, Article 147 of the Family Code governs their property relations. 

Under Article 147, wages and salaries earned by the parties during their cohabitation shall be equally divided between them. This is regardless of who worked to earn the wage or salary.

With respect to properties acquired during their cohabitation, the rules on co-ownership under the Civil Code govem. Therefore, a property acquired during the parties' cohabitation shall be presumed to have been acquired through the parties' joint efforts. For purposes of Article 147, "joint efforts" includes a party's care and maintenance of the family and of the household. With this presumption, the parties are deemed to own the property in equal shares. 

However, if a piece of property was obtained through only one party's effort, work, or industry, and there is proof that the other did not contribute through the care an4 maintenance of the family and of the household, the property acquired during the cohabitation shall be solely owned by the party who actually worked to acquire the property. 

In this case, there is proof that the Parafiaque lot was not obtained by Mario and Rosanna's joint efforts, work, or industry. Rita M. Tan, Rosanna's aunt, donated the 315-square meter lot to Rosanna and her father, Rodolfo M. Tan. The Deed of Donation dated August 25, 1998 provides that Rita M. Tan donated 157.50 square meters to "Rodolfo M. Tan, married to Josefina G. Leafio" and to "Rosanna L. Tan-Anda!, married to Mario Andal" each. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 139811 covering 157.50 square meters of the Parafiaque lot is under the name of "Rosanna L. TanAndal, of legal age, Filipino, married to Mario Andal." In Salas, Jr. v. Aguila, this Court held that "married to" only refers to the civil status of the property's registered owner.

Thus, Rosanna exclusively owns half of the 315-square meter Parafiaque lot. Mario has no share in this property because he did not care for and maintain the family and the household. 

As for the half of the duplex house that served as the parties' family  home, there is evidence that the funds used to construct the house were obtained solely through Rosanna and her father's efforts. In a promissory note dated July 13, 1998, Rosanna and her father jointly loaned P2,400,000.00 from the Elena P. Tan Foundation for the construction of a house on the Parafiaque lot. Although Mario signed the promissory note to give "marital consent" to Rosanna, he has no proof that he participated in acquiring the funds. He cannot be deemed to have contributed jointly in acquiring the funds since he did not care for and maintain the family and the household. 

As the funds to construct the house were obtained solely through Rosanna and her father's efforts, and Mario did not care for and maintain the household, he has no share in the duplex.

(4)

YES.

The trial court did not err in awarding Ma. Samantha's custody to Rosanna, without prejudice to Mario's right to visit his daughter.

In Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto, this Court held that the "separation of parents" contemplated in Article 213 may either be legal separation or separation in fact. In deciding cases involving custody of a minor, the courts must consider, among others, "the previous care and devotion shown by each of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home environment and time availability; [and] the [child's] emotional and educational needs."

Here, Mario and Rosanna have been separated in fact since 2000. Between them, Rosanna showed greater care and devotion to Ma. Samantha. Even when they still lived together, Rosanna had been more available to her child. She raised Ma. Samantha on her own since she and Mario separated. Mario has not supported both mother and child since he separated from Rosanna, even after he had claimed that he has been living "drug-free."

xxx

Nonetheless, Rosanna's parental authority over Ma. Samantha was already terminated in 2014 when the child reached the age of majority. Ma. Samantha is now qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life and, therefore, is at liberty to choose how to relate with her father.