PEOPLE v. UDANG, G.R. No. 210161 | 2018
G.R. No. 210161. January 10, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
V.
BIENVINIDO UDANG, SR. Y SEVILLA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Ponente: Leonen, J.
Doctrines:
A single act may give rise to multiple offenses. Thus, charging an accused with rape, under the Revised Penal Code, and with sexual abuse, under Republic Act No. 7610, in case the offended party is a child 12 years old and above, will not violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy.
Moreover, contrary to the trial court's determination, the Informations actually charged Udang with sexual abuse, under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, and not with rape, under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Based on the Informations, the charge against Udang was "child abuse," defined in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 as "the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of [a] child" and includes "any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being." The allegations in the Informations stated that Udang "sexually abuse[d]" AAA by having sexual intercourse with her while she was intoxicated, thus, "debas[ing], degrad[ing], or demean[ing] the intrinsic worth of AAA." While the Informations stated that the acts were "[c]ontrary to and in [v]iolation of Article 266-A in relation to Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 7610," the factual allegations in the Informations determine the crime being charged.
Synopsis:
Bienvenido Udang, Sr. y Sevilla was charged with two counts of child abuse for separate incidents of sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old victim who was intoxicated at the time. The trial court convicted Udang of rape under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, stating that Udang should have been convicted of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, which is the law on the special protection of children against abuse, exploitation, and discrimination. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Udang should have been convicted of sexual abuse instead of rape, as the charges filed against him specifically stated that he was being charged with sexual abuse. Additionally, the Supreme Court found that there were differences between the elements of rape and sexual abuse, which meant that Udang could not be charged with both crimes for the same criminal act. The Supreme Court also found Udang guilty of two counts of sexual abuse, which carries a penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. This is a lesser penalty than the penalty for rape, which is reclusion perpetua to death.
Issue:
WON accused-appellant, BienvinidoUdang, Sr. y Sevilla, was correctly convicted of rape punished under the first paragraph of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
No.
Based on the Informations,Udang was charged with two (2) counts of sexual abuse punished under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. Hence, he could only be convicted of sexual abuse under the Informations filed in this case and not for rape under the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, upon examination of the evidence presented, this Court finds Udang guilty of two (2) counts of sexual abuse. Thus, the penalty erroneously imposed on him—reclusion perpetua for each count of rape—should be reduced accordingly.
Based on the Informations, the charge against Udang was "child abuse," defined in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 as the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of a child and includes any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The allegations in the Informations stated that Udang sexually abused AAA by having sexual intercourse with her while she was intoxicated, thus, debasing, degrading and demeaning the intrinsic worth of AAA.
While the Informations stated that the acts were contrary to and in violation of Article 266-A in relation to Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, the factual allegations in the Informations determine the crime being charged.
In sum, this Court is morally convinced that Udang committed two (2) counts of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, with each count punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
As to the matter of double jeopardy, this Court disagrees with the trial court's ruling that charging Udang with both rape, under Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sexual abuse, under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, would violate his right against double jeopardy.
A single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar. Prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy.
The provisions show that rape and sexual abuse are two (2) separate crimes with distinct elements. The "force, threat, or intimidation" or deprivation of reason or unconsciousness required in Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not the same as the "coercion or influence" required in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610. Consent is immaterial in the crime of sexual abuse because the mere act of having sexual intercourse with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse is already punishable by law. However, consent exonerates an accused from a rape charge.
Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape. The offense for which he was convicted is punished by a special law while rape is a felony under the Revised Penal Code. The two are separate and distinct crimes. Thus, petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding that he did not commit rape.
The only time that double jeopardy arises is when the same act has already been the subject of a previous prosecution under a law or an ordinance. This is not the situation in the present case.
Dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Court of Appeals October 9, 2013 Decision in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01032 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Bienvinido Udang, Sr. y Sevilla is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of sexual abuse, under Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count. Furthermore, the accused shall pay AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of sexual abuse, all amounts shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until full payment. The award of exemplary damages is deleted.