AUSTRIA v. CA, G.R. No. L-29640|1971
G.R. No. L-29640 June
10, 1971
GUILLERMO
AUSTRIA, petitioner,
THE COURT OF APPEALS
(Second Division), PACIFICO ABAD and MARIA G. ABAD, respondents.
Rationale: Quantum of proof is required to establish
that a fortuitous event did take place. To require in the present action for
recovery the prior conviction of the culprits in the criminal case, in order to
establish robbery as a fact, would be to demand proof beyond reasonable doubt
to prove a fact in a civil case.
Case
Summary:
Facts:
1. In
a receipt dated 30 January 1961, Maria G. Abad acknowledged having received
from Guillermo Austria one (1) pendant with diamonds valued at P4,500.00, to be
sold on commission basis or to be returned on demand.
2. On
1 February 1961, however, while walking home to her residence in Mandaluyong,
Rizal, Abad was said to have been accosted by two men, one of whom hit her on
the face, while the other snatched her purse containing jewelry and cash, and
ran away.
3. Among
the pieces of jewelry allegedly taken by the robbers was the consigned pendant.
4. The
incident became the subject of a criminal case filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal against certain persons.
5. As
Abad failed to return the jewelry or pay for its value notwithstanding demands,
Austria brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila an action against her
and her husband for recovery of the
pendant or of its value, and damages.
6. Answering
the allegations of the complaint, defendants spouses set up the defense that
the alleged robbery had extinguished their obligation.
7. After
due hearing, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and ordered
defendants spouses, jointly and severally, to pay to the former the sum of
P4,500.00, with legal interest thereon, plus the amount of P450.00 as
reasonable attorneys' fees, and the costs.
8. It
was held that defendants failed to prove the fact of robbery, or, if indeed it
was committed, that defendant Maria Abad was guilty of negligence when she went
home without any companion, although it was already getting dark and she was
carrying a large amount of cash and valuables on the day in question, and such
negligence did not free her from liability for damages for the loss of the
jewelry.
9. Not
satisfied with his decision, the defendants went to the Court of Appeals, and
there secured a reversal of the judgment. The appellate court declared
respondents not responsible for the loss of the jewelry on account of a fortuitous event, and relieved them from
liability for damages to the owner.
10.
Plaintiff
thereupon instituted the present proceeding.
11. Petitioners contention: there was robbery in
the case, although nobody has been found guilty of the supposed crime. It is
petitioner's theory that for robbery to fall under the category of a fortuitous
event and relieve the obligor from his obligation under a contract, pursuant to
Article 1174 of the new Civil Code, there ought to be prior finding on the
guilt of the persons responsible therefor. In short, that the occurrence of the
robbery should be proved by a final judgment of conviction in the criminal
case. To adopt a different view, petitioner argues, would be to encourage
persons accountable for goods or properties received in trust or consignment to
connive with others, who would be willing to be accused in court for the
robbery, in order to be absolved from civil liability for the loss or
disappearance of the entrusted articles.
Issue:
1. Whether
or not in a contract of agency (consignment of goods for sale) it is necessary
that there be prior conviction for robbery before the loss of the article shall
exempt the consignee from liability for such loss. - NO
2.
Whether
or not Abad was negligent. - NO
Held:
1.
No.
We (the SC) find no
merit in the contention of petitioner.
It is recognized in
this jurisdiction that to constitute a caso fortuito that
would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary that:
(1)
the
event must be independent of the human will (or rather, of the debtor's or
obligor's);
(2)
the
occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation
in a normal manner; and that
(3)
the
obligor must be free of participation in or aggravation of the injury to the
creditor.1 A fortuitous event, therefore, can be
produced by nature, e.g., earthquakes, storms, floods, etc., or by the act of
man, such as war, attack by bandits, robbery,2 etc., provided that the event has all
the characteristics enumerated above.
It is not here
disputed that if respondent Maria Abad were indeed the victim of robbery, and
if it were really true that the pendant, which she was obliged either to sell
on commission or to return to petitioner, were taken during the robbery, then
the occurrence of that fortuitous event would have extinguished her liability.
The point at issue in this proceeding is how the fact of robbery is to be
established in order that a person may avail of the exempting provision of
Article 1174 of the new Civil Code, which reads as follows:
ART.
1174. Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
It may be noted the
reform that the emphasis of the provision is on the events, not on the agents
or factors responsible for them. To avail of the exemption granted in the law,
it is not necessary that the persons responsible for the occurrence should be
found or punished; it would only be sufficient to established that the
enforceable event, the robbery in this case did take place without any
concurrent fault on the debtor's part, and this can be done by preponderant
evidence. To require in the present
action for recovery the prior conviction of the culprits in the criminal case,
in order to establish the robbery as a fact, would be to demand proof beyond
reasonable doubt to prove a fact in a civil case.
2.
No.
It is undeniable that
in order to completely exonerate the debtor for reason of a fortutious event,
such debtor must, in addition to the cams itself, be free of any concurrent or
contributory fault or negligence.3 This is apparent from Article 1170 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, providing that:
ART.
1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages.
It is clear that
under the circumstances prevailing at present in the City of Manila and its
suburbs, with their high incidence of crimes against persons and property that
renders travel after nightfall a matter to be sedulously avoided without
suitable precaution and protection, the conduct of respondent Maria G. Abad, in
returning alone to her house in the evening, carrying jewelry of considerable
value would be negligent per se and would not exempt her from responsibility in
the case of a robbery. We are not
persuaded, however, that the same rule should obtain ten years previously, in
1961, when the robbery in question did take place, for at that time criminality
had not by far reached the levels attained in the present day.
Other issue: Prejudicial question:
There is likewise no
merit in petitioner's argument that to allow the fact of robbery to be
recognized in the civil case before conviction is secured in the criminal
action, would prejudice the latter case, or would result in inconsistency
should the accused obtain an acquittal or should the criminal case be
dismissed. It must be realized that a court finding that a robbery has happened
would not necessarily mean that those accused in the criminal action should be
found guilty of the crime; nor would a ruling that those actually accused did
not commit the robbery be inconsistent with a finding that a robbery did take
place. The evidence to establish these facts would not necessarily be the same.
Dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding no
error in the decision of the Court of Appeals under review, the petition in
this case is hereby dismissed with costs against the petitioner.